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ABSTRACT 
 
In English  
 
In the nineteenth century, the Hawaiian Kingdom became the first, and for a long time only, 
non-Western state to achieve full recognition as a co-equal of the Western powers. 
Technologically at the cutting edge of modernity but at the same time grounded in aboriginal 
tradition and identity, the Kingdom was an archetypical example of a hybrid state. While 
knowledge of this has been all but erased due to the on-going occupation of Hawai‘i by the 
United States, it has recently resurfaced thanks to the work of various Hawaiian scholars. Most 
remarkable, the Kingdom’s leaders, including monarchs, government officials and diplomats, 
used their country’s secured political status to promote the building of independent states on 
its model throughout the Pacific Islands, and envisioned a unified Oceania. Such a pan-Oceanian 
polity would be able to withstand foreign colonialism and be, in the words of one of the idea’s 
pioneers “a Power in the World.” While the islands of Oceania did eventually succumb to 
colonialism, and the Hawaiian Kingdom itself was invaded and occupied, the legacy of this 
visionary policy can be seen in many aspects of Oceania today and can serve as an inspiration 
and guideline for envisioning de-colonial futures for the Pacific region. Within this context, the 
dissertation examines and analyses two intertwined processes: First, the evolution of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom from its classical predecessors to the exemplary hybrid state in Oceania and 
the dissemination and institutional transfer of this model to other Pacific archipelagos; and 
secondly, the development of a Hawai‘i-based pan-Oceanianist policy and underlying ideology, 
which provided the rationale for the spread of the Hawaiian political model to be actively 
promoted by the Kingdom’s government. This historical narrative is put in perspective of the 
pan-Oceanianist writings of Epeli Hau‘ofa, current political moves towards more assertive 
Oceanian regionalism and the movement to de-occupy the Hawaiian Kingdom.   
 
Key words: Hawaiian Kingdom, Oceania, Pacific Islands, State Formation, Non-Western States, 
Hybridity, Institutional Transfer, Pan-Oceanianism, Geopolitics, De-colonial Futures  
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Ma ka ʻōlelo Hawaiʻi  
 
Ma ke kenekulia ‘umikumamaiwa, ua lilo ke Aupuni Mō‘ī Hawai‘i i aupuni kū‘oko‘a mua loa, a 
kiakahi nō ho‘i, ma waho o nā aupuni Haole o Europa me ‘Amelika.  He aupuni ia me ka 
‘enehana nupaikini loa, akā i hookahua nō ho‘i ‘ia ma ka mo‘omeheu ‘ōiwi maoli, a no laila, he 
aupuni pa‘i (hybrid state) hō‘ailona ‘ia. ‘Ane‘ane holoi ‘ia kēia  
ike e ka noho hewa ‘ana o ‘Amelika Huipū ‘ia ia Hawai‘i nei, akā ho‘iho‘i maila ‘ia ua ‘ike nei e ka 
hana o nā ‘akeakamai Hawai‘i like ‘ole. Kamaha‘o nui nō na‘e ka hana a ko Hawai‘i mau luna 
aupuni, ‘o ia ho‘i nā mō‘ī, nā kuhina aupuni a me nā ‘elele, e ho‘ohana i ko Hawai‘i noho kū‘oko‘a 
pa‘a ‘ana mehe mea lā he ho‘opai ‘ana i ke kūkulu ‘ana i nā aupuni kū‘oko‘a e like me Hawai‘i ma 
nā mokupuni o ka Pākīpika holo‘oko‘a, a hihi‘o maila i kekahi ‘Osiania huipū ‘ia. He pale ua  
aupuni ‘Osiania huipū ‘ia nei e kū‘ē i ko na aupuni haole hana ho‘opanalā‘au ‘ana, a ‘o ia ho‘i 
kekahi “Mana ma ka honua” wahi a kekahi o nā po‘o no‘ono‘o a kēia mana‘o. I loko o ka 
ho‘opanalā‘au ‘ia ‘ana o nā mokupuni o ‘Osiania, a o ka pu‘e ‘ana me ka noho hewa ‘ana ho‘i i ke 
Aupuni Hawai‘i, ‘ike ‘ia ka  ho‘oilina o kēlā papa hana hihi‘o ma ‘ō a ma ane‘i ma ‘Osiania i keia 
lā, a he hō‘eu‘eu ‘ana a alaka‘i paha no ka hihi‘o ‘ana i ka wā ma hope panalā‘au ‘ole (de-colonial 
futures) o ka Pākīpika. Ma waena o kēia kumumana‘o nui, he ‘elua kumuhana e kālaimana‘o ‘ia 
ma kēia pepa nui: Ka mea ‘akahi, ‘o ia ka loli ‘ana o ke aupuni Hawai‘i mai kona kumu i ka wā 
kahiko a hiki i kona lilo ‘ana i aupuni pa‘i (hybrid state) hō‘ailona ‘ia ma ‘Osiania, a ma hope 
aku, ka ho‘olilo ‘oihana aupuni (institutional transfer) o ke kumu ho‘ohālike Hawai‘i i nā pae 
‘āina ‘ē a‘e o ka Pākīpika; ka mea ‘elua, ‘o ia ho‘i ka ho‘omohala ‘ana i kekahi mana‘o politika 
hihi‘o e pili ana ia ‘Osiania holo‘oko‘a, a ‘o kēlā mana‘o nō ke kuleana no ka ho‘opai ‘ia ‘ana o ke 
kahua aupuni Hawai‘i i nā pae ‘āina ‘ē a‘e.  Ua pili ‘ia kēia mo‘olelo me ka mana‘o pili ‘Osiania 
holo‘oko‘a i kākau ‘ia e Epeli Hau‘ofa, me ke kumumana‘o o kēia mau lā e ho‘oikaika iā Osiania 
holo‘oko ‘a, a me ka ‘oihana e wehe i ka noho hewa ‘ia ‘ana o ke Aupuni Mō‘ī Hawai‘i. 
 
Hua‘ōlelo ha‘iloa‘a: Aupuni Mō‘ī Hawai‘i, ‘Osiania, Nā Mokupuni o ka Pākīpika, Kūkulu Aupuni, 
Nā Aupuni ma waho o ‘Europa me ‘Amelika (non-Western states), aupuni pa ‘i (Hybrid state),  
ho‘olilo ‘oihana aupuni (institutional transfer), mana‘o ‘Osiania holo‘oko‘a (pan-Oceanianism), 
politika pili honua (Geopolitics), Ka wā ma hope panalā‘au ‘ole (decolonial futures). 
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En français  
 
Au dix-neuvième siècle, le royaume hawaiien fut le premier et pendant longtemps le seul pays 
non occidental à être reconnu et traité d’égal à égal par les puissances occidentales. 
Technologiquement à la pointe de la modernité tout en étant basé sur la tradition et l’identité 
aborigène, le royaume était l’exemple archétypal d’un État hybride. La connaissance de ces faits 
historiques ayant été presque effacée due à l’occupation continue de l’archipel hawaiien par les 
États-Unis, a récemment réapparu grâce au travail de plusieurs intellectuels hawaiiens. Les 
dirigeants du royaume utilisèrent le statut politique privilégié de leur pays de façon 
remarquable afin de promouvoir l’édification d’États indépendants partout dans le Pacifique 
sur le modèle hawaiien. Ils envisagèrent ainsi une Océanie unifiée. Une telle entité politique 
‘PanOcéanienne’ aurait pu résister au colonialisme et serait devenue, selon les mots d’un des 
pionniers de ce concept : « une Puissance dans le monde ». Bien que les îles de l’Océanie 
succombèrent finalement au colonialisme et que le royaume hawaiien lui-même fut envahi et 
occupé, l’héritage de cette politique visionnaire peut être observé aujourd’hui à travers de 
nombreux aspects de l’Océanie. Des aspects qui peuvent servir d’inspiration et de programme 
pour envisager des futurs dé-coloniaux pour la région du Pacifique. Dans cette perspective, 
notre thèse examinera et analysera deux processus mêlés : premièrement l’évolution du 
royaume hawaiien, qui va de ses origines à l’exemplaire Etat hybride océanien et la diffusion du 
transfert institutionnel de ce modèle à d’autres archipels du Pacifique. Deuxièmement le 
développement d’une politique et d’une idéologie ‘PanOcéanienne’ sous-jacente, qui assurait 
une base logique solide à la diffusion de ce modèle politique hawaiien et qui était activement 
propagé par le gouvernement du royaume. Ce récit est mis en perspective avec les écrits 
‘PanOcéaniens’ d’Epeli Hau‘ofa, les mesures politiques actuelles qui vont vers un régionalisme 
océanien plus affirmé, et le mouvement vers la ‘dé-occupation’ du royaume hawaiien. 
 
Mots-clés: Royaume Hawaiien, Océanie, îles du Pacifique, formation d’État, États non 
occidentaux, hybridité, transfert institutionnel, ‘PanOcéanisme’, géopolitique, futurs dé-
coloniaux.  
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中文摘要 
 
夏威夷王國在十九世紀成為舉世第一個非西方世界的國家。它得到西方世界的承認，成
為第一個與西方世界具有同等地位的非西方國家，而且這個第一的獨特地位，維持了很
長的一段時間。 
夏威夷王國站在現代性的前沿，同時也基植於它的土著傳統和認同，在現代性與傳統土
著文化的交融中，夏威夷王國成為一個典型的混合國家。然而，鑒於美國在十九世紀後
期對於夏威夷王國的佔領，今日吾人對於夏威夷王國的認識，幾乎完全被抹拭。所幸，
由於眾多夏威夷學者的努力，昔日的歷史正漸漸重現於世。 
這其中，夏威夷最特殊的與不平凡的歷史，莫過於夏威夷王國的諸位領袖們，包括多位
君主、政府官員與外交官們，利用他們穩固的政治地位，將它們成為一個獨立國家的模
式推廣於太平洋多個島嶼區，試圖建立一個廣泛的統一大洋洲。這個被期待的泛大洋洲
政體被預期可以抵擋外來的殖民者。乃至，按其中一位先驅者的話“成為一個世界強權”。
然而，最終大洋洲的島嶼群並未能如這些先驅所願，而是在最後一一屈服於殖民主義。
同時，夏威夷王國自身，最終也被侵略與佔領。 
即便如此，這個昔日對於大洋洲島嶼區的偉大願景，在今日仍能提供太平洋地區在去殖
民願景上許多的靈感與指導。在此脈絡下，本論文檢視與分析兩種交織的過程。首先，
是夏威夷王國從未建立之前、到成為揉合傳統與現代的國家的演進過程，以及它是如何
的傳播這種模式，並制度化地擴散至太平洋其它島嶼區。其次，這種以夏威夷為中心的
泛大洋洲政體的概念之發展與其背後的意識形態為何，以及它是如何成為夏威夷王國積
極推動這種夏威夷政治模式的原理與論據。 
相關的歷史敘事，目前可見於Epeli Hau‘ofa相關的泛大洋洲觀點的作品中。目前此一地區
的政治活動正朝向肯定“大洋洲地域主義”(pan-Oceanianist) 的方向發展，同時就夏威夷而
言，目前的潮流也傾向支持以“去佔領”(de-occupy) 的方式，來恢復夏威夷王國。 
 
 
關鍵字：夏威夷王國、太平洋島嶼群、國家形成、非西方國家、雜混、泛大洋洲主義、
地緣政治學、去殖民展望 
 
 
Translated by Dr. and Professor David Teng-yueh MA, School of Ethnology and Sociology, 
Yunnan University, P.R. China 
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NOTES ON ORTHOGRAPHY AND TRANSLATIONS 
 
1) Since I am dealing with terms from a variety of languages while writing the 
dissertation in English, I italicise all words from languages other than English for reasons of 
clarity. 
2) In order to be consistent with the English version of the last legal constitution of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom of 1864, which, as Sai (2008) and others have argued, is still the supreme 
law of the land, I spell English words in the British, rather than the American, orthographic 
system.  
3) Words in Polynesian and other Central Pacific languages are generally written 
according to the modern linguistic spelling system first developed by the late King of Tonga, 
Tāufa‘āhau Tupou IV, for Tongan and by Samuel Elbert for Hawaiian, and now universally 
applied in Polynesian linguistics, using the inverted1 apostrophe [‘okina in Hawaiian] to mark 
the glottal stop [in those languages or dialects in which it occurs], and the macron [kahakō in 
Hawaiian] to mark long vowels. However, despite such an orthographic system having been 
proposed for all Polynesian languages, its actual use differs from archipelago to archipelago. 
Hawaiian is one of the few cases in which the system is used consistently for common words, 
place names and personal names in virtually all recent publications, whereas in some other 
archipelagos [Tahitian and Samoan for instance] it is not systematically used, especially  not for 
place and personal names.  While I attempt to write all common words and place names in full 
phonetic spelling, personal names will be spelled as commonly written today, i.e. often without 
any diacritics in those archipelagos where they are usually spelled that way.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that there are three different ways of representing the 
nasal consonant ŋ [pronounced like the ng in English singing]. That sound is written as g in 
Samoan, Fijian, ‘Uvean, Futunan, Niuean, Tuamotuan and Mangarevan, while the two letters ng 
are used in Rarotongan and New Zealand Māori; modern Rapanui alone frequently uses the 
phonetic symbol ŋ, which represents the sound most accurately but has been rejected as 
impractical in all other Polynesian languages. In Tongan, the sound was written g until 1943, 
when it was changed to ng, as which it is still written today. In addition, before the 1943 
Tongan spelling reform, the modern letter p was written as b, and the letter s sometimes as j. 
Thus the King’s name now spelled Sioasi Tupou used to be Jioaji Tubou, and Tonga was spelled 
                                                 
1
 Exceptionally, in Tahitian, the glottal stop [’eta] is represented by a regular apostrophe, not an inverted one, 
according to the dictionary of the Tahitian Academy (Académie Tahitienne 1999). 
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Toga. For reasons of consistency I will always use modern Tongan spelling, except for quotes, 
when I will provide the word in modern spelling in brackets (e.g. Tubou [Tupou]). 
Fijian has consistently been written in the same spelling since the written language was 
created in the 1830s. However, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century observers have often 
disregarded the official spelling and used a spelling more in tune with English phonetics of 
certain consonants. Fijian c, which represents the voiced consonant đ[pronounced like th like 
in the English word that] is thus often spelled “th,” and the prenasalised consonants d and b are 
often spelled as “mb” and “nd,” while the nasal consonant ŋ [properly spelled g in Fijian] is 
spelled as “ng.” The Fijian q, which represents a prenasalised g like the ng in English finger or 
mango, is often rendered as “ngg.” If such “anglicised” spellings occur in quotes, I will give the 
correct Fijian spelling in brackets, e.g. Thakombau [Cakobau], Thakaundrove [Cakaudrove], 
Mbengga [Beqa]. 
6) When using words and names of Micronesian languages I will employ the most 
recent official spelling systems, bearing in mind that some spellings underwent major changes, 
due to the complex phonology of those languages, which makes 19th or early 20th century 
spellings often hard to identify with current ones. When citing historical texts using obsolete 
spellings I will thus reference both the spelling used at the time and the modern spelling in 
brackets. (e.g. Ponape [Pohnpei], Kusaie [Kosrae], Ruk [Chuuk]). 
7) For the spelling of common words, place and personal names in other non-European 
languages, I try to follow either standard modern spelling for languages using the Roman 
alphabet [e.g. Malagasy and Malay] or standardized Romanisation, if existing, for languages 
using non-Roman alphabets [e.g. for Arabic, Japanese, Chinese and Thai].  Place and Personal 
Names in those languages will be left in the Romanisation most commonly used in English, 
even if diverging from more recent standardisations [e.g. Sun Yat-sen instead of Sūn Yìxiān; 
Tokyo instead of Tōkyō]. Since I am not, or only superficially, familiar with any of those 
languages, I will try my best to be consistent but I ask speakers of such languages for 
forgiveness for any inaccuracies or inconsistencies on my part. 
4) All translations, unless indicated otherwise, are my own. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
Introduction 
 
The Phenomenon of Non-Western Nation-States  
 
In 1859, geographer A. Petermann of Gotha in central Germany, produced and 
published a map of the Pacific area showing the possessions of the seven major powers in the 
Fig. 1.1: Petermann, A, Karte von Polynesien und dem Litoral des Grossen Oceans zur Übersicht der 
politischen Verhältnisse im Jahre 1859. Petermanns Geographische Mittheilungen (Mitheilungen aus Justus 
Perthes’ Geographischer Anstalt über wichtige Neue Erforschungen auf dem Gesemtgebiete der Geographie 
von A. Petermann), Jahrgang 1859, Tafel 9. Copyright expired. Scan by the author. 
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region by colour-coding [figure 1.1].  These included England, Russia, France, the Netherlands, 
Spain, and the United States, all of which are well known in history as imperial powers. The 
seventh power on the map, however, is what the cartographer terms Reich Kamehameha’s 
(“Kamehameha’s Empire”), i.e. the Hawaiian Kingdom, referring to the then reigning monarch, 
Kamehameha IV. For Petermann, Hawai‘i was thus clearly one of the great powers of the 
region, while neither China nor Japan, nor any of the smaller polities outside of European 
colonial rule, were acknowledged in the same way as Hawai‘i. 
  Three decades later in 1887, Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom commissioned 
Scottish painter William Ewart Lockhart to create a monumental oil painting of the Queen’s 
jubilee service at Westminster Abbey [figure 1.2]. The painting, which was finished in 1890 and 
is now part of the British Royal Collections, depicts the hundreds of guests from around the 
world, including dozens of members of royal families, who attended the celebration, down to 
the details of their individual facial features. While most of the dignitaries are assembled in the 
choir in the main nave, Anglican clergy and a few selected guests of honour are gathered in the 
sanctuary, closest to the high altar from which the scene is depicted. Among these special 
guests, one can see on the left side, Queen Consort Kapi‘olani and Crown Princess Lili‘uokalani 
of Hawai‘i. On the other side of the choir, under a gothic arch, one can see Prince Komatsu 
Akihito of Japan, Prince Devawongse Varoprakar of Siam and Prince Abu’n Nasr Mirza Hissam 
us Sultaneh of Persia.2 
 
                                                 
2
 Names of the guests from non-European monarchies after Supplement to the London Gazette, 5 Jan 1888 and 
Archer 1888: 228. A detailed legend of the people shown in the painting is provided on this internet forum: 
http://forum.alexanderpalace.org/index.php?topic=7419.55;wap2. That information appears to be accurate, but the 
source is not verifiable and should thus be used with caution. 
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The map and the painting raise several important issues about the world order 
prevailing in the nineteenth century, especially as it pertains to the Pacific region and the role 
of Hawai‘i therein. As the vast extent of territories color-coded on Petermann’s map as 
belonging to one of the six European powers indicates, during the age of imperialism in the 
19th century, most non-Western peoples were colonised by Westerners.3  Also, the 
                                                 
3
 I use the term “Western” (capitalized) to mean European and US-American states and civilisations, and “non-
Western” to refer to states and civilisations of the rest of the world. Since during the nineteenth century, these would 
roughly correspond to the core and periphery of global political and economic power distribution, I consider the 
dichotomy of the two terms useful in the context of my analysis of geopolitics of the period. I am also aware of 
criticism of the appropriateness of the term Western to refer to European civilisation and its derivates, given that the 
United States as the closest nation-state representing this type of civilisation is actually located to the East of 
Hawai‘i and other Pacific Islands. However, since I include several countries in East and Southeast Asia in my 
analysis, which are indeed located at the eastern end of the Eurasian continent, and especially given the fact that in 
the discourse of those countries’ leaders in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the term “Western” was well 
established to refer to Euro-American civilisation, I will continue to use it in that sense. Furthermore, by keeping the 
Fig. 1.2: Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee Service, Westminster Abbey, 21 June 1887, oil painting by  William 
Ewart Lockhart, 1890. Copyright expired. Source: Wikipedia. 
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overwhelmingly European crowd in Lockhart’s painting demonstrates that the global ruling 
elite of the time was almost exclusively composed of Europeans. Yet, the highlighting of the 
Reich Kamehamehas points out that there was an alternative to ending up a subject of political 
colonization for non-Western societies, namely to become for themselves recognized as 
independent states.  As the painting of Queen Victoria’s jubilee shows, there were several, but 
overall very few, such non-Western nation-states, yet some of their leaders had successfully 
joined the inner circle of the global elite. The ones represented by the princes on the right side 
of the painting are probably the most widely known. Besides Japan (arguably the most famous 
of them all), Siam [Thailand] and Persia [Iran], the Ottoman Empire [Turkey] and Abyssinia 
[Ethiopia] would fall into this category.  
What all these countries with very diverse traditions and cultures had in common was 
that that they were (and still are) states with hybrid political systems. By this term, I mean that 
they were grounded in traditional polities and lead by native rulers, but had adopted forms and 
styles of a modern Western nation-state. The goal of this development was to gain recognition 
by the Western powers as a -equal sovereign state, a status that was meant to preclude 
colonisation by one of those powers.  
As a result of their hybridization efforts, which resulted in the achievement of at least a 
degree of recognition by the Western powers, countries such as Japan, Thailand, Iran, Turkey 
and Ethiopia never became colonies, an enormous source of pride for their inhabitants to this 
day. Madagascar attempted a similar approach and was able to withstand European 
encroachment for most of the 19th century, even though it was eventually conquered by 
France. Other examples of shorter-lived hybrid states include the Empire of Korea and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
terminology in the original geographical framework (i.e. having Western refer to western Eurasia, meaning Europe) 
I also acknowledge the area to the east of the Pacific (i.e. the Americas) to have its own indigenous civilisations, and 
having become part of the “West” only in recent history through European settler colonialism. 
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Sultanate of Johor in present-day Malaysia, and there are multiple other small political entities 
in various parts of the non-Western world that at one point or another during the nineteenth 
century might be classified as hybrid states. Even within already established colonial systems, a 
few native societies attempted to conserve their autonomy by forming similarly hybrid political 
systems, as exemplified not only by the various “princely states” within British India and the 
Dutch East Indies but also several Native American nations in North America, such as the 
Cherokee Nation. 
 
The peculiar position of the Hawaiian Kingdom 
 
Within this group of hybrid non-Western states, the Hawaiian Kingdom plays a 
particularly important role. The highlighting of the Reich Kamehameha’s on Petermann’s map, 
while the much larger countries in East Asia are left unmarked, clearly indicates that in the 
1850s, Hawai‘i’s status as a recognized independent state was unique in the region. Indeed, 
other historical records show that the Hawaiian Kingdom was formally recognised as an 
independent state as early as 1843, decades before any other non-Western state. In 1858, just 
one year prior to the publication of the map, Hawai‘i had overcome the final hurdle in the way 
of full diplomatic parity with the West by having the last concession-burdened treaty [i.e. a 
treaty in which unequal advantages were granted to another power] revised. Even that treaty 
however had not questioned the sovereignty of Hawai‘i as an independent state, in contrast to 
the truly unequal treaty relations Asian countries had with the West during the same time, and 
whch were only revised in the 1890s in Japan’s case, and in in the early 20th century for the 
other Asian nations. In the same vein, the standing arrangements for the guests of honour in 
the choir of Westminster Abbey in 1887 set apart Kapi‘olani and Lili‘uokalani from their 
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Japanese, Siamese and Persian counterparts, underlining the particularly close relations of 
Hawai‘i’s rulers to the British court.  
Unfortunately, this position of global importance of Hawai‘i in the nineteenth century 
has been all but erased from historiography, obscured by the ongoing prolonged occupation of 
the Hawaiian Islands by the United States. Furthermore, whereas the rich political history of 
the Hawaiian Kingdom has recently been re-emerging, it is important to point out that during 
the nineteenth century, other Polynesian/Oceanian4 island nations were engaged in similar 
processes of creating hybrid States and seeking parity. The most important among them were 
Tahiti and the other Society Islands, Tonga, Sāmoa, and Fiji.  As will be seen in this dissertation, 
the efforts of some of these nations’ leaders closely followed the model provided by Hawai‘i, 
and they were at times advised by Hawaiian diplomats.  
                                                 
4
 The geographical terminology is complex and problematic in multiple ways. During most of the nineteenth 
century, the term “Polynesia” [“many islands”], originally suggested by Charles de Brosses in 1756 (Tcherkezoff 
2003: 179), was used to refer to all islands in the Pacific Ocean and was largely interchangeable with terms like 
“Oceania” and “Pacific Islands” in Western discourse. Nineteenth-century Hawaiian-language primary sources 
similarly use “Polinesia”/“Polenisia”/ “Polunesia,” “Aina Moana” [possibly a literal translation of “Oceania,” for a 
discussion of the term see Chang 2016: 129-132] and “Osiania” interchangeably to refer to the islands of the Pacific 
Ocean as a whole, and sometimes more specifically to the islands particularly closely related to the south of 
Hawai‘i. Those islands were traditionally referred to as “Kahiki,” but by the nineteenth century, “Kahiki” was 
shifting to mean more generally “foreign lands,” including Asia and the West.  
A restriction of the term “Polynesia” suggested by French explorer Dumont D’Urville in 1832 to refer only to 
certain islands of the central Pacific, which he wanted to contrast with the culturally and/or “racially” different 
islands of “Micronesia” [“small islands’], “Melanesia” [“black islands”] and “Malaysia”[ i.e. Austronesian South 
East Asia] only became widespread in the twentieth century (Clark 2003). In French-language discourse, there has 
been a tendency to even further restrict the term “Polynésie” to mean only the islands surrounding Tahiti under 
French rule, ever since Paris unilaterally changed the name of that colony from “French Establishments in Oceania” 
to “French Polynesia” in 1957.  
Given this fluid definition of geographical terms, I acknowledge the largely synonymous and interchangeable use of 
the terms “Polynesia” and “Oceania” in primary sources, which will be left uncommented. If using my own words, 
however, I will use “Polynesia” mainly in the sense of Dumont D’Urville to mean the linguistically closely related 
island groups within the triangle between Hawai‘i, Aotearoa and Rapa Nui.  
As archaeologists Patrick Kirch and Roger Green have recently argued, Dumont D’Urville’s definition of Polynesia 
corresponds to a unit of linguistically and culturally closely related societies and is thus indeed “an emic category” 
(Kirch and Green 2001: 54) that can be continued as a valuable subdivision of Oceania, unlike those of Micronesia 
and Melanesia, which were more arbitrarily based on superficial outsider observations. However, despite their 
linguistically and culturally less coherent nature, the terms “Micronesia” and “Melanesia” have also been 
appropriated by peoples so designated as markers of regional identity, for instance in the country name “Federated 
States of Micronesia” or the regional organisation name “Melanesian Spearhead Group,” and can thus no longer be 
considered entirely etic either.  
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However, the Hawaiian Kingdom’s role in Oceania went even further than merely 
providing a constitutional model to emulate and advice on how to build a successful modern 
state to other emerging island nations. Beginning during the reign of Kamehameha III, 
Hawaiian government officials envisioned their state taking the leading position in the move 
towards a unified or confederated polity covering as much as possible of Oceania, and thereby 
pre-empting Western imperial encroachment into the region. Charles St. Julian, Hawai‘i’s first 
diplomat appointed specifically to promote this policy in the capacity of “Commissioner to the 
Independent States and Tribes of Polynesia,” and author of several seminal essays on Hawaiian 
pan-Oceanian policy, argued in 1857 that if such a policy was successful, the resulting Oceanian 
“confederation would be a power in the world in the real as well as in the political sense of the 
term” (St. Julian 1857: 29; emphasis in the original). As a bold statement attesting to the self-
confidence displayed by Hawai‘i about Oceania’s ability to matter in the world, I have chosen 
this quote as the title for my dissertation.5 This nineteenth-century view of a Hawaiian-led 
Oceania as a potential “power in the world” markedly contrasts with twentieth-century 
characterizations of the islands as negligibly small and marginal in international politics, which 
have been perpetuated by imperial and orientalist scholars until modern Oceanian intellectuals 
have recently challenged them, as will be discussed below. One of the principal intents of this 
dissertation is thus to redirect this current debate about how much Oceania matters in the 
world back to its largely forgotten origins in the nineteenth century. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The statement also incidentally matches with Hawai‘i-based anthropologist Peter Mills’ recent assessment that “the 
significance of nineteenth-century Hawaiians and their history reached far beyond the Hawaiian Islands, and 
affected the globe” (Mills 2002: 235) 
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Outline of Research Questions and Arguments 
 
 This dissertation is centred on the Hawaiian Kingdom’s role in promoting native-led 
constitutional governments throughout Oceania in order to strengthen the region in its 
struggle against Western colonialism. In order to examine this role, I am asking the following 
main research questions: 
1) First, how did the Hawaiian Kingdom gain its unique and exceptional status as the first 
internationally recognized modern nation-state with a non-Western cultural heritage?  
2) Secondly, to what extent was the Hawaiian Kingdom a hybrid state as defined above 
and how can it be positioned within the global phenomenon of hybridity of non-Western 
nations?  
3) Third, when did Hawai‘i start to formulate a pan-Oceanian vision, how did this vision 
develop over the time, and who were the main thinkers developing this vision? 
4) Fourth, how did this vision and intent actually influence hybrid nation-building 
processes in other Pacific archipelagos?  
5) Fifth, what are the implications of this nineteenth-century history for today’s political 
issues faced by the nations of Oceania, especially in relation to re-emerging Oceanian 
regionalist movements? 
In order to answer those questions, I will first analyse the emergence and development 
of the Hawaiian Kingdom, both globally compared to other non-Western nations in Asia and 
Africa and within the culturally and linguistically closely related Polynesian archipelagos, and 
then qualify elements of hybridity in nineteenth-century Hawai‘i, again within a both global 
and Oceanian perspective. In the following, I will provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
interconnections between the creation of hybrid political systems in other 19th century 
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Polynesian archipelagos under the influence and guidance of the Hawaiian Kingdom. In 
conclusion I will point to the implications this research has for current politics of Oceania. 
In undertaking this analysis, I am positioning myself in a theoretical approach that is 
informed by two main currents, namely a historiography focused on Native agency and a 
visionary Pan-Oceanian approach to Pacific regionalism. 
 
Na Wai ka Mana?6 Questions of Agency 
 
In my master’s thesis in Pacific Islands Studies, Law as a Tool of Oppression and 
Liberation: Institutional Histories and Perspectives of Political Independence in Hawaiʻi, Tahiti 
Nui/French Polynesia and Rapa Nui (Gonschor 2008), I analysed the political history of three 
Polynesian countries in comparison, focusing on the processes of their takeover by foreign 
powers and seeking strategies on how to liberate them from ongoing foreign rule. While 
researching the periods of native state-building before imperialist takeover in each case, I came 
to realise that these periods were not merely “preludes” to colonialism, as Andrew Robson 
titled his biography of a British consul in pre-colonial Fiji (Robson 2004), but indeed crucial 
eras for the development of national consciousness, out of which colonialism or occupation 
were not the logical outcomes, but to the contrary, disruptive events with an adverse impact on 
the process of national development. And as the cases of other non-Western countries like 
Japan, Siam and Ethiopia demonstrate, Western rule was by no means unavoidable as many 
historians have claimed. Robson thus concludes his book, in apparent contradiction to its 
teleologically-charged title, as follows:  
                                                 
6 In English, “whose is/was the power?” I acknowledge Kamanamaikalani Beamer for this phrase, which is the title 
of his 2008 dissertation. 
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It is common to divide Pacific history into three periods: pre-contact, colonial, and 
independent or post-colonial. This, however, does little or no service to the decades 
immediately preceding the imposition of colonial rule. This period is distinctive, 
important, and fascinating, in part because it was a time relatively unburdened by the 
particular inequalities among people that colonial rule later imposed and assumed. […] It 
was a time of change when everything was in a state of flux. No one knew what the 
ultimate political fate of the islands would be […]. (Robson 2004: 173)  
 
This quote by Robson points out the importance of a non-deterministic, non-teleological 
approach. It has been a great mistake, I believe, to analyse the issues Pacific Island nations 
dealt with during the 19th century, such as religious and cultural identity, economic models, 
and political relations with foreign powers, only in reference to later occurring foreign 
occupation and colonisation. Rather, these issues should be looked at in reference to similar 
ones faced by other non-Western modernising societies during the same time period, especially 
those that have remained independent and whose historiography consequently has not been 
compromised under foreign rule. Just as Beamer warns against a fatalistic, “colonial” analysis of 
the Hawaiian Kingdom from the vantage point of later US occupation (Beamer 2008: 47-49), 
Anne McClintock has criticized a simplistic and generalising analysis of the non-Western world 
as “post-colonial”.  In Imperial Leather, she cautions that “[...] the singular category 
‘postcolonial’ may too readily licence a panoptic tendency to view the globe through generic 
abstractions void of political nuance” (McClintock 1995: 11). In the conclusion of the same 
book, McClintock argues that “[…] there is some urgency in the need for innovative theories of 
history and popular memory […]. Asking what single term might adequately replace 
‘postcolonialism’, for example, begs the question of rethinking the global situation as a 
multiplicity of powers and histories that cannot be marshalled obediently under the flag of a 
single theoretical term, be it feminism, Marxism or postcolonialism” (1995: 396, emphasis in 
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original). Bearing in mind these critical points by Robson, McClintock and Beamer, I am thus 
using, and further building, a theoretical framework that is appropriate for the study of non-
Western native statecraft in the 19th century. 
To focus more specifically on the region of my research, an important influence on my 
theoretical approach comes from the “Davidson School” of Pacific history, which I would like to 
explore briefly here. After more than a century of imperial histories and ethnographies of the 
Pacific, which had usually glorified the deeds of such Westerners as missionaries and colonial 
settlers, and more recent studies that considered the encounter established between the Pacific 
Islands and the West as a “Fatal Impact”, as Alan Moorehead (1966) titled his famous book, a 
new school of Pacific historiography arose in the late 1950s and 1960s, which was 
spearheaded by Australian historian Jim Davidson. Followers of the “Davidson School”, who 
dominated Pacific History for the following three decades, criticised both the imperial and the 
“fatal impact” historiographies for ascribing agency entirely to foreigners and relegating 
islanders to a position of passivity in the changes that happened to their islands, no matter 
whether these changes were judged positively or negatively. Davidson, whose practical work 
focused on Sāmoa, where he worked with local political leaders as an advisor in the making of 
the first post-colonial Pacific constitution (Davidson 1967), argued in his seminal 1966 essay 
for a new departure in the writing of history that should henceforth take an “island-centred” 
perspective (Davidson 1966). In a critical evaluation of Davidson’s arguments a few decades 
later, fellow Australian historian David Routledge further demanded “not only that the Islands 
must constitute the environment but that Islanders must be the main actors. The history must 
not only be Island-centred but Islander-oriented” (Routledge 1985a: 90; emphasis added).  
This “Islander-oriented” school of Pacific History has thus for the last five decades been 
dominant in Australian and New Zealand Universities, and various other scholars have written 
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history in a similar way.  Australian historian Carl Trocki, an influential scholar of 19th century 
Johor, for instance, re-evaluates native agency among Malay elites:  
While their [the natives’] means did not always achieve the desired ends, they did have a 
decisive effect on the ultimate outcome. It is a mistake to consider them as having been only 
passive or, at best, reactionary elements in the colonial situation. (Trocki 1979: xx) 
 
In a similar way, Cedric A. Sampson (1973) has questioned the prevalent characterisation of 
pre-French Tahiti as a “missionary kingdom” and focused on the agency of Tahitian ari‘i 
instead. Very similar is the recent analysis by Indo-Fijian law scholar Shaista Shameem on the 
nineteenth century Fijian Kingdom, questioning its characterisation as western-dominated, and 
characterising it rather as a hybrid, native-led multi-ethnic nation, while seeing the Westerners 
involved in it as supportive contributors to native rule (Shameem 2007).  
In Hawai‘i, on the other hand, imperial types of scholarship have endured much longer. 
For instance, Gavan Daws’ popular history book Shoal of Time (1968), even though he was 
personally acquainted with the Davidson school, arguably fits more in the imperial pattern, 
since he wrote it without using virtually any of the thousands of Hawaiian-language primary 
sources available and often reproduced opinionated statements by Westerners hostile to 
Hawai‘i without commenting them.  In reaction to this perpetuation of imperial scholarship, 
earlier native-oriented scholarship in Hawai‘i has been rather emphasising the “fatal impact” of 
the Western encounter (e.g. Stannard 1989; Trask 1993; Kame‘eleihiwa 1992, Merry 2000, 
Osorio 2002, Stauffer 2004), and often characterised statecraft as Western-imposed. Merry 
(2000) and Stauffer (2004), for example, have described the Hawaiian Kingdom as mainly 
created and operated by Westerners for their own interests to the detriment of the Hawaiian 
people. In contrast, recent Hawaiian scholarship has evolved along similar lines as the 
Canberra school before, increasingly focusing on native agency, as demonstrated in the works 
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of Silva (2004), Beamer (2008), Sai (2008) and Arista (2010), for instance.7  In a way 
reminiscent of Routledge quoted above, Beamer criticises both imperial and “fatal impact” 
perspectives by stating that his “interest is not what missionaries did for, or to, ʻŌiwi, but 
rather what ʻŌiwi attempted and accomplished through their own accord […]”(2008:21).  
The “islander agency” perspective, as it has been articulated by both the 
Davidson/Routledge school and the more contemporary Hawaiian scholars emphasising native 
agency like Beamer, thus provides a very useful contribution to the theoretical framework of 
this dissertation. However, the recent Hawaiian state-centred school of scholarship, including, 
in addition to Beamer and Sai, authors such as Young (2006), Moore (2010), Preza (2010) 
Perkins (2006, 2013) and Kauai (2014), has not yet sufficiently been taken note of in Pacific 
Studies outside of Hawai‘i at this point. At the same time it appears that the earlier scholarship 
of the Canberra School is not very well known among scholars studying Hawai‘i. Hence, my 
research is also intended to contribute to the overcoming of that disconnect by drawing from 
both schools. 8 
 However, reflecting earlier on the Davidson/Routledge school, David Chappell (1995) 
has questioned whether an outright rejection of “fatal impacts” and an indiscriminate emphasis 
of native agency is always helpful, given the obvious heavy impact of both epidemic disease and 
violence by Westerners on many if not most island societies. I agree with Chappell mainly on 
two points. The demographic collapse that followed the introduction of epidemic diseases on 
                                                 
7
 I am aware that this classification is an oversimplification and is not intended to make a negative judgment on any 
of the Hawaiian authors named in the first category. Native agency is present in the earlier works as well, 
increasingly so by publication date, as Beamer (2008) has demonstrates in the literature review of his dissertation.  
8 My hypothesis, yet to be confirmed by direct evidence, is that the presence of Gavan Daws, being institutionally 
part of the Canberra School but practicing himself a neo-imperial historiography of Hawai‘i, has been the main 
reason for this disconnect, and thus, because of his role as a “gatekeeper” on Hawai‘i-related issues, his erroneous 
understanding of Hawaiian history has been unquestionably replicated by most of his  ANU colleagues, even if their 
perspective on their own areas of research was one of islander-agency (e.g. Lātūkefu 1982 on 19th century 
constitution-making in the Pacific, a study of great interest for my own work, in which Lātūkefu basically gets all 
other cases right except for Hawai‘i, for which he awkwardly replicates statements from imperial histories). 
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most archipelagos had undeniably a heavy impact on the island societies. Fatal as these 
epidemics were biologically speaking, it seems doubtful however, whether their impact was 
really deadly to societies and polities. Since except for a few rare cases, Polynesian societies 
and cultures survived the epidemics, and state formation on many islands progressed despite 
the threat of a shrinking population, I would caution against the use of the word “fatal.” 
Nonetheless, these epidemics certainly were heavily damaging, threatening and jeopardising 
Polynesian societies, comparable to the bubonic plague epidemic in fourteenth century Europe. 
Secondly, Chappell is clearly right in that colonialism and foreign occupation did indeed 
victimise the islanders when they occurred. Proponents of a native-agency- focused and state-
centred view of Hawaiian history certainly would agree that native agency became severely 
limited once the power of governance was lost to a foreign occupier in the period following the 
events of 1893-1898, and that the loss of lands through title forgery, fraud, usurpation and 
ensuing evictions of native tenants by the “Provisional Government” and its successors, the 
banning of Hawaiian language in schools, forced Americanisation and militarisation have 
victimised the people of Hawai‘i for generations. Somewhat similar experiences were shared by 
most Pacific islanders during the various colonial regimes in other Pacific islands, some of them 
still on-going. The important point, however, is to use the two approaches, victim-focus, and 
agency-focus, in the right contexts. Attempts to project victim-focus approaches from a colonial 
setting onto the context of an independent state under native control, such as the Hawaiian 
Kingdom before 1887, are clearly missing the point. 
 Nonetheless, I also need to be aware of the pitfalls of constructing too strong a 
dichotomy between independent and colonial contexts. Even under foreign colonial rule or 
occupation, Islanders did not suddenly stop being Pacific Islanders, and creative agency, 
including both active resistance and selective appropriation, has continued. More recent Pacific 
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historians have thus emphasized hybrid identities of Pacific Islanders in multiple settings, 
whether the political context is pre-colonial, colonial or post-colonial.  
In Repositioning the Missionary (2010), for example, Vicente Diaz examines the attitudes 
of contemporary Chamorro to a missionary of the early Spanish colonial period who was killed 
by natives resisting Christianisation, and whom the Catholic Church is portraying as a martyr 
saint. Diaz goes beyond a simple dichotomy between Western mission/colonisation and native 
resistance, but examines the way Catholicism has been used by Chamorro to articulate their 
identity. Reflecting on Diaz’ earlier work along similar lines, Chappell (1995: 315) makes the 
important point that in contemporary Guam “Spanish customs and Catholicism are no longer 
colonial impositions but syncretized symbols of un-American identity.”  
Embracing aspects of Western culture, even if they were originally emanating from, or 
even imposed by, imperialism and turning them into a tool of identity articulation and 
resistance against other forms of colonialism is thus a brilliant example of native agency, 
selective appropriation and hybridisation. To extend Chappell’s point, similar points could be 
made about British Victorian culture in Hawai‘i, another syncretised symbol of un-American 
identity; about Anglo-Saxon Protestantism in Tahiti as a syncretised symbol of un-French 
identity; and about Franco-Tahitian Catholic culture in Rapa Nui, already a hybrid in itself but 
further syncretised as a symbol of un-Chilean identity.  
What further makes Diaz’ work methodologically interesting is his use of a third 
perspective that he refers to as a perspective “from behind”, and which he contrasts with the 
two traditional perspectives of colonial historiography, namely “from above” (i.e. the “imperial” 
point of view) and “from below” (i.e. the “native” point of view). In generalized terms, Diaz sees 
his “from behind” perspective, as one that “does not diametrically oppose or invert the 
[imperial institution’s] preferred meanings so much as to run angular to and away from them 
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and their opposing perspectives” (Diaz 2010: 147). I consider Diaz’ idea of a perspective that 
runs “angular to” and “away from” meanings assigned by either imperial or anti-imperial 
scholarship particularly useful in much of my research, since my conclusions are in many cases 
similarly angular to those of established scholarship of either school.  
Along these lines, it is important not simply to dismiss earlier histories one does not 
agree with, even those explicitly written from an imperialist point of view. Palestinian scholar 
Edward Said, famous for his criticism of imperial “orientalist” scholarship, has suggested a 
methodology of “contrapuntal reading” of these sources (Said 1993), which can provide 
insights against the intended purpose of their authors, and generally disclose a lot of useful 
information on earlier historical periods.  
Despite the rightful focus on native agency, one cannot ignore the roles played by 
Westerners, in nineteenth-century non-Western states in general, and in the Pacific Islands in 
particular. Beamer for instance, while emphasizing the active and informed decision-making of 
Hawaiian aliʻi in creating a hybrid political system, does not ignore the contributions by 
Western advisors to the Kingdom, such as former missionary William Richards. Considering 
them as people of “complex identities,” Beamer argues that “[w]hile their identity was still 
European, they may have become influenced or Hawaiian-ized through their interactions with 
Hawai‘i and the ali‘i” (2008: 28). Preceding Beamer, a very interesting article in a similar sense 
was written by Michael Vann (1997), which analyses the hybrid society of the Kalākaua 
renaissance period, multi-ethnic in character but based on native Hawaiian culture.  
Vann sharply contrasts this societal model of hybridity with the system of white 
supremacy advocated by Westerners unwilling to assimilate into that society. Those were the 
people who eventually perpetrated the “Bayonet” coup of 1887 and conspired with the US in 
the overthrow of 1893. While I do acknowledge the destructive energy unleashed by those 
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individuals, and their negative impact on the national development of Hawai‘i, I agree with 
Beamer that most earlier scholars have given those individuals too much credit, be it in 
connection with positive or negative events.  The same is true for many other archipelagos, in 
which both imperial and anti-colonial writers have tended to over-emphasise the impact of a 
tiny minority of Westerners, most likely because they happened to leave the largest amount of 
preserved written documents, and downplayed if not disregarded the agency of native leaders.  
 
Visions of Greater Oceania  
 
During the past decades, a debate has been going on in Pacific Islands Studies whether 
the frameworks of traditional disciplines of Western academia are useful for Pacific-related 
research, and various scholars have suggested other theoretical and methodological 
frameworks. What has especially been criticised is the “dominant approach in both history and 
anthropology […] to treat distinct Polynesian cultures and societies as “islands of history” 
engaging with Western capitalism and Christianity rather than as historically connected 
societies engaging or re-engaging with each other” (Sissons 2011: 209). In his seminal 1993 
essay “Our Sea of Islands”, Tongan anthropologist Epeli Hau‘ofa heavily criticised the belittling 
of the insular Pacific by Western disciplinary scholarship as a world of fragile and small islands, 
and confronted it with his own vision of “Oceania” as a vast maritime civilisation, including not 
merely the islands but also the surrounding ocean as well as Oceanians’ contemporary 
diaspora along the Pacific Rim. Referring to an earlier ground-breaking essay “Towards a New 
Oceania by Albert Wendt” (1976), Hau‘ofa describes Oceania as follows:  
‘Oceania’ connotes a sea of islands with their inhabitants. The world of our ancestors was a 
large sea full of places to explore, to make their homes in, to breed generations of seafarers 
like themselves. People raised in this environment were at home with the sea. They played in 
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it as soon as they could walk steadily, they worked in it, they fought on it. They developed 
great skills for navigating their waters, and the spirit to traverse even the few large gaps that 
separated their island groups. […]As I watched the Big Island of Hawai‘i expanding into and 
rising from the depths, I saw in it the future of Oceania, our sea of islands. That future lies in 
the hands of our people, not of those who would prescribe for us, get us forever dependent 
and indebted, because they can see no way out. (Hau‘ofa 1993: 8; 15) 
 
While thus advocating a decolonised, Islander-centred approach to Pacific Studies based on 
native epistemologies, in a later essay, “The Ocean in Us,” Hau‘ofa also cautions against 
exclusive, ethno-nationalist notions of Islander identity, and advocates an inclusive identity 
based on commitment and allegiance rather than ethnicity by stating that “[a]s far as I am 
concerned, anyone who has lived in our region and who is committed to Oceania is an 
Oceanian” (2008: 51).  
Hau‘ofa’s visionary approach is of central importance to the overall framing of my own 
research. While not necessarily departing from Western disciplinary methodologies, which I 
consider still useful, Hau‘ofa’s vision connects to my own conceptual framework in various 
ways. First of all, it is of particular interest to me that Hau‘ofa’s conceived of this vision not in 
Tonga, Fiji, or Papua New Guinea (the three countries he lived in for longer periods of time) but 
during a visit to the island of Hawai‘i while driving along the Saddle Road between Mauna Kea 
and Mauna Loa (Hau‘ofa 1993: 5). Although rarely cited in that way, one of the implicit 
statements in “Our Sea of Islands” is thus to return the Hawaiian Islands to a central place in 
the development of a visionary future for Oceania, a place the archipelago once already had in 
the nineteenth century, when the Hawaiian Kingdom was the “think tank”, so to say, for earlier 
pan-Oceanic projects, as will be explored in detail in chapter 6 of this dissertation. In other 
words, one might argue that the spirit of the Kings of Hawai‘i had somehow unknowingly 
inspired Hau‘ofa when driving through their realms in 1993. Focusing in one of my chapters on 
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the central role played by Hawai‘i in networking between the various archipelagos under 
consideration, I will thus explicitly link Hau‘ofa’s vision to the earlier discourse on Pan-Oceania 
projects emanating from the Hawaiian Kingdom, most notably articulated by King Kalākaua 
and epitomised in his “Order of the Star of Oceania,” an argument I have also been making in a 
recently published article written as part of this research (Gonschor 2013).  
Another important theoretical issue that has been discussed in Pacific Islands studies is 
that of the practical relevance of scholarship. In a 2006 article Houston Wood describes three 
main research perspectives for Oceania, namely traditional disciplinary research, 
interpretative perspectives and practice-oriented research (Wood 2006). Hau‘ofa’s work 
during the last decade of his life as a practical application of his earlier formulated academic 
vision, when he worked as the founder and director of the Oceania Centre for Culture and Arts 
in Suva, would clearly be a good case of such practice-orientation.  
In that sense, my intended re-framing of Hau‘ofa’s Oceania vision as both a 
retrospectively interpretative context for, and a sort of déjà vu re-enactment of the Hawaiian 
Kingdom’s late 19th century foreign policy also points to the practical relevance of my 
research. While not personally involved in policy-making, I nevertheless hope to make a 
contribution to providing a context to the increasing re-emergence of not merely visionary, but 
politically practical Pan-Pacific projects.  
Also, at least partly drawing on Hau‘ofa, other recent scholars have made important 
contributions to the rethinking of pan-Pacific connections as well. Kealani Cook, for example, 
has studied the relations between Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders during the time of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom as well as during the early colonial/U.S. territorial periods, drawing 
attention to aspects of both Hawaiian pan-Oceanian solidarity and more problematic Hawaiian 
claims to hegemony in the region (Cook 2011a). Furthermore, to give his work a practical 
20 
 
relevance, Cook has used his research as practical example of “teaching world history in 
Hawai‘i [through the role of] Hawai‘i in world history” (Cook 2011b). Focusing on literature 
production, Alice Te Punga Sommerville (2012) has reflected on the connections and 
disconnections between the Māori of Aotearoa and the tropical Pacific, using the anecdotal 
metaphor of a Māori-Tahitian interaction during the early encounter era to describe these 
contemporary relations, complicated as they are on account of the presence of the New Zealand 
settler-colonial state and its policies.  
With all respect due to Hau‘ofa and other recent Oceanian visionaries, I am also critical 
of the tendency of some of them to see Oceania as a sui generis region disconnected from the 
rest of the world, and especially from the eastern and western littorals of the Pacific Ocean. A 
majority of current Pacific scholars lacks any interest in a re-connection across the Pacific with 
other Austronesian peoples that have been separated by the imaginary line dividing the 
“Pacific” from Asia”, a line that is supposedly located somewhere between the Maluku islands 
and New Guinea, but hardly identifiable as such on the ground. Even an accomplished scholar 
like Hau‘ofa has fallen for that fallacy, considering in “The Ocean in Us” that the seafaring, 
Austronesian-speaking peoples living west of that imaginary line for some reason “do not have 
Oceanic cultures” (Hau‘ofa 2008: 53), an unsubstantiated statement that is worth of 
pronounced criticism. A few scholars, generally little acknowledged by mainstream Pacific 
Islands Studies, have thus suggested the development of a larger field of Austronesian Studies 
(Bellwood, Fox and Tryon 1995; Salazar 1998, Odango 2015). More specifically, Filipino-
Hawaiian scholar Arnold Hōkūlani Requilmán has underlined the historical connections 
between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the Malay Sultanate of Johor in this context (Requilmán 
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2002).9   After all, the Indonesian/Malay Archipelago needs to be acknowledged as the cradle of 
Oceania, where Austronesians first developed their unparalleled navigational technology 
before venturing out into the vast expanses of the central Pacific.10  
Most recently, Matt K. Matsuda has written one of the first recent Pacific histories to 
overcome the artificial isolation of the insular Pacific, extensively covering both the wider 
Austronesian world and the Pacific rim, while still being island-centred and not reiterating the 
fallacies of common “Pacific rim” studies that have relegated the islands in the centre of the 
ocean to mere footnotes (Matsuda 2012). Besides Oceania’s ancient connections to 
Austronesian Southeast Asia, the connections to its neighbours on the other seaboard of the 
Pacific are important as well, and need to be taken into account more, both in the classical and 
the post-encounter eras.11 Pioneer studies in that sense have been done of fifteenth-century 
Inca travels to Eastern Polynesia (Del Busto 2006), of the connections of the subarctic Northern 
Pacific to the rest of Oceania (Jones 2014), of the early Hawaiian diaspora on the north-eastern 
Pacific rim (Barman and Watson 2006; Olson 2014), the encounters between Hawaiian Queen 
Dowager Emma Kaleleonālani and leaders of the North American Choctaw and Chickasaw 
nations in the nineteenth century (Byrd 2011: 177-183) and representations of American 
Indians in Hawaiian-language sources (Chang 2015). Similarly in that sense are the recent re-
                                                 
9 Besides a few scholarly publications, Requilmán, who also uses the name Adam Keaweoka‘ī Kīna‘u, has published 
a large amount of high quality research in web blog format at <http://hawaiianhistorian.blogspot.com/>  as well as a 
comprehensive presentation of his research in video format in English 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oShirKsUDAk>, in Malay/Indonesian 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nXPA7ha-XWA> and in Malagasy 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T8o_5oKJ_uc> 
10
 A strong argument for (re)including Austronesian Southeast Asia in Oceania has also recently been made by 
Jennifer Gaynor (2013). 
11
 In order to avoid the pitfalls of imperial historiography, when discussing the Island societies and cultures as they 
were in existence during the time of their documentation by the first European explorers and by newly literate 
Islander historians a few decades later, I avoid the problematic terms pre-contact, ancient or traditional and instead 
use the term classical, following Campbell (1989), Charlot (2005) and Lyon (2013).  When it is unavoidable to use 
terminology directly referring to the first Western explorers and their interactions with Islanders, I will follow 
Hau‘ofa’s suggestion (2008: 62) in using the term encounter instead of contact. 
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assessments of the relation between Hawai‘i and the United States from a non-imperial 
perspective (Okihiro 2006, Kester 2009). 
It is thus crucial to extend Hau‘ofa’s vision of Oceania by including pan-Austronesian 
and circum-Pacific aspects. As Requilmán explains, the Oceania envisioned earlier by the 
leaders of the Hawaiian Kingdom was conceptualized in this broader way and not conscripted 
to the limiting “Polynesia-Melanesia-Micronesia” triad. This also aligns well with Hawai‘i’s role 
as a partner and model for other emerging States in the wider Pacific region during the 
nineteenth century, which was not limited to the island nations to the south but also 
prominently included its neighbours to the west, including fellow Austronesian realms such as 
Johor, the insular Pacific rim nation of Japan, and continental Asian states on the Pacific’s 
western seaboard like China and Siam.  
In the early twentieth century, German geopolitics scholar Karl Haushofer, a temporary 
resident of Japan, made a similar argument, considering Polynesians, other Austronesians and 
Japanese as members of a common Pacific civilisation engaged in a primordial struggle for 
survival against the alien Atlantic civilisation projected into the region by Anglo-Saxon 
imperialism (Haushofer 1939). What makes Haushofer’s argument particularly interesting for 
my research is that he saw the Hawaiian Kingdom, and especially King Kalākaua’s foreign 
policy, as an important element in this struggle, and furthermore, that he predicted that the 
forced imposition of Atlantic civilisation onto Hawai‘i through American imperialism – as  it 
was intensively ongoing during the time – would  fail in the long term, and that the Hawaiian 
Islands would eventually re-emerge as a part of Pacific civilisation (Haushofer 1939: 77-79, 
197-198, 233, 260). 
It appears that very few contemporary scholars of the Pacific have explored these kinds 
of connections so far. A notable exception, however, is Greg Dvorak, an American raised in the 
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Marshall Islands fluent in Japanese, who, by teaching Pacific Studies in Japan has made a major 
new contribution to the field as he explores in a recent article (Dvorak 2011). 
Apart from wider-ranging arguments about a “Pacific civilisation,” however, the 
Hawaiian Kingdom’s most important international role was that of a political model for other 
Pacific Island nations. As the only island state having achieved international recognition, the 
Hawaiian Kingdom was a “nation for which Polynesians generally had enormous respect” 
(Gilson 1970: 192). As I will explore in detail in this dissertation, from the 1850s onward, the 
Hawaiian Kingdom pursued a policy of supporting the formation of nation-states in the rest of 
Oceania and fending off their colonization by Western powers – in a sense a Hawaiian ‘Monroe 
Doctrine’ 12  for Polynesia. Within this framework, the Hawaiian model became essential for 
later state formation processes in Tonga, Fiji, and Sāmoa in the 1870s and 1880s. 
Given this historical situation, Hau‘ofa’s scholarship on Oceania, with the important 
extension to pan-Austronesian and Pacific-rim inclusive perspectives, provides a very 
important framework for this dissertation. In the next section I will turn my gaze upon my own 
positionality and explore – to take up Hau‘ofa’s metaphor – how Oceania has come to reside 
also “in me.”  
 
Oceania in Me: The author’s story  
 
I was born in Germany and my native language is German, but my last name, especially 
in its older spelling “Gonszior,” sounds rather odd to German speakers, for the very reason that 
it is not really a German name. As I learned through genealogical research, my paternal 
ancestors were from Masuria. Up to my great-grandparents’ generation, Polish was their first 
                                                 
12
 This comparison, often repeated by historians mentioning Hawaiian pan-Oceanist policy, is extremely 
problematic, as I will discuss in more detail in chapter six. 
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language, but unlike most ethnic Poles, their religion was Lutheranism, and they identified as 
loyal subjects of Prussia and later Germany. Having had a hybrid identity is thus part of my 
family heritage, and in hindsight this is perhaps one of the reasons I am now so interested in 
cultural hybridity.13  
Growing up in Germany, I developed an early interest in Oceania during my 
adolescence. At first, this interest was mainly anthropological, being fascinated with 
‘mysterious’ monuments and ‘exotic’ people, languages and cultures, but I soon began to 
understand political issues of ongoing colonialism and anti-colonial resistance in the region. 
During the mid-1990s, the resumption of French nuclear weapons testing in French Polynesia 
sparked in me a passion of solidarity for the Tahitian independence movement, which, after I 
learned more about the region, extended further to similar issues in Hawai‘i and other parts of 
Oceania under foreign rule. Thanks to the well-equipped library of the University of Tübingen 
anthropology department, I was able to read a lot about Hawaiian history and became equally 
passionate about the Hawaiian Kingdom, which I began to see as a historical counter-model to 
the colonial and neo-colonial situations I saw in too many islands of the present. As a non-
Islander, I was especially interested in loyal foreigners in the service of the Hawaiian 
Kingdom’s government, and became especially fascinated with the person of Walter M. Gibson, 
King Kalākaua’s minister of foreign affairs between 1882 and 1887. Interaction with various 
Hawaiian  and Hawai‘i-resident activists and scholars during the past fifteen years, the most 
important of them being the late Kekuni Blaisdell, Niklaus Schweizer and Keanu Sai, have for 
the most part confirmed, and helped further develop, my approach to studies of Pacific history 
and politics, and to the particular position of the Hawaiian Kingdom therein.  
                                                 
13
 For the complex hybrid identity of Masurians as ethnically Polish German nationals, see Blanke 1999, Kossert 
2006 and Berger 2007. 
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Starting off with those anecdotal moments of my adolescence, I dedicated my first eight 
years of academic research to independence movements in Eastern Polynesia, which resulted 
in my 2008 Master’s thesis in Pacific Islands Studies mentioned earlier. As explained above, 
during this research I was often reminded of the importance of native state-building in the 
various islands before Western imperialism, which of course aligned well with my previous 
fascination with the Hawaiian Kingdom. 
As far as non-native actors involved in nineteenth-century nation-building processes 
are concerned, I have come to the conclusion, in agreement with many of my academic 
colleagues such as Sai (2008) and Kauai (2014) that what I analyse was not primarily an ethnic 
but a national issue. Despite the fact that each of the nineteenth-century Pacific states was first 
and foremost the result of native agency, the state building processes I analyse also involve the 
agency of haole/pālangi/ pōpa’ā/pākehā, some of them great visionaries whose writings are as 
inspiring to me as those of Hau‘ofa. Characters with pan-Pacific visions like Charles St. Julian, 
Celso Moreno and Walter M. Gibson therefore take up central parts in my analysis, as well as 
important non-native agents of nation-building such as William Richards and Robert Wyllie in 
Hawai‘i, Shirley W. Baker in Tonga, and Albert B. Steinberger in Sāmoa, just to name the ones 
that I found having had the most impact. In line with Hau‘ofa’s quote above, all those people 
should be seen as Oceanians, not by descent but through dedicating their life to Oceania.  
Other examples of foreign-born naturalised Hawaiian academics, journalists, politicians 
and government officials whose presence, activities and writings have made very positive 
contributions to native nation-building include Abraham Fornander (Davis 1979), Charles 
Harris (Harris 1993), Hermann Widemann, and Charles Gulick.  The same can also be said 
about temporary residents and visitors writing about the Hawaiian Kingdom in a sympathetic 
way for a foreign audience, such as Adelbert von Chamisso (Schweizer 1973), Ludwig Choris 
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(1999; Charlot 1958); Manley Hopkins (1862); Charles de Varigny (2002), Reinhold von Anrep-
Elmpt (1885); Isabella Bird (1998), Robert Louis Stevenson (1973); Bosseront d’Anglade 
(1987) Isobel Field (1937) and Karl Haushofer (1939). Bearing in mind the difference of times 
and eras, I consider all of these historical figures as inspirational role models for myself and my 
kuleana as a foreign scholar residing in the Hawaiian Islands.  
Besides the inspirational value of their works for me, I also have a sense of being in a 
similar personal situation to some of these historical characters. Having lived in Oceania for a 
prolonged time, I feel a deep passion for the region, a passion not fully explainable in rational 
terms and at times puzzling to my European friends and relatives. When I come home to visit 
Europe, I sometimes feel like a stranger visiting from abroad, having become familiar with 
Oceanian culture and protocol while having forgotten some elements of the culture of my lands 
of origin. More than once, people from France have told me that I speak French with a Tahitian 
accent. In that sense, I would no longer describe myself as an outsider to the Pacific which I 
certainly was when I first came to the region in 1999. I am thus finding myself in a liminal 
space, neither Islander nor Outlander, but somewhere in between. UH Hilo historian Kerri 
Inglis, situating herself in a similar positionality, describes this quite pointedly, in a way I can 
fully subscribe to:  
I am not from these Islands and therefore will never be fully considered a part of this island 
community, and yet I can never return to who I was before I came here; I have both literally 
and metaphorically crossed into a liminal space that shares two cultural islands. (Inglis 2013, 
211n33) 
 
In line with my commitments to Oceania thus outlined, I consider this dissertation to be 
of great importance, not only for the scholarly community of Pacific historians and political 
scientists but also for the Island communities at large. Having myself been involved in, and 
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supportive of, national liberation movements in Hawai‘i, Tahiti, and Rapa Nui, it has been my 
interest to provide scholarly information that helps in the promotion of these causes. In my 
interactions with various scholars and political activists I have come to the conclusion that an 
informed appreciation of the past is the most solid foundation for the construction of a 
sustainable future. While the colonial period of the Pacific islands and its ramifications for the 
present have been extensively analysed, I think the era of native statecraft predating that 
period has been undervalued. Whereas I would argue that the colonial or occupational periods 
have been the source of humiliations that continue to plague many Pacific islanders, the 
previous period of Nation-State formation was crucial for the development of national 
consciousness and could therefore be seen as a source of national pride and self-confidence 
today. It was clearly seen as such by many Hawaiians of the late 19th century who took great 
pride in the socialising of their ali‘i in the inner circles of European royalty (Poepoe 1891; 
McGuire 1938) as well as, in general, in the kingdom’s international standing due to the 
modernization of its government, as the following 1883 newspaper editorial illustrates: 
A oia ka makou e hauoli nei, i ka hoomaopopo ana, mamuli o na mea i hoike ia aku imua o na 
aupuni nui—na mea hoi i hoike ole ia iloko o na au i hala hope ae—ua apo ia ko kakou wahi 
aupuni a ua lilo he aupuni nui—aole ma kona kahua, aole ma kona waiwai, aole hoi ma ka 
heluna o ka lahui, aka—ma kona kulana.14 
 
Having been a witness to, and participant of, scholarly efforts to recover historical 
knowledge about proactive agency of the Hawaiian and other Oceanic states, as exemplified in 
the quoted editorial, I would end this personal section with the words of Hawai‘i-based Pacific 
                                                 
14 “And this is what we are happy about, the understanding, because of the things that were shown before the great 
states – the things that were not shown in the ages past – that our little state has been accepted and has become a 
great state – not in its area, not in its wealth, not in the number of the people, but – in its standing.” Anonymous 
editorial titled “Hawaii imua o ke ao nei,” Ke Koo o Hawaii, 29 Aug 1883, p. 6. The editorial was brought to my 
attention in the 2014 Kamehameha Schools Song Contest pre-show documentary video “Kaapuni Honua/Global 
Travels,” <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zHwGulJxUGw>). 
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Islands studies scholar Terence Wesley-Smith, another mentor for myself. Reflecting on his 
own role as a witness and contributor to the changing discourse of Pacific Islands studies and 
drawing from Hau‘ofa’s writings, Wesley-Smith provides the following reflection  in his 
autobiographical essay “The Ocean in Me:”  
These shifts in the field of Pacific Islands Studies are, I believe, important ones. It has been 
satisfying to participate in a process of change that may in some small way help to redress the 
inequities of the past. Certainly, it is a process that has helped me feel much more connected 
to the people and places that have been at the centre of my professional life for more than two 
decades. In some sense I feel as if I have finally come to rest in Oceania, not least because 
some vital parts of the ocean have finally come to rest in me. (Wesley Smith 2004: 83-84) 
 
Chapter overview  
 
In the second chapter I will discuss theoretical concepts and methodologies relevant to 
my research and review some of the literature pertinent to the topic. I will provide a more 
detailed discussion of the theoretical concepts of “Parity,” “Similitude” and “Hybridity,” which 
are helpful frameworks to understand the interaction of the Hawaiian Kingdom and 
contemporary other non-Western states with the West. Furthermore, I will provide a short 
overview of the literature on state formation and discuss how the nation-state can be seen as a 
selectively appropriated tool within the previously discussed frameworks of parity, similitude 
and hybridity. I will then introduce the method of interdisciplinary comparative historical 
analysis, upon much of my research is based. The chapter ends in a more general literature 
review of previous studies of nineteenth-century Polynesian states, the Hawaiian Kingdom’s 
Pacific policy, and its longue durée global impact.  
The third chapter provides an overview of Western imperialism and non-western 
nation-building in the nineteenth century in order to place my research in a global historical 
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context. I will start off with an overview of the global political situation in the nineteenth 
century, a world in the process of being divided up between Western imperial powers while at 
the same time a few non-Western societies, usually located in geopolitcial “niches” survived the 
process and became hybrid nation-states. A short global survey of those states follows, first 
with a focus on Egypt, Japan, China, Siam, Johor and Madagascar, either because they sustained 
extensive relations with the Hawaiian Kingdom or because they show historical similarities 
and can thus serve as comparative cases. In the second section of the chapter, I will zoom from 
this global survey into the Pacific islands, and discuss the challenges resulting from the 
encounter with the West that were particular to Oceania, and then provide a short survey of 
hybrid states in Polynesia besides Hawai ‘i, focusing on Tahiti, Tonga, Sāmoa and Fiji. The 
chapter concludes with a description and analysis of the position and status of non-Western 
states in the late nineteenth-century international order and the complicated diplomatic 
relations those states had with the West, including the issue of unequal treaties and the 
achievement of parity by revising these treaties. 
In the fourth chapter, I will discuss in more detail why and how the Hawaiian Kingdom 
came to serve as the prototypical hybrid state of Oceania. This analysis of the emergence and 
development of the Hawaiian state starts off with an overview of the evolution of classical 
Polynesian societies. I will examine how complex political systems that transcended the 
prototypical Polynesian chiefdom type and should be seen as primary state societies developed 
in the Hawaiian Islands several centuries prior to its encounter with the West.  A close 
description of the political system of the classical Hawaiian states, the result of these 
developments, follows. My discussion then turns to the unification of the archipelago by 
Kamehameha I and the beginning selective adoption of Western technologies and political 
concepts during his reign. My focus then turns to the continuing hybridisation of the Kingdom 
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under Kauikeaouli [Kamehameha III], resulting in the building of the most advanced modern 
State in Oceania by the 1840s, as well as the achieving of international recognition of this state 
in 1843. The chapter ends in examining the consolidation of territorial control over the Central-
Northern Pacific, which the Hawaiian Kingdom essentially completed in the 1850s and early 
1860s with the annexation of various uninhabited atolls surrounding the main Hawaiian 
Islands.   
The fifth chapter examines parity, similitude and hybridity in nineteenth-century 
statecraft. Aspects of these phenomena in the Hawaiian Kingdom will be pointed out in 
comparison with the various other non-Western nations previously introduced and thus put 
into a global perspective. The chapter starts with an assessment of native agency in the 
relations of non-Western states with the West. My discussion then focusses on the hybridity of 
culture and political systems in these states, all of which combined traditional and Western 
aspects. This includes the complex identities of many policymakers, as well as the important 
issue of religion, specifically the adoption and adaptation of Christianity or the maintenance of 
traditional religion by the respective nation’s leaders.  I will then examine the role played by 
several specific aspects of material culture in the formation of hybrid states: First, I will look at 
currency, flags and other material symbols of sovereignty. Secondly, I will point out the crucial 
role played by literacy and print culture, especially newsprint, in the creation of “imagined 
communities,” i.e. the formation of national consciousness, as described by Anderson (1991). 
Similarly, I will examine how land tenure reforms, surveying and cartography resulted in the 
creation of national “geo-bodies,” as theorised by Thongchai (1994). The chapter will conclude 
in a discussion of early forms of networking between Non-Western States and the beginning of 
ideologies like Pan-Asianism and related movements, which sets an important background for 
the discussion of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s very early advocacy of such ideology. 
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Against this background, the role of Hawaiian diplomacy in inter-Oceanian relations will 
be examined and analysed in chapters six and seven, based on the analysis of diplomatic 
correspondence and other archival sources, as well as contemporary newspaper reports about 
those relations. Starting with a brief survey of the earliest instances of pan-Oceanian ideas in 
Hawai‘i, the sixth chapter centres around the pioneering work of Charles St. Julian, who was the 
first to develop a comprehensive policy envisioning a Hawai‘i-centred Oceania, and who 
contributed to shaping both Hawaiian foreign policy and the constitutional development in 
Sāmoa, Fiji and Tonga from the 1850s to the 1870s, assessing the importance of this early 
period of Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism.  
The seventh chapter examines the further development and culmination of pan-
Oceanianism during the reign of King Kalākaua from 1874 to 1887. After describing pan-
Oceanianist initiatives in the early years of his reign, the attention turns to the King’s 1881 
voyage around the world, the first such voyage in history by a ruling head of state and its 
implications, especially for the networking with other non-Western states, which was followed 
up by other Hawaiian diplomats throughout the 1880s. Further explored will be the roles 
played by Celso Moreno and especially Walter Gibson, who, besides building on St. Julian’s 
ideas, further contributed to the development of a pan-Oceanian and pan-Austronesian 
awareness among Hawaiian elites, culminating in a “New Departure in Hawaiian Politics,” 
during the mid-1880s, which connected the previous elements into a coherent pan-Oceanian 
foreign policy.  
In the eighth chapter, I turn my regard how this policy was implemented on the ground 
on the other archipelagos of the region. Hence, I will analyse in greater detail the political 
systems of the emerging states in central Polynesia that resulted from the previously 
mentioned initiatives of Hawaiian pan-Oceanian diplomacy by looking more closely at the 
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constitutions and legal codes produced in those states and providing a textual analysis thereof, 
with a particular focus on what kinds of terminologies were used for Western-style political 
concepts and how they might relate to classical concepts of governance. By comparing these 
constitutional systems, I line out a typology thereof, which can be roughly classified into those 
deriving from an earlier Tahitian model and those deriving from a later Hawaiian model, with 
certain overlaps.  After briefly mentioning the influence of the Tahitian model, my analysis is 
mainly focused on the Hawaiian constitutional model and its descendants i.e., the nineteenth-
century constitutions of Fiji and Tonga, and, to a significant degree, Sāmoa.  
The ninth and concluding chapter, conceptualised as a combination of an epilogue and a 
look into the future, examines the effects of the history documented in the previous chapters on 
the present, and the lessons that can be learned for the future. I will start by briefly 
summarizing the subsequent history of the Island nations, including imperialist takeover, 
colonial rule and decolonisation or lack thereof. I argue that through the American occupation 
of Hawai‘i and the subsequent colonisation of all remaining free islands by Western powers, 
any effective pan-Oceanian policy was barred from being developed during most of the 
twentieth century. However, the Hawaiian Kingdom and its pan-Oceanian policy dis in fact cast 
a long shadow into the 1900s, including Hawaiian efforts to maintain quasi-diplomatic 
relations with other Oceanian nations even after Hawai‘i had become occupied, and ongoing 
influence of the Kigdom and its policies on other non-Western states. More recently, through 
ongoing processes of decolonisation and deoccupation and struggles therefor, Oceania has 
been rising again. In this context, I will explore the relevance of the hybrid state model and its 
promotion by the Hawaiian Kingdom for the Pacific region today, exploring decolonial, 
deoccupational, and pan-Oceanian futures within this paradigm. Using the narratives from 
chapter six to eight, I will explore how this historical precedence can serve as inspirational 
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models ideas for regional initiatives outside the colonial or neo-colonial context today, and look 
at some promising examples of such initiatives. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
Assessing Oceanian Hybridity: A Review of Theories, Methodologies and 
Preceding Studies  
 
Introduction 
 
 In this chapter I will review relevant theoretical and methodological concepts, as well as 
preceding studies of topics related to my research.  First, I will provide a detailed discussion of 
the theoretical concepts of “parity,” “similitude” and “hybridity,” which are helpful frameworks 
to understand the interaction of the Hawaiian Kingdom and contemporary other non-Western 
states with the West. I will then provide a brief review of the literature on state formation, 
followed by a discussion of how Western state institutions have been transferred, selectively 
appropriated and hybridised in non-Western societies. Besides narratives presenting state 
formation as a linear progress, I also include more critical analyses of statecraft in the review. I 
will then turn to interdisciplinary comparative historical analysis as the principal methodology 
used in this dissertation, and discuss how this methodology can help understand the role of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom in nineteenth-century state building in the Pacific.  The following critical 
review of previous comparative studies of nineteenth-century Polynesian states as well as of 
previous studies of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s policy towards the rest of Oceania will serve as an 
inventory of the state of research on the topic and thereby help to define how my own work 
will both build on those works and go beyond them. Lastly, in order to point out the main 
direction of going beyond those studies, I will explore how to extend the methodology of 
comparative analysis in order to analyse Hawaiian policy through time and space and assess its 
long-term global impact.  
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The concepts of Parity, Similitude and Hybridity 
 
“Parity,” “Similitude” and “Hybridity” are some of the key theoretical concepts that I will 
use in examining the Hawaiian Kingdom and other non-Western Polynesian polities during the 
nineteenth century. According to Niklaus Schweizer (2005: 177), “[p]arity signifies an effort to 
be taken seriously by the Western powers, to be accepted as an equal and to be accorded the 
civilities and privileges established by international law. […] The preferred option in Polynesia 
was to achieve at least a degree of parity with the West.” While Schweizer, influenced by 
preceding statements made by Hawaiian artist Herb Kawainui Kāne, uses “parity” in a very 
comprehensive way, including aspects of international recognition, diplomatic equality as well 
as cultural hybridity and selective appropriation (Schweizer 2005: 177ff), I would like to assign 
a more restricted meaning to it in the context of this dissertation. Going to the root of the word, 
“being at par” i.e. being equal, parity first and foremost signifies an entity to be equal to 
another. Such equality is quite precisely measurable as far as international relations and 
diplomacy between states are concerned, but more difficult to measure in the social, cultural 
and economic fields. My use of the word parity will thus be limited to the fields of diplomacy 
and international treaties. A country engaging in equal diplomatic relations with the West will 
thus be considered to have achieved full parity, whereas one that has, for instance, unequal 
treaty relations, is not in a position of full parity with the West but has only a degree thereof. In 
the nineteenth century, transforming one’s political institutions to some degree in order to 
achieve such diplomatic parity was a goal shared by most emerging non-Western nation-states. 
Noenoe Silva argues that “[c]reating a nation in the form familiar to Europe and the United 
States was a necessary strategy of resistance to colonization because there was a chance that 
the nineteenth-century Mana Nui or ‘Great Powers’ might recognize national sovereignty” 
(Silva 2004a: 9). While the Hawaiian Kingdom received such recognition and thus achieved full 
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diplomatic parity with the Western powers in the mid-1800s, this pattern was later followed 
by Japan and other Asian nations, and by the end of the century most other Polynesian nations 
were also engaged in similar processes to seek parity. In that sense, other non-Western nations 
followed the pattern of parity established by Hawaiʻi.   
In that sense, Japan followed Hawaiʻi’s pattern, since it struggled with unequal treaties 
for much longer. In fact, in 1881, the Meiji Emperor asked King Kalākaua for assistance in the 
struggle to revise Japan’s unequal treaties in order to achieve full diplomatic parity, and 
eventually the Hawaiian Kingdom became the first nation enjoying extraterritorial rights in 
Japan to voluntarily renounce these rights in 1893. In a similar way, the Hawaiian pattern 
might also have been an inspiration for the Republic of China in its struggle to achieve full 
parity in the early twentieth century, since its founder, Sun Yat-sen, had been educated in the 
Hawaiian Kingdom and understood its character as a modernising non-Western State having 
achieved diplomatic parity, an aspect that has been almost completely ignored by most 
historians of the Chinese revolution because of mutual ignorance between them and historians 
of the Hawai‘i and the Pacific. 
While I thus limit the term parity here to a country’s position in international relations, 
another important aspect of non-Western societies in the nineteenth century is what historian 
Jeremy Prestholdt calls the strategy of similitude, i.e. a transformation of certain forms of 
behaviour, cultural protocols and aesthetic standards to make them similar to those of the 
West. In Prestholdt’s words, similitude is “a conscious self-presentation in interpersonal and 
political relationships that stresses likeliness.” (2007: 120). While superficially appearing 
similar to assimilation under colonial coercion, similitude as I use it in this context is 
voluntarily done by a society outside of colonial control, yet confronted with Western imperial 
hegemony. Prestholdt’s case study is of the small sultanate of Nzwani [Anjouan] in the Comoro 
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Islands [before it became colonized by France], the native elites of which cultivated a 
surprisingly close relationship with Great Britain throughout the nineteenth century and 
adopted various aspects of English cultural behaviour, with the aim of gaining the British 
empire as a preferred trading partner, political ally and informal protector.  Unlike what Indian 
scholar Homi Bhabha (1994) calls “colonial mimesis,” i.e. the use of mimicry as a tool of 
resistance by colonial subjects,15 Presthold argues that “similitude need not be subversive, 
confrontational or limited to the colonial environment. Similitude is more commonly employed 
in circumstances of asymmetrical power outside the bounds of colonialism. ” Mentioning the 
international relations of nineteenth-century Hawai‘i, Siam and Madagascar as further 
examples, Prestholdt describes similitude “[a]s a mode of self-representation [that] links 
symbols and claims to sameness in order to leverage relationships with the more powerful” 
(2007: 120). 
Whereas I am using the concept of parity to look at the position of the respective 
countries in international society, and the concept of similitude to examine their selective 
appropriation of Western culture and protocol in order gain advantages from hegemonic 
powers, I am using the related concept of hybridity to describe the wider character of the 
societies and political systems of non-Western states achieving parity and using similitude. 
Hybridity is an appropriate term here, since all non-Western states of the 19th century 
preserved aspects of traditional governance and culture while at the same time also embracing 
modern technology and the Western model of the nation-state as well as Western cultural 
protocols.  
The concept of hybridity has been used by a variety of authors to describe and analyse 
responses by non-Western societies to Western hegemonic influences, both in formal colonial 
                                                 
15
 Bhabha’s scholarship will be further discussed in connection to the concept of hybridity below. 
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settings and in those of confrontations between non-Western states and Western imperialism. 
Going beyond mere “mimesis” as described above, Homi Bhabha extensively uses the term 
“hybridity” to describe native reactions to British colonisation in India, thereby complicating 
simplistic analyses of colonialism. In The Location of Culture, he argues that hybridity “unsettles 
the mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power but reimplicates its identifications in 
strategies of subversion that turn the gaze of the discriminated back on the eye of power.” 
(Bhabha 1994: 159-160). Vicky Hsueh also makes use of the concept to unravel simplistic 
views of colonialism, but more from a legal and constitutional standpoint. In Hybrid 
Constitutions (2010) she analyses the constitutions of the early English settler colonies in North 
America to demonstrate how these legal systems were created by incorporating various 
elements of British and Native American origin. Similar to Bhabha, Lauren Benton and John 
Muth apply hybridity to societal analysis in colonial contexts, but extend it to non-colonized 
independent non-Western states. Benton and Muth’s essay “On Cultural Hybridity” (2000) not 
only investigates the hybrid aspects of partially Westernised colonial subjects, but also of the 
successful leadership of non-Western States in conflicts with Western imperialist powers, 
specifically Ethiopia in its victorious 1896 war with Italy and Japan in its victorious 1905 war 
with Russia.  
My use of the term “hybrid” to characterise native statecraft in Hawai‘i, the rest of 
Polynesia and other non-Western societies in the nineteenth century is primarily inspired by 
Kamanamaikalani Beamer. Conceptually influenced by Bhabha’s work cited above, Beamer’s 
work of analysing the strategies of selective appropriation by the native elites of the Hawaiian 
Kingdom shifts the term more definitively to a non-colonial situation, actually using the 
concept in order to underline the difference between a colony of a Western power and an 
independent non-Western state. In his dissertation, Beamer emphasises that “the Hawaiian 
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Kingdom was not a colonial institution but rather a hybrid structure to resist colonialism and 
offers insight into how an indigenous society appropriated the tools of the other for their own 
means” (2008, v). He elaborates further that he uses the concept of hybridity because to him it 
“accurately explain[s] the ways that people in their everyday lives engage and incorporate new 
tools and technologies”, and considers that “the benefit of a term like hybridity is that it focuses 
on the movement and motion between the traditional and the modern, the dominant and the 
dominated” (ibid., 27).   
Beamer’s lens of hybridity thus intends “to illustrate the ways in which Hawaiian rulers 
used traditional structures and systems of knowledge in an attempt to construct a modern 
nation-state” (ibid., 30), since “they were modifying existing structures and negotiating 
European legal forms which created something new, neither completely Anglo-American nor 
traditionally Hawaiian, but a combination of both.” (ibid., 177). Along the same lines, but more 
broadly in scope, and applied to the entire Pacific, David Armitage and Alison Bashford state 
that “Europeans and Pacific Islanders both possessed cosmologies that oriented their sense of 
the world and its origins: out of these emerged hybrid forms of knowledge […]” (Armitage and 
Bashford 2014:16). 
Another closely related theoretical concept, also cited by Beamer, which I find useful for 
my research, is that of the “Contact Zone”, as it has been developed by Mary-Louise Pratt in her 
1991 essay “Arts of the Contact Zone” which she later incorporated into Imperial Eyes (2008). 
Pratt defines “Contact Zones” as “social spaces, where disparate cultures meet, clash and 
grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and 
subordination […]” (Pratt 2008: 7) While Pratt mainly refers to situations of colonial 
oppression, I consider the term “Contact Zone” even more appropriate for independent non-
Western societies confronted with hegemonic Western influences, such as the cases under 
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consideration here. A decade earlier, Australian historian Greg Dening had already developed a 
similar perspective in his study of Marquesan society between the first Western encounter and 
definitive French colonisation (Dening 1980), focusing on the interaction between Europeans 
and islanders at the “beach,” i.e. the contact zone in which the encounter takes place. Beamer 
(2008: 25) points out that the Hawaiian Kingdom, as well as other island nations during the 
19th century were indeed “contact zones”, in which people from various backgrounds, both 
native and foreign, were involved in shaping their future. While some kind of integration into 
the Western-dominated world was clearly inevitable, a large space was left for the agency of 
the native leaders to manoeuvre these changes. In his 1993 thesis on the resistance of 
Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians against the coup-imposed 1887 “Bayonet Constitution”, William 
Earle comes to a similar conclusion:  
In the case of Hawai‘i, contact with the European world was largely inevitable and given the 
nature of world capitalism, incorporation into that system was also inevitable. However, at 
every point along the way there were choices that Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians made which 
had important consequences regarding the manner of incorporation and on whose terms that 
incorporation took place. (Earle 1993: xviii) 
 
In order to strengthen this argument, I would like to contrast the “hybrid state” model 
that I want to explore here with one that might be called a “transplant state.”16  Transplant 
states would be the imposed colonial systems that were put in place during the 19th and early 
20th centuries in non-Western areas taken over by the imperialist powers, usually without any 
consultation with the native peoples of the area and without inspiration from their traditional 
polities, and which, with slight modifications, are still in place in several Pacific Islands entities 
today, such as French Polynesia, Guam or Rapa Nui. But also modern post-colonial states 
                                                 
16
 I acknowledge John Wilson, who coined the term “Transplant State” as a counter-model in an earlier conversation 
with me.  
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directly developed out of colonial systems and lacking connections to pre-colonial polities, such 
as most present Melanesian and sub-Saharan African States, would fall in that category. The 
current US “State” of Hawai‘i, as it was created in the territory of the occupied Hawaiian 
Kingdom, with an institutional framework mainly copied from other US State constitutions, 
would be another example of a transplant state. On the other hand, since the “State of Hawai‘i” 
includes and continues in usurped form various institutions created by the Hawaiian Kingdom, 
it shares some aspects of a hybrid state as well.  
 
Theories of State Formation  
 
Since I am dealing with processes of state formation, both those of the classical 
Hawaiian state that was later hybridised to become the Hawaiian Kingdom and the formations 
of other Polynesian states under Hawaiian influence in the nineteenth century, a second area of 
political theory that informs my work is that related to state formation. A state is commonly 
understood as an organisation of society that is ruled by a central authority which relates to its 
subjects by means other than kinship, and which controls a certain territory, over which it 
exercises a recognised monopoly of force. In the history of mankind, those political structured 
are relatively recent. Processes to transform societies organised purely by kinship, such as 
tribal societies and chiefdoms, once common throughout the world, into states have occurred 
in many parts of the world during the past five millennia. The most detailed comparative works 
on those processes from an anthropological view have been The Early State, (Claessen and 
Skalník 1978) and Ideology and the Formation of Early States (Claessen and Oosten 1996), both 
of which contain articles on early state formation in pre-encounter Polynesia and analyse them 
in a worldwide comparative perspective. More specifically concerning Polynesia, the 
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comparative works by archaeologists Patrick V. Kirch (1984; 2010; 2012) and Robert Hommon 
(1976; 2013) as well as the study of classical Hawaiian history by Kēhaunani Cachola-Abad 
(2000) are essential in understanding the evolution of classical Hawaiian  polities within a 
wider Polynesian context, as will be discussed in chapter four.  Most interestingly for my 
research in this context, both Kirch (2010; 2012) and Hommon (1976; 2013) come to the 
conclusion that the Hawaiian Islands as well as Tonga were instances of primary state 
formation, meaning that a formation of states out of kinship societies took place without any 
external model to follow. Throughout world history, this occurred only in a few selected places, 
namely in ancient times in the Middle East (Egypt and Mesopotamia), the Indus valley, China, 
Mesoamerica and the Andean Highlands, as well as more historically recently in Central 
Eastern Africa (Sagan 1985) and in the Polynesian cases mentioned.  
Secondary state-formation processes, on the other hand, take their models from 
concurrently existing outside states. In other words, they became the destinations of 
institutional transfer. The modern states in Oceania emerging in the nineteenth century that 
my research is focused on are thus not only based on the foundations of local primary state 
formation in the cases of Hawai‘i and Tonga but are to a large extent secondary states based on 
transfer of Western models of statecraft.   
One of the most thorough studies of state formation in Europe, i.e. the source of this 
transfer, has been done by Charles Tilly (1975a; 1975b; 1990). Tilly provides a comprehensive 
analysis of European state evolution during the entire second millennium A.D., focusing on the 
formation of what he terms the “National State,” a territorially defined, socially diversified and 
bureaucratically organised state, as it formed specifically during the early modern age, in 
contrasts with other, more traditional state types such as multi-layered empires, city states and 
feudal agricultural states. Arguing along similar lines, Samuel E. Finer (1974) describes the 
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long and complex process in which kings in Western Europe monopolised the means of 
violence within their realms and consolidated their rule through the establishment of bounded 
territorial sovereign spaces.  
Particularly, “[l]ate Medieval England was the most centralised and unified monarchy in 
Europe” (Loades 1997a: 1). This, combined with the fact that Great Britain later was the first 
and foremost Western country to interact with Polynesians and hence became the primary 
source of institutional transfer to the Hawaiian Kingdom and other Polynesian states, makes 
Great Britain the most relevant of all European state formations to look into in greater detail 
here. An important body of work has been produced to study the particularly centralised 
structure of the English state under the Tudors (Loades 1997a and b) and its subsequent 
evolution into the modern British state (Edwards 2001; Ellis and Barber 1995). Ellis (1995) 
points out the particular importance of borderland administrations within the Tudor state. In 
the sixteenth century, the realm’s core of lowland England was already territorially organised 
and firmly under the control of a London-based bureaucracy. In the areas bordering Scotland 
and the still independent parts of Ireland, on the other hand, a gradual transition from a more 
diffuse system of enforcing governance by working with networks of local clans, especially in 
still tribally organised areas like parts of Ireland at the time, to the organisational structure of a 
territorial state as we know it today can be well observed. An earlier, long-term study by 
Michael Hechter of the United Kingdom’s constantly oppressed and underdeveloped “Celtic 
fringe,” i.e. Ireland, the Scottish Highlands, Wales and Cornwall (Hechter 1975) introduces the 
concept of “internal colonialism,” to modern state building, a recurrent topic that has 
frequently arisen in nation-state-building when there is major cultural and linguistic diversity 
within an area that is refashioned into a nation-state by a dominating ethno-linguistic group.  
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The culmination of the European state-building process was the modern bureaucratic 
state of the post-enlightenment nineteenth century, which was comprehensively analysed in 
the early-20th century study by Max Weber (1995), a study arguably yet unsurpassed in depth 
and scope. Its primary characterisation is its perceived rationality centred on the hiring and 
promotion of officials on the basis of qualification and merit, not on any other principles such 
as personal relationships to their superiors, as in a patrimonial regime. It was essentially this 
model, of the “Weberian” bureaucratic state, that was institutionally transferred to much of the 
World in the nineteenth century.  
 The unique process of European state-building thus described later became crucial for 
the subsequent history of state formation worldwide because it resulted in a unique system of 
co-equal political entities sharing the same conventions of mutual interaction, i.e. sovereign 
states under international law. Other states that were formed after this original process thus 
had to conform to the format already established, as Tilly aptly states in the conclusion of his 
seminal study of European state formation:  
[T]he European state-makers, and a few non-European collaborators, through war, conquest 
and alliance, eventually fashioned a worldwide system of states. As the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries have worn on, the newcomers to this system had less choice of the 
positions they would occupy in it, even down to the exact territories they would control. 
(Tilly 1975b: 81) 
 
State formation outside of Europe thus became severely conscripted once Western 
influence had become dominant in the world. From that moment onwards, state formation 
processes in non-Western regions unavoidably included institutional transfer. In areas close to 
trade routes, or under early European colonial rule, that process started as early as in the 
sixteenth century.  In Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, for example Anthony Reid (1988) 
describes the evolution of insular and coastal Southeast Asian states in terms of economy, 
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technology and political centralisation during the fifteenth to sixteenth century, highlighting 
the role of maritime trade with China and Europe in the political centralisation process, which 
lead to the adaptation of various foreign technologies to enhance state formation and 
expansion. To be accurate, in that early age China played an equally important part as did the 
West in that particular region,17 but by the nineteenth century virtually all transferred 
technology and institutions came from the West.  
 
Institutional Transfer, Selective Appropriation and Hybridisation 
 
While in many parts of the non-Western world this transfer happened coercively 
through Western colonialism, it also occurred through borrowing in a pattern of selective 
appropriation by non-Western states that were able to avoid colonisation by Western imperial 
powers. Since the Hawaiian Kingdom, as well as other state-building projects in 19th century 
Oceania fall into that category, that type of Western institutional transfer is what I focus on 
here. While the manoeuvring space for these states was certainly limited, given the hegemony 
by the nineteenth century of the Western state as a prescriptive model for the world, there was 
much more choice left to the agency of those states’ leaders, as opposed to societies under 
colonial rule which were subject to full-scale institutional imposition at the whim of the 
coloniser. In a study of Western institutional transfer to Japan, for example, Eleanor Westney 
(1987) demonstrates how the Meiji leaders carefully selected institutions to adopt from 
different Western countries, and thereby created their own innovative version of a distinctively 
Japanese institutional modernity. In a similar way, the transfer of institutions originating from 
                                                 
17
 This Chinese influence is comparable to the role other major civilisations played in other regions before the 
emergence of European hegemony, e.g. Islamic state institutions were heavily transferred from North Africa and the 
Middle East to pre-colonial Western and Eastern African states, as described by Herbst (2000); and much earlier, 
Hindu-Buddhist state institutions had been transferred from India to various states of Southeast Asia, as will also be 
discussed in the context of hybridity in Chapter five (Coedès 1968).  
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the European state formation process to the Pacific Islands, both in the nineteenth century, and 
in the present post-colonial era, has recently been examined in a comprehensive survey by 
Peter Larmour (2005).  
While the “institutional transfer” model, as employed by Westney and Larmour, is 
certainly useful, it sometimes appears to miss out on the hybridity of the political system that is 
the destination of the transferred institutions. Especially in the case of Tonga and Hawai‘i, 
which themselves had in classical times developed political institutions with some parallels to 
those of pre-modern European states, existing institutions were certainly not replaced, but 
rather modified, i.e. hybridised, in the process of institutional transfer. For instance, it is 
striking how much the Hawaiian conception of a traditional polity as an organic body with the 
Mō‘ī [monarch] as its head (Malo 1987: 121-122) resembles both Hobbes’ concept of the State 
as a “Leviathan” (Hobbes 1968) and Hegel’s concept of “state organicism” (Wolff 1984). As 
Beamer points out, “[t]he fact that governance was abstractly thought of in these terms is of 
great significance toward the understanding of the modernisation of this system” (2008: 63).  
In that sense, the well-documented model function of Hawai‘i for other Pacific Islands 
state-building projects that is at the core of makes the hybridisation process there even more 
complex.  The institutions of the constitutional Hawaiian state, itself a hybrid merging the 
outcome of the original state formation process in classical Hawai‘i with transferred 
institutions from the West, became in turn transferred to Fiji, Tonga, Sāmoa and other islands, 
where they were further hybridised by merging with classical political institutions of those 
archipelagos.  
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Critical analyses of Statecraft 
 
The state as an institution, and especially the processes of state-driven modernisation 
as they happened during the 19th century, has been the subject of criticism from several 
angles. I have already mentioned above how modern state building by England had led to the 
marginalisation of Britain’s “Celtic Fringe” and the emergence of a pattern of “internal 
colonialism” (Hechter 1975). Along similar lines, in Seeing Like a State (1998), James Scott 
describes how during the 19th century state bureaucracies rationalised control over their 
territory and citizenry through such measures as surveying, land tenure reforms, the 
establishment of a standardised naming system and the standardisation of a national language. 
As Scott argues, this process of modernisation created the basis for more extreme schemes of 
rationalisation and social control that were implemented by totalitarian regimes during the 
20th century, all of them eventually failing but often at cost of a dramatic human suffering. In a 
similar, albeit less dramatic way, Narusawa Akira criticises the “excess of order” arising out of 
state modernisation in Japan (Akira 1997).  
While I concur with Scott and Akira in denouncing these excesses, I also agree with 
Scott’s statement to be “[…]emphatically not making a blanket case against either bureaucratic 
planning or high-modernist ideology[,]” but to “[…] make a case against an imperial or 
hegemonic planning mentality that excludes the necessary role of local knowledge and know-
how” (Scott 1998: 6). With a few possible exceptions, the emerging states in 19th century 
Polynesia were not “imperial or hegemonic” in nature, but, as hybrid constructions, did indeed 
include local knowledge and know-how in their modernisation processes. For example, as 
Kamanamaikalani Beamer and Ka‘eo Duarte have outlined, the Māhele land reform process in 
the Hawaiian Kingdom during the 1840s and 1850s included the safeguarding of native tenant 
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rights (Beamer 2008: 194-202), and maps of the Hawaiian Government Survey were based on 
local knowledge of land boundaries (Beamer and Duarte 2009).  
Lastly in this section on statecraft, I would also like to caution against an interpretation 
of state formation processes as corresponding to a teleological evolutionary scheme. In my 
interpretation, change of social structures does not necessarily follow a linear model from the 
simpler to the more complex. As I will briefly mention in the third chapter, there is evidence 
that there was yet another instance of pristine state formation in Oceania, namely that of the 
Saudeleur dynasty on the Micronesian island of Pohnpei, centred on the urban capital of Nan 
Madol. Likely a very stratified, feudally organised state, the Saudeleur system existed for 
several centuries, but was eventually overthrown around the early seventeenth century, and 
the island’s political system morphed into a more decentralised structure of five kinship-based 
chiefdoms during the classical era. According to Pohnpeian oral tradition, the urban-centred 
feudal state of the Saudeleur, parasitically extracting labour and resources from the rural 
population, had become so oppressive and unbearable that the islanders rebelled with the help 
of a chiefly leader from outside who established a political system more appropriate for the 
islanders’ needs (Hanlon 1988a: 9-25). Similarly, there are hypotheses that the political system 
of Sāmoa once used to be much more centralised, ruled by the demi-divine Tui Manu‘a dynasty 
and a few other high-ranking lines, but that it eventually developed into the decentralised 
system based on autonomous village councils of Sāmoa’s classical period, a system that 
arguably was the most useful for the people’s needs (Meleiseā 1987). In other places like the 
Hawaiian Islands, the trend apparently went in the opposite direction during the classical 
periods, towards more and more centralised polities as described above. Thus, I would argue 
that the development of statecraft and political systems should not be seen as strictly following 
an evolutionary model from the primitive to the complex, but rather as an adaptation to 
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circumstantial needs. If looked at in this way, this also sheds another light on the adaptation of 
Western-style statecraft during the nineteenth century, which could then be seen not so much 
as an abstract necessity to be “modern” or “civilised” according to Western standards, but 
rather as an adaptation to the needs of a new situation, in which classical political institutions 
would no longer deliver useful governance if left unchanged.    
 
Interdisciplinary Comparative Historical Analysis 
 
Analysing political processes that have taken place in a variety of locations in the past, I 
conceptualise the methodology of my work as both interdisciplinary and comparative.  In the 
past few decades, interdisciplinary approaches have become increasingly common in Pacific 
studies. Many of the works published in the field defy easy categorizations according to 
classical Western academia such as history, geography, anthropology and political science. 
According to Terence Wesley-Smith (1995: 128), in Pacific studies “perhaps the most notable 
convergences have occurred at the boundaries between the disciplines of anthropology (or 
more properly, ethnography) and history.” Australian historian Greg Dening for instance, has 
revolutionized the writing of Pacific history by relying heavily on methodologies hitherto 
employed only by anthropologists in order to write a history of the Marquesas Islands from 
first Western encounters to definitive French colonisation (Dening 1980), and Pacific 
anthropologists have made intensive use of archival materials, hitherto a domain reserved to 
historians (e.g. Sahlins 1985). In a similar way, my own research draws from multiple 
disciplinary approaches, including political science, history, anthropology and geography. 
Given the multiple archipelagos studied, this dissertation is to a large extent one of 
comparative historical analysis, i.e. using historical data from primary (mainly archival) and 
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secondary sources, and analysing these data comparatively within the theoretical framework 
outlined in this chapter.  
Conceptualization of this research began with the empirical, not with the theoretical. In 
other words, I did not choose my cases of study to make a point in theory, but rather I started 
looking for theories to give more traction to my study. One particular approach that I found 
well suited for parts of this dissertation is comparative historical analysis. When the Hawaiian 
Kingdom developed into a very complex state at full parity with European states by the mid-
1800s, and then actively promoted itself as a model to inspire other archipelagos to create a 
similar states, a situation was created where a comparative study could be undertaken, namely 
how the transfer of Hawaiian political ideas and institutions turned out in the different 
archipelagos that were the recipients of this transfer. The nineteenth-century Polynesian states 
thus become interesting comparative case studies to make more general points about state-
building, selective appropriation and institutional transfer. 
Comparative historical analysis has been a commonly used method in the social 
sciences, and many seminal works that have become foundational in the formulation of major 
theories have heavily drawn from such research. As Mahoney and Rueschenmeyer (2003: 3-
40) describe, most major social theorists, including scholars as distinctive and influential as 
Adam Smith and Karl Marx, have used comparative historical case-studies in order to make 
major points to refine their theories. As a general characterization of this type of academic 
work, Mahoney and Rueschenmeyer state that “[w]hile not unified by one theory or method, all 
work in this tradition does share a common concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on 
process over time, and the use of systematic and contextualized comparison” (ibid,: 10). 
One major challenge of comparative historical analysis is that of selection bias, as 
Geddes (1990) explains. If only cases are selected that show the results the author is interested 
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in researching (e.g. the development of a particular system of government or institution), the 
studied phenomena will be merely described but cannot properly be explained. Similarly, 
Lustick (1996) points to the complications arising out of the selection of secondary sources. 
For reasons of efficiency it is unlikely a researcher will be able to rely entirely on primary 
sources, but all researchers, even those whose work appears most descriptive and neutral, are 
biased in one way or another. Moreover, because of the biases in original research, secondary 
sources often contradict one another, which once more requires the secondary researcher to 
side with one of the interpretations and discard contradicting ones. Selection bias thus 
represents a multi-faced dilemma that is not easy to solve. Lustick recommends practitioners 
of comparative historical research to be conscious of the bias of their research and to 
acknowledge differences and contradictions that put limits to their conclusions.  
Following these recommendations (Luctick 1996: 615) I will consciously limit myself to 
the use of interpretative secondary sources within the “Islander-agency” schools of 
historiography as outlined in chapter one, while acknowledging that secondary sources with 
other interpretations exist and that an analysis based on those sources might lead to a different 
conclusion.  
That being said, the fact that Hawai‘i was not the only Oceanian kingdom during the 
nineteenth century, but the only one to enter the family of nations as an independent state, 
makes it worthwhile to first analyse the political development of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 
comparison to the other island kingdoms. The outcome could then better explain what made 
Hawai‘i exceptional compared to the other archipelagos.  As far as state formation as such is 
concerned, the other archipelagos can thus serve as comparative case studies, while in terms of 
international recognition, the rest of Oceania serve as negative case studies. In the second step, 
when the transfer of the Hawaiian state model to the other archipelagos is being analysed, the 
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archipelagos at the destination of this transfer serve as comparative case studies and what can 
be measured is whether this transfer was successful in the long run or not.  
Of further interest is that the cases of state formation in Oceania challenge the notion 
that military power was a precondition for recognition by the West. Even the Hawaiian 
Kingdom as the largest and most politically stable of Oceania’s states had absolutely no military 
capacity to fend off a belligerent invasion by a potential Western coloniser after the 1830s. In 
its later negotiations with the Great Powers, Hawai‘i had no military leverage whatsoever. Yet it 
was precisely Hawai‘i which managed through use of ingenious diplomacy to become the first 
non-Western state to be fully recognized, decades before Japan, which was arguably the 
militarily strongest of all non-Western states at the time. Studying the emergence of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom and other states in Oceania in the nineteenth century thus shifts the 
attention of history from militarist policies to peaceful diplomacy without any military backing, 
something quite unusual for the nineteenth century, when international society was far less 
institutionalised than today, and much less durable protection was guaranteed solely by virtue 
of state sovereignty.  
Another important issue to consider in such comparative approaches in the study of 
Pacific Islands is how unique Oceania is, and how separately it should be treated from other 
regions of the world. In her 2006 essay “On Analogies: Rethinking the Pacific in a Global 
Context”, Teresia Teaiwa has criticized the simplifying and superficial analogies made by 
Western journalists and scholars, such as those about the supposed “Caribbeanisation” or 
“Africanisation” of the Pacific, which, besides being usually very imprecise and anachronistic, 
are often based on inaccurate Western stereotypes about places like Africa in the first place. 
That being said, Teaiwa is also critical of a  self-centred, isolationist view of Pacific Studies and 
welcomes serious comparative work, such as, for instance, genuine studies of similarities in the 
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problems of post-colonial nation-building in Africa and Melanesia (Teaiwa 2006: 80). She also 
states her concerns about a simplified dichotomy of “Native” versus “Western”, which risks 
inadvertently replicating colonial stereotypes of native stagnation and Western progress, 
arguing that “what worries [her] about some assertions of indigenous difference from “the 
West” is that they often do not account for changes in indigenous ways of knowing and being” 
(ibid: 75, emphasis in the original).  
While I see the merit in examining Pacific societies on their own terms and being careful 
about too easy analogies, I concur with the point Teaiwa makes about the danger of refusing 
comparisons and dialogue with other world cultures, including the West. As outlined above, in 
my analysis I am not limiting myself to Oceania alone but use a wide array of literature on 
state-building in other parts of the world for comparison. Such an approach clearly shows 
ahistorical, static views of pre-encounter Pacific societies to be inaccurate, when in fact some 
very detailed research about the evolution of “traditional” culture provides ample evidence 
that society and culture significantly evolved and changed before arriving at the classical stage. 
While it is true that some earlier historians and anthropologists did make inappropriate 
comparisons, especially when coming from an imperialist point of view, some of these 
examples from the era of the Hawaiian Kingdom should not be easily dismissed and need to be 
seriously re-examined and evaluated. For instance, the use of the early 19th century Prussian 
land reform as a template for the Māhele land reform that was suggested by privy council 
member William Little Lee to King Kamehameha III in December 1847, has been dismissed by 
Kame‘eleihiwa (1992: 219-20) as inappropriate and superficial, and similarly, a comparison by 
the Kingdom’s head surveyor W.D. Alexander of classical Hawaiian land tenure to medieval 
European feudalism (Alexander 1882) has been dismissed by a broad range of late 20th 
century Hawaiian scholars as equally inappropriate (e.g. Trask 1993). A more subtle analysis of 
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these analogies, as they have been made by Beamer (2008) and Preza (2010) however, 
stepping away from a presentist view and putting them in a proper historical context, shows 
that they were indeed useful at the time.18  
More important for my own research, however, are comparative studies of Pacific 
Islands with other non-Western societies, especially those that had also engaged in selective 
appropriation and constructed hybrid, modernizing states, like the Japanese Empire of the 
Meiji era, the Kingdom of Siam, the Sultanate of Johor, or the Kingdom of Madagascar. What 
makes comparison with other non-Western states additionally helpful is that those 
comparisons also contribute to breaking down the dominant dichotomy of Islanders vs. 
Westerners. Since the Hawaiian Kingdom was in direct communication with some of these 
states, such comparisons are not merely analogies to make a point, but are highly appropriate 
to provide historical contexts. As discussed above, size and military capacity is obviously a 
major factor of difference that needs to be taken into consideration, since unlike the Pacific 
Islands states, some of those in Asia had millions of citizens and large military forces that 
sometimes, such as in the case of Japan, matched those of the West. This important distinction 
aside, however, parallels are still quite numerous, and thus worth considering for comparative 
analysis. In a sense, I would argue that the quasi-universal acknowledgement of Meiji Japan as 
the primary model for other non-Western modernization (Andaya 1977; Esoavelomandroso 
1988; Pistor-Hatam 1996; Worringer 2004; Aydın 2007) was replicated on a smaller scale 
                                                 
18
 The case of W.D. Alexander is particularly interesting for my research. While I acknowledge that he later became 
a traitor to the Kingdom and as such authored a biased work of anti-Kingdom political propaganda (Alexander 
1896), I do not believe that his later treasonous actions make his earlier work invalid, which would be tantamount to 
tossing out the baby with the bathwater. Having been appointed head surveyor of the Kingdom by Kamehameha V, 
in which capacity Alexander gained a first-hand knowledge of Hawaiian land tenure over decades of work in the 
field, there is little reason to assume that his analysis of Hawaiian land tenure concluding in an analogy to feudal 
Europe was inaccurate, especially since it was not based on an out-of context comparison between Hawai‘i and the 
West, but rather on a careful comparison with classical land tenure systems in other parts of Polynesia, as he 
described in another article (Alexander 1888). 
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concerning the Hawaiian Kingdom’s model function for Oceania.  Hawai‘i and the Pacific could 
thus be seen as a microcosmic mirror of Japan and the non-Western world at-large.  
 
Previous Comparative studies of Nineteenth-Century Polynesian States 
 
The crucial period in Pacific history between the initial Western encounter in the late 
eighteenth and colonial takeover in the late nineteenth century, in which my research is 
situated has been documented by various historians. Regional Histories of Oceania usually 
contain at least a chapter dedicated to this period (e.g. Oliver 1961; Campbell 2003a, Howe, 
Kiste and Lal 1994). Most of these studies, however, focus on the impact of Western influence, 
leading up, more or less teleologically, to eventual colonial takeover (e.g. Hempenstall in Howe, 
Kiste and Lal 1994: 29-39). Powerful native rulers such as Kamehameha I of Hawai‘i and 
George Tupou I of Tonga, are usually mentioned (e.g. Oliver 1961: 182, 257), but few Pacific 
historians have focused on native state formation in a systematic comparative way. 
Anthropologists, on the other hand, have usually focused on pre-Western social organisation, 
as in the comparative studies on classical Polynesian socio-political evolution by Sahlins 
(1958), Goldman (1970) and Kirch (1984) [which will be further discussed in chapter four], 
and if interested in post-encounter developments, have tended to study them as “acculturation 
processes” rather than continuations of indigenous social evolution with new variables 
introduced (e.g. Thomas 2010). Political Scientists have for the most part studied Oceania as a 
region only as far as the post-World War II period of decolonisation and post-colonial state 
building is concerned. The only exception appears to be Peter Larmour, who in his 2005 book 
Foreign Flowers: Institutional Transfer and Good Governance in the Pacific Islands, gives the 
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state-building processes of the nineteenth century major credit as a precursor to recent issues, 
which his study is focused on (Larmour 2005: 9, 13, 67-77, 171-172, 183).19   
As far as I am aware, the first book-length work to contain a major focus on nineteenth-
century state building in Oceania was Kerry Howe’s 1984 Where the Waves Fall. Howe provides 
a typology of political development in the major Polynesian archipelagos after the Western 
encounter, classifying them into successful and unsuccessful state formation attempts. He 
classifies Tahiti, Hawai‘i, and Tonga as cases of “conquering Kings,” referring to the Pomare, 
Kamehameha and Tupou dynasties, respectively. Aotearoa, Samoa and Fiji, on the other hand, 
are to Howe cases of “monarchs manqué” (Howe 1984: 125-255). While this analysis is laying 
some good groundwork for the understanding of state-building in the nineteenth century 
Pacific, and as such has been an influential source for the development of my own analysis, 
Howe’s typology is in several ways over-simplistic, and his analysis not always sufficient. For 
some reason, the seventh of the larger Polynesian archipelagos, the Marquesas Islands, is 
missing from his comparative analysis. This is astonishing, since that archipelago would be a 
more convincing negative case study for state formation than any of the three Howe attempts 
to present as such. In the Marquesas, there was virtually no state formation at all, whereas Fiji 
and Samoa did develop constitutional governments, even if they were clearly much more 
instable and short-lived than those of Hawai‘i and Tonga. Equally problematic is his argument 
that “[t]here could be no such thing as a Maori nation” in Aotearoa (Howe 1984: 229), given 
that there were at least two attempts to build a Māori state in the nineteenth century, and there 
was certainly a formation of national consciousness through the spread of a unified Māori 
literary language. On the other hand, Howe’s classification of Tahiti with Hawai‘i and Tonga as 
a successfully unified native kingdom is also problematic, given, first, that the Tahitian 
                                                 
19
 Larmour’s important work will be discussed in more detail in chapters six, seven and eight. 
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Kingdom never brought the entire Tahitian [Society Islands] archipelago, let alone the entire 
sphere of use of Tahitian as a literary language, under its rule, and secondly, that the Tahitian 
Kingdom, unlike its Hawaiian and Tongan counterparts, went through phases of major internal 
instability after the passing of its first monarch in 1821. 
New Zealand historian Ian Campbell in his 1989 Pacific history volume (re-edited in 
2003 as Worlds Apart) dedicates two chapters to state formation in the nineteenth century. 
Both chapters focus mostly on the agency of Westerners and the roles they played, supportive 
or destructive, of native monarchies.  In the first chapter Campbell discusses the important 
influence of missionaries in the formation of monarchies in the first part of the nineteenth 
century, hence referred to as “missionary kingdoms” (Campbell 2003a: 88). This designation 
may have some merit for Tahiti, where mission presence preceded, and majorly influenced, the 
formation of a monarchical state, but is more problematic for Hawai‘i, where the missionaries 
encountered an already consolidated archipelago-wide state. In the second chapter, Campbell 
focuses on the presence of Western settlers and how this led to the undermining, or prevention 
of sustainable formation, of native monarchies  during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, arguing that the exceptional survival of the Tongan monarchical state is mainly due to 
the absence of large settler community while admitting King Tupou I’s “shrewd leadership” 
(Campbell 2003a: 105) so that “[h]ere [in Tonga] at least, the success of Polynesian 
statesmanship was evident” (ibid.: 116). The inherent dismissal of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 
this discourse is problematic and appears to be a conclusion in hindsight rather than one based 
on primary source evidence, since at least until 1887, Hawai‘i was acknowledged throughout 
the Pacific as a successful model of a modern state under native Polynesian leadership, and 
Tonga’s late nineteenth century reforms explicitly used the Hawaiian political system as a 
template, as I will discuss below.  
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Another detailed comparative study of Polynesian states in the nineteenth century was 
done by French historian Claire Laux.  In Les théocraties missionnaires en Polynésie au XIXe siècle 
[“The Missionary Theocracies in Nineteenth-Century Polynesia”] (Laux 2000), she focuses on 
the role played by missionaries in the creation of political systems that have been referred to as 
Christian theocracies during the early nineteenth century in Tahiti, Hawai‘i, the Cook Islands, 
Tonga, Mangareva, ‘Uvea and Futuna. While Laux does problematize the indiscriminate 
characterisation of these polities as “missionary theocracies,” her main focus is still on the 
missionaries themselves, and the agency of native monarchs is less acknowledged.  For 
instance, describing nineteenth-century Tonga as a “‘théocratie’ protestante de longue durée” 
[long-lasting Protestant “theocracy”] (Laux 2000: 31) is quite problematic, given the deep-
seated conflict between King Tupou I and the mission – a conflict essentially won by the King, 
not the missionaries – towards the end of the century. 
Each of those mentioned studies contain valuable information and have hence informed 
my understanding of state formation and development in nineteenth-century Oceania. None of 
them, however, has systematically analysed nineteenth-century state-building in the context of 
the longue durée of Polynesian socio-political evolution. Also, none of these studies has 
highlighted the crucial importance of the Hawaiian Kingdom both as a model for, and active 
promoter of, later state-building in other archipelagos. 
 
Previous Studies of Hawaiian Policy towards Oceania 
 
Coverage of Hawaiian policy towards Oceania by modern historians appears to have 
started with a 1951 Master’s thesis by Jason Horn entitled “Primacy of the Pacific under the 
Hawaiian Kingdom.”  Horn’s volume, unfortunately left unpublished, starts off with an 
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acknowledgement of Hawaiian agency, stating in the preface that “[e]xisting accounts of 
international diplomatic developments in 1887 affecting Samoa do not cover adequately the 
important role played by the Hawaiian Kingdom” (Horn 1951: ii). He subsequently presents a 
deep and nearly exhaustive study of Hawaiian diplomacy in Oceania from the 1850s to the 
1880s, based on archival resources in the Hawai‘i Archives. Horn appears to be the first 
historian to have systematically examined those documents. His focus is on the two most 
voluminous collections of documents relating to the issue, namely St. Julian’s correspondence 
with Foreign Ministers Wyllie and Harris in the 1850s and 1870s, as well as Hawaiian Envoy to 
Sāmoa Bush’s correspondence with Foreign Minister Gibson in 1887. As far as archival 
documents available in Hawai‘i and newspaper articles in English are concerned, Horn’s 
history is quite comprehensive. The major shortcoming, similar to most other twentieth-
century historians, is his lack of using Hawaiian-language materials, except for a few archival 
documents for which he procured translations.  
The two high-profile mid-twentieth century works of Hawaiian history, Kuykendall’s 
three-volume The Hawaiian Kingdom and Gavan Daws 1968 Shoal of Time each contain one 
chapter on the issue of Hawaiian policy towards Oceania. Kuykendall appears to have been 
alerted to the importance of Oceania for the history of the Hawaiian Kingdom only through the 
work of Horn, on whose thesis committee he served, since the first two volumes of the trilogy 
(Kuykendall 1938 and 1953), covering the reigns of all the Kamehamehas, contain no mention 
of St. Julian’s activities and his influence on Hawaiian policy.  Only Kuykendall’s third volume 
(edited posthumously in 1967) contains a detailed chapter titled “Hawaii Seeks Leadership of 
Pacific Islands” (Kuykendall 1967: 305-339), which introduces St. Julian and summarises his 
activities – mainly based on Horn’s thesis –, and continues a thorough analysis of Hawaiian 
Oceania policy during Kalākaua’s reign, based on detailed primary source research which in 
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several instances exceeds that of Horn. Kuykendall’s main merits are the thoroughness of his 
research, and his relative lack of bias. At the end of the chapter, Kuykendall quotes King 
Kalākaua himself explaining the motivations for his policy (Kuykendall 1967: 339).    
While Kuykendall’s methodology as a historian, writing the history of a country whose 
main language he was unable to read, still deserves criticism, Daws’ handling of the same issue, 
on the other hand, is much more problematic. While Kuykendall documents Hawai‘i’s Oceania 
policy in great details without much comment, Daws’ approach is to provide a short summary 
of the main events and then to reproduce derogatory comments made by domestic opponents 
of Kalākaua (Daws 1968: 235-239). Thus, the only primary source quoted at length in Daws’ 
chapter is a cynic poem making fun of Kalakāua’s policy that was published in the English-
language opposition newspaper Hawaiian Gazette, an organ of the “missionary party.” No 
rebutting quote from the pro-Government press is provided, and, worse, Daws uses a line from 
the Gazette’s poem, “The Empire of the Calabash” as the title for the whole chapter.20 American 
anthropologist Douglas Oliver falls right in line with Daws, referring to Hawaiian pan-Oceanian 
policy as a “pathetic development [...] to delay the inevitable” (1961: 139). 
Another, much less well-known mid-twentieth century historian who did extensive 
research on Hawaiian diplomacy in the Pacific Islands is Merze Tate, who in the early 1960s 
published two articles on the topic; one focused on Hawai‘i’s early interest in Polynesia focused 
on St, Julian’s activities (Tate 1961), the other one concentrating on Hawaiian policy under 
Kalākaua and the mission to Sāmoa (Tate 1960). Like Kuykendall, Tate partly builds on Horn’s 
work but uses further sources, especially those in US archives because of her background as a 
                                                 
20
 Daws’ book is notorious for such an approach of one-sided quoting of derogatory comments by the treasonous 
opposition, for instance by titling the chapter on King Lunalilo “Whisky Bill” (190), ending the chapter on Gibson’s 
life in a personally insulting quote George Dole made at Gibson’s funeral (250), and describing the first territorial 
legislature of 1900, dominated by Hawaiian patriots attempting to preserve as much as possible of Hawaiian identity 
under the imposed US system, as “worse than anyone thought it could be” (294-5). 
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US diplomatic historian.  With the use of a wider variety of international sources, Tate’s work 
represents a quite insightful geopolitical study, seeing the Hawaiian Kingdom as an “indigenous 
competitor to Western powers within the region” (Tate 1960:378). However, despite these 
progressive geopolitical insights, Tate’s approach is still situated within the framework of Great 
Power policy, and more specifically within an Anglo-Saxon perspective of British and US 
imperial rivalry. In the end, she comes to the conclusion that the goals of Hawaiian policy in 
Oceania were unrealistic, because Great Britain and the United States would have never let that 
policy happen, even if the Hawaiian Kingdom had made stronger and earlier efforts to 
implement it (Tate 1961: 244), a debatable assessment that appears to be too much based on 
teleological thinking.  Furthermore, especially for the later phase under Kalākaua and Gibson, 
Tate’s Anglo-Saxon imperial focus is too limiting, since the Hawaiian Kingdom was increasingly 
positioning itself in a station of non-Western solidarity and embracing a kind of early non-
aligned, tiers-mondiste attitude, as I will further explore in the next section of this chapter.21 
More in line with such a view is the recent work of another African-American historian, 
Gerald Horne, who in The White Pacific (Horne 2007) frames nineteenth-century Hawaiian 
diplomacy in the context of a global challenge to White supremacy. Horne places Hawaiian 
state-building and pan-Oceanian diplomacy in the context of preserving the rights of non-White 
people and preventing slavery-like plantation colonialism by primarily American 
entrepreneurs throughout the Pacific, arguing that a Hawaiian-led league of Asian and Pacific 
nations would have offered “alternatives to colonialism” (Horne 2007: 91) by establishing 
“Hawaiian Supremacy” (ibid.: 92) that would have led to a “Black Pacific” instead of a “White” 
                                                 
21
 Furthermore, Tate’s claim that Hawai‘i’s Oceanian policy during Kalākaua’s reign was “lacking popular support” 
(Tate 1960: 407) is likely to be based on a selective reading of English-language sources biased against Hawaiian 
government policy produced by the unrepresentative but high-profile “missionary party,” not on an assessment of 
public opinion, which on all accounts appears to have been in the majority favourably inclined towards King 
Kalākaua’s policies. In that sense, Tate’s selection bias resembles that of Daws, although she does not deploy the 
latter’s cynicism and attempts to present an objective interpretation. 
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one (ibid.: 129). Overall, Horne provides a good characterisation of Hawaiian foreign policy, but 
nonetheless, his focus is somewhat limited, as he attempts to transplant an African American 
studies perspective into the Pacific, an approach that only partially works. The abuses of the 
labour trade in the Pacific that Horne presents as the link between slavery in the American 
South and later American overseas imperialism certainly existed, but these were by no means 
the only, and probably not the central, problem Hawaiian and other Polynesian state-builders 
and their foreign advisors had to deal with.  
Between Tate’s limiting Anglo-Saxon focus and Horne’s overly pan-Africanist view of 
the Pacific, Paul Hooper’s 1980 Elusive Destiny takes up somewhat of a middle ground. Overall, 
of the all the authors not situating themselves within the recent Hawaiian renaissance, Hooper 
probably provides the best analyses of nineteenth-century Hawaiian foreign policy.  While 
most of his book is concerned with mid-twentieth century internationalist movements engaged 
in brokering relations between Asia and North America, he sees the Hawaiian Kingdom’s 
foreign policy not merely as a prelude to those later activities, but credits the statesmen of 
independent Hawaii with establishing the archipelago as a hub of Pacific diplomacy, while 
regretting that all of this was completely obscured by the kingdom’s overthrow and subsequent 
Americanisation.  Hooper thus correctly identifies Hawaiian foreign policy as internationalist, 
and wide-ranging in purpose, serving both geopolitical objectives – keeping Western 
imperialism at bay – and domestic policy goals – strengthening of Hawaiian national identity 
(Hooper 1980: 43; 64). 
As mentioned in chapter one, the work of ‘Ōiwi scholars arising from the late twentieth 
century Hawaiian renaissance has majorly changed the landscape of Hawaiian historiography, 
resulting in an increased focus on aboriginal Hawaiians, especially maka‘āinana [commoners], 
and increased use of Hawaiian language sources. While the earliest such works were mainly 
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focusing on the “fatal impact” of the Western encounter, a paradigm into which an active 
regional policy by the Hawaiian state hardly fits, later works of ‘Ōiwi scholarship have 
increasingly focused on Hawaiian agency – more so with advancing chronology, as Beamer 
(2008: 34-49) has pointed out –, and, as mentioned in chapter one, most recent works (e.g. Sai 
2011; Beamer 2014) have portrayed the Hawaiian Kingdom and its international diplomacy in 
a positive light. However, most of the recent ‘Ōiwi scholars have not dedicated more than a 
subchapter to Hawai‘i’s Oceania policy, and if so, mentioned only its culmination during the 
reign of Kalākaua (e.g. Osorio 2002: 229-235; Beamer 2014: 186-190), but not its development 
over the preceding decades. 
The first aboriginal Hawaiian historian to engage in a volume-length study of Hawaiian 
relations with other parts of Oceania is Kealani Cook. His 2011 dissertation “Kahiki: Native 
Hawaiian Relations with Other Pacific Islanders” employs a very deep approach grounded in 
recent trends of Pacific and indigenous studies, including a focus on native agency and on a 
pan-Oceanian view of Pacific history as opposed to national archipelago histories isolated from 
each other. His study is also the first examination of inter-Oceanian relations that 
systematically uses sources in Hawaiian and other Polynesian languages. Of the 1887 Hawaiian 
diplomatic mission to Sāmoa, Cook’s work is probably the deepest and most detailed study to 
date, including a rigorous analysis of the letters sent home by the Hawaiian diplomats.  
For the purpose of my project, however, there are also certain limits to Cook’s work. 
Cook uses an ethnic rather than a national lens, as his study is by title one of the relations of 
“Native Hawaiians” with “other Pacific Islanders”, not of the Hawaiian State with the rest of 
Oceania. This excludes by definition the important non-aboriginal thinkers and actors involved 
in Hawai‘i’s pan-Oceanian policy, such as Wyllie, St. Julian, Harris and Gibson on Hawai‘i’s side, 
or Steinberger on Samoa’s side, to which Cook refers to only fleetingly or not at all, with the 
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effect that the view becomes somewhat narrowed. Secondly, I appreciate Cook’s critical view of 
Hawaiian culturally supremacist and politically hegemonic claims as they were first displayed 
by Hawaiian missionaries in Micronesia and the Marquesas Islands, and also at times by 
Hawaiian envoy Bush and his secretary during their 1887 mission in Sāmoa. However, I see the 
author’s tendency to analyse the evolution of Hawaiian attitudes towards other Pacific 
Islanders between 1850 and 1907 [the chronological scope of the dissertation, the end point 
referring to former Hawaiian Kingdom official John Tamatoa Baker’s voyage through 
Polynesia] as a “gradual transition from the missionaries’ embrace of empire and rejection of 
Pacific Islander cultures to Baker’s rejection of an imperial Pacific and embrace of Polynesian 
solidarity” (Cook 2011: 398) as quite problematic. Even though Cook admits the “diversity of 
opinions in the lāhui and the complex relationships between Natives and empires in general” 
(ibid.) the master narrative suggests that only after Hawai‘i had become occupied, there is at 
last equality between Hawaiians and the other Islanders. This leaves the reader to wonder 
what could be effected by nations equal in their subjection to imperialism, as opposed to the 
time prior to occupation, when the Hawaiian Kingdom had the political and economic clout to 
be a global player and did indeed matter as a power in the region. Still, as the deepest analysis 
of aboriginal Hawaiian thought on other islands so far, Cook’s work is certainly an important 
secondary source for this dissertation. 
 
Comparative analysis of Hawaiian policy and its longue durée global impact 
 
While I use the above-mentioned previous studies of Hawaiian policy towards Oceania 
as an important base for my own work, I intend to frame Hawaiian policy more clearly within a 
global discourse of resistance to Western imperialism and hegemony. For that purpose, I 
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intend to use comparative historical analysis not merely to look at the Hawaiian Kingdom in 
comparison to other non-Western states within and without Oceania, but also to look at 
Hawaiian pan-Oceanian policy in the context of early “Pan-” political ideologies developed to 
oppose Western imperialism. As I already mentioned in the previous chapter, and as the details 
of my research in chapter six will show, Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism was not limited to what is 
now referred as Oceania [Polynesia-Melanesia-Micronesia], but instead was defined broadly to 
embrace all of Austronesia, and even Asian Pacific rim nations such as Japan and China. In 
1881, King Kalākaua of Hawai'i was actually envisioning all of Asia and Oceania to join together 
to protect itself against the West, suggesting to the Meiji Emperor to build a Hawaiian-Japanese 
led league of Asian and Pacific nations (Keene 2002: 347-350). For this reason, Hawaiian policy 
was not only pan-Oceanian but also pan-Asian. Hence, studying the development of Pan-
Asianism, especially in its early formulations chronologically close to the Hawaiian Kingdom, 
provides an important comparative framework to situate Hawaiian policy.  
In that sense, I have also looked into intellectual histories of early pan-Asianism as well 
as studies of cooperative diplomacy by non-Western states. One of the most comprehensive 
such studies, The politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia by Turkish historian Cemil Aydın (2007) 
provides a thorough global overview of Pan-Asian and Pan-Islamic thought during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Aydın essentially argues that there were two main 
lines of argument in the movement, one a reactionary reassertion of native cultural identity, 
and one embracing universalist humanitarianism as articulated by the Western Enlightenment, 
but at the same time pointing out the contradictions between the Western discourse of 
enlightened civilisation and its violent and disrespectful behaviour, based on raw power alone, 
towards the rest of the world. A more detailed review of Aydın’s work will be provided in 
chapter five. 
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Another important aspect of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s role in the early development of 
pan-Asianism is the fact that Chinese revolutionary statesman Sun Yat-sen, one of the most 
prominent early 20th century proponents of pan-Asianism, was partly raised and educated in 
the Hawaiian Kingdom, specifically during the early 1880s, i.e. during the very time when 
under King Kalākaua’s reign Hawai‘i’s pan-Oceanian policy was reaching its climax.  A close 
reading of Sun’s writings, especially his 1924 Kobe speech on Pan-Asianism (Sun 2011) and the 
Three Principles of the People, Sun’s most comprehensive work of political theory and 
philosophy (Sun 1927), particularly lecture four on the international solidarity of anticolonial 
nationalism (ibid.: 77-100), against the political reality Sun experienced in the Hawaiian 
Kingdom provides further hints to Hawai‘i’s historical role as a breeding ground of Pan-
Asianism.  
Since the Hawaiian Kingdom was a new and emerging player in the field of international 
relations, an analysis of its foreign policy can also benefit from a comparison with other new 
and emerging states, at various stages in history. The Italian adventurer, activist and ephemeral 
Hawaiian minister of Foreign affairs Celso Moreno, for instance, compared Hawai‘i’s mission to 
unify Oceania under its leadership with the unification of Italy under the leadership of 
Piedmont-Sardinia (Moreno 1887: 11), and St. Julian’s biographer Marion Diamond also 
mentions the unification both Italy, as well as that of Germany under Prussian leadership as 
contexts in which the early Hawaiian pan-Oceanian visions can be situated (Diamond 1990: 2, 
44). While these comparisons are certainly useful from a nation-building perspective, in terms 
of international relations they are quite limited, since newly unified Italy and Germany quickly 
became accepted members of the inner circle of imperial powers and did not go through 
protracted struggles for full recognition as Hawai‘i did during the 1840s and 50s, and Japan did 
during the entire nineteenth century. Thus, turning once more to the non-Western world, P. 
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Kalawai‘a Moore has more recently pointed out that the Hawaiian Kingdom could also be seen 
as somewhat analogous to present post-colonial developing states in that it had to position 
itself as a newcomer in a world dominated by Western powers (Moore 2010: 291). 
Corresponding to this assessment, Peter Calvert in his seminal study The Foreign Policy of New 
States gives the following definition of a “new state” in terms of international relations: 
By ‘new states’, we should logically mean those areas, formerly part of colonial empires, 
which have only recently gained or regained the status of independent countries. But in 
practice, as we shall here, we also cover states which have never been effectively colonized, 
like Thailand and Ethiopia, as well as countries that have been independent for more than a 
century, like Brazil and Mexico, since their experience has a great deal to tell us about the 
problem of asserting one’s position in a world already dominated by established powers. 
(Calvert 1986: 3-4)  
 
In that sense, the Hawaiian Kingdom, of the cases mentioned in the quote most similar 
to Thailand and Ethiopia, would clearly qualify as a “new state.”22 Calvert’s analysis of those 
states’ foreign policy can thus provide another useful framework to examine the Hawaiian 
Kingdom. As according to Calvert, “[th]e highest aspiration of a third world leader […] will be to 
lead a regional power”(ibid.:155), the Hawaiian monarchs – especially  Kalākaua – could also 
be seen as predecessors of such visionary non-aligned movement leaders as Jawaharlal Nehru 
and Sukarno, or, more regionally, of pan-African leaders like Emperor Haile Selassie and 
Kwame Nkrumah or pan-Arabic leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser. Turning the gaze back to 
Oceania, more recently Voreqe Bainimarama of Fiji has also emerged as a non-aligned 
regionalist leader, and Fiji under his rule has to a certain extent continued where the Hawaiian 
                                                 
22
 “New State” here should be strictly limited to an international relations context of a state newly becoming 
involved in the international community, and not refer to the historical age of a state’s cultural and political roots. In 
the latter terms, the Hawaiian Kingdom with its roots going back centuries of classical Hawaiian statecraft would 
certainly be an “old” state, unlike the United States and other Western settler states that would be “new” states in 
that sense. 
68 
 
Kingdom had left off over a century ago.23 A diplomatic handbook written by one of Fiji’s 
leading diplomats (Mataitoga 2013) thus offers insights that are in some aspects amazingly 
similar to those of late nineteenth century Hawaiian diplomacy.  
Yet, seeing the Hawaiian Kingdom as an early example of a leading “third world” 
country is also problematic, since especially towards the end of the nineteenth century Hawai‘i 
had a high level of technology and infrastructure development, an efficient government 
apparatus, and a high per capita income, all of which matched those of contemporary Western 
countries, and in that sense, the Kingdom was far more developed than the rest of Oceania and 
the few other countries in the periphery of the nineteenth-century world system that might be 
seen as the “third world” of the time, e.g. Latin American countries, Siam and Ethiopia. In terms 
of development level,  Hawai‘i might thus just as well be compared to Japan at the same time, 
and to today’s countries in parts of Asia, the Middle East and Latin America that are referred to 
as Schwellenländer in German,24 of which the Hawaiian Kingdom could be seen as somewhat of 
a prototype.  
In summary, while the Hawaiian Kingdom, and the smaller Oceanian states formed 
under its influence certainly were sui generis states in many ways, I argue that using various 
analogies throughout different time periods – while also bearing in mind important differences, 
of course –, is helpful to evaluate the importance of the Hawaiian Kingdom and its pan-
Oceanian policy in the longue durée of global politics.  
 
                                                 
23
 Arguably, Bainimarama’s distant predecessor as prime minister of Fiji, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, had already 
taken up a similar position of regional leadership in the 1970s and 1980s, when he formulated the ideology of the 
“Pacific Way.” See Lawson 2010 for a critical evaluation of this ideology. 
24
 Literally “threshold countries,” meaning countries in transition from an economic classification of “developing” to 
one of “developed.” The term “newly industrialised country” that is often given as an English equivalent, is not 
quite an accurate translation, since the German term implies a transition in progress and does not focus on one 
specific aspect of economic development, whereas the English term narrowly focuses on industrialisation and 
implies a completed process. Since the Hawaiian Kingdom did not have major manufacturing industries [yet], the 
English term would be barely appropriate, whereas the German one would fit quite well. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this second chapter, I have identified the most useful theoretical and methodological 
concepts to analyse the internal structure and international relations of the Hawaiian Kingdom 
and other non-Western states, namely the concept of parity, similitude and hybridity, and the 
methodology of interdisciplinary comparative historical analysis. I have also explored 
literature on state formation in order to find an appropriate framework to analyse nineteenth 
century Pacific state building and the selective appropriation of institutions transferred to 
Oceanian and other non-European states from the West. Furthermore, having provided a 
comprehensive review of scholarly works hitherto available on nineteenth-century state 
building in Oceania, and Hawai‘i’s role therein, I have laid a groundwork from which my own 
research can depart to another level, which includes framing Hawaiian policy in favour of 
native state building in the rest of Oceania within the context of longue durée anti-imperialist, 
non-aligned and regionalist political movements.   
As the next step leading to the core of my analysis, I will now turn my attention to its 
historical context and in the following third chapter provide an overview of non-Western state-
building in the nineteenth century within the context of global Western imperialism and 
resistance thereto.  
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CHAPTER 3:  
Historical Context: Western Imperialism and non-Western Nation-
building 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As I have explained in the previous two chapters, this dissertation places state- and 
nation-building in nineteenth century Oceania in a worldwide context of non-western 
statecraft in the nineteenth century. The present chapter will provide an outlook on the issues 
at stake for non-Western polities during that historical period, including historical sketches of 
five of them that have particular relevance for this study, and a discussion of their status in 
international law and diplomatic relations with the West. Then, after briefly considering what 
challenges were specific to state-building in Oceania, a more thorough survey of nation-state 
building in the Pacific Islands will follow, including a discussion of their foreign relations in the 
international system based on the same parameters as before.   
While the initial wider non-Western survey only focuses on those state-building 
projects that are relevant for my further discussions in the later chapters, the Pacific Islands-
wide survey is attempting to be exhaustive in briefly enumerating all cases of nineteenth 
century states in the region. The more detailed focus however, is on the four cases of Tahiti, 
Tonga, Sāmoa and Fiji, all of which are relevant for the study of Hawaiian Kingdom policy in the 
region. The Hawaiian Kingdom itself will be treated separately in the following chapter four. 
 
The World in the Nineteenth Century 
 
 The nineteenth century brought the world closer together than any previous era in 
history. While proponents of world-system theory such as Immanuel Wallerstein (2011a) have 
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argued that the process of “globalisation” started with European colonial expansion to the 
Americas in the sixteenth century, Wallerstein also states that the system significantly 
expanded in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, incorporating hitherto isolated 
world regions (Wallerstein 2011c). What happened between the turn of the nineteenth and the 
turn of the twentieth century was certainly an exponential expansion of the European world-
system into virtually all parts of the world, closing the gaps, so to say. I would argue that in the 
mid-18th century most parts of the world were still outside the “European world system,” 
because despite its already global reach, its penetrations in most parts outside of Europe and 
certain core-colonial areas were merely punctual. By the late 19th century, however, the trend 
had reversed, and areas yet unpenetrated by the system were now in a small minority.  
 In the Pacific region, this can be well attested by the fact that despite Spanish 
exploration of the region in the sixteenth century, during the following two centuries colonial 
penetration by the Spanish, Portuguese and later Dutch empires remained limited to parts of 
the ocean’s eastern seaboard, from Mexico to northern Chile, and selected islands and port 
cities of the Malay archipelago and the western seaboard such as Melaka, Batavia, Manila and 
Macau. Spanish colonial trade between Asia and the Americas did indeed become a significant 
part of the world economy, increasingly so in the eighteenth century when the region became 
flooded with silver dollars minted in Spanish America, which would remain the region’s main 
currency for most of the nineteenth century as we shall see (Museo de Arte Oriental de 
Salamanca 2008). However, until the late eighteenth century, most of the insular Pacific 
remained isolated from both capitalist and colonial penetration, and most islands were not 
even known to Europeans until the explorations of Captain James Cook in 1767-1779 
(Schweizer 2005: 41-50; Finney 1994: 286-288). Following Cook and other late 18th century 
explorers, the islands of the central Pacific were slowly incorporated into the world capitalist 
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system as well, and a few decades later, Western imperialism in the guise of settler colonialism 
(in Australia and Aotearoa) or gunboat diplomacy (in the tropical islands), extended its reach 
into the region, too.  
 In other parts of the world, during the nineteenth century the important but spatially 
limited commercial and imperial networks of the past three centuries increasingly morphed 
into territorially consolidated colonial empires. For instance, in the seventeenth century, the 
reach of actual Dutch colonial control in the Malay Archipelago was limited to a few seaports, 
coercive monopolistic trade relations with a few native rulers, and a few smaller islands of the 
Maluku archipelago containing spice plantations. Later, the British established a few colonial 
port towns in the vicinity, such as Penang and Singapore. By the early twentieth century, 
however, the entire Malay Archipelago was territorially divided into a British sector [the future 
post-colonial nation-states of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei] and a Dutch sector [the future 
post-colonial nation-state of Indonesia].25 The nineteenth century thus was the era in which the 
Western model of the territorial nation-state became projected most thoroughly onto the rest 
of the world.  
 
Colonial empire-building and niches of national survival  
 
By that time, when the modern, bureaucratic and territorial state had come to full 
fruition in Europe, institutional transfer occurred in a more systematic and coercive form 
through Western colonial rule over large parts of the non-European world. It is important, 
                                                 
25
 Both colonial sectors were then still somewhat more internally complex than their post-colonial successor states 
are today, especially the British sector, which consisted of a series of port-city colonies (Penang, Melaka, Singapore 
and Labuan), ten Malay sultanates under British protectorate [with varying degrees of actual British control], a 
territory ruled by a British chartered company [North Borneo] and a private British adventurer’s hereditary fiefdom 
under British protectorate [Sarawak]. Despite this variety in political organization, by the early twentieth century all 
these polities had become territorially defined entities bounded by survey lines.  
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however, to recall that institutional transfer not only happened coercively through colonialism 
but also through borrowing in a pattern of selective appropriation by non-Western states that 
were able to avoid colonisation by Western imperial powers. Since the Hawaiian Kingdom and 
the other state-building projects in nineteenth century Oceania, fall into that category, that type 
of Western institutional transfer is particularly interesting in the context of this dissertation.  
Selective appropriation is a strategy that has been used by many native polities 
confronted with imperialism throughout the world.  However, as colonial empires were 
growing and territorially consolidating during the nineteenth century as described above, 
many of those ended up being swallowed up by colonial empires, either through annihilation 
by conquest [e.g. Burma by the British or Aceh by the Netherlands] or through forced 
incorporation into colonial empires as protectorates [e.g. the sultanates of Surakarta and 
Yogyakarta in central Java within the Dutch East Indies or various “Princely States” within 
British India]. In contrast, a few native states were able to survive outside of colonial empires, 
either because of their own military strength [such as Japan], or because they were located in 
“niches” between competing Western colonial empires [such as Siam], and used the strategy of 
selective appropriation to develop into nation-states whose independence became recognized 
or at least officially acknowledged by the dominant Western powers.  
While the manoeuvring space for these states was certainly also limited, given the 
hegemony of the Western state, in the nineteenth century, as a prescriptive model for the 
world as indicated in the quote by Tilly in the previous chapter, there was much more choice 
left to the agency of those states’ leaders, as opposed to societies under colonial rule which 
were subject to full-scale institutional imposition at the whim of the coloniser.  
In a study of Western institutional transfer to Japan, for example, Eleanor Westney 
(1987) demonstrates how the Meiji leaders carefully selected institutions to adopt from 
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different Western countries, and thereby created their own innovative version of a distinctively 
Japanese institutional modernity. However, despite the lack of direct imposition and more 
space to negotiate institutional transfers, modernising non-Western states nevertheless faced 
many constraints. As Ayşe Zarakol (2011) argues, the “stigma” of not being among the 
European original members of the family of nations subjected them to a high level of scrutiny 
by the West, which meticulously evaluated their domestic reforms to judge whether their 
states indeed corresponded to the “standard of civilisation” (Gong 1984), and there was thus a 
long process of dynamic interaction, usually to the disadvantage of the non-western state, of 
institutional transfer and the level of international recognition, a process which in most cases 
lasted long into the twentieth century (Horowitz 2005). The early unambiguous recognition of 
the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1843, and the revision of its last concession-burdened treaty by 1858 
thus represent a highly exceptional case, as I will discuss below.  In the following, the most 
important of these non-Western states, and the most relevant to our discussion, will be 
explored. 
  
Examples of Non-Western Nation-States 
 
Japan  
 
Arguably the most significant of all non-western modernizing nation-states of the 
nineteenth century was the Empire of Japan. Its importance to the wider non-Western world in 
the nineteenth century, and to the Hawaiian Kingdom in particular, warrants a more detailed 
description of Japan’s political evolution here.  
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Based on a millennia-old Imperial dynasty with mythological origins, whose realm was 
later enriched by Chinese concepts of statecraft, Japan had been a state-like entity for centuries, 
albeit occasionally interrupted by periods of civil strife. The last period of national unity under 
a government based on classical Japanese statecraft was the Tokugawa shogunate, also known 
as bakufu [military government], from the early 
sixteenth century to the 1860s. Run by a parallel 
dynasty of hereditary shoguns [military leaders], 
which eclipsed the imperial dynasty that was 
reduced to figureheads, the Tokugawa bakufu was 
known for its strict policy of isolation in order to fend 
off Western influences that were perceived as 
harmful. While this policy earned the Tokugawa era a 
label of backwardness by Western observers and 
later Japanese historians, the bakufu was in fact an 
era of extraordinary complex social and cultural 
development, which included the world’s highest 
rate of urbanisation during the 18th century26 while 
at the same time developing a system of sustainable forestry and resource management far 
ahead of any other highly urbanised society. According to the present heir of the shogunal 
dynasty, Tokugawa Tsunenari (2009), these developments under the bakufu laid the 
foundation for the country’s later rapid modernization, which ran more efficiently and was met 
with less traditionalist resistance than in most other non-Western states. In fact, after United 
States gunboat diplomacy forced the shogunal government to end its policy of isolation in the 
                                                 
26
 With about one million inhabitants, the shogunal capital of Edo (later called Tokyo), was the largest city in the 
world at the time. 
Fig. 3.1: The Meiji Emperor of Japan. 
Portrait made in 1888 by unknown 
artist. Copyright expired. Source: 
Wikipedia 
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1850s, the first moves towards state modernisation, including plans for a constitutional form of 
government, were done by the last shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu [Keiki] in the 1860s 
(Sugimura 1939: 1-6). 
The bakufu, however, was overthrown and the young emperor Meiji [reg. 1867-1912, 
fig. 3.1] restored to an actual position of ruling head of state in 1868. Even though initiated by 
traditionalist opponents of the last shogun’s reforms, the Meiji restoration in fact accelerated 
the modernisation of many aspects of Japanese society and politics. The mix of feudal and 
bureaucratic administration of the bakufu was replaced with a centralised bureaucratic state 
modelled on nineteenth century France. The feudal domains were replaced with prefectures of 
a unitary state, while their traditional lords [daimyo] were recast as a peerage modelled on that 
of Great Britain, now bearing titles such as “Baron,” “Count” and “Marquis” (Mason and Caiger 
1997: 210-219, 257- 303). 
After careful debates and deliberations, Meiji’s empire adopted a constitution in 1889, 
which was strongly influenced by those of the German and Austrian Empires and attempted to 
balance a strong monarchy with elements of liberalism in order to create the political stability 
necessary for rapid industrialisation and further social and political reforms (Sugimura 1939; 
Grimmer-Solem 2005; Takii 2007).27 
During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Japan rose to the ranks of the 
great industrial powers, and was able to build a powerful military, so that any danger of 
colonization through conquest by a Western power became essentially averted. To the 
contrary, Japan began to act as an imperial power itself.  The Meiji Empire extended its direct 
rule over Okinawa and the Ainu territory of Hokkaido, while acquiring Taiwan as an overseas 
colony in 1895 after waging a successful war against China. Japan also brought Korea under its 
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 The full text of the Meiji Constitution in English translation is reproduced in Takii 2007: 149-161. 
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political and economic influence and ended up taking her over in 1910 (Iriye in Jansen 1995: 
268-312).  
As we will see in subsequent chapters, Meiji Japan established close relations with the 
Hawaiian Kingdom. King Kalākaua visited the Meiji Emperor in 1881, and both monarchs 
inspired each other’s policies in various ways. Close and cordial diplomatic relations were 
maintained between the two monarchies until the end of the century (Watanabe 1944). From 
the late nineteenth century Hawaiian point of view, Japan was particularly interesting as an 
example of hybrid non-Western modernity, Succeeding in building an economic and military 
clout that could compete with the West while maintaining being grounded in native identity 
and spirituality, Japan was in many ways what many Hawaiian intellectuals envisioned for their 
own country. as will be discussed in detail in further chapters. Surely modern Japan also 
represented the more problematic aspects of parity, as Japanese policy towards its domestic 
minorities and weaker neighbouring states soon came to resemble that of the Western 
imperialist powers, although it is unclear to what extent Hawaiian observers were aware of 
this. 
 
China 
 
 Throughout the nineteenth century, China took quite a different route from Japan. 
Under the ethnic Manchu Qing Dynasty since the mid-1600s, the Chinese Empire had regained 
strength throughout the eighteenth century and by 1800 ruled an area vastly exceeding the 
modern People’s Republic of China, and exercised various degrees of suzerainty over most 
other polities on the eastern half of the Asian continent (Likhit 1975). Based on a Confucian 
tradition of statecraft dating back to the first millennium BC and a more or less continuous 
tradition of unified imperial rule over at least the core provinces of China proper, the Chinese 
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Empire conceived of itself as the centre of the world both politically and culturally. Thus the 
native name for China, 中國 [Zhōng Guó] means “Central State” or “State of the Centre.”  
When China became confronted with ever more aggressive Western policies in the 
middle of the nineteenth century, most Chinese leaders were strongly opposed to any 
modernisation along Western lines, which would mean submitting to standards set by 
“barbarians” (Gong 1984: 130-136). Since the superiority of Western military technology 
became more and more obvious, for instance during the Opium War waged by Britain in order 
to gain trade concessions and force an unequal treaty on the country in 1842, Chinese leaders 
increasingly realised the need to adopt at the very least Western military technology and 
engage in international diplomacy in order to 
safeguard the Empire’s independence. Imperial 
officials began studying Western statecraft and 
technology, and started to modernize the country’s 
military forces. Western weapons and warships 
were acquired, industrialisation and trade with the 
West was intensified, and Beijing created a ministry 
of foreign affairs and began sending diplomats 
overseas. Unlike in Japan, however, no significant 
restructuring of the bureaucratic and 
administrative system was undertaken, and based 
on the continuing understanding to be of a 
civilisation superior to that of the West, the strategy 
of similitude was almost entirely rejected (Gong 
1984, 149-157). Commonly referred to as the “self-strengthening movement,” this period of 
Fig. 3.2: Li Hongzhang. Photograph taken in 
1896 by Russell & Sons. Frontispiece in Li 
Hung-Chang: His Life and Times by Mrs. 
Archibald Little (London: Cassell & Co. 
1903). Copyright expired. 
 
79 
 
selective modernisation was later dominated by imperial official Li Hongzhang [1823-1901, fig. 
3.2], who held various high offices under several emperors in a capacity somewhat akin to a 
Prime Minister.28 In this role, he hosted Hawaiian King Kalākaua in 1881, formalising 
Hawaiian-Chinese relations which were close during most of the nineteenth century. 
The Qing Empire’s policy of selective technical modernisation while refusing to reform 
itself on a broader basis proved unsuccessful in the long run, as China became more and more 
economically dominated by Western powers, while domestically the power of the imperial 
monarchy was eroding. The empire ended up being overthrown by a revolutionary Chinese 
nationalist movement in 1912. The new Republic of China then in the early 20th century 
undertook comprehensive political, social and cultural reforms while upholding a distinct 
Chinese national identity, comparable to those of the modernising monarchies in the other 
Asian nations mentioned.29 As I will mention later, the Hawaiian Kingdom indirectly served as a 
source of inspiration for those reforms. 
 
Siam 
 
Besides Japan, the best known Asian state to retain its independence during the period 
of Western imperialism was the Kingdom of Siam [later renamed Thailand].  In the early 
nineteenth century, the kingdom based in Bangkok was a native state of medium strength, a 
distant tributary to the Chinese Empire but itself in turn a regional powerhouse exercising 
suzerainty over various smaller neighbouring states in continental Southeast Asia.  After 
initially attempting a path of “self-strengthening” while continuing the classical structure of 
government, King Mongkut [reg. 1851-1868] and especially his son King Chulalongkorn the 
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 For a more detailed description and analysis of Li Hongzhang’s contribution to Chinese modernisation, see Chu 
and Liu 1994. 
29
 For these transformations, see for instance, Zarrow 2012. 
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Great [reg. 1868-1910, fig. 3.3] systematically restructured the 
Siamese state, transforming it from the regional centre of a 
complex tributary network to a territorially bounded nation-
state, run by a western-style bureaucracy under an absolute 
monarchy (Wyatt 1969, 1976, 2003: 166-209; Baker and 
Phongpaichit 2005: 47-80).  
Located in another niche between the competing British 
and French colonial empires, Siam was able to maintain its 
independence by demonstrating to the two potential 
colonisers its efficiency as a modern state. However, Siam had 
to make various concessions and lost the territories of several 
of its former tributaries to France and Great Britain in the process (Chandran 1970). While 
modern in its outlook, Chulalongkorn’s kingdom only reformed its administration and 
bureaucracy but did not develop towards constitutionalism like Meiji Japan did. The outcome 
was in some sense a remake of Louis XIV’s France, or Peter the Great’s modern but absolutist 
Russia (Peleggi 2002: 8-9), which might be one of the reasons why Chulalongkorn, among the 
various European monarchs he was in contact with, maintained particularly close personal 
relations with Tsar Nicolas II, the only European monarch then still wielding absolute powers.  
As another non-Western monarchy visited by King Kalākaua in 1881, and maintaining 
diplomatic relations with the Hawaiian Kingdom through the following years, Siam also 
warrants specific attention as a comparative case of nineteenth century state modernisation.  
 
 
Fig. 3.3: King Chulalongkorn 
(Rama V.) of Siam. 
Photographer and date 
unknown. Taken before 
1912. Copyright expired. 
Source: Wikipedia. 
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Johor and other Malay states 
 
Throughout the nineteenth century, various native polities in the Malay Archipelago, 
most of them organised as Islamic sultanates, attempted to maintain their independence, but 
most of them were eventually subjected under Western colonial rule, either through land 
cession treaties, forced protectorates over the native state itself, or conquest followed by 
subjection under direct colonial rule. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the last 
remaining sultanates, either already under a protectorate or still struggling to preserve full 
independence, attempted strategies of modernisation, similitude and hybridisation. Employing 
those strategies to varying degrees, the sultanates on the Malayan peninsula as well as Brunei 
on Borneo and the central Javanese states of Yogyakarta and Surakarta were able to maintain 
the highest degree of political power, resembling that of the larger of the princely states within 
British India mentioned above. 
While states under protectorates of Western powers fall outside the purview of my 
dissertation and will not be further referred to here, one 
state among those on the Malayan peninsula was 
somewhat of an exception warranting some 
consideration here: The sultanate of Johor, located at 
the southern point of the peninsula, stands out as the 
most actively modernizing of the Malay states, and the 
one that preserved the highest degree of power for the 
longest time, becoming subjected to a formal British 
protectorate only in 1914, even though a previous 
treaty in 1885 had disabled the sultanate from 
conducting independent foreign relations  (Andaya and 
Fig. 3.4: Majarajah Abu Bakar of 
Johor. Photographer and date 
unknown. Taken before 1895. 
Copyright expired. Source: Hawai‘i 
State Archives. 
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Andaya 2001: 173-174; 202). While Johor’s sovereignty had become significantly compromised 
after it had ceded the island of Singapore located off its shore to the British in 1819, the state 
regained strength under the rule of Temenggong [executive court official] Abu Bakar [reg. 
1862-1895, fig 3.5]. An ambitious nobleman not of the original sultan’s dynasty, Abu Bakar 
usurped power from the weak ruling sultan and rebuilt Johor as a modern state, first under the 
title of Temenggong, than as Maharajah, and eventually assuming the title of Sultan himself in 
1885 (Trocki 1979). While under some sort of informal British overrule, Abu Bakar maintained 
close relations with other powers, such as Meiji Japan, which he visited in in 1883 (Abdullah 
bin Mohammed 1971; Sweeny 1980). In 1895, a few months before his passing, Abu Bakar 
promulgated a constitution for his state, the second one in all of Asia after Japan, which is a 
foundational document in Malay jurisprudence to this day (Iza Hussin 2013).  
Before his voyage to Japan, Maharajah Abu Bakar was another of King Kalākaua’s hosts 
in 1881. The meeting was especially cordial, since the two rulers contemplated on their 
common Austronesian heritage (Requilmán 2002). The ruler of Johor thus related more closely 
than any other of the Hawaiian King’s Asian hosts to Hawai‘i’s pan-Oceanian policy. 
 
Madagascar 
 
The other major independent Austronesian state in the nineteenth century was the 
Kingdom of Madagascar in the western Indian Ocean. Unlike many of the previously mentioned 
countries, Madagascar was not a unified polity before it started intensive interaction with the 
West in the early 1800s. At the time, a native state centred on the castle-towns of 
Ambohimanga and Antananarivo in the Merina highlands of central Madagascar successfully 
conquered all the central highlands and extended its power over parts of the coastal regions as 
well.  Upon having conquered about two thirds of the large island, King Radama I [reg. 1810-
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1828] began an ambitious program of building of a modern state. Madagascar entered into 
diplomatic relations with Great Britain, while undertaking domestic reforms, which included 
aspects of similitude and hybridisation (Valette 1979).  
Throughout the rest of the century, Madagascar went through different strategies of 
selective appropriation, depending on the vision of its monarchs. Radama I aspired to an 
institutional Westernisation, inviting missionaries of the Congregationalist London Missionary 
Society [LMS] to teach Western technology and statecraft, while remaining himself faithful to 
the traditional religion. His traditionalist successor, Queen Ranavalona I [reg. 1828-1861], 
however, rejected most aspects of Western culture and persecuted Christianity, all the while 
continuing to appropriate Western military technology (Brown 2006: 147-169; Campbell 
2005: 93-99), a strategy somewhat similar to the “Self-strengthening” of late Qing Dynasty 
China. Her son Radama II and succeeding monarchs re-adopted Radama I’s policies, i.e. they re-
admitted Western missionaries and were open to Western cultural influences, including an 
increasingly westernised, hybrid court culture. In 1868, the court and most of the Malagasy 
elite converted to LMS Christianity and Madagascar became a Christian state, albeit continuing 
in many aspects to be grounded in traditional models of statecraft (Raison-Jourde 1991). 
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, under Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony 
[in office 1864-1896], the kingdom was further modernised and attempted to secure its 
independence through multilateral diplomacy (Esoavelomandroso 1979; Randrianarisoa 
1997). For a while, Madagascar was able to survive in another niche by playing off potential 
colonisers against one another. In the end, however, the country was conquered by France and 
first made into a protectorate in 1885, then, after another war of conquest, a colony in 1896 
(Rabemananjara 1996). 
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While I have not found evidence of direct contact between Madagascar and Hawai‘i or 
any other Polynesian state during the nineteenth century,30 the Kingdom in the Western Indian 
Ocean is particularly relevant as a comparative case for this research. Not only is Madagascar 
Austronesian like the Polynesian islands, but there is also a lot of similarity in the political 
developments of the nineteenth century.  Similar to the Polynesian islands, Highland 
Madagascar had been relatively isolated from outside influences for a long time and was 
incorporated into the world system only in the late eighteenth century. And finally, unlike in 
any of the previously mentioned states, Christian missionaries played a major role in 
Madagascar’s political development, like they did in Polynesian states.31   
 
Relations with the West: Unequal and Equal Treaties 
 
As mentioned above, relations between European and non-European States were 
mostly unequal during the nineteenth century. All of the Asian states mentioned above were 
incorporated into the European-dominated international system on the basis of formally 
unequal relations.   
As we recall from the sections on state formation in chapter two, modern international 
law is an outgrowth of the specific political evolution of European states in the late medieval 
and early modern periods.  Whereas most other instances of imperialism, earlier in history or 
in other world regions, were centred around one single state that saw itself as the centre of the 
world [China, Egypt, Persia, Rome, the Mongolian Khanate, etc.], European expansion since the 
                                                 
30
 Arnold Hōkūlani Requilmán (Adam Keawe Manalo-Camp) states in his high-quality educational video “The 
Austronesian Heritage”  <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oShirKsUDAk>  that there were indeed relations 
between the royal families of the two countries, and mentions a turtle given as a wedding gift by King Radama II of 
Madagascar to King Kamehameha IV and Queen Emma of Hawai‘i. While I see no reason to doubt the accuracy of 
this statement, I have not been able to verify it in primary sources so far. 
31
 It was the very same LMS that played a major role in several Polynesian archipelagos, and one of the LMS 
missionaries, William Ellis, was personally involved in both Eastern Polynesia and Madagascar (Johnston 2007). 
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late 1400s had always been multi-polar and was never monopolised by one single state. Thus 
modern age European imperialism, unlike most of the other imperialisms in human history, 
brought along a system of inter-state relations which it attempted to impose on the societies 
encountered.  
During the Renaissance and Enlightenment eras, early European theorists of 
international law, such as Grotius (1625) and De Vattel (1758) based their understanding of 
inter-state relations on a system of “natural law” in which each polity enjoyed, at least in 
theory, co-equal sovereignty regardless of other qualities such as culture and religion. During 
the early nineteenth century, however, this conception changed, and in the works of important 
authors in the field such as Wheaton (1836) the principle of “natural law” was replaced with a 
“standard of civilisation.” This meant that international law was now seen as deriving from 
Christian32 civilisation, and only states meeting the standard set by that civilisation were 
deserving admittance into the family of nations as full members (Gong 1984; Horowitz 2005: 
452-455).  
Within this framework, many non-Western nations were acknowledged by the Western 
powers as states, but could not be recognized as members of the Family of Nations as long as 
they did not meet the Western-defined “standard of civilisation.” British international law 
scholar John Westlake, in his 1894 Chapters on the Principles of International Law, after listing 
the existing member states of the Family of nations, mentions that “[o]ur international society 
exercises the right of admitting outside states to parts of its international law without 
necessarily admitting them to the whole of it” (Westlake 1894: 82). As previously mentioned 
and alluded to several times, at the time of Westlake’s writing, all non-Western states, with the 
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 More precisely Western Christian, i.e. not a priori including Orthodox and other Eastern branches of Christianity. 
Orthodox Christian Ethiopia, for instance, was as much an outsider to the family of Nations as non-Christian states 
of the Middle East and Asia.  
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notable exception of the Hawaiian Islands fell into this category. Foreign relations of those 
states with members of the Family of Nations were conducted on a formal diplomatic level, but 
treaties with these countries were unequal. This meant that the Western treaty partner had 
advantages over the non-Western treaty partner, for instance through extraterritorial 
immunity for nationals of the Western state from the non-Western state's justice system, being 
tried by consular courts of the Western state instead, or that the pursuit of independent foreign 
trade policies by the non-Western state was made impossible through fixed tariffs set by the 
Western state. Since significant aspects of sovereignty were compromised for states subjected 
to this regime of international relations, American historian Richard Horowitz in his 2005 
analysis of nineteenth century non-Western state transformation describes them as 
“semicolonial states,” explaining this term as follows: 
In contrast to fully colonial systems in which one power exerted both political and cultural 
dominance, the semicolonial treaty framework imposed a European-centered cosmopolitan 
civilization as a standard upon which indigenous states would be judged […]. (Horowitz 
2005: 457) 
 
As Horowitz further explains, the origin of regimes of extraterritoriality lies in the 
system of “capitulations” in the Ottoman Empire, i.e. exemptions from Ottoman and Islamic law 
for non-Muslim foreign residents within the empire, which were initially granted voluntarily 
since the late middle ages by each Ottoman sultan for his lifetime, but were in the nineteenth 
forced to be maintained by unequal treaties. As China was obliged to sign the Treaty of Nanjing 
with Great Britain in 1842 after the Opium War, concessions of extraterritoriality based on 
those in the Ottoman Empire were included. Throughout the 1850s and 1860s, the system was 
extended to apply to Japan and Siam, and eventually by the end of the century to virtually all 
non-Western states (Horowitz 2005: 460-462).  
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States subjected to this regime, which as Horowitz points out ironically contradicts the 
very basic principle of territorial sovereignty that international law was built on in the first 
place (2005: 461-462), were thus focusing their foreign diplomacy throughout the nineteenth 
century on getting these treaties abrogated and replaced with equal treaties, which would 
make them at last members of the family of nations in full parity. The prospect of abrogating 
unequal treaties was thus a major motivation for the use of similitude and the hybridisation of 
traditional institutions undertaken by non-Western countries. Horowitz particularly mentions 
reforms of the justice and penal systems, the introduction of centralised administrative 
bureaucracy headed by specialised ministries, especially one for foreign affairs and one for 
finance, and a demarcation of borders to create a bounded territorial space for the state as the 
most important transformations non-Western nations were forced to undertake in order to 
achieve parity.  
According to the conventional story told in most world histories, Japan was the first 
non-Western state that successfully implemented those reforms while at the same time gaining 
enough strength to match the West economically and militarily, and hence succeeded in 
revising its treaties in the 1890s. In that story, the process of treaty revision started with a new 
equal treaty signed with the United Kingdom in 1894, and extraterritoriality privileges in Japan 
were ended altogether in 1899 (Gong 1984:195-200). According to Gong and similar sources 
(e.g., Bull and Watson 1984; Zarakol 2011; Ford in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 222), Japan 
remained the only non-Western state to achieve parity in that sense in the nineteenth century. 
The other mentioned states gained treaty revision only in the first half of the twentieth century, 
e.g. Turkey in 1923, Egypt in 1936 and China in 1943 (Bull in Bull and Watson 1984: 220). 
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This narrative of course ignores the fact that there was one case of a non-Western state 
that did successfully enter the family of nations and achieved full parity, namely the Hawaiian 
Islands, which received formal recognition as an independent state in 1843, and which was 
able to revise its last concession-burdened treaty in 1858, as I will discuss in more detail in the 
next chapter. Similarly, most scholars writing on the unequal treaty system also ignore that 
several Pacific Islands states were also subject to it.33  
While Japan moved from unequal treaty relations to full recognition, other states were 
less fortunate, and their “semicolonial” status was downgraded to one of colonial protectorate 
or outright colony. Especially vulnerable to colonisation were those states that had an unequal 
treaty with only one Western power or in whose neighbourhood region one such power was 
overly dominant economically or militarily. In such a case, the strategy of playing the great 
powers off against one another in order to secure national sovereignty was difficult to use. 
Johor, for instance, had no treaties with Western powers other than Great Britain, whose 
colony of Singapore was literally in visible distance from the sultan’s palace across the Johor 
Strait.  A similar situation arose for the native states in the interior of India once they were 
engulfed by British conquests. Madagascar, even though having negotiated treaties with five 
different Western states [Great Britain, France, USA, Italy and Germany], towards the end of the 
century found herself in a region economically and militarily dominated by France – the latter 
had earlier established commercial and military bases on several islands off Madagascar’s coast 
(Prou 1987: 267) –, so that Paris was eventually able to invade and conquer the Kingdom.  
At the other end of the spectrum, it was not impossible for a non-Western state 
formerly disadvantaged by unequal treaties to use the new-won full recognition in order to go 
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 The first scholar to mention Pacific Islands states in a comparative discussion of unequal treaty relations is 
Turkish political scientist Turan Kayaoğlu, who lists Tonga and Samoa in a comparative table on extraterritoriality 
(2010:5).  
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“from victim to predator,” to use Horowitz’ words (2005: 456), and in turn coerce unequal 
treaties on other non-Western States. Japan, for instance, forced unequal treaties on Korea 
from the 1870s onwards and after winning the 1895 Chinese-Japanese war compelled China to 
accept an unequal treaty imposing extraterritoriality for Japanese nationals in China, along the 
lines of the unequal treaties with the Western Powers. As we will see below, Hawai‘i belongs in 
the same category of being formerly disadvantaged in its relations to the West and than 
becoming an advantaged party in unequal treaties, since in 1871 it negotiated an unequal 
treaty granting Hawaiian subjects extraterritoriality in Japan just like nationals of the Western 
powers, and in 1887, Hawai‘i convinced Sāmoa to sign a treaty giving the former rights of over-
rule over the latter. I would hesitate, however, to impute the same base motives to Hawai‘i that 
have been ascribed to Japan in its dealings with Korea and China. 34 A more detailed discussion 
of this will follow in chapters seven and eight. 
Also useful in the discussion of international relations between Western and non-
Western states during the nineteenth century is Colin Newbury’s notion of “patron-client” 
relationships.  In Patrons, Clients and Empire (2003), based on a detailed study of the 
beginnings of British colonial involvement in India, Newbury argues that agents of Western 
powers often started joining complex political networks between native states first as clients of 
more powerful native states, but with European power strengthening throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the relationship went through a “reversal of status.” The 
European power thereby ended up becoming the patron, and native states their clients, but the 
functioning of the political system as a whole remained similar. Newbury’s interpretation is 
probably most useful in describing the growth of the British East India Company at the expense 
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 For this reason, I have deliberately chosen the more neutral terms “disadvantaged party” and “advantaged party” 
instead of Horowitz’ terms “victim” and “predator” in Hawai‘i’s case, since Hawai‘i was far less extremely 
exploited through its early unequal treaties than Asian nations were, and did not use its own unequal treaties with 
Japan in 1871 and with Sāmoa in 1887 in order to bully those countries in a way Japan did to Korea and China. 
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of the Moghul Empire and smaller Indian states, as well as earlier stages of Western interaction 
in other parts of the world.  
Going beyond the core of Newbury’s work, I would suggest applying the “patron-client” 
metaphor to the above mentioned nineteenth-century international relations, reinterpreting 
the “semicolonial” unequal treaty relations between full members of Family of Nations and 
non-Western states with ambiguous status as similar to a patron-client relationship. A 
“reversal of status” happens when a non-Western state revises its treaties, becomes a full 
member of the Family of Nations, and is now enabled to impose itself unequal treaties on not 
fully recognised states.  
 
Tracing examples of political status development of non-Western states 
 
The flow chart on the next page [Figure 3.5] shows in a simplified form the possible 
status developments a non-Western political entity could undergo under nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century international law. At the very beginning, a traditional polity was 
distinguished by whether it could be acknowledged as a state or whether it had no political 
structures that were recognisably state-like. In the latter case, such polities, of which in the 
words of Westlake “international law takes no account” (Westlake 1894: 136), would be 
incorporated into the international system by being conquered or otherwise taken possession 
of by a state, usually in the form of a colony. Early twentieth century legal scholar Lassa 
Oppenheim calls this process “occupation,” more precisely colonial occupation, not to be 
confused with belligerent occupation of one state by another (Oppenheim 1920: 383-384). 
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Later developments in international law in the twentieth century would allow those territories 
to become independent states through processes of decolonisation.35  
If a traditional polity is acknowledged as a state – as  most of the political entities 
discussed in this dissertation were –, it usually starts its entry into international society by 
concluding an unequal treaty with a Western power, for instance China with Great Britain in 
1842; Japan with the United States in 1854. In order to avoid too close a dependency on one 
Western state, the native state will be inclined to sign more such treaties with other powers. A 
non-Western state might 
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 Since this dissertation deals with state formation and transformation in the nineteenth century, twentieth century 
decolonisation is outside the purview of this work and is mentioned here only to complete the possibilities in legal 
status evolution as shown on the chart. For more detailed discussion of decolonisation as it pertains to the Pacific 
Islands in the present, see my master’s thesis (Gonschor 2008). 
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also be 
formally recognised by a bi- or multilateral declaration, as it was done for the Hawaiian Islands 
in 1843 or for the Ottoman Empire in 1856. The next step on the way of achieving full parity as 
an independent state is the revision of treaties, i.e. a “reversal of status” in Newbury’s terms. 
Once this is achieved, the state’s full recognition has been achieved in fact.  
Fig. 3.5: Flow chart showing possible 
steps of political status evolution 
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Before 
the achievement of this final step, however, deviations from this line of development are 
possible at every stage. For instance, acknowledged but not formally recognised states were 
sometimes de facto dis-acknowledged and subsequently taken over as a colony. If a state has 
treaty relations with only one Western power, an unequal treaty can become a precedent for a 
Fig. 3.6: Flow chart showing steps of 
political status evolution of selected 
non-Western states 
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severe limitation of that state’s sovereignty and be followed up by another unequal treaty that 
reduces the native state to a protectorate, i.e. it becomes formally disabled to conduct any 
foreign policy of its own. The “protected” state could then be further undermined and its 
structures fully dissolved through an act of conquest, or a forced or voluntary abdication of the 
native ruler, transforming it into a colony. Alternatively, the protectorate could outlive the high 
imperial period and later be dissolved, giving the state independent status at last, as happened 
to Johor in 1957 (in a federation with other Malay sultanates). Figure 3.6 shows the same flow 
chart with the lines of development and selected key dates thereof for the most well-known 
non-Western states, including the five discussed earlier in this chapter, marked in different 
colours.36 
 
Challenges resulting from the encounter with the West particular to Oceania  
 
As in many of the other non-Western societies mentioned in the previous paragraphs, 
the encounter with the technologically overwhelming West challenged traditional systems of 
governance in Oceania, leading to the necessity to radically reform traditional institutions in 
order to be able to resist being taken over by potential colonisers. But the encounter with the 
West had specific impacts on Polynesian societies that were not shared by other non-Western 
societies. While I intend to point out commonalities of nineteenth-century states in Oceania 
with other hybrid states of the non-Western world and thereby ground Hawaiian and other 
Polynesian statecraft in a global perspective, it is important also to examine the particularities 
that set the Oceanian cases apart from those in the rest of the world. 
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 A list of international treaties of all Oceanian and selected Asian states during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century is attached as Appendix 1 at the end of this dissertation 
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Unlike most of the latter, the Polynesian islands had been for the most part isolated 
from the rest of the world for many centuries before Western explorers eventually penetrated 
into the region  in the late 1700s (Campbell 2003b: 64-65). One of the dramatic consequences 
of this late and sudden encounter were epidemics of introduced diseases such as measles, 
smallpox and various venereal diseases, all of which were common in most parts of the world, 
but against which the isolated communities of Polynesia had not developed immunities. These 
epidemics, which ravaged through most of Oceania throughout the nineteenth century, caused 
a massive decline, if not collapse, of the archipelagos’ populations.  
In a case study of this phenomenon, Hawai‘i-based  American historian David Stannard 
argues that in consequence of introduced germs, the numbers of aboriginal people in the 
Hawaiian Islands decreased from at least 800,000 in the classical era to about 40,000 towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, a dramatic population collapse of about 95% within one 
century (Stannard 1989).37  Whichever figures are more accurate, a massive post-encounter 
population collapse is clearly attested for the Hawaiian Islands, Most other Oceanian 
archipelagos experienced similarly deadly epidemics, which even in the least extreme 
scenarios reduced the population by at least one third or one half  (Robson 2004: 17; Jones in 
Armitage and Basford 2014: 129).38  
This was in marked contrast to the experiences of Asian or African peoples, including 
Austronesians in Southeast Asia, who had been part of the global exchange of germs and 
development of immunities against them for millennia and were thus in the average not 
significantly more prone to infectious diseases than Europeans. To the contrary, especially in 
                                                 
37
 While some critical reviewers have doubted Stannard’s high pre-encounter estimate, even if one assumes the 
lowest estimate of 200,000, the statistically well-documented figures of the late 1800s would still make it a barely 
less dramatic population collapse of 80%. 
38
 The Americas, similarly isolated from the other large continents throughout most of word history, also lacked 
common epidemic diseases of the “Old World” such as smallpox and measles, with similar devastating 
consequences to the aboriginal population following contact with the West (cf. Stannard 1989). 
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tropical areas of the continents, European explorers, missionaries and colonisers were often 
more heavily affected by diseases such as malaria and yellow fever and suffered more 
casualties than the natives.39  
In that sense, the encounter with Western imperialism was more dramatic for 
Polynesian archipelagos than it was for most other non-Western societies. Whereas the latter 
might have feared merely for their survival as independent polities, for the Polynesian 
archipelagos their very physical survival as a people was at stake. Kamanamaikalani Beamer 
acknowledges this as a major factor influencing Hawaiian ali‘i in their decision to accelerate the 
development and modernisation of their nation-state during the nineteenth century (Beamer 
2013: 125). The occurrence or threat of a massive population collapse is thus a major 
independent variable unique to Pacific Islands state formation. 
Also, the Pacific Islands stand apart from other non-Western societies because at the 
time of the initial encounter, the difference in technology with the West was much more 
pronounced than that of other non-Western societies, both materially [industrial metallurgy 
and advanced firearms as opposed to stone and wooden implements] and epistemologically 
[an industrialised literary and print culture as opposed to a culture based on oral transmission 
of information]. Unlike other non-Western societies, for which the strategies of similitude and 
selective appropriation merely involved a degree of technological upgrade or switch [as, for 
instance, from traditional swords to Western-style swords, or from woodblock printing to lead 
type printing, or from a native script to a Romanised script],40 for Polynesian societies such 
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 Within Oceania, this was also true for most parts of Melanesia, where malaria is endemic, but not for triangular 
Polynesia and Micronesia, where the usual “tropical diseases” did not exist prior to the encounter with the West.  
40
 If earlier encounters are taken into account, there was also heavy borrowing and selective appropriation in the 
other direction, when the late medieval West adopted such non-Western-invented technologies as the magnetic 
compass and gunpowder from China, and mathematics from the Islamic World, including the Indo-Arabic numerals 
0123456789 now considered as quintessentially “Western” as the Roman alphabet. Even later, the adoption of a 
more rationalistic and secular worldview in the West during the “Enlightenment” period of the 1700s was at least 
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processes involved massive changes in the use of technologies and epistemologies.  To express 
it in a more graphic example, a view of Bangkok or Tokyo in 1800 compared to one in 1880 
would involve relatively minor changes such as streetcars on the roads; one might see some 
people now wearing Western dress, and between the mainly traditional-style buildings one 
would see occasional samples of Western architecture. But overall, the impression of a dense 
urban metropolis belonging to a non-Western culture would barely change. Between a view of 
Honolulu in 1800 and one in 1880, on the other hand, one would hardly be able to identify 
anything in common, since the period between them marks the transition from a small village 
in a society without nucleated urban settlements to a capital city resembling to a large extent, 
in its general outlook, contemporary medium-sized urban settlements in the West. A view of 
Honolulu by visiting artist Ludwig Choris of 1816 [fig. 3.7] already shows a dense urban 
                                                                                                                                                             
partly influenced by Confucian ideas from China, which had been translated into Latin and made available to 
Western philosophers in the late seventeenth century.   
Fig. 3.7. View of Honolulu Harbour. Pencil and Watercolour, by Ludwig Choris, 1816. Copyright expired. 
Source Wikipedia 
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settlement and a few Western-style buildings such as the fort and the two-storey customs 
house, none of which were there a few decades earlier, but overall it is still mainly 
characterized by classical Hawaiian hale pili [thatched houses]. In contrast, a view of the city in 
1886 by Kalākaua’s court artist John Strong commissioned by the King to celebrate his fiftieth 
birthday [fig. 3.8] shows essentially a modern city, with almost all buildings constructed in a 
Western or hybrid style.41 
 Furthermore, what set the Polynesian archipelagos apart from most of the other non-
Western societies discussed in chapter two are the relatively natural boundaries of each 
archipelago. Island clusters such as the Hawaiian Islands, Sāmoa or Tonga were not only 
geographically conscripted natural units but also relatively homogenous culturally and 
linguistically, with a more or less uniform classical social system and a language mutually 
understandable throughout each archipelago. Morphing such a pre-existing geographical and 
cultural unit into a nation-state was a comparatively smooth process as opposed to the 
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 In addition, the choice to depict a Western-style rowboat in the foreground, instead of an Austronesian-style 
double-hull canoe as in Choris’ picture, underlines the intent to present Honolulu as a “modernized” city, even 
though from other contemporary paintings and photographs it is clear that many, if not most, of the small watercraft 
in use in the Hawaiian Islands at the turn of the twentieth century were still traditional-style outrigger canoes.  
Fig. 3.8. View of Honolulu Harbour. Painting by Joseph Strong, 1886. Copyright expired. Collection of 
‘Iolani Palace. Source: Wikipedia. 
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artificial and inherently violent formation of “geo-bodies” of continental nation-states, such as 
for instance Thailand and Ethiopia, as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The 
major exception within the Pacific however, was Fiji, which, although geographically a clearly 
conscripted archipelago, was culturally and linguistically much more diverse than any of the 
archipelagos of Polynesia proper, and thus the state formation process in Fiji was in some ways 
more akin to those of the Asian and African cases mentioned above, as will be discussed below.  
 
A brief survey of Nation-States in Oceania 
 
In the following, I will provide an overview of nineteenth-century states in Oceania, 
including a more detailed introduction of the four most important archipelagos and a more 
summarising discussion of other cases of state formation. As mentioned above, the Hawaiian 
Kingdom, representing the most complex and developed of the Oceanian states, will be skipped 
here and discussed in detail in a separate fourth chapter. 
Tahiti and the Leeward Islands 
 
The Tahitian [Society] archipelago stands out as one of the two Polynesian archipelagos 
– the other being the Hawaiian Islands – where  constitutional monarchies emerged in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, much earlier than in other Pacific archipelagos, where similar 
processes took place only in the second half of the century (Howe 1994).  
In classical times, the archipelago was dominated by a powerful class of ari’i rahi (high 
chiefs), and the ari’i families of all parts of the Society Islands were also closely related to each 
other and shared genealogies linking them to common ancestors. While Tahiti is by far the 
largest island of the archipelago, the smaller island of Ra’iātea leeward of Tahiti, was of 
particular importance, as it was the ancient centre of Eastern Polynesian aristocracy and ari’i 
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rahi families throughout the archipelago traced their genealogies back to the Tamatoa lineage 
of Ra’iātea (Henry 2000: 255-267). In spite of this aristocratic tradition, the centralisation of 
power and stratification of classical Tahitian society was far from a completed process and only 
in progress during the initial European encounter. During the late eighteenth century the 
Island of Tahiti was divided into several mata’eina’a [tribal chiefdoms], as were most of the 
other islands, but, as Tahitian anthropologist Vonnick Bodin (2006) has pointed out, the 
Tahitian chiefdoms ruled only coastal regions, while most of Tahiti’s large but very rugged 
interior valleys were inhabited by noho vao [inhabitants of the woods], i.e. independent clans 
completely rejecting hierarchical polities, not unlike 
the Fijian kai colo [hill peoples] of the interior of Viti 
Levu (Nicole 2010) which will be discussed below, or 
the various “Hill peoples” in Southeast Asia (Scott 
2009).42 Among the coastal chiefdoms, the Teva of 
the mata’eina’a of Pāpara and the Pomare of the area 
of present-day Pape’ete were particularly strong and 
were fighting for pre-eminence during the early 
encounter era. Even though Pomare I emerged as a 
dominant figure by the 1790s, he was unable to gain 
permanent supremacy and build a state like 
Kamehameha I had done in Hawai‘i (Oliver 1975, 
Vol. 3; Newbury 1980).  
                                                 
42
 It appears that due to the demographic collapse following the introduction of foreign diseases as well as easier 
access to trade with Western visitors when living close to the shore, these communities began merging with the 
coastal chiefdoms in the early post-encounter era and had ceased to exist by the time of Pōmare II’s political 
unification of Tahiti in 1815. 
Fig. 3.9. King Pomare II of Tahiti. 
Engraving by R. Hicks after a drawing by 
William Ellis. In Polynesian Researches by 
William Ellis (London 1830). Copyright 
expired. 
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Only after Pomare’s son Pomare II [reg. 1815-1821; fig. 3.9] allied himself with the 
British Protestant missionaries of the London Missionary Society [LMS], who had come to the 
island in 1797, and converted to Christianity, he led a decisive victory over the traditionalist 
party led by Opuhara, the paramount Teva ari’i rahi, in 1815.  
Subsequently, Pomare II was able to create a centralised Christian monarchy with a 
reorganised social structure. He reserved the title of ari’i for himself, which became henceforth 
equated with “king.” The former ari’i of the other mata’eina’a lost their titles and were instead 
appointed by the king as tāvana [governors], ruling over mata’eina’a now re-imagined as 
territorial divisions of Pomare’s kingdom instead of autonomous kin units (Robineau 1987). 
Firmly controlling Tahiti and its neighbour island Mo’orea in that pattern, Pomare II was also 
able to extend his kingdom to include parts of the Tuamotu and Austral archipelagos through a 
strategy of co-opting missionary efforts on these islands, i.e. presenting conversion to 
Christianity as being identical to submission under Pomare’s rule. However, most significantly, 
Pomare II was unable to incorporate the Leeward Society Islands into his kingdom, which 
morphed into three independent kingdoms, centred on Ra’iātea, Huahine and Pora-Pora, 
respectively, each institutionally modelled on, but politically separate from, the Tahitian 
kingdom. In the extended Tahitian language sphere [i.e. areas traditionally speaking languages 
different from Tahitian but adopting Tahitian as a literary language in consequence of LMS 
missionisation], three more native kingdoms modelled on the Tahitian kingdom, namely 
Rimatara, Rurutu and Rapa, were formed [see Map 3.1] Unlike its Hawaiian counterpart, the 
Tahitian linguistic and cultural sphere was thus not unified under one government.  
 After enacting a first Tahitian law code in 1819,43, a widely enlarged law code was 
published after Pomare II’s death in 1825,44 which included considerable constitutional 
                                                 
43
 E Ture no Tahiti. Tahiti: Printed at the Mission Press, 1819. Reprinted in Bouge 1952.  
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purposes and in fact made the Tahitian Kingdom a constitutional monarchy, the first in the 
Pacific, and possibly anywhere in the non-Western world, actually predating that of Hawai‘i by 
fifteen years.  
                                                                                                                                                             
44
 E ture na Tahiti, e Moorea, e na Meetia, Ana, Auura, Matea, e Tetiaroa hoi. Tahiti: Nenei raa a te mau Misionari 
ra, 1825. On microfilm in UH Hamilton library, call number MICROFILM 5007 no.2 
Map 3.1 
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However, despite displaying these early developments in modern statecraft, the 
Tahitian Kingdom’s existence as a sovereign political entity was rather short-lived, and it 
became the first major Polynesian state to lose 
its independence, since its ruler, Queen Pomare 
IV [reg. 1827-1877, fig. 3.10], was forced to sign 
a protectorate agreement with France in 1842, 
which, after a protracted war of resistance was 
renewed in 1847. For the first two decades, 
France respected the protectorate agreements 
and the Tahitian kingdom operated 
autonomously under French over-rule. Later, 
however, France undertook efforts to 
undermine and erode the power and autonomy 
of the kingdom until by the 1870s the kingdom 
was all but an empty shell, and its last monarch 
was compelled to formally sign it out of existence to become a full-fledged French colony in 
1880.45 In consequence, unlike the other Polynesian states mentioned below, from the mid-
1840s on, Tahiti had no longer any part in the interconnected dynamics of Polynesian nation-
state building processes of the mid- and late 19th century. 
 When France took over Tahiti, a “niche of sovereignty” opened up for the three Leeward 
Islands kingdoms of Ra’iātea, Huahine and Pora-Pora, due to a joint British-French guarantee 
not to take them into possession, and they continued to exist as small independent states, with 
a significant degree of international recognition, until the end of the nineteenth century, when 
                                                 
45
 For a detailed analysis, based on primary source research, of the complex process of French colonial takeover of 
the Tahitian kingdom, see my MA thesis (Gonschor 2008: 35-42) 
Fig. 3.10: Queen Pomare IV of Tahiti. Painting 
by Charles Giraud, 1852. Copyright expired. 
Collection of Musée du Quai Branly, Paris. 
Source: Wikipedia. 
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they were forcefully taken over by France and made into colonial dependencies in 1898. 
Similarly, within the extended Tahitian language sphere, the small kingdoms of Rapa, Rurutu 
and Rimatara outlived the Tahitian kingdom but by the turn of the twentieth century they had 
all become colonised by France as well.46 
 
Tonga 
 
Among all other Polynesian archipelagos, Tonga was most comparable to Hawai‘i, since 
it shared a similar development, from the more egalitarian tribal society of ancient Polynesia 
into a highly stratified society in its classical period (Kirch 1984: 217-242; Kirch 2010: 27-28) 
which Hommon (2013: 188-1999) has identified as a primary state society, similar to that of 
the Hawaiian Islands. This classical stratification in turn facilitated the formation of a 
centralized monarchy under George Tupou I in the mid-1800s (Howe 1984: 177-97; Campbell 
2001: 72-84). 
In classical times, “[w]hen Europeans first reached Tongatapu [Tonga’s main island], 
they not only encountered a large and powerful chiefdom, but one which served as the most 
central and important node in a wide exchange network linking numerous islands of west 
Polynesia.” (Aswani and Graves 1998: 153).  This Tongatapu-centred polity, reaching far into 
the neighbouring archipelagos of Western Polynesia, was termed by Tongan anthropologist 
‘Okusitino Māhina the “Tu‘i Tonga Empire” (Māhina 1986), while it has been referred to by 
other scholars less spectacularly as the “Tongan Maritime Chiefdom” (Kirch 1984; Clark, Burley 
and Murray 2008). Whatever the exact nature of the polity, which likely had its climax of 
spatial extension centuries before the Western encounter, there is evidence in oral histories 
                                                 
46
 For a detailed analysis of the complex processes of French colonial takeover of the Leeward Islands Kingdoms 
and other native states within the Tahitian language sphere, see my MA thesis (Gonschor 2008: 42-56) 
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(Māhina 1986; Aswanti and Graves 1998), in the monumentality of construction in the capital 
Lapaha on Tongatapu (Clark, Burley and Murray 2008), as well as in the place names within 
that capital and on the outer islands (Clark 2010) to suggest a highly stratified political system 
firmly controlling Tonga’s core island groups of Tongatapu, Ha‘apai  and Vava‘u, and exercising 
some degree of control, varying through  time, over more outlying islands such as 
Niuatoputapu, Niuafo‘ou and ‘Uvea, as well as important degrees of influence over the 
surrounding islands of Futuna, Niue, Rotuma, parts of Sāmoa, parts of Fiji, and possibly even 
over some islands further beyond [see map 3.2]. Ruling over this extended empire was the Tu‘i 
Tonga [literally “Lord of the South”] dynasty, direct descendants of the Gods, which later 
became eclipsed from actual political rule by two emerging collateral dynasties of secular 
rulers, first the Tu‘i Ha‘atakalaua and later the Tu‘i Kanokupolu (Māhina 1986; Campbell 
1989a). By the time of the Western encounter, a diarchy of a sacred formal ruler [Tu‘i Tonga] 
and a secular actual ruler [Tu‘i Kanokupolu] had been well established, somewhat similar to 
the classical Japanese diarchy of the divine emperor and the temporal shogun.   
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Following the Western encounter, and possibly indirectly in consequence of the latter, 
the classical system collapsed around the turn of the nineteenth century, and Tonga became 
fragmented into numerous warring chiefdoms (Campbell 1989b). The establishment of a 
Wesleyan [Methodist] mission in 1822 coincided with the rise of the warlord Tāufa‘āhau [c. 
1797-1893, fig. 3.11], who converted to their religion, took the name of King George Tupou, 
after King George of Britain, and through a series of wars and alliances succeeded through the 
middle of the nineteenth century to reunify the Tongan islands as a Christian Kingdom under 
his rule, first assuming the Tu‘i Kanokupolu title in 1845 after having consolidated a power 
base in the northern groups of Ha‘apai and Vava‘u, and finally conquering Tongatapu and 
forcing the Tu‘i Tonga title to lapse after the passing of its last holder Laufilitonga in 1865 
(Lātūkefu 1975a). The latter’s descendants would later marry into the Tupou dynasty, thereby 
Map 3.2 
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effectively absorbing the Tu‘i Tonga dynasty into the modern royal family. In a sense, the 
process was similar to Japan’s Meiji restoration, but with inverse players, since in Japan, the 
modernising forces restored the historic sacred dynasty and 
discarded the usurping dynasty of Tokugawa shoguns, while in 
Tonga, the historically usurping dynasty of Tu‘i Kanokupolu 
took the modernising and centralising role and 
discarded/absorbed the historic dynasty of Tuʻi Tonga. 
While still struggling to re-unify Tonga, George Tupou I 
also started attempts to regain power over all the outer islands 
once under Tongan influence and thus restore the Tu‘i Tonga 
Empire under a new dynasty. When installed as the Tu‘i 
Kanokupolu in 1845, i.e. while still based on Ha‘apai and 
Vava‘u and not having full control over Tongatapu yet, he was 
ceremonially addressed as ruler not only over Tonga but also over Fiji, Sāmoa, Niue, ‘Uvea and 
Futuna (Campbell 1983: 163). A brilliant strategist, Tupou I used the Wesleyan mission, which 
had also set up missions in some of those islands, as Tongan political agents. At least for ‘Uvea 
and parts of Fiji, this is clearly supported by evidence, since Tongan attempted to invade ‘Uvea 
in 1835 and continued attempts to gain influence there through a minority of Wesleyan 
converts [the majority and the paramount chief or King, Lavelua, having been converted to 
Catholicism] (Campbell 1983).  In Sāmoa the situation was more complex. The Tongan 
Wesyleyan mission there certainly acted as an important agent of Tupou’s influence and Tupou 
Fig. 3.11. King George Tupou I 
of Tonga. Drawing by unknown 
artist, middle of the nineteenth 
century. Copyright expired. 
Source: Wikipedia. 
108 
 
himself visited Sāmoa twice in the 1840s, but unlike later in Fiji, the King did not involve the 
Tongan government directly in Samoan political affairs (Campbell 1990).47  
As for Fiji, in the 1830s, Tongan converts were also heavily involved in the beginning of 
the Wesleyan mission on the eastern Fijian island of Lakeba. From the 1840s to the 1850s, King 
George Tupou’s cousin Ma‘afu [1816-1881, fig. 3.15] conquered a large domain in Fiji in the 
name of the Tongan Kingdom and subsequently administered the conquered territories as a 
Tongan official (Spurway 2015).  Tupou I himself intervened militarily in Fijian power 
struggles to support his ally Cakobau, who subsequently converted to Wesleyanism. However, 
formal Tongan involvement in Fiji ended when Ma‘afu officially separated himself and his 
Fijian domains from the Tongan government and instead became a Fijian chief in 1869. Four 
years earlier, Tupou had concluded written treaties in a Western fashion with the two closely 
allied Fijian chiefdoms of Lakeba and Bua (Campbell 1990: 168).48  
In his 1990 article “The Alleged Imperialism of George Tupou I,” historian Ian Campbell 
questions the durability of Tupou’s imperial project. The evidence in the ‘Uvean and Samoan 
cases shows no long-term commitment to political domination over these islands, and it 
appears to that the prolonged Tongan involvement in Fiji was more due to personal ambitions 
of Ma‘afu than to any concerted Tongan government policy. Campbell thus argues that 
throughout the 1850s Tupou remained busy consolidating his power on Tongatapu and had no 
energy to get involved in overseas imperial activities By the 1860s, when Tupou’s power was 
fully consolidated in all of Tonga’s core islands, Western imperial powers had already made 
                                                 
47
 Nonetheless, there remained important political relations, e.g. in 1875 a Samoan delegation travelled to Tonga to 
learn about the Tongan government system, according to an article in the Tongan government newspaper Koe 
Boobooi, July/August 1875, p. 37. 
48
 See map 3.2 for a graphic representation of these expansion attempts by the Tongan Kingdom in the nineteenth 
century. 
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important inroads into the region, and Tupou thereafter used a deliberately low-key approach 
to regional politics, with the safeguarding of Tonga itself as the chief goal (Campbell 1990). 
Instead of re-building a Tongan empire throughout Western Polynesia, Tupou thus 
consolidated his realm as a modern nation-state limited to the three core island groups of 
Tonga plus the two northern outliers of Niuatoputapu and Niuafo‘ou. In 1887, Tonga enacted a 
law defining the territorial boundaries as a rectangle by longitudes and latitudes, at the time 
limiting the national territory to the latter islands and making Tonga one of the first instances 
of a nation claiming a boundary of its territorial sea [see map 3.2] (Buchholz 1984: 116-117). 
Domestically Tupou I undertook a series of political reforms throughout the century, 
culminating in the 1875 adoption of a constitution modelled on that of Hawai‘i in which will be 
discussed in detail in chapters six and seven. Internationally, late nineteenth century Tonga 
found itself for a long time in another niche of sovereignty between British and German 
spheres of imperial interest and could save itself from being colonised by skilfully playing off 
these interests against each other. The strategy worked, to a large extent, throughout Tupou I’s 
lifetime and a few years beyond, but in 1900, his successor Tupou II was compelled to sign a 
protectorate treaty with Great Britain, which took over Tonga’s external sovereignty until the 
treaty was dissolved in 1970 and Tonga became a fully independent state (Campbell 2001). 
During those seventy years within the British Empire, Tonga conserved a considerable degree 
of autonomy, more than was typical for British protectorates; so overall, one could say that the 
Tongan Kingdom survived the imperialist period rather smoothly. 
 
Sāmoa 
 
Unlike Hawai‘i and Tonga, which due to their already highly stratified classical political 
systems and the strong personal ambitions of their modern founding fathers Kamehameha I 
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and George Tupou I became consolidated as monarchical nation-states from early on, the 
Kingdom of Sāmoa remained a state-building project in the making throughout the nineteenth 
century, although its existence cannot be denied, since the Samoan Kingdom was party to 
several international treaties in the later part of the nineteenth century, as will be discussed in 
chapters five and six.  
On one hand, one could argue that a proto-national consciousness was more developed 
in Sāmoa than in most other Polynesian archipelagos, given the existence of a traditional name 
for the entire archipelago, Sāmoa, which has its own legendary origins (Meleiseā and Schoeffel 
1987: 2-10) and unlike other names of Polynesian archipelagos is neither a descriptive term 
nor does it refer to any particular island in the Samoan archipelago. Furthermore, there existed 
a national faʻalupega [ceremonial greeting enumerating the most important chiefly titles] for all 
of Sāmoa. According to Samoan historian Malama Meleiseā, the existence of this faʻalupega is 
evidence that “the idea, if not the reality, of a unified Samoa has existed for centuries” (Meleiseā 
1987: 1-2; emphasis in the original).  
On the other hand, however, the classical Samoan political system was remarkably 
decentralised. Based on comparative work in western Polynesia, archaeologists Geoffrey Clark 
and Helene Martinsson-Wallin argue that  
From a materialized ideology perspective, the reduced clustering of monumental architecture 
in Samoa and the absence of significant massive burial structures point to a very different 
political structure to that in Tonga, suggesting that power in Samoa was less centralised and 
was dedicated towards local or regional control, rather than inter-archipelago or archipelago 
expansion, as in Tonga. Under these circumstances, the relative instability and poor cohesion 
of large socio-political formations in Samoa precluded the establishment of a dynastic 
political system (Clark and Martinsson-Wallin 2007: 32). 
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Hence, instead of large centralised chiefdoms, the core polities of Sāmoa by the time of 
the Western encounter were small units called nuʻu, often translated in a simplified manner as 
“villages,” which should be understood as polities consisting of several ʻāiga [extended 
families] owning a wedge-shaped piece of land usually stretching from the shore to the interior 
mountain ranges (Meleiseā 1987: 5-6). Groups of such nu‘u formed sub-districts, which in turn 
formed districts, both of which  should be regarded rather as confederations of nuʻu than 
chiefdoms in their own sense, each ruled by a fono [council] composed of the highest-ranking 
chiefs of the constituent nuʻu (Gilson 1970: 51ff; Meleiseā 1987: 6) [see also map 3.3]. 
Despite this decentralised political system, the chiefs within each fono had different ranks, and 
there existed indeed highly ranked chiefly titles that carried similar amounts of mana [spiritual 
power] as those of the absolute rulers of Hawaiʻi and Tonga. Through deliberation and 
consensus-finding, the fono of the district capital villages on ʻUpolu Island could bestow the 
Map 3.3 
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highest four chiefly titles (Tui Āʻana, Tui Ātua, Tamasoāliʻi and Gatoaitele), usually on a chief 
from a high-ranking family who had proven his leadership qualities in warfare. The bearers of 
the paramount titles would then be acknowledged as the formal leaders of their districts and 
were highly venerated by people of lower rank, but unlike in the more centralised Polynesian 
archipelagos, their position was rather ceremonial.  
In exceptional cases, an individual who was genealogically well-connected and 
extraordinarily successful in war could accumulate all four titles and become Tafaʻifā [“four 
standing as one”], and in combination with another supreme title from Savaiʻi Island, assume 
the position of Tupu o Sāmoa [“Supreme Ruler of Sāmoa,” literally “growing of Sāmoa,” 
implying someone from whom people grow or descend”] (Gilson 1970: 58-60; Meleiseā 1987: 
11-12; So‘o 2008: 37-38). Like the individual paramount titles, even the combination of all of 
them in one person signified rather enormous prestige 
than absolute power, since “there was no associated 
bureaucracy that could have given any holder the secular 
control enjoyed by the kings of Tahiti, Hawaiʻi and Tonga” 
(Howe 1984: 234). No contender for a paramount title was 
thus able to establish permanent dynastic rule for his 
family.  
While the system was from its inception well 
balanced and provided reasonable governance for the 
Samoan people for centuries, after the Western encounter 
it became highly inefficient to protect the people against 
foreign incursions. During the 1820s and 1830s, through a 
series of wars and political alliances, the high-ranking chief Malietoa Vaiʻinupō [c.1765-1841; 
Fig. 3.12: Malietoa Vai‘inupō, 
engraving by a member of the 
Wilkes expedition, mid-1840s. 
Copyright expired. Source: 
Wikipedia. 
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fig. 3.12] was able was to acquire all the supreme titles and call himself Tupu. Even though his 
position was mistaken by many European observers for a “kingship,” and he converted to 
Christianity after his war victories, Vai‘inupō had no ambitions to build permanent dynastic 
kingship and did not use the new religion as a tool to perpetuate his rule by transforming his 
title into a “Kingship by the Grace of God”, as it had been done successfully by Pomare II in 
Tahiti and Tupou I in Tonga (Gilson 1970: 59-60; Meleiseā 1987: 28).  
After Malietoa Vaiʻinupō’s death in 1841, a long period of wars ensued between 
contenders for chiefly titles. At the same time, western settlement intensified, and especially 
during the 1860s and 1870s, great amounts of land were sold by individual village chiefs to 
settlers, often in order to pay for weapons (Meleiseā 1987: 21-36). Since no Samoan state 
existed to control these movements, and traditional Samoan politics were most unlikely to 
produce one, resident foreigners and Samoan leaders alike increasingly looked for outside 
models to follow, chiefly among them the Hawaiian Islands, as will be discussed in chapter six. 
The increasing familiarity with Hawai‘i as a functioning Polynesian state, combined with the 
ever increasing land alienation and western encroachment helped to reinforce the political will 
among an increasing number of Samoans to create a centralised government for their nation, 
especially since Sāmoa found itself in another potential “niche” of sovereignty between 
German, British and American colonial interests that could be played off against one another if 
a strong Samoan government existed. Hence the formation of a functioning native state to fill 
this niche became ever more imperative.  
Finally, in 1873 a representative group of seven high ranking chiefs from all major 
districts established themselves as the Taʻimua [“Frontline”] and formed a Samoan national 
government. The American adventurer and diplomat Albert Steinberger, one of the few pālagi 
[foreigners] trusted by most Samoans, served as their chief advisor, and with his help, a 
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constitutional Kingdom of Samoa was formed in 1875. (Robson 1979: 45-59; Howe 1984: 251-
252). Vaiʻinupō’s grandson Malietoa Laupepa [1841-1898, fig. 3.13] was elected King and 
appointed Steinberger his Premier.  
However, the political system created in 1875 was far 
from stable and in the long run the attempt at Samoan state-
building could be considered as failed. No strong political 
leadership emerged, and Western colonial interests constantly 
interfered to stir up Samoan political factions against one 
another. In consequence, the period between 1875 and 1900 
was marked by numerous attempts to reconstitute a 
government according to the 1875 constitution, each lasting 
for a short moment before the country reverted to periods of 
factional divisions or outright civil war (Meleiseā 1987: 38-
45).  
Foreign interventions attempting to set up a functioning Samoan government were 
undertaken by the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1887 [discussed in detail in chapter six] and by the 
three contending Western powers [Germany, Great Britain and the United States], which in 
1889 established a “tripartite protectorate” over Sāmoa. Nonetheless, political instability 
continued, and in 1899, the archipelago ended up being divided between Germany and the 
United States, each making part of the archipelago their colony (So‘o 2008: 43-44). The larger 
German part [the western islands of Savai‘i and ‘Upolu] became a Trust Territory of New 
Zealand after World War II and achieved independence in 1962 with a constitutional system 
somewhat similar to that of the pre-colonial one of 1875 (Meleiseā and Schoeffel 1987: 153ff; 
Fig. 3.13: Malietoa Laupepa in 
Hawaiian uniform sent by 
King Kalākaua, photograph 
taken c. 1895 by unknown 
photographer. Copyright 
expired. Source: Wikipedia. 
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1987: So‘o 2008: 51ff),49 whereas the smaller American part [Tutuila and Manu‘a] is still a US 
colonial territory today (Shaffer 2000).  
 
Fiji 
 
Evidence from anthropological and historical work (Derrick 1950; Hocart 1952; Sayes 
1982; Routledge 1985a) points to a medium level of socio-political stratification of classical 
Fijian polities.  Along with a greater ethno-linguistic fragmentation than the previously 
discussed archipelagos, there were very pronounced divergences in socio-political organisation 
between different political entities. The west coast and interior of the largest island of Viti Levu 
was inhabited by various autonomous tribes with decentralized leadership systems, commonly 
referred to as kai colo [hill people], while larger polities were forming at the eastern coast of 
Viti Levu, on the second largest island of Vanua Levu, and on the smaller islands in the East of 
the archipelago. At least some of the latter might be regarded as being the beginning of the 
primary state formation process at the turn of the nineteenth century, similar to the chiefdoms 
in Tahiti.  
In her detailed case study of the chiefdom of Cakaudrove and its ruling iSokula dynasty, 
Sayes (1982) shows how that family clan gained supremacy over others through prowess in 
warfare and by making political alliances, and was then able to at least temporally 
institutionalise this position by assigning itself a status close to “divine kingship.” Once 
temporarily centralised internally in this form, a particularly strong vanua [chiefdom, literally 
“land,”] was then able to impose itself on other such vanua through conquest or threat thereof 
                                                 
49
 Unlike the highly instable and often virtually non-existent pre-colonial state under the 1875 constitution, the post-
colonial Samoan state since 1962 has experienced actual political stability, arguably more than most other post-
colonial states of the region. For an analysis of the post-colonial Samoan state, its achievements and problems see 
So‘o 2008 and Meleiseā and Meleiseā 2012. 
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and make them its tributaries. Such a network of tributaries under the leadership and 
domination of one vanua was known as a matanitū.  
 As Sayes (1982; 1984) points out, several such large matanitū had formed during the 
eighteenth century. It is unclear how deep these developments went back in time, but the 
important point is that large matanitū had already developed before European influence 
reached the islands. Equally important, however, is the fact that large numbers of Fijians, 
particularly in western and central Viti Levu, continued to live in small-scale vanua not 
affiliated with any matanitū (Brewster 1922).  Also important is the existence of a common 
name for the archipelago, Viti50, despite its pronounced ethno-linguistic and socio-political 
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 Viti was corrupted in English to Fiji, which is a rendering of the Tongan pronunciation of Viti. 
Map 3.4 
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fragmentation; so that, similar to Sāmoa, some type of embryonic Fijian national consciousness 
already existed before any attempts at political unification were undertaken (Croasdell: 2001: 
16-18). 
During the nineteenth century, some of the large matanitū in the archipelago further 
consolidated, which became the foundations upon which later the construction of a unified 
Fijian state was attempted. As mentioned earlier, the presence of Tongan prince Ma‘afu, first as 
a conqueror on behalf of his home kingdom, later as an independent warlord creating his own 
matanitū, also heavily influenced these political developments. Besides Ma‘afu’s significant 
domain, the most important of these matanitū were Cakaudrove, Bua and Macuata on Vanua 
Levu and adjacent islands, Lakeba in the southern Lau islands, as well as Bau and Rewa in the 
region surrounding the delta of the Wailevu or Rewa river in south-eastern Viti Levu (Derrick 
1950: 158) [see map 3.4]. Throughout the middle of the century, the chiefdom of Bau 
constantly rose to an ever more pre-eminent position, slowly 
subjugating and incorporating neighbouring vanua on the east 
and north coast of Viti Levu as well as the Lomaiviti islands 
between Viti Levu and Vanua Levu.  After allying with Tongan 
forces who convinced him to convert to Wesleyanism, Bau’s 
ruler Cakobau [c.1815-1883; fig 3.14] won a major war against 
his main rival chiefdom of Rewa in 1855 and subsequently 
assumed for himself the title of Tui Viti [“Lord of Fiji”] and 
began claiming kingship over the entire archipelago.  
However, Cakobau’s ambitions were frustrated by the 
presence of Ma‘afu and the powerful Fijian chiefdoms in the northeast, who thwarted further 
Bauan expansion. At the same time, all matanitū came under ever increasing pressure of 
Fig. 3.14: King Cakobau of 
Fiji. Photo by Francis H. 
Dufty, mid-1870s. Copyright 
expired. Source: Wikipedia. 
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Western incursions, since the number of European settlers, 
and with them instances of cannon boat diplomacy by their 
home countries, constantly increased. In 1865, the six major 
matanitū thus attempted to form a confederation and 
constitute a central government under one of the six 
paramount chiefs as president [see map 3.4]. However, the 
confederation failed, since Cakobau as the first president 
attempted to centralise power over the other matanitū 
(Derrick 1950: 158-159; Scarr 1976: 115-116).   
 After this first attempt of political unification had 
failed, the six matanitū reverted to their independent status, 
and state formation proceeded in smaller units. As mentioned above,  Bua and Lakeba 
concluded written treaties with Tonga, mainly in order to protect themselves from further 
encroachment by Ma‘afu, while strengthening themselves vis-à-vis Cakobau’s claims of 
centralization. In 1867, together with Cakaudrove and Ma‘afu, they formed the Tovata 
Confederacy, which was renewed and formalised in 1869 in a written constitution [see map 
3.5] (Derrick 1950: 161, 186-187; Routledge 1985a: 115; Reid 1990). 51 
                                                 
51
 By 1869, Ma’afu had absorbed the matanitū of Lakeba under his domains and created a new matanitū of Lau with 
him as paramount chief. As such, he was party to the 1869 Tovata constitution with Cakaudrove and Bua. 
Fig. 3.15: Ma‘afu. Photo taken 
by Francis H. Dufty, mid-
1870s. Copyright expired. 
Source: Wikipedia. 
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Being locked out of a paramount position in the entire archipelago, Cakobau proceeded 
with the consolidation of his own domains as a modern state. In 1867 the Kingdom of Bau was 
officially proclaimed as a constitutional monarchy, with a constitution modelled on that of 
Hawai‘i [which will be discussed in detail chapter seven]. However, unlike the quite successful 
Tovata Confederacy, the Bauan Kingdom proved to be unstable, and especially unable to 
control the important European settler community in Levuka on the island of Ovalau (Crane 
1838: 27-35; Routledge 1985a: 112-113). 
Map 3.5 
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In 1871, increasing agitation by those settlers to create a white supremacist republic in 
the archipelago prompted Cakobau to revamp the Bauan government by appointing a ministry 
of loyal settlers selected by him (Crane 1938: 38-69). A convention of delegates from most 
parts of Fiji was elected to amend the Bauan constitution to serve as the constitution for a 
unified Kingdom of Fiji. Shortly thereafter, the ruling chiefs of all major matanitū consented to 
merge their states with that of Bau (Crane 1938: 70-87), each becoming a province of the new 
Kingdom of Fiji, in addition to the provinces of the Bau realm administered by appointed 
governors [see map 3.6]. The Tovata confederacy was officially dissolved, but its former 
members insisted on more administrative autonomy than other provinces.  
The Kingdom of Fiji under Cakobau operated according to its constitution for about two 
years. However tensions continued within the new state and prevented true political stability 
Map 3.6 
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from emerging. This instability was based on four factors: First, agitation from racist factions of 
the settlers against the government continued (Routledge 1985a: 167-171). Secondly, the 
British government, of which most settlers were subjects, refused to formally recognise the 
Fijian government and the British consul actively sabotaged the government by forbidding 
British subjects to be recruited into the Fijian army (Crane 1938: 134-135), which in turn 
encouraged the rebellious attitudes of many British settlers. Third, the eastern chiefs, most of 
all Ma‘afu, were reluctant to submit to Cakobau’s authority and attempted to run their 
provinces as independent realms, for instance by withholding taxes, or threatening outright 
secession (Crane 1938: 225; Derrick 1950: 238). And fourth, the kai colo in the interior of Viti 
Levu and some other islands resisted any attempts to incorporate their territory into the Fijian 
state, leading to a brutal guerrilla war in the mountains that became increasingly costly to the 
Fijian government (Routledge 1985a: 175-178; Nicole 2011: 23-24). 
As a result of these four factors of instability, the Kingdom was not able to consolidate 
itself. Eventually, the pressures proved too much, and in 1874 Cakobau, Ma‘afu and the other 
leading chiefs decided to cede their country to Great Britain, which, given the precarious 
condition of their Fijian state, they saw as the least of all possible evils (Routledge 1985a: 186-
210). As part of the deal, Britain promised to establish a system of indirect rule and thus 
institutionalise the position of the chiefs. For almost a century, Fiji was a British colony, until it 
achieved independence in 1970 (Lal 1992).  
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States in other Islands and Archipelagos52 
 
While the most important states in Oceania have thus been presented, several other 
states or state formation attempts took place on other archipelagos as well, which will be 
summarised in the following. 
The two remaining of the larger Polynesian archipelagos, Aotearoa [New Zealand] and 
the Marquesas Islands, stand apart from the four that have been discussed so far in that state 
formation processes there did reach only limited stages or none at all during the nineteenth 
century, for different reasons. As huge continental-size landmasses in the colder climatic zones, 
the islands of Aotearoa are very different from the rest of Polynesia. Classical Māori society was 
much less stratified than in the larger tropical archipelagos previously discussed, consisting of 
more loosely organised tribal communities whose chiefs ruled over much smaller units than 
for instance those of linguistically closely related Tahiti (Goldman 1970: 30-54). Due to interest 
in establishing European settlements, the United Kingdom formally claimed the islands as a 
British colony in 1840. A few years before, however, an embryonic attempt to form a Māori 
state had taken place as in 1834 and 1835 a group of rangatira [chiefs] of the northern tip of 
the North Island had met to adopt a national flag and to sign a declaration of independence of 
the Whakaminenga o ngā Hapu o Nū Tireni [United Tribes of New Zealand] (Orange 2004: 13-
16; Moon 2006: 102-104, 11-114).  
The contested nature of the 1840 Waitangi treaty, which supposedly signed over the 
independence declared in 1835 to Great Britain, and its important ramifications today are 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.53 However, what is important here is that due to its 
ambiguity, the sovereignty of the British colonial state over the entirety of Aotearoa remained 
contested throughout the rest of the nineteenth century, and the actual monopoly of power of 
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 For the location of the islands mentioned, see map 1 at the beginning of the dissertation. 
53
 For a summary of these complex ramifications, see Orange 2004. 
123 
 
the British Empire was not established in all parts of the country until around the turn of the 
twentieth century (Belich 1996: 261). This in turn provided the niche for the second Māori 
state formation project in the nineteenth century, the Kīngitanga, or Māori King Movement, i.e. 
the attempt to create a unified pan-tribal Kingdom on all the land not alienated to European 
settlers in the 1850 and 1860s (Sorrenson 1963; Ballara 1996). The Kīngitanga was the most 
prominent of the Māori nation-building movements, and the one that came closest to a de-facto 
independent state, but there were various other movements to build pan-tribal and state-like 
entities (Cleave 1983), some of which also were able to evade British territorial control until 
the end of the century (Belich 1996: 261-264). Even thereafter, the Kīngitanga existed as a sort 
of “government in exile” and today, after having regained some of its lands and resources, once 
more is an important player in Māori and New Zealand national politics (King 1981; Kirkwood 
2001). 
 Of the larger Polynesian archipelagos, the Marquesas Islands might be considered the 
strongest negative case of state formation. The archipelago remained fragmented into 
numerous warring chiefdoms throughout the first half of the 19th century, and only the most 
embryonic attempts at state formation were undertaken in the late 1830s, when Iotete, chief of 
Vaitahu valley on the island of Tahuata, extended his power to the entire island and intended to 
give his chiefdom the appearance of a State by calling himself “king”, wearing a Western 
uniform and adopting a flag, while on Nuku Hiva, chief Temoana of Taioha‘e valley, who had 
travelled around the Pacific and even to London, developed similar ambitions (Newbury 1980: 
70-71; O’Reilly 1975: 272-273, 551; Thomas 1986). However, neither of the two initiatives 
developed into a native state comparable to those described in previous sections, before 
French colonial intervention subjugated the archipelago in a long process stretching from 1842 
to 1880 (Dening 1980; Bailleul 2001). 
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A very different and peculiar case of state formation occurred in the Cook Islands. In 
that archipelago, British and Tahitian LMS missionaries imported the legal-political system of 
the Tahitian Kingdom in the 1820s and 1830s, but unlike in the Society Islands, local political 
dynamics did not produce any significant centralisation of power under one ruler, not even 
within singular islands such as the main island of Rarotonga, each of which had several ariki 
[chiefs]. Instead of centralised kingdoms, each of the Cook Islands evolved into a sort of 
constitutional aristocracy by simply “freezing” the existing political order in a framework of 
law codes. Even though they lacked a central monarch, these polities enjoyed great political 
stability throughout the century. Later, after Britain proclaimed a protectorate over the 
archipelago in 1888, the islands were re-organized into a federation in 1891, laying the 
foundation for the national identity of the archipelago, which resurfaced in the 1960s after a 
long interlude of New Zealand colonial rule from 1901 to 1965 (Spoehr 1973; Gilson 1980).  
Several small single-island entities in Polynesia developed into monarchical states as 
well. The Kingdoms of Rurutu, Rimatara and Rapa in the Austral Islands south of Tahiti have 
already been mentioned. Similarly, in the far southeast of today’s French Polynesia, the island 
of Mangareva [also known as the Gambier Islands] had already been a quite stratified society 
under a single ruler before the Western encounter (Goldman 1970: 150, 153, 170-171) and 
under the influence of French Catholic missionaries who created a Mangarevan literary 
language evolved into a kingdom that continued as an independent entity until it was made a 
French protectorate in 1871 (Laval 1968; Vallaux 1994).54 Not only did the small Mangarevan 
Kingdom leave a heritage of unusually monumental stone monuments in a French rural 
baroque style, including cathedrals, chapels, royal palaces and chiefly mansions, it was also one 
of the few islands to enact a written constitution independent of the Tahitian and Hawaiian 
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 For a detailed analysis, based on primary source research, of the complex process of French colonial takeover of 
Mangareva, see my MA thesis (Gonschor 2008: 56-59) 
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models discussed in chapter seven below.55 The island of ‘Uvea [Wallis I.], already mentioned 
above as having been within the Tongan sphere of influence, also developed into an 
independent island kingdom under French Catholic influence, before being taken over as a 
French protectorate at the end of the century. ‘Uvea mirrored to some extent Mangareva – 
especially in the monumentality of its architectural heritage – but was more durable in its 
political structures, since unlike its Mangarevan counterpart, the ‘Uvean Kingdom still exists 
today under French over-rule (Languirand 2000; Huffer and Tui 2004; Rau 2006).  
Less clearly structured island states, yet articulating themselves as independent 
kingdoms when interacting with Westerners, existed on Niue before its colonisation by New 
Zealand in 1901 (Chapman, Etuata et al. 1982) and on Rapa Nui [Easter Island] before its 
takeover by Chile between 1888 and 1896. Both islands had developed their own literary 
languages under missionary influence [Sāmoa-based LMS missionaries in Niue’s case; Tahiti-
based French Catholics on Rapa Nui]. Furthermore, on long-isolated Rapa Nui, renewed contact 
with Tahiti due to missionary and commercial influences not only precipitated an embryonic 
nation-building process, including the creation of a Rapanui national flag immediately before 
Chilean annexation, but also reinforced the awareness to be part of the larger region of 
Polynesia (Hotus et al. 1988; McCall 1997; Castri 1999; Fischer 2005; Raybaud 1996).56 
In Eastern Micronesia, several embryonic states or state formation processes could also 
be observed. This is particularly interesting in the context of this dissertation, since Hawaiian 
and Hawai‘i-based American Calvinist missionaries were active in the region throughout the 
second half of the nineteenth century (Morris 1987). In pre-classical and classical times, highly 
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 Constitution Mangarévienne du 13-12-1869. Codes Mangaréviennes du 18-1-1870. French manuscript translation 
of unlocated Mangarevan original. Microfilmed copy in UH Hamilton Library, call number MICROFICHE D 
30053; Na takao Turega Magareva. Manuscript copy by Alphonse Pinart, done in Pape’ete in 1877, of an earlier 
text from the early 1870s. Manuscript in Bancroft Library; microfilmed copy in UH Hamilton Library, call number 
MICROFILM S 11341, item 20. 
56
 For a more detailed discussion of the pre-colonial Rapanui Kingdom and its takeover by Chile, see my Master’s 
thesis (Gonschor 2008: 64-70) 
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stratified societies with single rulers residing in urban capitals had existed on the islands of 
Pohnpei [where this system had been replaced with one of less stratified chiefdoms several 
generations before the encounter with the West] (Hanlon 1988a) and Kosrae [where it 
continued into the nineteenth century] (Cordy and Ueki 1988; Cordy 1993). Like Tonga and 
Hawai‘i, classical Kosrae and pre-classical Pohnpei could thus be considered primary states. 
However, whereas Hawai‘i and Tonga morphed into modern states interacting with the 
international community, the Kosraean kingdom did not develop into an internationally visible 
modern state, with even less of an international profile than the above mentioned small 
Polynesian island kingdoms of Rurutu, Rimatara, Mangareva or ‘Uvea, which were featured in 
encyclopaedias of world flags, for instance (Siebmacher 1978).  Apparently, the Western 
encounter and Americo-Hawaiian missionary efforts had rather disintegrating effects on the 
classical Kosraen monarchy, whose political leadership was increasingly eclipsed by the 
Calvinist church and its pastors (Lewis 1967; Buck 2005). 
In contrast, on the Gilbert Islands [Kiribati], where classical political structures were not 
as stratified, the Hawaiian missionary presence precipitated the attempts by some ambitious 
chiefs to establish monarchical states (Morris 1987). Ironically, this was most apparent on the 
island of Abemama, whose high chiefs Baiteke and Binoka rejected missionary presence but 
otherwise attempted to emulate the Hawaiian political model and conquer the surrounding 
atolls to create a dynastical state (Roberts 1953; Maude 1976). 
Finally, state formation attempts were also made in a few cases by Western settlers and 
adventurers. For instance, in 1889, French and British settlers founded Franceville in the New 
Hebrides as an independent municipality, which later, under the name of Port Vila, became the 
capital of the New Hebrides colony and now of the post-colonial independent nation of Vanuatu 
(Cawsey 1988: 391–403). On Yap and some neighbouring islands in Western Micronesia, Irish-
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American trader and adventurer David O’Keefe attempted to reorganise local political systems 
and put himself at its top as the island’s ‘king,’ (Hezel 1983: 263-267; Klingman and Green 
1993) and similarly, on Rapa Nui in the 1870s, French adventurer Jean-Baptiste Dutrou-
Bornier attempted to build his own ‘kingdom,’ by manipulating local leaders, other resident 
foreigners and the French colonial administration in Tahiti to his advantage, until Rapanui 
locals ended his meddling in their affairs by killing him in 1876 (Putigny 1994; Fischer 2005: 
103-120). Created and operated by Westerners, these state formation attempts were nearly 
entirely based on institutional transfer and thus examples of ‘transplant’ states, differing from 
colonial transplant states only in that they were not created by official policies of an existing 
Western state, but rather by the actions of private individuals from the West.  
However, in one particular case, that of ‘Queen’ Emma Coe in New Britain and adjacent 
Melanesian and outlier Polynesian islands, the situation was more complex. The colonisation 
scheme by Coe and her family to create a state-like entity based on a network of plantations on 
islands not claimed by any state was in many ways similar to Western settler adventurism such 
as O’Keefe’s or Dutrou-Bornier’s. But since the Coes were not Westerners, but a ‘afakasi 
[genealogically mixed] Samoan family, what was transplanted to Melanesia was itself a hybrid 
of Western and Polynesian culture (Robson 1979; Salesa 2014). 
 
Treaties and International Relations of Oceanian states 
 
If the data for the Pacific Islands states discussed in the second half of chapter three are 
entered in the flow chart, similar trajectories of status development to those of other non-
Western states can be seen [see Fig. 5.3], with a similar wide range of diverging paths as in the 
selected cases from other parts of the world in the previous chart.  The most significant visible 
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difference is that among some of the Oceanian archipelagos that were colonised, the step of 
decolonisation has yet to happen.57  
Except for Hawai‘i, to be discussed in the next chapter, the Pacific island states were 
much less active in international diplomacy than their Asian counterparts mentioned above, 
but several of the Oceanian states had treaty relations with the major Western powers as well.  
In 1826 an American ship captain negotiated agreements with the Kingdoms of Tahiti [with the 
minor king Pomare III and his council of regency] and Ra’iātea [with Tamatoa III].58 In 1838, 
Queen Pomare IV signed an equal convention with France, virtually identical to the French-
Hawaiian treaty of the previous year,59 and, again paralleling the Hawaiian situation, barely a 
year later, Queen Pomare was compelled to sign an unequal treaty with France in 1839.60 
However, in the series of acts of war and compelled agreements between 1842 and 1847 
recounted above, the Kingdom of Tahiti was forced under a French Protectorate and thereafter 
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 As mentioned above, this is a topic that is beyond the scope of this dissertation but which I have extensively 
discussed in my MA thesis (Gonschor 2008).  
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 Texts of the two treaties are reproduced on pages 3-5 of an untitled printed pamphlet, part of the papers of French 
consul in Tahiti Jacques-Antoine Moerenhout, filed in Correspondance Politique, Océanie CP 19 Archives 
Diplomatiques de la République Française, La Courneuve.  
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 Convention entre Sa Majesté Louis-Philippe 1
er, Roi des français, […] Et sa Majesté Pomaré, Reine d’O-Taïti. 4 
September 1838. Original in Traités, Océanie, Archives Diplomatiques, La Courneuve.  
60
 Untitled Convention in Tahitian and French, dated 20 June 1839. Original in Traités, Océanie, Archives 
Diplomatiques, La Courneuve. 
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ceased to be an actor in international relations.61  
 
                                                 
61
 Interestingly, a copy of the 1847 protectorate convention [Convention entre S.M. la Reine des Iles de la Société 
d’une part; et le Capitaine de Vaisseau Charles Lavaud, Gouverneur des Possessions Françaises de l’Océanie, 
Fig. 3.16: Flow chart showing steps of 
political status evolution of selected Pacific 
Islands states. The status evolution of Pora-
Pora, not shown for space constraints, is 
similar to that of Huahine, except that it did 
not go through a protectorate before the 
abdication of its last monarch in 1895. 
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However, at the same time the three Leeward Islands kingdoms had their independence 
recognised in 1847 by an Anglo-Franco-Proclamation similar to the one of 1843 on Hawai‘i that 
will be discussed in the next chapter. Yet, there were two important differences, namely first, 
that the reason for the recognition of the Leeward Islands was not the “existence […] of a 
government capable of providing for the regularity of its relations with foreign nations” as in 
Hawai‘i, but merely the fact that the two powers were “desirous of removing a cause of 
discussion between their respective governments relative to the Islands in the Pacific Ocean,” 
and secondly, in the Leeward Islands case, Britain and France merely declared to “formally 
acknowledge the independence” of the islands,” whereas in the Hawaiian case, the two powers 
had declared to “consider the Sandwich Islands as an independent State.” The 1847 declaration 
was thus mainly a declaration not to colonise the Leeward Islands and not necessarily a 
declaration to treat them as independent states. Nonetheless, the declaration had the effect of 
protecting those islands against colonial encroachment during several decades, including by 
third countries. For instance, in 1858, during a domestic power struggle in Ra’iātea, an 
American consul unsuccessfully attempted to annex that kingdom to the United States but the 
scheme failed after the international status of the islands was disclosed to him (Boston Semi-
Weekly Advertiser, 2 October 1858; Newbury 1980: 198). In 1868, Huahine entered into a 
convention about military assistance and mutual extradition of criminals with the French 
                                                                                                                                                             
Commissaire du Roi auprès de la Reine, agissant au nom de S.M le Roi des Français d’autre part. E parau faaau, 
faaau hia o tona hanahana, te Arii Vahine o te mau fenua Totaiete i te hoe pae e o Charles Lavaud Tavana o te mau 
fenua Farani i te Moana te Auvaha o te Arii i pihaiho i te Arii vahine mai te ioa o tona hanahana te Arii o te Farani 
i te tahi pae. 5 June 1847; original in Centre for Overseas Archives, Aix-en-Provence, box 9, file A52] is in the 
treaty files of the French Diplomatic Archives at La Courneuve, thus the 1847 convention appears to be recognised 
by France as an international treaty, unlike any of the various other protectorate agreements made by France with 
Pacific Islands states. 
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protectorate government of Tahiti,62 but this convention was not signed with the Emperor of 
France, but with “the Protectorate government.”63 The only attempt by any of the Leeward 
Islands to further diplomatically secure its independence was done by Huahine when it signed 
an equal treaty with Germany in 1879, an offer that the two other kingdoms refused (Newbury 
1980: 200). But the Huahine treaty remained a draft, as it was never ratified on the German 
side.64 
As mentioned in chapter three, the Leeward Islands were taken over by France after 
Great Britain had given its consent to revoking the 1847 declaration in 1887. France 
proclaimed all three kingdoms annexed in 1888, but actually their independence continued for 
a while, in Huahine’s case until the establishment of a protectorate in 1890 followed by the 
abdication of the last monarch in 1895, whereas Ra’iātea fought a protracted war of resistance 
until conquered by French forces in 1897.  
The one other Pacific country besides Hawai‘i that came close to recognition as an 
international state in the nineteenth century was the Kingdom of Tonga. Its formal treaty 
relations started in 1855, when the French compelled King George Tupou to sign an unequal 
treaty with Paris. While usually regarded as Tonga’s first treaty (Lātūkefu 1974: 166), there are 
some uncertainties about its status under French law, since unlike the 1830s conventions with 
Hawai‘i and Tahiti, the 1855 Tongan treaty is not filed as a treaty in the French diplomatic 
archives but in an obscure box in the French colonial archives instead.65 As mentioned 
                                                 
62
 Convention entre le gouvernent du Protectorat et le gouvernement de Huahine. 3 July 1868. Reprinted in 
Messager de Tahiti, 11 July 1868. Found in File A101, Box 20, Océanie, Centre for Overseas Archives, Aix-en-
Provence. 
63
 This represents a legal oddity, given the fact that the foreign affairs of Tahiti had been turned over to the French 
national government, and any entity called “the protectorate government” certainly was no sovereign state in 
international law. Thus it is highly doubtful that the 1868 agreement could qualify as an international treaty. 
64
 Vertrag zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und der Regierung von Huahine. Parau au – i rotopu e te Hau Eremanea 
e te Hau Huahine. 28 April 1879. Federal Archives of Germany, Berlin. File R 1001/8988 
65
 Koe tohi fakatotonu a Tupou koe Tui o otu fonua o Toga, pea mo du Bouzet e kovena oe kakai falanise oku nofo i 
Oseania, a ia oku ne fai oe tohi ni koe fekau a e afio a Napoleone III koe Tui o falanise. Convention entre le Tupou, 
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previously, in 1865, Tonga entered into treaties with the Fijian matanitū of Bua and Lakeba.66 
These were equal treaties as far as mutual rights of subjects were concerned, but the one with 
Lakeba included an unequal military alliance that limited Lakeba’s right to wage war. Both 
treaties remained short-lived as the two Fijian states eventually merged into the Kingdom of 
Fiji in 1871.   
A decade later, after creating a constitutional government modelled on that of Hawai‘i, 
Tonga was able to conclude an equal treaty with the German Empire in 1876.67  While this 
theoretically elevated the Tongan Kingdom into a status of equality with the Western powers, 
Tongan attempts to use the German treaty as a precedent for relations with other powers was 
not successful. Tonga’s first treaty with Great Britain in 1879 was an unequal one, as was its 
amended version of 1891.68 The treaties in fact opened the door for Britain to meddle in the 
kingdom’s internal affairs, which it frequently did in the 1890s, for instance by using the 
treaty’s extraterritoriality provisions in order to arrest and deport British subjects working for 
                                                                                                                                                             
roi des iles Tonga d’une part, et, au nom de sa Majesté Napoléon III Empereur des Français, M. du Bouzet chef de 
division, gouverneur des établissements français de l’Océanie d’autre part. 9 January 1855. Original in File B 14, 
Box 13, Océanie, Centre for Overseas Archives, Aix-en-Provence. 
66
 Treaty between Jioaji Tubou [Sioasi Tupou], King of the Tongan Islands, as represented by Tubou Haabai 
[Tupou Ha‘apai] and Henele Maafu on the first part, and Jioaji Tui Bua of the second part. 3 January 1865. Treaty 
between George Tubou [Tupou] King of the Friendly Isles, as represented by Henry Maafu and Tubou Haabai 
[Tupou Ha‘apai] of the one part, and Tui Neiau [Tui Nayau] King of Lakeba and surrounding Islands, of the other 
part.14 February 1865. Manuscript copies of the English versions of the treaties, as Registers No. 371 and 383 on 
pp. 620 and 653 of deeds book, HBM Consulate registry of deeds 1858-73, National Archives of Fiji. 
67
 Talite Feofeani a Jiamani mo Toga. Freundschaftsvertrag zwischen Seiner Majestät dem Deutschen Kaiser, 
König von Preußen etc. im Namen des Deutschen Reichs, und Seiner Majestät dem Könige von Tonga. Treaty of 
Friendship between His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia etc. in the name of the German Empire, and 
His Majesty the King of Tonga. 1 November 1876. Original in Treaty Archives, Political Archives of the Foreign 
Office of Germany, Berlin. Reprinted in Tongan in Koe Boobooi, Vol. 2 No. 13 (November 1877):107-108. German 
and English texts reprinted in Reichs-Gesetzblatt, No. 34 (1877): 517-522.  
68
 Treaty of Friendship, between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the King of 
Tonga. Koe Talite o Bilitania mo Toga. Printed English version in item 18 874 431, Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington. Tongan version reprinted in Koe Tohi Lao oe Buleaga o Toga, 1883. Ko Hono Tolugofulu ma Valu Ta‘u  
oe Bule Monuia ihe Kelesi ae Otua oe Kigi Ko Jioaji Tubou (Nuku‘alofa: Kuo Buluji Maae Buleaga o Toga 1883): 
162-164. English version of 1891 amended version, Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Tonga. Made 
by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the King of Tonga on the twenty-ninth day 
of November 1879 and amended on the Second day of June 189, reprinted in The Law of Tonga, 1891. Passed by the 
Legislative Assembly, and Sanctioned by His Majesty in the Year 1891 (Auckland: H. Brett, for the Tongan 
Government, 1891): Appendix xix-xx. 
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the Tongan Government, all the way up to Tongan Prime Minister Shirley Baker (Rutherford 
1996: 215-219). The 1888 Tongan-American treaty69 was slightly more equal than the British 
one, providing somewhat of a reciprocity in jurisdictional extraterritoriality, but not to the 
point of creating fully equal relations such as the German treaty, which contained no 
extraterritoriality clauses at all. Eventually in 1900, Britain forced Tonga to re-negotiate its 
treaty, and the outcome, even though still formally called a “friendship treaty,” was in fact a 
protectorate agreement through which Tonga lost its ability to conduct its own foreign affairs, 
only to be regained in 1970 (Campbell 2001: 133-134).  
Sāmoa, despite its political instability throughout most of 
the nineteenth century, had treaty relations with Western powers 
as well. Its first international agreement was signed in 1839, by 
Malietoa Vai‘inupō, several other high ranking chiefs, mainly from 
within Sā Malietoa as well as from Manono, the British and 
American consuls as well as the captain of a visiting American 
Navy ship. While several authors have regarded this document as a 
Samoan domestic law code regulating visits by Western ships, 
based on the fact that the British and American representatives 
signed merely as “witnesses” (e.g. So’o 2008:28-29), the United 
States government considered the document as somewhat 
equivalent to a multilateral treaty with Great Britain and Sāmoa, 
and accordingly published it in its treaty collection, despite the fact 
                                                 
69
 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the King of Tonga. 
English version reprinted in Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-
1949. Compiled under the direction of Charles I. Bevans, LL.B., Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State, 
Vol.11 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and United States Printing Office 1974): 1043-1047. 
Fig. 3.17: Samoan 
statesman and diplomat 
M.K. Le Mamea. Photo by 
Joseph Strong in 1887 
during the Hawaiian 
diplomatic mission to 
Sāmoa, when Le Mamea 
was Secretary of the 
Interior. Hawai‘i State 
Archives. Copyright 
expired. 
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that it was never ratified.70  The first real international treaty entered into by Sāmoa was 
signed with the United States in Washington in 1878 by Samoan envoy M.K. Le Mamea [Fig. 
5.4].71 This was of particular significance, as Le Mamea’s was the only diplomatic mission by a 
nineteenth-century native Pacific Island government other than that of Hawai‘i to any Western 
capital.72  This also proves that the Samoan government, as tenuous and unstable as it may 
have been, was actively pursuing its own international relations. The treaty, which contained 
extraterritoriality clauses and was thus unequal, was used as precedent for similar treaties that 
Samoa concluded with Germany73 and Great Britain in 1879.74 
The extraterritoriality clauses in these unequal treaties set the precedence for a 
multilateral convention signed later in 1879 between Samoa and Great Britain, with the 
concurrence of the United States and Germany.75 That convention declared the capital city of 
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 Commercial regulations made by the principal Chiefs of the Samoa group after full consideration in Council on 
the 5
th
 day of November /39. Reprinted in Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of 
America, 1776-1949. Compiled under the direction of Charles I. Bevans, LL.B., Assistant Legal Adviser, 
Department of State, Vol.1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and United States Printing Office 1968):3-6. 
The entry in this volume itself contains a note questioning the document’s technical legal standing as an 
international treaty. 
71
 Treaty between the United States of America and the Government of the Samoan Islands. Friendship and 
Commerce. 17 January 1878. English version reprinted in Treaties and Other International Agreements of the 
United States of America, 1776-1949. Compiled under the direction of Charles I. Bevans, LL.B., Assistant Legal 
Adviser, Department of State, Vol.11 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and United States Printing Office 
1974): 437-439. Printed Copy also in item R 6 387 984, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
72
 The mission of the extraordinarily talented Samoan statesman Le Mamea’s to Washington, D.C., which deserves 
to be a subject of detailed historical research, is briefly referred to in Gilson 1970: 349ff, and in Shaffer 2000: 82-84. 
For a short sketch of Le Mamea’s background, see Davidson 1967: 69-71 
73
 Freundschaftsvertrag zwischen Seiner Majestät dem Deutschen Kaiser, König von Preußen etc., im Namen des 
Deutschen Reichs, Und Ihren Excellenzen den Herren der Taimua, im Namen der Regierung von Samoa. 24 January 
1879. Original in Treaty Archives, Political Archives of the Foreign Office of Germany, Berlin. German version 
reprinted in Reichs-Gesetzblatt No. 4 (1881):  29-34. English translation in Treaties and Engagements Relating to 
Samoa: 1878-88, Foreign Office Confidential Prints, No. 5965 (London: Printed for the use of the Foreign Office): 
2-5. 
74
 O le Feagaiga o le fealofani [xxx]ua osia e Lana Afioga le Tupu o Peritania ma le Tupu ma le Malo o Samoa. 
Treaty of Friendship, etc., between Her Majesty the Queen and the King and Government (Malo) of Samoa. 28 
August 1879. Manuscript copy of Samoan version in item R 12 677 576, Archives New Zealand, Wellington. 
English version reprinted in Treaties and Engagements Relating to Samoa: 1878-88, Foreign Office Confidential 
Prints, No. 5965 (London: Printed for the use of the Foreign Office): 6-7. Printed French translation in MD Océanie 
3, Mémoires et Documents, Diplomatic Archives of France, La Courneuve. 
75
 Convention between Her Majesty and the King and Government of Samoa for the government of the Town and 
District of Apia. 2 September 1879. Manuscript copies of Samoan version, with some original signatures, in item R 
12 677 577, and of English version in item R 22 351 755, Archives New Zealand, Wellington; English version 
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Apia and its surroundings an extraterritorial municipality under consular jurisdiction, over 
which the Samoan government had no control (Gilson 1970: 360-61; Burgoyne 2006)[see map 
3.3], similar to the city of Shanghai in China, which was under joint rule by Western diplomats 
and excluded from Chinese control from 1845 until 1943 (Haan 1982). A series of other 
agreements and conventions between the Samoan government or factions thereof and one or 
several of the three treaty powers followed throughout the 1880s.76 
In early 1887, Samoa entered into an unequal treaty of a radically different nature, 
namely one of confederation with Hawai‘i, a document of central importance to the overall 
argument of this dissertation, which will be discussed in the seventh and eighth chapters. 
Despite its profound significance for Oceanic regionalism, the actual effects of that treaty were 
short-lived, as both Hawai‘i and Samoa experienced coups d’état in mid-1887, which brought to 
power in both countries factions hostile to any Hawaiian-Samoan cooperation.  
Towards the end of the century, Samoan agency begins to dissipate from international 
agreements. In 1889 the three treaty powers signed a trilateral convention that placed the 
Samoan Kingdom under what has been called a “tripartite protectorate” of the powers.77 Samoa 
itself, which was not a party to the convention, was still regarded as independent, but the 
convention further ‘extraterritorialised’ the islands by creating institutions within the Samoan 
                                                                                                                                                             
reprinted in Treaties and Engagements Relating to Samoa: 1878-88, Foreign Office Confidential Prints, No. 5965 
(London: Printed for the use of the Foreign Office): 7-9. 
76
 Texts of some of these conventions reprinted in Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States 
of America, 1776-1949. Compiled under the direction of Charles I. Bevans, LL.B., Assistant Legal Adviser, 
Department of State, Vol.1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and United States Printing Office 1968):63-70, 
and in Treaties and Engagements Relating to Samoa: 1878-88, Foreign Office Confidential Prints, No. 5965 
(London: Printed for the use of the Foreign Office): 10-20. 
77
 Neutrality and Autonomous Government in Samoa (General Act of Berlin). 14 June 1889. Reprinted in Treaties 
and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949. Compiled under the direction of 
Charles I. Bevans, LL.B., Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State, Vol.1 (Washington, D.C.: Department of 
State and United States Printing Office 1968):116-128. 
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government that were appointed by the three powers.78 After another decade, however, the 
powers concluded another trilateral convention, this time to declare all previous treaties and 
conventions null and void, thereby implicitly disposing of the Samoan state completely, and 
dividing up the archipelago into a German and a US colonial possession. It remains unclear how 
the Samoan Kingdom, which was not a party to this convention, was legally dissolved in the 
process.  
 
The international status of Fiji’s was even more tenuous than that of Samoa. In 1840 
visiting United States naval officers witnessed a document of commercial regulations signed by 
several Fijian chiefs at Bau Harbour, similar to the 1839 Samoan document mentioned above.79 
Since at the time there was no centralised Fijian government, and the chiefs of Bau only 
controlled parts of central Fiji, the document’s force was certainly limited. A note of debt signed 
by Cakobau to the captain of another visiting US warship in 1855 also contained elements of a 
bilateral treaty and is thus listed as well in the American compilation of treaties.80 Historian R. 
A. Derrick furthermore mentions another US treaty with Fiji in 1857 (1950: 136-137), but I 
                                                 
78
 These institutions brought mixed results for Samoa. The foreign-appointed Supreme Court certainly made bad 
decisions biased towards settler interests (Meleiseā 1987: 41; So‘o 2008: 43), but in great contrast, the foreign-
appointed Land Commission admittedly did a great job, as it declared most spurious land purchases null and void, 
resulting in the large majority of the archipelago being returned to its native owners and declared inalienable 
customary land, which it still is today (Gilson 1970: 404-415). 
79
 Commercial Regulations made by the Kings and Principal Chiefs of the Feejee group of Islands, after full 
consideration in council. 10 June 1840. Reprinted in Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United 
States of America, 1776-1949. Compiled under the direction of Charles I. Bevans, LL.B., Assistant Legal Adviser, 
Department of State, Vol.7 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and United States Printing Office 1971): 683-
685. Similar to the 1839 Samoan document, this is technically not a treaty, but is nonetheless listed in the named US 
State Department compilation of treaties. 
80
 Claims; Engagement signed on board United States sloop of war “John Adams”, Levuka Harbor, Ovalau, Fiji 
Islands, October 23, 1855. Reprinted ibid: 686-687. 
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have so far not found evidence thereof. 81 In 1858 Cakobau signed a convention with France, 
but this was not filed as an international treaty by the French government.82 
While these documents fall into the time before any real state had emerged in Fiji, they 
are thus are somewhat spurious. After major matanitū began consolidating and hybridising as 
modern states in the 1860s, two of them signed treaties with Tonga, as mentioned above. Most 
striking, however, is the absence of any international treaty to which the 1871-1874 Fijian 
Kingdom was a party. Whereas the Hawaiian Kingdom, the United States, Germany and Great 
Britain all had consuls in Fiji, the international status of the Fijian Kingdom remained unclear. 
While the Hawaiian Kingdom conducted relations with its Fijian counterpart at the highest 
levels [see chapters seven and eight], and the United States apparently also recognised the 
Fijian Kingdom (Crane 1938: 186), Great Britain as the most important power in the region, 
and of which most foreign settlers in Fiji were subjects, was at the most willing to grant a “de 
facto” recognition to the Fijian government, and at times the British consul actively sabotaged 
the latter (Crane 1938: 88, 134-135, 141-142; Routledge 1985: 166-167). When the Fijian 
government, increasingly unstable not the least thanks to British destabilisation efforts, 
entered into negotiations for annexation with Britain in 1874 as the least possible evil, Britain 
used its non-recognition and the absence of any international treaty as a precedent and 
effectively dis-acknowledged the Fijian Kingdom, letting Cakobau and the provincial governors 
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 The alleged 1857 treaty with Fiji is not included in the noted 1968-74 US treaty compilation. 
82
 Convention de paix et d’amitié entre Zacombao [Cakobau] Tui Viti, (Roi de Bau), d’une part; et au nom de S.M. 
l’Empereur des Français, M. le capitaine de frégate Le Bris Durumain, commandant de la corvette La Bayonnaise, 
fondé de pouvoirs de M. le Gouverneur des Etablissements Français d’Océanie, d’autre part. 7 July 1858. 
Reprinted in The Consolidated Treaty Series, 1648-1919, Vol., 119: 233-234. Not included in the Oceania treaty file 
of the French Diplomatic Archives in La Courneuve, and also not found in Centre for Overseas Archives, Aix-en-
Provence during my research there in 2006. 
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sign the document of cession as “native chiefs,” as if the constitutional Fijian state had never 
existed.83 
In the case of Aotearoa, the 1834-35 Whakaminenga o ngā Hapu o Nū Tireni [United 
Tribes of New Zealand] was to a significant degree acknowledged as an independent state by 
Great Britain,84 and as such, the controversial 1840 treaty of Waitangi made with that state in 
order to supposedly cede sovereignty to the British Empire could be seen as a bilateral 
international treaty, at least as far as the northern chiefs among the signatories who had 
previously signed the 1835 declaration of independence are concerned.85 While from the 
British point of view the independence of New Zealand was dis-acknowledged in 1840, many 
Maori tribes considered themselves independent throughout the nineteenth century, and the 
Kīngitanga of the late 1850s specifically considered itself to be continuing the entity 
proclaimed in 1834-35.86 
The various smaller states and political entities in the Pacific had no significant treaty 
relationships with the West, most of them none at all.  One of the few exceptions is ‘Uvea, which 
did conclude a treaty with France in 1842, which however was not ratified until the island 
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 Instrument of Cession of the Islands of Fiji by Thakombau [Cakobau], styled Tui Viti and Vuni Valu, and by the 
other high Chiefs of the said islands to Her Most gracious Majesty Victoria, by the grace of God, of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland Queen, Defender of the Faith, &c &c &c. 10 October 1874. Copy of Original 
on display in the Fiji Museum. Reprinted in Derrick 1950: Appendix. 
84
 In 1843, the newly adopted flag of the Whakaminenga was saluted by a visiting British warship with a twenty-one 
gun salute, a significant gesture, reserved to the honouring of sovereigns in diplomatic protocol (Moon 2006: 103). 
85
 Since the Māori word rangatiratanga is translated as “independence” in the 1835 declaration, its supposed 
translation as merely “chieftainship” in the 1840 treaty, in which kawanatanga [a neologism based on the maorified 
English word to govern] is ceded to Great Britain, does not make much sense. Since in the 1840 treaty, the 
signatories cede kawanatanga but retain tino rangatiratanga, it is hard to argue how the independence declared in 
1835 was ever given up to Great Britain. See He Wakaputanga o Te Rangatiratanga o Nu Tirene; original in the 
Constitution Room, Archives New Zealand, Wellington; a facsimile scan is available at 
<http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/files/images/declaration-of-independence-5khigh.jpg> and Te Tiriti o Waitangi, nine 
sheets; originals in the Constitution Room, Archives New Zealand, Wellington; reprinted with detailed analysis of 
signatures in Orange 2004: 280-316. For a discussion of the treaty within the context of treaty-making in the 
nineteenth-century Pacific, see also Bennion 2004. 
86
 At the 1857-58 meetings leading to the crowning of Potatau Te Wherowhero as Māori King, the 1834 
Whakaminenga flag was repeatedly flown (Stokes 2002: 151, 159) 
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came under a French protectorate in 1887.87  The atoll of Funafuti in Tuvalu [then referred to 
as Ellice Is.] and the atoll of Jaluit in the Marshall Islands concluded treaties with Germany in 
1878, but like the one with Huahine, these treaties were apparently not ratified. 88 
In summary, we can see that relations of the Pacific Islands states with the West in the 
nineteenth century were generally similar to those of non-Western states in other parts of the 
world. While the Hawaiian Kingdom stands out as the first of all non-Western states to achieve 
full parity, the other states in the Pacific islands were similar to those in Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East in having a degree of recognition, but being only second-class members of the 
international community, or in Horowitz’ words, “semicolonial” states, due to the unequal 
treaties they were subjected to. Just like their Asian counterparts, the Oceanian states were 
actively engaged in attempting to revise these treaties to gain full parity. While Hawai‘i had 
completed the process in 1858, Tonga initiated it in 1876 with its equal treaty with Germany. 
This was hoped to be the first step towards “status reversal,” to use Newbury’s words, but it 
did not progress further, since Great Britain refused to follow suit and increasingly treated 
Tonga as a client state instead. For Sāmoa, treaty status remained unambiguously unequal, but 
as Le Mamea’s mission to the US demonstrates, Samoans were actively engaged in obtaining 
the best possible deal within the unequal treaty framework.  
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 Traité conclu entre S. M. le Roi des Iles Wallis et le Capitaine Mallet, commandant la corvette L’Embuscade, 
représentant S.M. le Roi des français.  4 November 1842. Reprinted in The Consolidated Treaty Series, 1648-1919, 
Vol. 94: 33-34. Manuscript copy, together with that of the 1887 ratification in file MD Océanie 7, Mémoires et 
Documents, Diplomatic Archives of France, La Courneuve.  
88
 Reprinted as part of “Treaties between Germany and various Pacific Islands, signed 12 November-20 December 
1878,” The Consolidated Treaty Series, 1648-1919, Vol. 154: 17-22. Neither of these is filed as an international 
treaty in the Political Archives of the Foreign Office of Germany in Berlin. 
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Conclusion: A complex environment for Hawaiian Kingdom diplomacy 
 
In the nineteenth century, Western state institutions were transferred to the rest of the 
world in higher intensity than any time before. While this transfer in many cases happened 
forcefully through colonialism, many non-Western societies selectively appropriated Western 
concepts of governance and statecraft in order to avoid and resist colonisation. Especially if 
located in “niches” between rivalling Western imperial interests, non-Western states had good 
chances to survive as independent nations. This was most prominently the case in parts of East 
Asia and the Middle East, where several large countries such as Japan, China, Siam, Persia and 
the Ottoman Empire survived as independent states.  At a closer look at the world, many other 
such cases can be detected, even if several of them, e.g. Madagascar, eventually lost their 
independence to Western colonialism, despite their best efforts at nation-state building over 
decades.  
In the Pacific Islands, the encounter with the West created specific conditions not found 
in most of the other non-Western world, namely a declining or collapsing population, within 
societies already quite small on a global scale, which made efforts to build recognisably modern 
states all the more urgent as a tool of national survival.  Whether such efforts would be 
successful was to a large degree preconditioned by the existing classical political systems, since 
these determined, more than any outside influences, whether the transformation into nation-
states would be successful. It is thus no surprise that the two classical Polynesian societies that 
have been understood as primary state formations, the Hawaiian Islands and Tonga, developed 
into internally stable and externally recognisable nation-states during the nineteenth century, 
whereas the other major Polynesian archipelagos that were lacking classical primary state 
institutions had more difficulty following such a development.  
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In Tahiti, early French colonial intervention prevented a Tahitian nation-state from fully 
developing, and in Sāmoa and Fiji, attempts to create constitutional monarchies – partly on the 
Hawaiian model – proved tenuous, due to both internal and external factors of instability. In 
Aotearoa, the political fragmentation of classical Māori society, and the early presence of 
British settler colonialism prevented a native nation-state from emerging, even though strong 
efforts in that direction were undertaken by the Kīngitanga in resistance to the British. On the 
Marquesas Islands, an even more fragmented classical political system also prevented any 
significant native state formation process, whereas on several smaller islands such as the Cook 
Islands, Mangareva or ‘Uvea, stable native states did emerge. For reasons to be explored, but 
which lie beyond the scope of this dissertation, the small primary state society of Kosrae, unlike 
the larger primary state societies of Hawai‘i and Tonga, did not develop into a nation-state in 
the nineteenth century.  
This overview of non-Western states in general, and Polynesian states in particular, 
now sets the stage for the entry of what was the largest of the latter and the first 
internationally recognized of the former, namely the Hawaiian Kingdom. As an active member 
of the international society from the 1840s onwards, Hawai‘i was in many ways comparable to 
the larger non-Western states mentioned in the first part of this chapter, and actually pre-dated 
them in its entry into the family of nations as a fully recognised state. At the same time, as the 
largest and best-organised of a diverse set of Polynesian states of various sizes and degrees of 
stability and development, the Hawaiian Kingdom from early on played a pivotal role within 
Oceania, as will be discussed in more detail later. In other words, the Hawaiian Kingdom should 
be seen as the hinge between the world of non-Western states in general, of which it was a very 
visible part, and the smaller states in the Pacific that were barely taken notice of, and of which 
Hawai‘i was destined to be the international spokesperson. Given this central role, an 
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understanding of the origins and development of the Hawaiian Kingdom is necessary, which 
will be examined in greater detail in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
Reich Kamehameha’s: The Hawaiian Kingdom as the Prototypical Hybrid 
State of Oceania 
 
In all these respects [efficient social and political organisation] the Government of the 
Hawaiian Islands, youthful as it is, will bear a comparison with those of the best-ruled States 
of Europe, and will be found greatly superior to most of them. But among the native 
Governments of Central Polynesia there are none that approach in the slightest degree that 
possessed by the Hawaiians. (Hawaiian Commissioner Charles St. Julian, 1857)89  
 
He aupuni mana kumukanawai ke aupuni Hawaii, ua paa ke kumukanawai a me na kanawai, a 
ma ka mana kumukanawai ka nohoalii a me ka lahui, a me ka pono o ka lehulehu, a ma ka 
mana o ke kumukanawai ka waiwai. O ka hapa nui o na aupuni i loko o Europa, he mana Moi 
wale no, a he mana alii, a o ke kumukanawai a me na kanawai, aia i loko o ka waha hookahi o 
ka Moi a i ka noonoo hookahi a ka Moi, a no laila, ua hele i mua ke aupuni Hawaii ma ke 
kukulu ana i mau kumukanawai no ke aupuni. Pehea ihola hoi na aupuni malamalama o 
Europa? Haule hope ia Hawaii. (Hawaiian Historian Samuel Mānaiakalani Kamakau, 1869)90 
 
But as regards the success of Hawaiian Independence, as contrasted with other Polynesian 
Groups or States, we must recognize the paramount claims of the Hawaiian Hero 
Kamehameha, in the establishment of a nationality. This is the distinguishing advantage of the 
Hawaiian Archipelago, and without such a Conqueror and organizer, other groups and races 
remain disorganized, and a prey to foreign adventure. (Editorial in the Pacific Commercial 
Advertiser, 1881)91 
 
Introduction 
 
After having introduced the phenomenon of non-Western states and their position in 
nineteenth century international politics in general, and in Oceania in particular, I will now 
turn my attention to the Hawaiian Kingdom, which during the time-period under study was 
unquestionably the most internationally visible state of Oceania, as well as an important state 
of the non-Western world at large. I have already mentioned the important position assigned to 
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 St. Julian 1857: 2. Emphasis in the original. 
90
 “The Hawaiian Kingdom is a kingdom based on constitutional power, the constitution and the laws are written 
down permanently, and the constitution defines the powers of the throne and of the people, as well as the welfare of 
the population, and its wealth is based on the power of the constitution. In the majority of the governments of 
Europe, however, there is royal power only, and the power of the nobility, and the constitution and laws are based in 
the sole utterances of the King and the sole mind of the King, and therefore, Hawai‘i has gone ahead of them in the 
building of a constitutional form of government. What is going on with the enlightened governments of Europe? 
They have fallen behind Hawai‘i.” “Ka Moolelo Hawaii,” Ke Au Okoa, 23 September 1869: 1. Reprinted in 
Kamakau 2001: 312) 
91
 Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 8 January 1881, p. 2. Author not mentioned, but most likely editor W.M. Gibson. 
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the Kingdom from etic perspectives, such as in Petermann’s 1859 map featuring the Reich 
Kamehameha’s. Furthermore, the three above quotes by an official of the Hawaiian 
government, a Hawaiian historian, and a Hawaiian journalist, attest to the fact that also 
contemporary observers with an emic perspective considered the Hawaiian Kingdom to be not 
only the most advanced state of Oceania, but even ahead of many Western states in terms of 
bureaucratic efficiency and constitutional development. Furthermore, whereas the first two 
quotes point to a successful modernisation of the Hawaiian state in the middle of the century, 
the last quote hints at an awareness that Hawai‘i’s exceptional advance actually predates these 
modernisation processes and can be traced to developments happening many decades earlier 
during the late classical and early encounter periods.  
In order to explain how these developments came to be, I will use this chapter to 
examine the emergence and development of the Hawaiian state in more detail. In the previous 
chapter, when looking at state-modernisation processes in the non-Western world in the 
nineteenth century, the previous development of statecraft in each of the societies forming 
those states was not analysed at all for most cases, and only superficially for the four more 
detailed Oceanian cases. But, as the third quote demonstrates, in order to fully grasp the 
significance of a polity’s changes during the nineteenth century, an understanding of the 
previous political evolution of that polity is essential. Since the Hawaiian Kingdom is the 
central focus of my study, a much deeper look into the development of native statecraft and 
classical political institutions of that archipelago will be given, before I examine its nineteenth-
century hybridisation in more detail.  
Building essentially on the recent work of Kamanamaikalani Beamer, I mainly reiterate 
his argument that the Hawaiian Kingdom’s origins can only be understood by looking deep into 
its classical Hawaiian predecessor states, that this classical system then underwent a process of 
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hybridisation through selective appropriation of Western technology and ideas, and that the 
resulting modern Hawaiian state was a unique hybrid system, constructed through native 
agency and under native control until its invasion by the United States in 1893. What I add to 
Beamer’s scholarship is an additional focus on some other aspects on classical Hawaiian 
governance, partly based on the inclusion of the recent works of several archaeologists in my 
analysis. I also include a comparative approach that frames the development of classical 
Hawaiian governance within socio-political evolution across Polynesia. Furthermore, I extend 
the analysis of nineteenth-century state hybridisation, modernisation and territorial expansion 
by including some additional primary and secondary sources to deepen some aspects of my 
study. 
The chapter starts off with an overview of the evolution of classical Polynesian societies, 
examining how complex political systems that transcended the prototypical Polynesian 
chiefdom type and should be seen as primary state societies developed in the Hawaiian Islands 
several centuries prior to their encounter with the West. This resulted in the formation the 
political system of the classical Hawaiian states, of which I will then provide an outline. The 
discussion then turns to the unification of the archipelago’s main islands by Kamehameha I and 
the beginning selective adoption of Western technologies and political concepts during his 
reign. The next section deals with the continuing hybridisation of the Kingdom under 
Kamehameha’s son Kauikeaouli, resulting, by the 1840s in the building of the most advanced 
modern State in Oceania, of which the achieving of international recognition in 1843 provides 
the most obvious evidence. In the end, I will focus on the spatial dimension of the Kingdom, 
analysing how it consolidated territorial control over the Central-Northern Pacific in the 1850s 
and early 1860s through the annexation of various uninhabited atolls surrounding the main 
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Hawaiian Islands.  Finally, I will describe and evaluate the Kingdom’s treaty relations with 
Western powers and its position in the international system. 
 
The evolution of classical Polynesian societies and the formation of primary states 
 
The societies of the various Polynesian archipelagos at their point of development 
before the Western encounter have been the subject of comparative analysis for a long time, 
given their closely related languages and native material culture in contrast to their 
significantly diverging degrees of political stratification (Cachola-Abad 2000: 2). Furthermore, 
Polynesia is quite unique in having preserved oral histories of a chronological depth that is 
extraordinary for an originally non-literate civilisation (Charlot 1999: 50; Cachola-Abad 2000: 
48-49). Social scientists, particularly anthropologists, have thus found Polynesia to be perfectly 
suited for comprehensive, multi-case comparative analyses. Some pioneer work in that sense 
was started in the nineteenth century by scholars residing in the Hawaiian Kingdom such as 
Abraham Fornander (1878-85) and William D. Alexander (1888), as well as British colonial 
scholars residing in New Zealand such as Edgard Tregear (1891) and S. Percy Smith (1898), 
who, under the patronage of Queen Lili‘uokalani of Hawai‘i co-founded the Polynesian Society 
in 1892 (Polynesian Society 1892). Further pioneer anthropological work among a wide range 
of Polynesian archipelagos was done in the first half of the twentieth century by Māori scholar 
Te Rangi Hiroa [Sir Peter Buck], famous for his bestselling popular history of pre-encounter 
Polynesia titled Vikings of the Sunrise (Hiroa 1938).  
Partly based on those pioneer studies, in the second half of the twentieth century, social 
anthropologists Marshal Sahlins (1958) and Irving Goldman (1970) produced comprehensive 
comparative studies of socio-political development in Polynesia. While Sahlins focused on the 
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environmental influence on the degree of social stratification, Goldman sees status rivalry as 
the primary cause for social evolution towards more complexity. Both divide Polynesian 
societies into three classes, on one end of the continuum tribal societies with a political system 
based on seniority of descent, on the other end societies stratified in classes of nobles and 
commoners, and a third category comprising societies somewhere in between the two. Both 
agree on putting most Polynesian societies existing on atolls and small high islands or 
archipelagos as well as sparsely populated Aotearoa in the first category as well as on putting 
the Hawaiian Islands, Tonga and Tahiti in the second.  
Based on in-depth archaeological surveys of various archipelagos, Patrick Kirch wrote 
another comprehensive study of all Polynesia in the 1980s focusing on the evolution of the 
Polynesian societies into different directions (Kirch 1984). Together with another 
archaeologist, Kirch has also more recently published the first systematic attempt to 
reconstruct the ancestral Polynesian society that lay at the origin of these evolutions, 
combining archaeological finding with linguistic reconstructions of proto-Polynesian (Kirch 
and Green 2001).  
The common theme of these anthropological and archaeological studies is the evolution 
from an ancestral, relatively egalitarian tribal society – which  some argue is similar to the 
classical conditions on some of the smaller archipelagos – to more complex classical polities as 
they were documented on the larger and more densely populated archipelagos during the 
Western encounter. 
Sahlins, Goldman and Kirch in his earlier writings considered the Hawaiian Islands and 
Tonga as “complex chiefdoms,” i.e. as the most stratified of all classical Polynesian societies, yet 
still within the category of “chiefdoms”, i.e. hierarchical yet pre-state societies. Goldman, for 
instance states that “Polynesian social evolution reached its greatest development in the 
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Hawaiian Islands, where all changes in direction or further elaborations of traditional forms 
under way elsewhere finally came to fruition” (Goldman 1970: 200, quoted by Kirch 2010: 1). 
In contrast, in the 1970s, archaeologist Robert Hommon first suggested classical Hawai‘i to 
have transcended the “chiefdom” category and displaying features of an “archaic state” 
(Hommon 1976). Recently, Kirch has taken up the same idea, arguing in his 2010 book How 
Chiefs became Kings that classical Hawaiian rulers were kings of early states rather than 
powerful chiefs, and in 2013 Hommon came out with The Ancient Hawaiian State, a revised 
version of his 1976 dissertation augmented by more comparative analysis of other Polynesian 
societies, making a clear argument that classical Hawai‘i, alongside classical Tonga, should be 
counted as one of the very few cases of primary state formation [i.e. state formation without 
outside influence from already existing states], alongside such ancient civilisations as Egypt, 
Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, China and Central America (Hommon 2013).  
One of the problems of all these anthropological works, however, is that while they are 
well-grounded in social science theories and have used a remarkable array of material from 
multiple Polynesian archipelagos, none of their authors is a fluent speaker of Polynesian 
languages, and if they use any such source material, it is in English translations. A 
comprehensive comparative study of classical Polynesian societies by a fluent speaker of 
multiple Polynesian languages, from a truly emic perspective, has yet to be undertaken.  
Furthermore, I am cautioning against placing too much confidence on archaeological, 
linguistic and ethnographical methods to determine past social and political systems. I agree 
that it seems quite possible with relative accuracy to use oral traditions to reconstruct 
genealogical connections, to use archaeology to reconstruct settlement and economic patterns, 
and to use historical linguistics to reconstruct proto-languages. On the other hand, using those 
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types of evidence to make clear deductions on the political structures in place during a 
particular time in the past appears much more speculative.  
In summary, while a lot of details of Polynesian political evolution previous to the 
classical period are unclear and will most likely always remain so, the fact that classical Hawai‘i 
and Tonga had developed into primary state societies, while the rest of Polynesia most likely 
had not, is of central importance for the understanding of the further political development of 
these archipelagos following the encounter with the West. It is thus no surprise that of the 
archipelagos discussed in the previous chapter, Tonga made the transition into a modern 
nation-state relatively easily, while the other archipelagos had more challenges to follow such a 
transition. In the Hawaiian Islands, which of all Polynesian archipelagos had the most state-like 
qualities before the encounter with the West, the transition happened even more smoothly 
than in Tonga, as we will see in the following analysis, which will start with a more detailed 
description of classical Hawaiian statecraft and its evolution.  
 
The evolution of classical Hawaiian Statecraft 
 
The Hawaiian Islands were originally discovered and settled by explorers from central 
Eastern Polynesia, i.e. the Marquesas Islands and the Tahitian [Society] archipelago, sometime 
during the first millennium AD. While the early history of Polynesian settlement is somewhat 
obscure, with contradicting dates from archaeological samples and a transition between deep 
mythology and early historical accounts that is often difficult to disentangle within oral 
traditions, the history of the last twenty-three generations prior to Kamehameha I, i.e. roughly 
from the beginning of the second millennium AD, is well documented in oral traditions that 
have been written down by various native and Western researchers in the nineteenth century, 
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such as Davida Malo (1987), Samuel Mānaiakalani Kamakau (1991b, 1996, 2001), Abraham 
Fornander (1996) and King Kalākaua (1972). In her detailed study of this period of Hawaiian 
history, modern Hawaiian anthropologist C. Kēhaunani Cachola-Abad points out how the 
different oral histories documenting these twenty-three generations are “amazingly coherent” 
to form a “unified whole” (2000: 30).  
Multiple analyses of the political evolution during this period of Hawaiian history have 
been done, mainly by anthropologists combining findings from archaeological excavations, 
historical linguistics and an analysis of oral traditions. Besides Cachola-Abad, examples include 
Cordy (2000), Hommon (1976, 2013) and Kirch (1984, 2010, 2012). The findings of the latter 
three basically agree that Hawaiian governance evolved from a more egalitarian kinship-based 
political system originally imported from Central Polynesia to a highly stratified structure of 
governance with only three to five independent polities throughout the archipelago, each 
headed by a quasi-divine Mō‘ī [ruler] reigning over up to 100,000 or more subjects.  
As noted above, Hommon, and more recently Kirch (2010, 2012) have been arguing that 
the Hawaiian political system of the classical era prior to the Western encounter had completed 
the transition from kinship-based “chiefdoms”  to “archaic” or “primary” state societies. 
Hommon defines a state as follows:   
In brief, a state is an autonomous society that perpetuates itself by employing the political 
power of its legitimate central government to control certain activities of its population. To 
remain in power, the government must support itself with a revenue stream, maintain 
internal order, provide for the common defense, and demonstrate legitimacy through state 
rituals and other means, measures that require the general acquiescence, or submission, if 
not the consent, of the governed (Hommon 2013: 121). 
 
Furthermore, and of great importance for Hawai‘i as we will see, “[a] state’s territory and 
resident population are commonly divided into bounded administrative units” (ibid: 122). 
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From a slightly different angle, Kirch defines an “archaic,” or primary, state as having the 
characteristics of a “class-endogamous strata typically organized into at least three and often 
four administrative levels, with divine kings at their apices” (Kirch 2010: 2). Both authors 
rigorously document how the four polities existing in the Hawaiian Islands at the point of the 
encounter with the West correspond to these definitions. 
This typology, however, is challenged to some extent by Kēhaunani Cachola-Abad, who 
argues that putting societal evolution in stage “boxes” is problematic. While she agrees with 
Kirch and Hommon that during the centuries prior to Kamehameha I, the Hawaiian socio-
political system evolved into more and more complexity and stratification, she doubts that it 
would ever be possible to determine when and how the transition from one tightly defined 
stage to another, such as from “chiefdom” to “state” actually happened, and how the actual 
accomplishment of such a step should be defined (Cachola-Abad 2000: 8). While I agree with 
Cachola-Abad that a rigorous typology does not necessary do justice to the complexities of 
social evolution, I still think some kind of typology is necessary to classify different political 
systems in political science. While an analysis of classical Hawaiian society in isolation might 
do without such typology, a comparative approach necessitates it to reference differences in 
the systems of governance at hand. For the purpose of this dissertation at least, the distinction 
between “chiefdom” and “state” societies is of essential importance, as only such a typology can 
explain why the transfer of the Hawaiian governmental system to some Polynesian societies 
succeeded, while it failed in others.    
A somewhat diverging, additional perspective has been provided by Russian sociologist 
Elena Ermolaeva (1997), who has examined that period based on similar sources, but added in 
first-hand observations by early Russian explorers, in order to diversify the point of view, 
attempting to transcend a native-vs-Western-European dichotomy.  What makes Ermolaeva’s 
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approach particularly interesting is her use of Wallerstein’s world-system theory, seeing the 
Hawaiian Islands during their isolation from the rest of the globe as its own “world-system” 
displaying dynamics of core-periphery relations exemplified in marriage exchanges and trade 
of high-prestige feather items throughout the archipelago, arguing that throughout the several 
centuries before Kamehameha I, the core of the system fluctuated between the main islands 
before eventually settling on Hawai‘i Island. 
Anthropologist Marion Kelly focuses on the economic developments that enabled 
political stratification, arguing that population increases lead to the development of complex 
agricultural irrigation systems [‘auwai] and coastal fishponds [loko i‘a], which in turn 
necessitated more centralized political control (Kelly 1989). Kelly’s analysis, as far as irrigation 
systems are concerned, reiterates Karl August Wittfogel’s notion of “hydraulic civilisation,” i.e. 
the highlighting of the importance of irrigation systems for primary state formations (Wittfogel 
1956). Also primarily focused on the economic aspect of primary state formation, archaeologist 
Thomas Dye, based on an intensive archaeological survey of the dryland field system in North 
Kohala on Hawai‘i Island, has centred his argument on pigs as a sort of prestige currently used 
by the ali‘i class, similar to other Oceanian societies, but at a much larger volume (Dye 2010; 
2014).   
The most detailed recent study of classical Hawaiian political evolution has been done 
by C. Kēhaunani Cachola-Abad, which was already mentioned several times above. In her 2000 
dissertation, Cachola-Abad uses a systematic survey of oral traditions, as they were written 
down in manuscripts or published in newspapers during the nineteenth century, to develop a 
comprehensive model of socio-political development over the twenty-three generations 
preceding Kamehameha I. Diverging from the models developed by other anthropologists such 
as Hommon, she uses Darwinian  evolutionary theory, which she argues can not only be 
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extended to the field of social sciences but also corresponds to an emic Hawaiian view of 
evolution (Cachola-Abad 2000: 19-20).92 Within this framework, Cachola-Abad focuses on the 
dynamics of interaction between the four polities in the Hawaiian Islands, i.e. Kaua‘i, O‘ahu, 
Maui and Hawai‘i, both peaceful ones such as intermarriages and inter-polity warfare. 
Interestingly, her statistical analysis of these relations shows a predominance of peaceful 
relations over most time-periods, which means that a focus on warfare alone is insufficient to 
explain the long-range evolution of the complex polities in the archipelago (ibid.: 567-573). 
Cachola-Abad in her conclusion already argues that an understanding of the long-range 
evolution of Hawaiian socio-political complexity “creates a more positive view of attempts by 
the [nineteenth-century] Hawaiian monarchs to modernize Hawai‘i” (ibid.: 578). The first 
author to examine the evolution of classical Hawaiian political system in the explicit context of 
its further evolution as a modern state in the nineteenth century, however, is Kamanamaikalani 
Beamer. In his 2014 book, Beamer identifies three main traditional principles of governance 
that shaped the classical Hawaiian polity, namely (1) Mō‘ī: a supreme ruler at the head of each 
polity often translated as paramount chief or king. This was a hereditary position that carried 
not only effective political power but also high rank sanctioned by mana [spiritual power]; (2) 
palena: fixed land boundaries, created during the 15th-16th centuries by famous mōʻī on each 
island, dividing the land into a series of nested units, the most important being moku and 
ahupuaʻa; and (3) kālai‘āina: the administration of the territory through the distributing of land 
units such as moku and ahupua‘a by a mōʻī among his supporters after each succession 
(Beamer 2014: 19-49). According to the conclusion in Beamer’s earlier dissertation, these 
three “critical ancient structures […] were the foundations of government and would be later 
codified in the modernization of the Hawaiian Kingdom” (Beamer 2008: 293). 
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 As for instance lined out in the Kumulipo, a classical Hawaiian chant that explains the evolution of the universe in 
genealogical sequences (Kalākaua 1889; Liliuokalani 1897; Beckwith 1972) 
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Since I am especially focusing on the evolution of the constitutional framework of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom, as it became later institutionally transferred to other Pacific archipelagos, 
as I will discuss in detail in Chapter six, I am particularly interested in the origins of Hawaiian 
concepts of law. I thus suggest here a fourth central structure of classical Hawaiian statecraft, 
namely that of kānāwai [commandment, law or decree]. In the following section, I will 
elaborate on these four principles in some more detail, in order to outline the political system 
of classical Hawai‘i, and then discuss the interaction between classical Hawaiian polities.  
 
Principles and Characteristics of Classical Hawaiian of Governance 
 
Mō‘ī 
 
The term Mō‘ī is likely a Hawaiian neologism since there is no clear cognate word in 
other Polynesian languages. According to nineteenth-century Hawaiian scholar Kepelino 
Keauokalani, the word combines the words mō [gourd]93 and ‘ī [to speak], thus referring to the 
ruler of a classical Hawaiian polity, whose word reigned supreme, as a vessel of speech 
(Keauokalani 1932: 142-43).94 As opposed to the Proto-Polynesian term *‘ariki that referred to 
a tribal chief, and in its Hawaiian derivative form ali‘i designated the chiefly or noble class in 
classical Hawai‘i, I would argue that Mō‘ī can be safely translated into English as “monarch,” all 
the while maintaining the same cautions that should be applied to the terms “king,” “emperor” 
etc. as translations for the titles of the rulers of various other non-Western polities.  
The most basic prerequisite for becoming Mō‘ī was to be a member of the ‘aha ali‘i 
[council of chiefs], an institution assembling the higher ranking members of the chiefly class 
                                                 
93
 Apparently, the word mō for gourd as explained by Keauokalani is an archaic term not commonly used in other 
nineteenth century sources, since it is not listed in the standard Hawaiian dictionaries, neither the one of the 
nineteenth (Andrews 1865) nor that of the twentieth century (Elbert and Pukui 1986). 
94
 For a more detailed discussion of the term mō‘ī, and citations of other relevant sources, see Beamer 2014: 21. 
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that was of divine origins (Fornander 1996: 28-29). While the position of Mō‘ī was in theory 
sacrosanct and hereditary within the ruling dynasties, it was not uncommon for Mō‘ī who ruled 
irresponsibly to be overthrown by public revolt and replaced with more popular relatives of 
junior genealogical rank. The toppling of Hākau a Līloa, a tyrannical and unpopular ruler of 
parts of Hawai‘i Island in the fifteenth or sixteenth century [nine generations before 
Kamehameha], and his replacement with his lower ranking half-brother ‘Umi a Līloa who is 
venerated as a righteous “great king” (Malo 1987: 170-178; Kamakau 1992: 1-21) became a 
symbolic term of reference to the moral quality of pono [righteousness] of classical Hawaiian 
kingship, alongside other similar accounts (e.g. Malo 1987: 129-130).  
Below the Mō‘ī, the government apparatus of a classical Hawaiian polity included 
various office holders. According to Keauokalani, besides various specialised personal 
attendants, these included the kuhina [executive counsellors] of the ruler (Keauokalani 1932: 
132-133), and most importantly among them the kuhina nui [chief executive] (ibid.: 146-147), 
who in turn presided over kia‘āina [governors] (ibid.: 146-147). The latter position referred to 
people appointed by a Mō‘ī to administer conquered territories, especially outer islands, such 
as Maui and O‘ahu when conquered during Hawai‘i Island Mō‘ī Kalaunuiohua’s first attempt to 
unify the archipelago in the twelfth of thirteenth century [twenty generations before 
Kamehemeha] (Malo 1987: 166-167). While according to Malo, Kalaunuiohua reappointed the 
defeated Mō‘ī as kia‘āina of their former kingdoms, later conquerors appointed their own 
relatives to be governors, for instance when Kalani‘ōpu‘u of Hawai‘i Island [one generation 
prior to Kamehameha I] appointed a chief named Puna to be kia‘āina of the conquered parts of 
Maui (Kamakau 1996: 14; cf. also Hommon 2013: 27).   
Other important officials in a classical Hawaiian polity were the ilamuku [executioner] 
who killed people violating kapu [religiously sanctioned prohibitions] and kānāwai [edicts, see 
156 
 
below] (Keauokalani 1932: 126-127) and the pu‘ukū nui [head treasurer] who administered 
the goods in the Mō‘ī’s possession and supervised their redistribution to subordinate chiefs 
(ibid.: 128-129). Mentioning these offices here is very important because they continued into 
the nineteenth-century constitutional monarchy with slightly modified functions and were 
equated with Western-style offices in the English translations of the constitution and laws, as I 
will discuss further below in this chapter.  
Furthermore, it is quite striking how some classical Hawaiian theories of governance 
resemble those in Western political science. For instance, Hawaiian Historian Davida Malo’s 
conception of a traditional polity as an organic body with the Mō‘ī as its head (Malo 1987: 121-
122) resembles both Hobbes’ concept of the State as a “Leviathan” (Hobbes 1968)95 and Hegel’s 
concept of “state organicism” (Wolff 1984). As Beamer points out, “[t]he fact that governance 
was abstractly thought of in these terms is of great significance toward the understanding of 
the modernization of this system” (2008: 63). 
Palena 
 
The second basic principle of governance, palena, is also of critical importance for the 
understanding of the classical Hawaiian political system. As administrative units of larger 
polities, Hawaiian land divisions like moku and ahupua‘a were conceptually very different from 
geographically similar land units in other Polynesian islands, such as Tahitian mata’eina’a or 
Samoan nu‘u, which constituted kin-based autonomous polities as discussed in the previous 
chapter (Newbury 1980: 23; Meleiseā 1987: 5-6). It is also striking that the words designating 
land divisions of classical Hawai‘i were for the most part innovations not cognate to land 
division terms in other parts of Polynesia. A linguistic analysis of the word ahupua‘a, for 
instance, shows its purpose as a taxation or tribute gathering unit for a centralised 
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 I acknowledge P. Kalawai‘a Moore for pointing this out in his dissertation (2010: 221) 
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government, referring to an ahu [altar] decorated with the head of a pua‘a [pig] situated at its 
boundary, upon which tribute for the island’s Mō‘ī would be deposited to be collected during 
the annual religious ceremonies referred to as makahiki (Lyons 1875: 104). Unlike chiefs 
heading clans and their territories in less stratified Polynesian societies, Hawaiian ahupua‘a 
were administered by konohiki, land managers appointed by the mō‘ī’s central 
administration.96   
 The above given etymology of the word ahupua‘a points to the importance not just of 
the land division itself, but particularly of its boundaries. According to Hawaiian historical 
traditions, very precise boundaries of ahupua‘a, as well as various larger and smaller units 
were created during the fifteenth or sixteenth century in the course of major political reforms 
by famous Mōʻī on each island, for instance on O‘ahu by Mā‘ilikūkahi [thirteen generations 
before Kamehameha I],  as described by Kamakau:   
I ka noho Aupuni ana o Mailikukahi, Ua noho huikau ka aina; aole maopopo ke Ahupuaa, ke 
Ku, ka Iliaina, ka Mooaina, ka Pauku aina a me na Kihapai. Nolaila, kauoha aku o Mailikukahi i 
na ‘Lii me na kaukaualii, me na puali alii a me na Luna, e Mahele i ka aina i moku, a me na 
Ahupuaa, a me na kupono me ka Iliaina a me na Mooaina a puni o Oahu – Eono moku. Eono 
alii nui Aimoku; a hoonoho aku la ia i na’lii i Ahupuaa, he Ahupuaa nui, he alii nui, he 
kaukaualii, he ku-pono ka aina, he puali, he Iliaina – Haawiia ka aina i na makaainana a pau 
loa, a puni o Oahu.97 
 
                                                 
96
 However, unlike the neologism ahupua‘a, the term konohiki is not a Hawai‘i-specific innovation as claimed by 
Kirch (2012: 141), but is indeed cognate to togo‘iti in Mangarevan, where it means a chief or nember of the ruling 
family (Rensch 1991: 269), as well as to other derivatives of the Proto-Polynesian word *toŋohiti with more 
different meanings in a variety of other Polynesian languages. 
97
 “During the reign of Mā‘ilikūkahi the land was in a stale of confusion. It was not clearly understood what was an 
ahupua‘a, a kū, a ‘ili ‘āina, a mo‘o ‘āina, a paukū ‘āina and a kīhāpai. Therefore, Mā‘ilikūkahi ordered the chiefs, 
the lower chiefs, the warriors and the overseers, to divide the land into moku, ahupua‘a, [‘ili]kūpono,‘ili ‘āina and 
mo‘o ‘āina all around O‘ahu. There were six moku. There were six high chiefs ruling over each moku; and he 
established the chiefs to rule over the ahupua‘a; for a large ahupua‘a, a high chief; for a lower chief the land was a 
[‘ili] kūpono; for a warrior, a ‘ili ‘āina. Land was also given to all of the maka‘āinana throughout O‘ahu.” Samuel 
M. Kamakau, “Ka Moolelo o Hawaii Nei, Helu 12. No Ke Kaapuni Makaikai i na Wahi Kaulana a me na Kupua, a 
me na ‘Lii Kahiko mai Hawaii a Niihau.” Nupepa Kuokoa 4, 35 (Sept 2, 1865): 1. I acknowledge Kamanamaikalani 
Beamer for pointing this passage out to me. 
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While Mā‘ilikūkahi is credited with having initiated these reforms on O‘ahu [cf. fig. 4.1], his 
initiative was soon followed by the other kingdoms, and similar reforms  were enacted by 
Manokalanipō on Kaua‘i, by Kaka‘analeo on Maui and by the already mentioned ‘Umi a Līloa on 
Hawai‘i Island (Kirch 2010: 91; Beamer 2014: 35). According to Beamer, what makes palena 
specifically important to the classical political system is that their creation by decree of the 
ruler demonstrates the centralisation of power in the hands of the Mō‘ī, and furthermore, that 
they provide for an organisation of the polity into defined territorial units, which could be 
assigned to subordinate ali‘i without having to redefine them over and over again (Beamer 
2005: 63, 122, 124; 2014: 35, 47). 
Map. 4.1:  Moku and ahupua‘a land divisions on O‘ahu, as created by Mā‘ilikūkahi. Only moku names are 
included. Drawn by the author, based on data from Hawaiian Government Survey maps. 
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Kālai‘āina 
 
This brings us to the third principle, namely kālai‘āina. In the most simple way, 
kālai‘āina is translated as “carving the land” and refers to a redistribution of the land units 
bounded by palena among the leading ali‘i of the kingdom.  Since these assignments of land 
management were not inheritable, each succession of a new Mō‘ī involved a new kālai‘āina. 
(Beamer 2014: 45-47). The fact that the word kālai‘āina was later in the constitutional 
monarchy equated with the Western political concept of “politics” in general, as well as with 
“political economy” and “domestic policy” in particular [as will be discussed further below], 
points to the central importance this principle must have had in classical Hawaiian statecraft.  
Interestingly, Davida Malo’s 1840s-1850s Hawaiian history manuscript Ka Moolelo 
Hawaii contains a chapter entitled “No Kalaimoku” [literally “about carving land sections,” 
translated more creatively by Emerson in Malo 1951: 187 as “The Civil Polity”], in which Malo 
states, “O ke kalaimoku oia ma lalo e pili ana i ka hooponopono aupuni […].”98 He then first 
describes the classical political system in general, using the famous human body analogy 
mentioned above, and then goes to describe the process of kālai‘āina in minute details (Malo 
1987: 121ff). The central officeholder organising the redistribution of lands was called 
kālaimoku [“carver of land divisions”], a key executive and administrative advisor to the Mō‘ī.99 
Initiating a kālai‘āina, genealogies of the members of the ‘aha ali‘i would be gathered, and a 
hale nauā [“house of genealogical challenge”] would be built, into which only those proving 
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 “Kālaimoku means below relating to the administration of government.” (Malo 1987: 121) 
99
 Beamer (2005: 68-71) speculates that the kālaimoku might be the predecessor to the office later called kuhina nui, 
since Keauokalani, whose writings postdate Malo’s, only mentions the latter and not the former. Beamer specifically 
mentions the appointment of Ka‘ahumanu to be kuhina nui after Kamehameha I’s passing in 1819, suggesting that 
the latter office was only created through this act. While this might be correct, I would suggest a different 
interpretation in which both offices existed in classical times and continued into the nineteenth century, with the 
following argument: First, during Ka‘ahumanu’s regency Kamehameha’s kālaimoku, Kalanimōkū, continued 
holding his office, and secondly, during the early constitutional period there existed both a kuhina nui [“premier”] 
and a kuhina kalai‘āina [“minister of the interior”], the latter I would suggest to be a modernised rendering of 
kālaimoku, given the lexical relation of the terms (cf. also Mykkänen 2003: 142-143). 
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close genealogical relation to the new Mō‘ī would be admitted. It was among those that the Mō‘ī 
with the assistance of his kālaimoku redistributed the lands within the kingdom (Malo 1987: 
125-127). Furthermore, it was part of the kālaimoku’s responsibility to oversee the granting of 
plots of land to the maka‘āinana and to see to their interests, so that the entire polity, and not 
merely the ruling class, would thrive (ibid: 122, 125, 127).100 
Kānāwai 
 
As mentioned above, the rules and regulations pronounced by the Mō‘ī to make this 
polity function and therefore help preserve social peace within the realm were called 
kānāwai.101 Besides these royal edicts that come closest to the modern meaning of “law,” there 
were also kānāwai that stemmed directly from the Gods, for instance rules regulating religious 
protocol. Kamakau lists various kānāwai given by the Gods or proclaimed by kings, most of 
them relating to behaviour between the social classes in religious contexts, while some of them 
were expressly enacted to provide relief for maka‘āinana from overly strict applications of 
religious prohibitions and chiefly abuses of power (Kamakau in Ke Au Okoa, 10, 17 and 24 
March 1870; Kamakau 1991: 11-17). For instance, the Kānāwai Ni‘aupi‘o Kolowalu, proclaimed 
by O‘ahu’s Mō‘ī Kūali‘i in the seventeenth century [three generations before Kamehameha I] 
guarantees the safety of men, women and children to be left unharmed by the wayside, and 
obliges hungry people to be fed (Kamakau in Ke Au Okoa, 17 March 1870: 1, c.3). Similar 
kānāwai were pronounced by other rulers as well. Hence, some of the classical Hawaiian 
                                                 
100
 The latter aspect of looking for the domestic welfare and social peace within the realm makes it even more likely 
that the office of kālaimoku in the classical regime is a direct predecessor to that of kuhina kalai‘āina under the 
constitutional system, as argued in the preceding footnote. 
101
 I am not sure of a conclusive etymology of the word kānāwai. The nineteenth century standard Hawaiian 
dictionary indicates kā-nā-wai to mean “relating to the waters,” suggesting a relation to water use regulations 
essential for the functioning of ‘auwai [irrigation systems] (Andrews 2003: 254). However, this logically-appearing 
etymology is considered unlikely by the authors of the twentieth-century standard Hawaiian dictionary (Pukui and 
Elbert 1986: 127-8). 
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kānāwai laid the foundation for what later in the nineteenth century became known as the rule 
of law, and, in twentieth-century terms, human rights and social welfare. 
In this context, it is striking that most other nineteenth-century Polynesian states used 
transliterations of foreign terms to describe “law,” either taken from the Bible or from modern 
English usage, as will be discussed in Chapter seven. The Hawaiian Kingdom, on the other hand, 
stands out by using kānāwai for that purpose, a native term that had been used in the classical 
era and thus predates its equation with Biblical and Western concepts of law in the nineteenth 
century. Most notably, Kamehameha I’s Kānāwai Māmalahoa [Law of the Splintered Paddle], 
the famous edict granting safe passage to travellers (Kamakau 1996: 77, 112, 120, 159, 222), 
which is in fact a reiteration of Kūali‘i’s Kānāwai Ni‘aupi‘o Kolowalu mentioned above, is 
referred to in the 1839 legal code of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a precedent for more modern 
Hawaiian laws.102 
 
Dynastic interrelations and peer-polity interaction 
 
As remarked above, four kingdoms consolidated in the Hawaiian archipelago during the 
centuries prior to Kamehameha. From oral histories as well as archaeological surveys we can 
deduct how and when the larger islands were unified under one dynasty, for instance the 
island of Hawai‘i under ‘Umi a Līloa (Cachola-Abad 2000: 341-342; Kirch 2010: 98), or Maui 
under Kiha a Pi‘ilani, after two consolidated chiefdoms had existed, on East and West Maui, 
respectively, for several generations prior (Cachola-Abad 2000: 331-332, 357-359; Kolb 
1994103). At the same time, formerly independent smaller islands were absorbed within the 
emerging kingdoms based on the four largest islands. Especially ambitious Mō‘ī occasionally 
                                                 
102
 Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom 1839: He kumu kanawai, a me ke kanawai hooponopono waiwai, no ko 
Hawaii nei Pae Aina. Na Kamehameha III. i kau. Honolulu (Photocopy in UH Hamilton library. Call number 
KFH30.5 .K86 .1839a), p. 15. I acknowledge Kamanamaikalani Beamer for pointing this out in his book (2014:125) 
103
 See the illustration in Kolb 1994: 528 for a particularly interesting combined genealogical and graphic 
representation of this unification process on Maui. 
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achieved the temporary incorporation of another of the large kingdoms, as for instance O‘ahu’s 
ruler Peleiōholani in the mid-eighteenth century [two generations prior to Kamehameha] 
temporarily absorbed parts of Kaua‘i and Molokai into his realm (Fornander 1996: 289-90; 
Cachola Abad 2000: 430; Cordy 2002: 32-33), and later, O‘ahu itself was in turn conquered by 
Kahekili II of Maui [one generation before Kamehameha]. On the other hand, the enormously 
large space of the Hawai‘i Island polity, and occasionally the three medium-sized kingdoms as 
well, temporarily disintegrated into smaller units, such as Hawai‘i after the reign of ‘Umi a Līloa 
and after that of Kalani‘ōpu‘u, and O‘ahu after the reign of Kākuhihewa (Cachola-Abad 2000: 
Table 7.1). In summary, the number of classical Hawaiian polities was constantly in flux, 
oscillating somewhere between three and six but clearly remaining a single-digit number since 
initial consolidations had taken place.  
I have already stated that unlike sometimes assumed, the expansion of classical 
Hawaiian states and the incorporation or annexation of neighbouring polities did not only 
involve warfare but also, and often more successfully, peaceful exchanges, especially marriage 
alliances (Cachola-Abad 2000). Despite the division of the Hawaiian archipelago into a 
minimum of three separate kingdoms, their ruling lineages were closely related by blood. As 
Kamakau (1842: 52) wrote, “O na ‘lii Oahu a me Kauai, o ko Hawaii a me Maui a me Molokai 
hookahi no kupuna.”104 Cachola-Abad’s research clearly confirms this in details, revealing 
intermarriages between the chiefly lineages of the different islands in almost every of the 
twenty-three generations prior to Kamehameha (2000: fig 7.1). This is a trait classical 
Hawaiian society had in common with several other Polynesian archipelagos even if their 
political system was less stratified. For instance throughout the Tahitian [Society] archipelago, 
virtually all of the high ranking ari’i were intermarried descendants or collaterals of the 
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 “The Chiefs of O‘ahu and Kaua‘i, of Hawai‘i, of Maui and of Molokai, have all one common ancestor.” I 
acknowledge Kamanamaikalani Beamer for bringing that quote to my attention. 
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Tamatoa lineage of Ra’iātea (Henry 2000). Similarly, high-ranking families of all parts of Sāmoa 
were also closely related to each other and shared genealogies linking them to common 
ancestors (Gilson 1970: 51ff; Schoeffel 1987; Tuiatua Tupua Tamasese 1994; 1995). 
Specifically to Hawai‘i, however, was that interrelated families ruled stratified primary 
states, of which none permanently dominated the others. This created a very peculiar situation 
that Kirch refers to as “peer-polity interaction” (Kirch 2010: 219; 2012: 230, 291, 297), a 
dynamic process in which innovations of one Mō‘ī were adopted by his or her peers, as for 
instance the above-mentioned adoption of Mā‘ilikūkahi’s ahupua‘a system by Kaka‘analeo and 
later by ‘Umi. In a sense this was an early instance of “institutional transfer” within the same 
cultural sphere, predating the later transcultural transfers from the West in the nineteenth 
century. 
Furthermore, I suggest using the term “peer-polity interaction” to mean not only the 
process of institutional borrowing but also an awareness by the classical Hawaiian rulers of 
being essentially equal to each other, and in consequence, the development of a system of 
diplomatic protocol to interact with one another, which laid important groundwork to later 
Hawaiian interactions with culturally foreign states. Cachola-Abad thus underlines the central 
importance of classical Hawaiian peer-polity interaction for the development of nineteenth 
century Hawaiian diplomacy:  
With an understanding of Hawaiian history that begins from the time of Kamehameha, one 
might assume that this rush of Hawaiian ali‘i to gain [international] recognition was an 
attempt to Westernize Hawai‘i in order to remain a sovereign, independent nation. This is 
only partly true. For indeed, the notion of rulers recognizing each other’s sovereign status, of 
nations conducting formal diplomatic relations, and of political alliances being formed among 
heads of state was not at all ‘Western’ or ‘foreign’ It was very Hawaiian.  Ali‘i were engaged on 
the same for generations. Although other major changes to the political, social and economic 
fabric of the time were clearly Western in origin, it is significant to note that Hawaiian 
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monarchs had an astute native understanding of state-to-state relations which in part came 
from their being taught their own history. It is perhaps this understanding and an openness 
to evolution that allowed ali‘i of the 1800s to adapt quickly and effectively to a changing 
world context that otherwise swallowed up so many Pacific Island nations. (Abad 2000: 578) 
 
In that sense, the primary states of the Hawaiian Islands were quite different from the 
other classical Polynesian state in Tonga, where the Tu‘i Tonga, as well as its secular co-ruler 
[Tu‘i Ha‘atakalaua and later Tu‘i Kanokupolu] were in a centralized monolithic position. Unlike 
a Hawaiian Mō‘ī who was only one among several Mō‘ī, the Tu‘i Tonga was the only Tu‘i Tonga, 
and the Tongatapu polity was understood as the only possible central authority. The classical 
Tongan system was thus somewhat similar to the Chinese Empire as a centralised polity that 
regarded any other polities as either its tributaries or “enemy barbarians,” but never as its 
peers. Given  the history of Tongan actual or attempted domination over the surrounding 
Western Polynesian polities for centuries, any leadership role by Tonga in the nineteenth 
century was naturally regarded with suspicion by its neighbours, and thus Tonga itself had to 
undergo a significant process of adjustment in order to accept its role as one among many co-
equal states, which was also similar to China’s long and torturous adjustment to being merely a 
nation-state among others, as I have described in chapter three. 
In the Hawaiian Islands, on the other hand, there had been parity of authority between 
the four main polities over generations, which was somewhat akin to other peer polity systems 
in world history such as the poleis of ancient Greece and the states of the post-Westphalian 
European system. This also relates to Ermolaeva’s notion of a Hawaiian “world system” 
(Ermolaeva 1997). While Ermolaeva focuses more on the shifting positions of core and 
periphery between the polities than seeing them simply as peers, such an inequality in fact is 
true for any peer polity system in world history. Nonetheless, formal peer polity systems 
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necessitate the creation of a system of diplomatic parity that is unthinkable in formally 
centripetal systems like imperial China and classical Tonga. 
In summary, the importance of classical Hawaiian statecraft as a foundation for the 
development of the Hawaiian Kingdom in the nineteenth century cannot be underestimated. 
Domestically, the centralisation of power under a Mō‘ī in command of a centralised 
bureaucratic apparatus, the creation of territorial land units bounded by fixed palena 
[boundaries], the formalisation of the political administration through the kālai‘āina 
[redistribution of land] and a notion of social responsibility for the population, as well as the 
enactment of chiefly kānāwai  [edicts] to regulate protocol and protect commoners against 
abuse laid the groundwork for what was to become a modern constitutional state. At the same 
time, the experience of peer polity interaction between the classical Hawaiian kingdoms would 
later facilitate the acceptance of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s role in the modern state system, and 
also its interaction with the rest of Oceania as a state among other Oceanian states. Within a 
framework combining the notion of peer polity interaction with that of core-periphery 
dynamics, it would then not too far-flung an idea to envision the Hawaiian Kingdom as a primus 
inter pares among Oceanian states.  
Unifying the Archipelago 
 
From the above analysis of Hawaiian history prior to the encounter with the West, it 
becomes very clear that the idea of a centralised state was well present in classical Hawai‘i, and 
that, in other words, the basic building blocks for the modern state that became the Hawaiian 
Kingdom were by and large already present before the influx of Western ideas. As 
Kamanamaikalani Beamer (2014: 28) points out, reiterating a statement by King Kalākaua 
(1973: 177), a unification of the entire archipelago by conquest had already been attempted by 
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the Hawai‘i Island ali‘i Kalaunuiohua many centuries prior to Kamehameha and came close to 
success.  
Soon after what was likely the initial Western 
encounter in the late 1770s, the previously developing 
dynamics of archipelago-wide dynastic alliances and conquest 
warfare came to fruition. First Kahekili II of Maui acquired 
control over O‘ahu [by conquest] and Kaua‘i [through dynastic 
alliance], once again creating a situation where only one island 
[Hawai‘i] was left outside of the hegemon state. However, with 
Kahekili’s death in 1794, the Greater Maui kingdom once more 
fell apart. Instead, between 1780 and 1795 the ambitious 
Hawai‘i Island ali‘i Kamehameha the Great [c. 1758-1819; fig. 
4.1] first re-unified Hawai‘i Island and then conquered Maui, its dependent islands and 
O‘ahu.105  Finally, after several failed attempts at conquest, Kamehameha was able to achieve 
suzerainty over Kaua‘i and its dependencies through a peaceful agreement in 1810, thus 
becoming the first leader to realise the goal of becoming Mō‘ī of the entire archipelago 
(Kamakau 1996).106  
The consolidation of Kamehameha’s conquests and acquisitions into a permanent 
political system for the entire archipelago was clearly facilitated by the highly centralized 
classical political structure of each of the conquered polities. As Kirch states, “Hawai‘i knew 
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 While many Western historians have emphasized the use of Western weapons by Kamehameha’s troops as the 
decisive factor in their military victories, Australian historian Paul d’Arcy has recently re-examined those claims, 
concluding that Kamehameha’s successes were to a large extent build on a continuity of classical military and 
political strategies, and the additional limited use of western weaponry – which had also been acquired by 
Kamehameha’s opponents – was rather a supplementary element than a game changer (D’Arcy 2003). 
106
 Over-rule by the Hawaiian Kingdom, which was agreed upon by Kaua‘i s ruler Kaumuali‘i in 1810 was later 
challenged by his son George Humehume in 1825. In the ensuing battle, Humehume was at last vanquished by 
Hawaiian forces and the island thereafter definitely incorporated into the kingdom.  
Fig. 4.1: Kamehameha I. 
Painting by Ludwig Choris, 
1816. Copyright expired. 
Source: Wikipedia. 
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kingship well enough long before hearing of King George […] and other European rulers” 
(2010: x). Hence, when Kamehameha did hear of King George and styled his government a 
“kingdom” on the British model, it was in fact merely a new designation and hybridization of 
the already existing political system (Beamer 2014: 48; 104 ff). The office of Mōʻī was formally 
equalled with the Western concept of kingship; palena continued to serve as the basic 
administrative and land management units, and the word kalaiʻāina continued as a general 
term for political administration. Similarly, alongside divine commandments, royal kānāwai 
continued to be the rules upon which social organisation of the kingdom was based, with 
Kamehameha’s already mentioned Kānāwai Māmalahoa of particularly importance as a 
reiterated declaration of basic human rights for the kingdom’s subjects.  
Thanks to the writings of Ioane ‘Ī’ī, who served in Kamehameha’s court before 
becoming a major official in the Hawaiian Kingdom government later in the nineteenth century, 
we know a lot of details about Kamehameha’s governance (‘Ī‘ī 1983). The monumental work of 
history by Kamakau also illustrates how Kamehameha’s government functioned, while at the 
same time providing ample evidence of the latter following a tradition of statecraft going back 
many generations into classical time (Kamakau 1996).  
One of the most important innovations introduced into Hawaiian governance by 
Kamehameha was a political relationship with Great Britain. In 1794, having consolidated rule 
over Hawai‘i Island but prior to his conquest of Maui and O‘ahu, Kamehameha made an 
agreement with visiting British naval captain George Vancouver. According to Vancouver’s 
report, Kamehameha agreed to cede his Kingdom to Great Britain, making the statement, 
reiterated by many other Hawaiians, that they were now “Tanata no Britannee” [Kānaka no 
Beritania, i.e. “people in the service of Britain,” or “people under the suzerainty of Britain”]. 
Whatever Kamehameha’s exact intentions were, the British government did not act on it for 
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more than a decade, until Kamehameha had two formal letters written to King George III in 
1810, upon which the British crown replied in ambiguous terms implying a relationship of 
friendly alliance. In the analysis of historian Rhoda Hackler (1986), later reiterated by Beamer 
(2014: 64; 71-75), the relationship between Kamehameha’s Kingdom and the British Empire 
was that of an alliance, not of a cession.107 French Anthropologist Jean-François Baré provides 
an interesting additional context for Kamehameha’s connection to Great Britain. In comparing 
this with a comparable situation in Tahiti where the Pomare dynasty similarly allied itself with 
the King of Britain, Baré argues that in Eastern Polynesia, during the early encounter with the 
unfathomable power of the British Empire, there developed an “intériorisation de l’Angleterre” 
[“interiorisation of England”] into local politics and mythology (Baré 1987: 26), “une 
construction mytho-politique” [“a mythical-political construct”], in which England became a 
quasi-divine outside protector (ibid: 19).  
The most important aspect of the special relationship with Britain, besides the 
protection of the Kingdom against possible aggression by another Western imperial power 
(Kauai 2014: 73ff), was the adoption of what Hawaiian political scientist D. Keanu Sai has 
termed a system of “British governance” (Sai 2008b: 39-42), a perfect example of similitude as 
I have discussed it in chapter two. This included equating the office of Mō‘ī with that of “King;” 
equating the office of kālaimoku with that of “Prime minister,” including the adoption of the 
name Billy Pitt [the then current British Prime minister] by Kamehameha’s kālaimoku 
Kalanimōkū, and equating the offices of kia‘āina with those of governors, as the British Crown 
appointed them to head its overseas colonies (Sai 3008: 39). The alliance with Britain also 
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 There is some debate on the excat nature of Kamehameha I’s relationship with Great Britian among Hawaiian 
scholars today. In contrast to Hackler’s and Beamer’s analysis, Sai (2011: 21) has made a stronger argument for 
some kind of cession to Great Britain actually taking place. 
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included the British union flag, which was later incorporated in the upper corner of the 
Hawaiian national flag adopted by Kamehameha in 1816 (Williams 1963).108 
Overall however, these changes remained rather superficial, and the system of 
government remained essentially that of a classical Hawaiian state. The core institutions like 
the Mō‘ī and his executive advisors including the kia‘āina appointed to govern the conquered 
islands, the palena of the territorial divisions and the kānāwai and kapu to regulate society 
remained very similar if not identical to how they had operated during previous reigns. The 
one  major innovation was the employment of foreigners, preferably Britons, such as the 
British sailors John Young and Isaac Davis, who, as major military and diplomatic aides to 
Kamehameha, were elevated into the higher ali‘i class. Later arrived other foreign employees of 
the King, such as Britons George Beckley and Alexander Adams, the Spaniard Francisco de 
Paula Marín, or the Frenchman Jean Baptiste Rives, were treated similar to court retainers of 
kaukau ali‘i [lower chiefly] rank in the classical system (Kame‘eleihiwa 1992: 59).  
Already in his lifetime, Kamehameha I was regarded as a great statesman and credited 
as the father of the Hawaiian nation (see for instance Choris 1999 and Chamisso quoted in 
Schweizer 2005: 198). After his passing in 1819, he was elevated to a divine position, and 
between the formal abolition of the classical religion in 1819 and conversion of the court to 
Christianity in the mid-1820s, a formalised veneration of the late king emerged as a new 
national religion (Charlot 1985: 5-7). Later, Kamehameha I re-emerged as the founding father 
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 Recently, Hawaiian language scholar Kalaniakea Wilson has argued that besides its obvious reference to a 
special relationship with the UK the Hawaiian flag also contains symbolism of the classical Hawaiian religion, 
which at the time of the flag’s creation [1816] was still the state religion of the Kingdom. According to a statement 
by Wilson in an interview with posted on YouTube < https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1L5g_K4HJ4> , the red 
and blue stripes stand for the Kū [God of war and politics, traditionally symbolised by red and yellow feathers] and 
Lono [God of peace and dryland agriculture, symbolised by a wooden cross decorated with large banners of white 
backcloth], while the blue stripes symbolise the water deities Kanaloa [God of the ocean] and Kāne [God of 
freshwater]. In a personal communication on 29 October 2015, Wilson told me the sources this hypothesis is based 
on are hitherto undocumented oral traditions he gathered from descendants of Kamehameha’s family and associates 
in the moku of Kohala on Hawai‘i Island.  
170 
 
figure in secular nationalist discourse from the 1860s onwards (Mellen 1956: 277). It was in 
this context that the only known work of poetry composed by Kamehameha I himself was 
published in 1861 (Nogelmeier 2011), followed by Kamakau’s and ‘Ī‘ī’s above mentioned 
histories of the conqueror and his times in the late 1860s and 1870s. This prominence of the 
Na‘i Aupuni [“Conqueror of the Realm”] in late nineteenth century patriotic discourse is clearly 
pointed out in the third quote at the beginning of this chapter. However, as I have cited 
Cachola-Abad above, it is important not to see his deeds in a historical vacuum, but rather as 
the culmination of centuries of classical Hawaiian statecraft.  
 
Hybridising the Hawaiian State 
 
It was after the passing of Kamehameha I in 1819 that the first major changes in the 
Hawaiian political system were undertaken. Shortly after Kamehameha’s successor Liholiho 
[Kamehameha II; 1797-1824] acceded to the throne, under the 
influence of kuhina nui Ka‘ahumanu [d. 1832] the classical 
religion was officially abolished and traditionalist resistance 
quashed in the ensuing short battle (Kamakau 1996: 206-216). 
After Liholiho passed away during a visit to London to clarify the 
relationship between Hawai‘i and Great Britain in 1824, 
Ka‘ahumanu assumed executive power as the regent for 
Liholiho’s minor brother Kauikeaouli [Kamehameha III, 1813-
1854, fig. 4.2].109 Under her leadership, in the mid-1820s the 
court converted to Calvinist Christianity, a religion that had been 
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 A detailed biography of Kauikeaouli was recently published by Norwegian anthropologist Christiaan Klieger 
(2015).  
Fig. 4.2: Kauikeaouli 
[Kamehameha III]. Painting 
by unknown artist, c. 1840s. 
Copyright expired. Source: 
Wikipedia. 
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brought to the islands by missionaries of the New England-based American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions [ABCFM] in 1820.  
In consequence, a major step of hybridisation took place as the Hawaiian language was 
brought into written form and the term kānāwai began to be used for printed laws enacted by 
Ka‘ahumanu in Kauikeaouli’s name, prescribing Christian principles of behaviour, such as not 
to kill, not to steal and to abstain from moe kolohe [“mischievous sleeping,” i.e. extramarital sex] 
throughout the late 1820s and early 1830s (Beamer 2014: 114-15).  At the same time, many 
orally transmitted classical kānāwai, such as those regulating resource management, remained 
in force. The main political institutions of the classical system such as the ‘aha ali‘i, and the 
kālaimoku [prime minister], as well as the kia‘āina [governors] in their partly British-style 
hybridisation, remained largely unchanged during the early Christian period. Upon reaching 
his majority in the early 1830s, for a short time Kauikeaouli attempted to challenge the parallel 
dynasty of Christian kuhina nui established by Ka‘ahumanu by attempting to appoint his 
traditionalist aikāne [friend and/or lover] Kaomi into the position of kuhina nui instead of 
Ka‘ahumanu’s successor Kīna‘u and push back Christian influence, but the power struggle was 
won by Kīna‘u and her supporters in the end (Kamakau 2001: 117-123).  
Decisive steps to transform the Kingdom into a modern nation-state were done in the 
late 1830s. In 1838, ABCFM missionary William Richards resigned from the mission to be 
employed by Kamehameha III as his chaplain, teacher and translator (Williston 1938: 39-40), 
and in the latter position, Richards translated American economist Francis Wayland’s recently 
published book Elements of Political Economy into Hawaiian as No Ke Kalaiaina (Richards 
1840), which he used as a textbook for lectures to the members of the ‘aha ali‘i (Kamakau 
2001: 127-129; Mykkänen 2003: 143-153). This enabled Hawaiian leaders to understand 
Western concepts of governance and the global capitalist economy, into which the Kingdom 
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was inevitably becoming incorporated. Unlike later education of Hawaiian elites in English 
using original textbooks from America and Great Britain, Richards’ free translation of Waylands 
created a hybrid text that combined Western perspectives on capitalism with practical 
recommendations of economic practices to follow that were understandable to Hawaiians 
(Mykkänen 2003: 147, 150). Particularly interesting is that Richards chose the word kālai‘āina 
as a translation for “political economy,” which points to the fact that the classical concept of 
kālai‘āina was transformed and hybridised to resemble Western concepts of politics and 
economics, rather than being replaced or supplanted by the latter. In the view of one historian, 
his expertise in kālai‘āina made Richards the new kālaimoku of the Kingdom (Kame‘eleihiwa 
1992: 174).  
Partly under the influence of Richards’ lectures, Kauikeaouli and the ‘aha ali‘i enacted a 
comprehensive law code in 1839.110 Preambled by a section called Kumu Kānāwai [source of 
law, i.e. constitution] which is usually termed “Declaration of Rights” in English and grants 
basic human and civil rights to all of the King’s subjects, the legal code contained a codification 
of classical kānāwai and kapu regulating resource management. Of particular significance is the 
reference made to Kamehameha I’s Kānawai Māmalahoa as a precedent for more modern civil 
rights legislation.111 One year later, another document entitled Kumu Kānāwai, drafted in 
collaboration between Richards, Boaza Māhune and Ioane Kāpena, was decreed by 
Kamehameha III and Kīna‘u (Kamakau 2001: 190-191), usually referred to in English as the 
Constitution of 1840.112  
                                                 
110
 Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom: He kumu kanawai, a me ke kanawai hooponopono waiwai, no ko Hawaii 
nei Pae Aina. Na Kamehameha III. i kau. Honolulu 1839. 
111
 Ibid, p. 15. I acknowledge Kamanamaikalani Beamer for pointing this out in his book (2014: 125). See in this 
context also the latter’s discussion of early Hawaiian constitutionalism (2014: 116-130). 
112
 Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Ke kumu kanawai a me na kanawai o ko Hawaii Pae Aina. Ua kauia i ke 
kau ia Kamehameha III. Honolulu 1841. Partly reprinted, transcribed and translated in Ka Ho‘oilina/The Legacy: 
Puke Pa‘i ‘Ōlelo Hawai‘i/Journal of Hawaiian Language Sources, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2002): 35-49; hereafter 1840 
Hawaiian Constitution. 
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By laying out the functioning of government in details, the document transformed the 
Kingdom into a constitutional monarchy, in fact one of the earliest of such political systems in 
the world, as Kamakau stated in the quote at the beginning of this chapter. It is also 
remarkable, that the constitution was granted by Kauikeaouli without being pressured to do so 
by any popular revolutionary movement, as was usually the case for the transformation of 
absolute into constitutional monarchies elsewhere in the world. Kamakau also points to this 
fact, while mentioning that even three decades later many European states were still absolute 
monarchies:   
Ua hana ʻia ke kumukānāwai o nā aupuni nui o ka honua me ka hoʻokahe koko, a ma loko o nā 
kaua, a ma nā kumu hoʻolimalima i nā kaua a me ka hoʻokahe koko e loaʻa ai ke kumukānāwai. 
ʻAʻole aupuni Karistiano, a he aupuni naʻauao ma ka honua, i hāʻawi wale mai ka mōʻī a me nā 
aliʻi i ke kumukānāwai no ke aupuni a no ka lāhui. Ua paulele nui nā mōʻī me [nā] aliʻi i ke 
aupuni kumukānāwai ʻole a pēlā kekahi mau aupuni ma ʻEuropa i kēia mana[wa]. (Kamakau 
2001: 198)113  
In a similar way, modern German political scientist Bernd Marquardt, in his 2009 
Universalgeschichte des Staates [“Universal History of the State”] points to the extraordinary 
position taken by the Hawaiian Kingdom in this regard, stating that “Hawaii sogar ab 1839, also 
früher noch als Preußen, die europäische Verfassungsstaatlichkeit gemäß dem Muster der 
konstitutionellen Monarchie in die austronesische Sprachenwelt Ozeaniens überführte” 
[“Hawai‘i as early as 1839, preceding even Prussia, transferred European constitutionalism, in 
the pattern of the constitutional monarchy, into the Austronesian-speaking world of Oceania”] 
(Marquardt 2009: 478). 
                                                 
113
 “The constitutions of the great countries of the world were created with the shedding of blood and through war, 
and the reason to use war and bloodshed was to get a constitution. There is no Christian or enlightened country in 
the word where the king and the nobility just granted a constitution for the country and the people. The kings and the 
nobles strongly believe in governance without a constitution, and some countries in Europe are still like this today.” 
Originally published in Ke Au Okoa, 29 April 1869, p. 1.  
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The political framework created by the 1840 constitution, included the King as the chief 
executive, the Kuhina Nui as his executive co-ruler, a legislature consisting of the ali‘i below the 
king, now named “House of Nobles” in English and elected representatives of the maka‘āinana, 
as well as a group of Lunakānāwai Ki‘eki‘e [Supreme Judges] presided by the King as Chief 
Justice.  Beamer has pointed out that the House of Nobles was a direct continuation of the ‘Aha 
Ali‘i (2014: 127).  Similarly, the office of the Mō‘ī and the Kuhina Nui continued from classical 
times. The two major institutions without direct classical precedence, and which hence could 
be seen as institutionally transferred from the West, were the elected representatives of the 
common people, and the institution of a judiciary, even though at this point it was still 
intertwined with the executive, since the Mō‘ī was ex officio also the chief justice.  
 
Achieving international recognition 
 
Having significantly modernised the 
government structures of the Kingdom, the next step 
towards the establishment of a modern nation-state 
was securing the international recognition of its 
sovereignty. In early 1842, King Kamehameha III 
commissioned an embassy to travel to the United 
States, England and France, in order to pursue a formal 
recognition of independence by those three powers. 
The embassy included Timoteo Ha‘alilio, William 
Richards, as well as Sir George Simpson, governor of 
the British Hudson Bay Company, in whose interest it 
Fig 4.3: Timoteo Ha‘alilio and William 
Richards in Paris, 1843 or 1844. 
Daguerreotype by unknown 
photographer. Copyright expired. 
Source: Wikipedia. 
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was to have Hawaiian independence secured and who would help the two envoys gain access 
to British government officials (Kuykendall 1938: 191-192). While the Hawaiian envoys were 
negotiating in Europe, events developed rapidly as in February of 1843, the kingdom was 
temporarily taken over by British navy captain Lord George Paulet, but its independence was 
restored on 31 July 1843 by Paulet’s superior Admiral Richard Thomas (ibid: 206-221;  
Kamakau 2001: 149ff).  
Meanwhile in Europe, after having begun negotiations with the British government, 
Ha‘alilio and Richards [fig. 4.3] travelled to France by way of Belgium in March, where King 
Leopold I, being related to both the French and British royal family, and heading a country only 
recently having gained independence itself, formally recognized Hawai‘i and promised them his 
support (Kamakau 2001: 183; Kuykendall 1938: 196). Eventually, after protracted 
negotiations, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs Lord Aberdeen and French Ambassador to 
Britain St. Aulaire signed a joint declaration recognizing Hawai‘i’s independence on 28 
November 1843 in London (Kamakau 2001: 186-187; Kuykendall 1938: 202-205) [Fig. 4.4]. 
With British and French recognition a fait accompli, U.S. Secretary of State John Calhoun 
confirmed in writing the recognition of the Kingdom by the United States to Ha‘alilio and 
Richards on their return voyage in July 1844 (Williston 1938: 86).  
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The 1843 declaration was considered of central importance for the Hawaiian Kingdom’s 
standing in the international community, and in consequence, 28 November subsequently 
became one of the national holidays under the name of Lā Kū‘oko‘a or Independence Day (Sai 
2011: 10; Beamer 2014: 16, 138). As will be more thoroughly discussed in chapter five, 
through this declaration, Hawai‘i became the first, and for many decades the only, non-Western 
State to be recognised as co-equal member of family of nations, a fact that was acknowledged 
throughout the second half of 19th century. For instance, International Law scholar John 
Westlake implicitly acknowledged it when he wrote the following in 1894, just prior to the 
recognition of the second non-Western country [Japan]: 
Fig. 4.4: Joint French and British declaration recognising the independence of the Hawaiian Islands, 28 
November 1843. Courtesy of Kamanamaikalani Beamer, who located the original document in the 
United Kingdom National Archives, London, and reprinted it in Beamer 2014: 140-141. 
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The international society to which we belong, and of which what we know as international 
law is the body of rules, comprises – First, all European States [...] Secondly, all American 
States [...]Thirdly, a few Christian States in other parts of the  world, as the Hawaiian 
Islands, Liberia and the Orange Free State […]. (Westlake 1894: 81-82. Emphasis added) 
 
It needs to be noted here that the latter two were offshoots of the European state system like 
those in the Americas, having been established either by European or Westernized African 
settlers on African soil. This then indeed leaves the Hawaiian Islands as the only non-Western 
state in Westlake’s list.  
The level of recognition afforded to the Hawaiian Kingdom also made it a unique case 
among the island states of Oceania.  For instance, William N. Armstrong, attorney-general of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom from 1880 to 1882, pointed to this fact in his 1903 account of King 
Kalākaua’s voyage around the world in 1881, in which he accompanied the sovereign. While 
himself a traitor to the Kingdom who celebrated its occupation by the United States, he 
acknowledged that the Hawaiian Kingdom will “nevertheless stand out in history as the 
solitary community, of that boundless region of Oceania, that presented all the functions of a 
complete government, and was in good and regular standing with the family of nations” 
(Armstrong 1977: 289). 
 
Further Modernisation through the mid-1800s 
 
Once recognition had been achieved, internal efforts of political and economic 
modernisation continued. From 1844, the governmental structure was reorganised, which 
became formalised in a series of organic acts from 1845 to 1850, which amended the 
constitution to organise and structure the government apparatus (Kuykendall 1938: 261-266). 
From 1846 on, the executive government consisted of five ‘oihana [departments], each headed 
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by a kuhina with a specific portfolio, namely the (1) the Kuhina Kālai‘āina [Minister of the 
Interior], a position that both succeeded the kālaimoku and became merged with that of Kuhina 
Nui; (2) the Kuhina no ko nā ‘Āina ‘Ē [Minister of Foreign Relations]; (3) the Kuhina Waiwai 
[Minister of Finance]; (4) the Kuhina A‘o Palapala [Minister of Public Instruction], a position 
later in 1855 abolished and replaced with the Board of Education headed by a president; (5) 
Kōkua Lunakānāwai Nui [literally “aide to the chief justice,” later called Loio Kuhina, i.e. 
“Lawyer-Minister,” both officially referred to in English as Attorney General (Kamakau 2001: 
247-249). The five cabinet ministers, together with the four governors and whomever else the 
Monarch desired to appoint, formed the ‘Aha Kūkākūkā Malu  [Privy Council] as the most 
important executive advisory body of the Mō‘ī.114 Furthermore, the judiciary was restructured. 
The second organic law of 1847 created a new ‘Aha Ho‘okolokolo Ko‘iko‘i a Kaulike [Superior 
Court of Law and Equity] consisting of judges knowledgeable in both Hawaiian and Anglo-
Saxon Common Law, in addition to the ‘Aha Ho‘okolokolo Ki‘eki‘e [Supreme Court of Judicature], 
the new name for the Supreme Judges presided by the king.115  
These and several more minor changes to the governmental structure were formalised 
in the new constitution of 1852.116 The latter definitively separated the judiciary from the 
                                                 
114
 Kanawai i Kauia e Ka Moi, e Kamehameha III., ke Alii o Ko Hawaii Pae Aina: Ua Hooholoia e na ‘Lii Ahaolelo 
a me la Poeikohoia, i ka Makahiki Iwakaluakumamakahi o Kona Noho Aupuni ana, a i ke Kolu a me ka Ha o Kona 
Noho Kuokoa Ana, A.D. 1845 a me 1846. Ua Huipuia mai na Olelo Ae I ke Kuokoa ana, a me na Kuikahi me ko na 
Aina E (Honolulu: Mea Pai Palapala a na Misionari Amerika 1846); Statute Laws of His Majesty Kamehameha III, 
King of the Hawaiian Islands. Passed by the House of Nobles and Representatives during the Twenty-First Year of 
His Reign and the Third and Fourth Year of His Public Recognition, A.D. 1845 and 1846. To Which are Appended 
the Acts of Public Recognition and The Treaties with Other Nations. Vol. 1 (Honolulu: Charles E. Hitchcock, 
Printer, Government Press 1846): First Act, Sect. 11 to 20. Hereafter 1846 Organic Laws. 
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 Hawaiian terms in Kanawai i Kauia e Ka Moi, e Kamehameha III., ke Alii o Ko Hawaii Pae Aina: Ua Hooholoia 
e na ‘Lii Ahaolelo a me la Poeikohoia, i ka Makahiki Iwakaluakumamalua o Kona Noho Aupuni ana, a i ka Lima o 
Kona Noho Kuokoa Ana, A.D. 1847. Ua Huipuia mai na Olelo Ae I ke Kuokoa ana, a me na Kuikahi me ko na Aina 
E. Buke II (Honolulu: Mea Pai Palapala a na Misionari Amerika 1847), p. 29, 35. English terms in Statute Laws of 
His Majesty Kamehameha III, King of the Hawaiian Islands. Passed by the House of Nobles and Representatives 
during the Twenty-Second Year of His Reign and the Fifth Year of His Public Recognition, A.D. 1847 To Which are 
Appended the Acts of Public Recognition and The Treaties with Other Nations.  Vol. 2 (Honolulu: Charles E. 
Hitchcock, Printer, Government Press 1847), p. 29, 35. 
116
 He kumu kanawai a me na kanawai o ka Moi Kamehameha III, ke alii o ko Hawai‘i  
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executive, by creating an independent ‘Aha Ho‘okolokolo Ki‘eki‘e [Supreme Court] now 
exclusively composed of experts in Common Law, to replace the two superior courts of the 
1847 law. Later in 1855, the position of Kuhina Nui was once more detached from that of 
Minister of the Interior, and the two offices were again hold by two different individuals (Sai 
2011: 55). The constitution also specified the election of the House of Representatives by 
universal suffrage of all native, naturalised and denizened subjects of the Kingdom, an 
unusually democratic feature for the time, when virtually everywhere else in the world 
parliaments, if they existed at all, were elected by a tiny wealthy minority of the population. 
Furthermore, the list of rights at the beginning of the constitution was significantly enlarged, to 
include, among other items, freedom of speech, the prohibition of slavery and the right to trial 
by jury. Altogether, the list of constitutional rights enjoyed by Hawaiian subjects was quite 
extensive in comparison to other countries of the time. 
Despite these moves, in certain aspects, towards Anglo-Saxon concepts of law, the 
continuity of classical Hawaiian offices remains apparent in the organic acts and the new 
constitution. Besides the already mentioned Kuhina kalai‘āina and other kuhina, this includes 
also various subordinate offices. For instance, the classical office of Ilamuku [head executioner], 
continued as the head of the national police force, called “Marshall” in English, within the law 
department headed by the attorney general.117 The classical Hawaiian term pu‘ukū [“treasurer, 
steward”] was used twice, closest to the classical definition of the term as Haku pu‘ukū 
[chamberlain] of the king’s household,118 but also as Pu‘ukū Pa‘i palapala no ke Aupuni [director 
                                                                                                                                                             
Pae Aina, i kauia e na alii ahaolelo, a me ka poeikohoia, iloko o ka ahaolelo o ka makahiki 1852.  Honolulu 1852. 
Partly reprinted, transcribed and translated in Ka Ho‘oilina/The Legacy: Puke Pa‘i ‘Ōlelo Hawai‘i/Journal of 
Hawaiian Language Sources, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2002):180-225; hereafter 1852 Hawaiian Constitution. 
117
 Hawaiian term in 1846 Organic Laws, Hawaiian version, p. 178ff; English term in 1846 Organic Laws, English 
version, p. 233ff. 
118
 Hawaiian term ibid. p. 150-151; English term ibid. p. 194-195. 
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of the government press] under the minister of the interior.119 Later in the nineteenth century, 
the term also became used, again similar to the classical definition, as Pu‘ukū Nui o ka Waihona 
Aupuni [registrar of public accounts] within the department of finance (Hitchcock 1887: 171). 
The second major reform during the late 1840s and early 1850s, besides that of the 
government institutions was that of the land tenure system. This included the establishment of 
the Poe Ho‘onā Kuleana ‘Āina [Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles] in 1845, the 1848 
division of lands between Kauikeaouli and 252 
konohiki of various ranks, which created the three 
categories of the King’s land, later referred to as ‘Āina 
Lei Ali‘i [Crown Land], Government Land and Chiefs’ 
Lands [Konohiki Lands] as well as the 1850 Kuleana 
Act granting titles to hoa ‘āina or maka‘āinana [native 
tenants]. Through this complex reform process, the 
land tenure system was reformed and modernised, in 
order to make it compatible with Western customs 
while conserving local specificities and securing native 
tenants’ rights (Perkins 2006: 99-103; Perkins 2013; 
Beamer 2014: 142-152; Preza 2010).120  
After Kamehameha III passed away in 1854, his nephews Alexander Liholiho 
[Kamehameha IV, reg. 1854-1863, fig. 4.5] and Lota Kapuāiwa [Kamehameha V, reg. 1863-
1872, fig. 4.6] continued the process of state-building and initiated a third phase of political 
modernisation. While Kauikeaouli had mainly relied on former ABCFM missionaries as his 
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 Hawaiian term ibid. p. 18ff; English term ibid. p. 22ff. 
120
 While this evaluation reflects Perkins, Sai, Beamer, Preza and other more recent scholars, the land reform process 
of the late 1840s and early 1850s has been severely criticised as a Western-inspired scheme in previous scholarship 
during the latter part of the 20
th
 century; see for example Kameʻeleihiwa 1992.  
Fig. 4.5: Alexander Liholiho [Kamehameha 
IV], photograph taken around 1855. 
Copyright expired. Source: Wikipedia. 
Original in Hawai‘i State Archives.  
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principal advisors and government officials, his two successors were highly suspicious that 
these officials would bring too much Calvinist and American influences into the government, 
and they also disliked the quasi-theocratic features of the education system, since the latter 
was based on the mission schools established by the ABCFM, and the department of public 
instruction remained under Calvinist domination throughout Kauikeaouli’s reign. While of 
Kauikeaouli’s original cabinet Kamehameha IV retained foreign minister Robert Wyllie [1798-
1865], a physician and entrepreneur from Scotland who had already represented a secular 
voice in the cabinet,121 the new king replaced almost all ABCFM-affiliated government officials 
with a new set of haole advisors of diverse national and professional backgrounds dedicated to 
the Kingdom and committed to secularism and international neutrality, including such people 
as Abraham Fornander, Charles de Varigny and Charles Harris. Most of them were Freemasons 
– as were Kamehameha IV and V themselves – (Karpiel 1998, 2000a, 2000b), and many of them 
members of the Anglican Church, to which the court itself converted in 1862 (Kuykendall 1953: 
84-99; Semes 2000; Beamer 2014: 170-174). Similarly, on the Board of Education missionary 
affiliates were gradually replaced with Hawaiian chiefs and non-missionary Westerners, with 
Kamehameha IV and V’s father Mataio Kekūanāo‘a taking over the presidency of the Board 
from former missionary Richard Armstrong when the latter passed away in 1860 (Makekau-
Whittaker 2013: 97). Another aspect of this political internationalisation was a move away 
from solely Anglo-Saxon ideas as sources of institutional transfer towards a mixing of the latter 
with continental European models. This explains the enactment of a Hawaiian Civil Code, a 
continental European concept alien to the Anglo-Saxon tradition of law, in 1859.122 
                                                 
121
 For a biographical sketch of this extraordinary Hawaiian statesman, see Taylor 1929. 
122
 1859 The Civil Code of the Hawaiian Islands. Passed in the Year of Our Lord 1859, to which is Appended an 
Appendix, Containing Laws not Expressly Repealed by the Civil Code; the Session Laws of 1858-9, and Treaties 
with Foreign Nations. Published by Authority. Honolulu: Printed for the Government 1859. Also published in 
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The third phase of institutional modernisation 
culminated in the decreeing of a revised constitution by 
Kamehameha V in 1864.123 While the extensive declaration 
of rights remained essentially the same as in the preceding 
1852 document, major changes included the abolishment 
of the office of Kuhina Nui, the explicit separation of 
legislative, executive and judicial powers, the combining of 
the House of Nobles and Representatives into a 
unicameral legislature, and the limiting of universal 
suffrage by the introduction of property qualifications for 
representatives and voters.  
Certain later historians have considered the move of Kamehameha V to grant a new 
constitution by decree as a regressive move. Ralph Kuykendall for instance, refers to the 
enacting of the constitution as a as a coup d’état (1953: 132-134). However, a closer look at the 
circumstances shows, first, that the King was completely within his previous constitutional 
rights to grant a new constitution, and secondly, that the latter actually represented further 
progress in modern statecraft as compared to the 1852 constitution, since the new constitution 
clarified the separation of powers and bound the monarch’s prerogatives more clearly within 
the law (Sai 2011: 56-59).  
Furthermore, Charles de Varigny, former French diplomat and Kamehameha V’s 
Minister of Finance during the enactment of the new constitution, provided a convincing 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hawaiian as O na Kanawai Kivila o ko Hawaii Pae Aina, Hooholoia i ka Makahiki 1859. A ua Huiia me ka Hope, 
Kahi i Paiia’i na Kanawai i Hooholoia iloko o 1858-9. Honolulu: Paiia no ke Aupuni 1859 
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 Kumukanawai i haawiia e ka Moi Kamehameha V., ma ka lokomaikai o  
ke Akua, ke alii o ko Hawai‘i Pae Aina, ma ka la 20 o Augate, M.H. 1864. In: Na Kanawai o ka Moi Kamehameha 
V. Honolulu 1865. Reprinted and transcribed in Ka Ho‘oilina/The Legacy: Puke Pa‘i ‘Ōlelo Hawai‘i/Journal of 
Hawaiian Language Sources, Vol. 2 (2003): 16-51; hereafter 1864 Hawaiian Constitution. 
Fig. 4.6: Lot Kapuāiwa 
[Kamehameha V]. Photograph 
taken around 1872. Copyright 
expired. Source: Wikipedia. 
Original in Hawai‘i State Archives. 
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argument why the restriction of suffrage was necessary. As the 1860s marked the rise of sugar 
plantations to provide an important element of the country’s economy, more and more 
labourers migrated to the islands, and Kamehameha V and his advisors feared plantation-
owners could manipulate politics by compelling their labourers to vote according to their 
interests. A restriction of the vote to property owners would thus ensure plantation owners to 
dispose of only one vote and not the dozens or hundreds of their employees (Varigny 2002: 
180-181).124  
With the constitution of 1864, and the bodies of law previously passed in the 1850s, the 
Kingdom had essentially reached the climax of its institutional modernisation, and in many 
respects its conclusion. The only major further modernisation that followed was the re-
introduction of universal male suffrage in 1874.125 This was essentially the political system 
later transferred to Fiji, Tonga and partly to Sāmoa, as will be discussed in chapter seven. 
 
Consolidating Territorial Control over the Central-Northern Pacific 
 
The third phase of institutional modernisation under Kamehameha IV and V also largely 
corresponds with the consolidation of Hawaiian territorial control over the central northern 
Pacific. While Kalauniohua had already attempted to unify the eight main Hawaiian Islands in 
the twelfth or thirteenth century as mentioned above, this long-time dream of many leading 
ali‘i nui was at last achieved by Kamehameha when he obtained the submission by Kaua‘i’s Mō‘ī 
Kaumuali‘i in 1810. However, Hawaiian rule over Kaua‘i remained tenuous until a rebellion by 
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 Interestingly, Varigny’s argument was reiterated by Kuykendall in his third volume when reflecting on the 
changing pattern of suffrage restrictions during the late nineteenth century. This also appears to be one of the few 
instances where Kuykendall cites a non-English-language source (Kuykendall 1967: 189). 
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 Under Kamehameha V’s successors Lunalilo and Kalākaua, the property requirements for voting were removed 
in 1872-1874 (Kuykendall 1967: 189), presumably because by that time the contract-bound plantation labourer 
population was becoming outbalanced by an independent urban working class, so the dilemma described by Varigny 
was no longer posing a danger to the Kingdom. 
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Kaumuali‘i’s son George Humehume in 1824-25 was militarily subjugated by Hawaiian forces, 
and the island, together with Ni‘ihau, subsequently fully integrated into the centralised 
government apparatus of the Hawaiian Kingdom (Mills 2002; Warne 2008).  
While the permanently inhabited Hawaiian Islands and their immediate outliers were 
thus under a unified government, the status of the various small uninhabited islands in and 
around the Hawaiian pae ‘āina [archipelago] remained ambiguous. With the achieving of 
international recognition in 1843 and the revision of concession-burdened treaties in the 
1850s, the leadership of the Hawaiian Kingdom became aware of rules of international law 
governing the acquisition of uninhabited islands.  
In 1857, King Kamehameha IV thus commissioned Captain John Paty of the Hawaiian 
schooner Manuokawai to complete Hawaiian control over the entire pae ‘āina. Subsequently, 
Paty took possession of Nīhoa, Laysan and Lisianski islands in the name of the Reich 
Kamehameha’s (Behm 1859: 188-189; Horn 1951: 50-51). For some reason, however, Paty’s 
mission overlooked the other islands in the Hawaiian chain. In consequence, in 1859, the 
United States claimed French Frigate Shoals under the American Guano Act of 1856 (Behm 
1859: 189), but did not further follow suit with this claim. In 1867 the United States claimed 
Midway, this time not under the Guano Act, but for strategic reasons as a possible future naval 
base (O’Donnell 1993: 56-58; Burnett 2005: 782).  
During this period Mokumanamana [Necker Island] was claimed by neither country, but 
a British attempt to use the latter as a cable substation in the 1890s precipitated the so-called 
Republic of Hawai‘i [a puppet government installed in consequence of an American invasion of 
Hawai‘i in 1893, see chapter eight] to land an “annexation party” on the island in 1894 
(Williams 2007). However, archaeologist Kekuewa Kikiloi’s recent research has shown that 
both Nīhoa and Mokumanamana had been regularly visited for religious purposes by Hawaiian 
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kāhuna [priests] until the official abolishment of the classical religion in 1819 (Kikiloi 2012), 
thus one should make the argument that these two islands were an integral part of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom from its very beginning and any later “annexations” were only confirming 
Hawaiian sovereignty over them but not establishing it.   
In September 1886, while Hawaiian pan-Oceanian policy was reaching its climax, as will 
be discussed in chapter six, King Kalākaua commissioned Colonel James Boyd to take 
possession of Moku Pāpapa [Ocean or Kure Island], which was accomplished on 20 September. 
Unlike the previous Paty mission that used only rationales of international law, Boyd’s 
commission was partly based on research of the Hawaiian Board of Genealogy that had 
determined that the entire island chain had ancestral connections to the Hawaiian people and 
was therefore inherently part of the national territory (Horn 1951: 94). In consequence, during 
the rest of 1886 and the beginning of 1887, the Hawaiian Kingdom began negotiations with the 
United States with the intent of convincing the latter to transfer their claim on Midway atoll to 
Hawai‘i, and thereby complete the territorial incorporation of the entire island chain. US 
secretary of State Thomas Bayard displayed his willingness to consider such a transfer, and it 
was only because of the “bayonet coup” of June-July 1887 in Honolulu that overthrew 
Kalākaua’s constitutional government [to be discussed in chapter eight] that the negotiations 
stopped.  If the 1887 coup and the subsequent US invasion of the Hawaiian Islands in 1893 had 
not taken place, the transfer of sovereignty over Midway would most likely have occurred 
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(Horn 1951: 94-96). 
 
Even before the territorial consolidation of Ko Hawai‘i Pae ‘Āina [the Hawaiian 
Archipelago] was thus attempted, the Kingdom’s territorial reach stepped beyond the 
archipelago itself and branched out to smaller islands in the North Pacific. In 1858, another 
expedition commissioned by Kamehameha IV under command of Captain Samuel Allen of the 
Hawaiian ship Kalama annexed the atoll of Kalama [Johnston] southwest of the Hawaiian chain 
(Behm 1859: 188-189), and similarly, in 1862, another Hawaiian expedition led by Captain 
Zenas Bent annexed Palmyra atoll (Horn 1951: 51), extending the Hawaiian Kingdom’s 
territory even further to the south [see map 4.2]. 
Map 4.2. 
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While Palmyra remained the furthest island formally claimed by the Hawaiian Kingdom 
as part of its national territory,126 the question of Hawaiian sovereignty over the even more 
outlying atolls of Puaka‘ilima [Baker Island], Ulukou [Howland Island] and Paukeaho [Jarvis 
Island] in the central Pacific127 might be asked as well. While all three islands were taken 
possession of by Americans under the Guano Act,128 the guano deposits on these islands were 
subsequently exploited by Hawaiians – both kānaka labourers and naturalized or native born 
Hawaiian haole managers (Judd 1935; Rosenthal 2012) – , thus it remains unclear how the 
United States should have maintained its claim under the terms of the Guano Act if there were 
no US citizens present to maintain it, and hence a Hawaiian sovereignty claim is likely to 
prevail if the issue would be submitted to international arbitration today.129  
 
                                                 
126
 The temporary claim by the Hawaiian Kingdom over the island of Sikaiana in 1856 indicated on map 4.1 will be 
treated in chapter six, since unlike any of the small islands treated here in this section, Sikaiana has its own native 
Polynesian population and its attempted Hawaiian annexation thus belongs into the category of inter-Polynesian 
relations rather than into that of Hawaiian territorial consolidation.  
127
 Hawaiian names according to nineteenth century sources, reiterated in Tengan 2004: 157. For the location of 
these islands, see map 1 in at the beginning of the dissertation. 
128
 The Guano Act [full title An Act to authorize Protection to be given to Citizens of the United States who may 
discover deposits of Guano], passed by the United States Congress in 1856, stated as follows:  
[…] when any citizen or citizens of the United States may have discovered, or shall hereafter discover, a deposit of guano 
on any island, rock, or key not within the lawful jurisdiction of any other Government, and not occupied by the citizens of 
any other Government, and shall take peaceable possession thereof, and occupy the same, such island, rock, or key may, 
at the discretion of the President of the United States, be considered as appertaining to the United States (Thirty- Fourth 
Congress, Sess. 1, Ch. 164, approved 18 August 1856. Accessible online at http://legisworks.org/sal/11/stats/STATUTE-
11-Pg119.pdf). 
129
 The collection of materials produced by the naturalised Hawaiian Judd family that was heavily involved in the 
exploitation of guano on the central Pacific atolls provides some interesting insights here. In his 1858 diary when 
visiting these Guano Islands, Hawaiian-born, non-US citizen Albert Francis Judd calls Jarvis a “US territory” (Judd 
1935: 15-16) and describes hoisting an American flag on the island (ibid: 37). At the same time, however, Judd 
refers to the Hawaiian national holiday of July 31
st
 as “Independence Day” (ibid: 55), while making no comments at 
all on July 4
th
, the US national holiday, thus his primary national identification appeared to be with the Hawaiian 
Kingdom and not the US. During the same time his US-born father Gerrit P. Judd reported taking possession of 
what was then called New York Island [later Washington Island, now Teraina] in the name of the United States 
(ibid: 74, 80-81), even though as a naturalised Hawaiian subject he was no longer a US citizen at the time, thus 
rendering the proclamation null and void under the terms of the Guano Act. Since Washington Island was later taken 
possession of by Great Britain and permanently occupied by British subjects, and is now an integral part of the 
Republic of Kiribati with a permanent I-Kiribati population, any Hawaiian sovereignty claim over the latter island 
arising from Judd’s action would clearly be superseded by that of Kiribati. 
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Treaties and International Relations of Hawai‘i 
 
Putting nineteenth-century Hawai‘i back into a comparative perspective with both its 
Oceanian sister nations to the south and its larger cousin states in Asia, it is striking how its 
trajectory on the flow chart at the end of the previous chapter [fig. 3.16]. Interestingly Hawai‘i’s 
trajectory stands apart from the other Island states and, if compared with the chart of larger 
non-western states [fig. 3.6] is most similar to that of Japan, since it went through an early 
revision of its treaties, began to conclude its own advantaging unequal treaties with 
neighbouring states and was never colonised but went through a phase of occupation, which 
however, in Japan’s case endured only seven years from 1945 to 1952, whereas in the 
Hawaiian case it has been going on since 1898, i.e. continuously for 117 years as of 2015 (Sai 
2008b). 
Already before its formal recognition in 1843, the Hawaiian Kingdom concluded 
international conventions with three Western powers, namely the United States in 1826,130 the 
United Kingdom in 1836 and France in 1837 and 1839. While the American and British 
conventions and the first French one did not contain any unequal clauses, the 1839 convention 
with France that was forced on the Hawaiian Kingdom in an act of gunboat diplomacy 
(Kuykendall 1938: 166-167) was clearly burdeded with concessions, giving the French consul 
powers to interfere in the Hawaiian judicial system when dealing with French subjects resident 
in the islands and setting fixed tariffs for French goods.131 However, the treaty was not as 
disadvantaging as the typical unequal treaties Asian states were subjected to, as it gave the 
                                                 
130
 The 1826 convention was never ratified by the US, thus strictly speaking it was only a draft, not a binding 
international agreement. Despite this fact, however, it was regarded as a “morally binding” de-facto treaty (Stauffer 
1983). The Hawaiian government considered it Hawai‘i’s first international treaty and thus included it in its 
compilation Treaties and Conventions Concluded between the Hawaiian Kingdom and other Powers since 1825 
(Honolulu: Elele Book, Card and Job Print 1887) before the 1836 British and 1839 French conventions. 
131
 Convention conclue entre le roi des iles Sandwich Taméaméa III et le capitaine Laplace, commandant de la 
frégate française L’Artemise au nom de son gouvernement. 17 July 1839. French original in Traités, Océanie, 
Archives Diplomatiques, La Courneuve. English translation in Treaties and Conventions Concluded between the 
Hawaiian Kingdom and other Powers since 1825 (Honolulu: Elele Book, Card and Job Print 1887): 5-6. 
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French consul merely the right to appoint a jury to judge French subjects, not to judge them in 
a consular court under French law.132 Hawaiian hopes that with formal recognition of their 
country’s sovereignty in 1843-44, the disadvantaging treaty with France could be reversed 
were thwarted, at least for the time being. To the contrary, when both France and the United 
Kingdom re-negotiated their treaties with Hawai‘i in 1844-1846, both new treaties, entering in 
force in March 1846, contained concessions modelled on the notorious 1839 French 
convention (ibid: 204; 368-373). Nonetheless, despite containing these unequal concessions, 
the treaties did not question Hawaiian independence, as they accepted that foreigners were 
subject to Hawaiian law, not extraterritorially except from it as they were under the unequal 
treaty regimes in Asia.133 
 Nonetheless the treaties were a disgrace, and during the following twelve years, the 
main focus of Hawaiian diplomacy was to obtain a revision of them. The strategy used was to 
negotiate equal treaties with smaller Western nations and then use these as precedent to 
compel Britain and France to re-negotiate their objectionable treaties. While for Asian nations 
it took many decades to succeed in such a strategy, in Hawai‘i’s case, it succeeded almost 
immediately, as in October of 1846, merely a few months after the notorious French and British 
treaties, Hawaii concluded an equal treaty with Denmark, which was followed by an almost 
identical equal treaty with Hamburg in 1848 (ibid: 373-374).  An equal treaty with the United 
States ensued in 1849.134 With these precedents established, the United Kingdom could be 
                                                 
132
 I acknowledge Keanu Sai for pointing out this crucial difference between unequal treaties with Asian countries 
containing extraterritoriality clauses throughout the century and the concesion-burdened treaties Hawai‘i had in its 
early period of foreign relations. 
133
 Idem. 
134
 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America and the King of the 
Hawaiian Islands, 20 December 1849. Reprinted in Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United 
States of America, 1776-1949. Compiled under the direction of Charles I. Bevans, LL.B., Assistant Legal Adviser, 
Department of State, Vol.8 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and United States Printing Office 1971): 864-
871. 
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persuaded to revise its treaty in 1851-52.135 France alone remained tough for a few more years. 
After two more equal treaties were concluded, with Sweden and Norway in 1852, and with 
Bremen in 1854 (Kuykendall 1838: 374, 381-382), France was finally compelled to give up its 
stubbornness, and in 1857 at last concluded an equal treaty with the Hawaiian Kingdom, which 
was ratified by Napoleon III on 20 March 1858, and by King Kamehameha IV on 8 September of 
the same year.136 This marked the last major milestone in Hawaiian foreign relations, since 
from this date on, the last small blemish that tainted the Kingdom’s status as a full-fledged 
member of the Family of Nations was removed. 
After having thus achieved full treaty equality, the Kingdom continued concluding 
treaties with most states then in existence, including in 1863 with Belgium; in 1863 with Spain; 
in 1864 with the Netherlands and Luxemburg, with Italy and with Switzerland; in 1869 with 
Russia; in 1875 with Austria-Hungary, in 1879 with Germany; and in 1882 with Portugal. 137 In 
1875, Hawai‘i signed a treaty of commercial reciprocity, i.e. mutual duty-free trade, with the 
United States,138 which boosted the Kingdom’s economy, but also brought some long-term 
problems connected to an increasing economic dependency on the American market (La Croix 
and Grady 1997). As mentioned above, being a member of the “inner circle” of countries, 
                                                 
135
 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian Islands. 10 July 1851. Reprinted in Treaties 
and Conventions Concluded between the Hawaiian Kingdom and other Powers since 1825 (Honolulu: Elele Book, 
Card and Job Print 1887): 31-39. 
136
 Traité d’amitié, de commerce et de Navigation, entre Sa Majesté Napoléon III, Empereur des Français, et Sa 
Majesté Kaméhaméha IV, Roi des Iles Hawaï. Kuikahi aloha, kalepa ame ka hoohololoku, iwaena o Ka Moi 
Napoleon III Ke ’Lii o Ko Farani, a me Ka Moi Kamehameha IV ke’Lii o Ko Hawaii Pae aina.  29 October 1857. 
French and Hawaiian original in Traités, Océanie, Archives Diplomatiques, La Courneuve. English translation in 
Treaties and Conventions Concluded between the Hawaiian Kingdom and other Powers since 1825 (Honolulu: 
Elele Book, Card and Job Print 1887): 57-69. 
137
For a list and full English text of most of the treaties, see Treaties and Conventions Concluded between the 
Hawaiian Kingdom and other Powers since 1825. (Honolulu: Elele Book, Card and Job Print 1887). Photocopies of 
most original treaty texts are also available at the Hawai‘i State Archives, folders REF JX 1182.A6 1997, Vol.1-3. 
Scans of most original treaties are also available at <http://www.Hawaiiankingdom.org/treaties.shtml> 
138
 Treaty of Reciprocity between the United States of America and the Hawaiian Kingdom. 30 January 1875. 
Reprinted in Treaties and Conventions Concluded between the Hawaiian Kingdom and other Powers since 1825 
(Honolulu: Elele Book, Card and Job Print 1887): 123-127. 
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Hawai‘i was now also able to impose its own unequal treaties on other non-Western nations 
not yet fully recognised. Thus, in 1871 Hawai‘i enacted an unequal treaty with Japan, and in 
1887 an unequal treaty with Sāmoa, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven.  In 
addition, Hawai‘i also entered into a multilateral treaty in 1885 when joining the Universal 
Postal Union, the first global international organisation.139  
Furthermore, the Hawaiian Kingdom also maintained diplomatic relations with several 
other states with which it had not concluded treaties, such as various Latin American countries, 
China, and several other Asian states. By early 1887, Hawai‘i maintained 103 legations and 
consulates worldwide, an impressive number given the comparatively small size of the 
country.140 This intense diplomatic activity, to which can be added the Hawaiian participation 
in international expositions and international scientific conferences mentioned in the previous 
chapter, clearly shows that the Kingdom was not only formally recognised by, but also very 
actively involved with, the international community.141 
This fact has barely been taken notice of by most recent general historians and 
international legal scholars. I already mentioned that the remarkable success of Hawai‘i in 
achieving treaty revision decades before any Asian nation is absent from all comparative 
histories of treaty relations of non-Western states that I am aware of. Even comprehensive 
studies of state formation and international relations that do mention Hawai‘i often get its 
                                                 
139
 Universal Postal Union. Additional Act of Lisbon to the Convention of the 1
st
 of June 1887[sic, correct date 
should be 1878]. Reprinted in Treaties and Conventions Concluded between the Hawaiian Kingdom and other 
Powers since 1825 (Honolulu: Elele Book, Card and Job Print 1887):151-159. Besides the obvious practical benefits 
to improve international communications, joining the Universal Postal Union also served as an important first step 
for other non-Western states in their long struggle for treaty revision, such as for instance for Japan (Howland 2014). 
140
 “Diplomatic and Consular Representatives of Hawaii Abroad” Printed broadsheet dated 1 June 1887. Copy in 
Miscellaneous Foreign 1890, FO&Ex, Hawai‘i State Archives. 
141
 As a result of these worldwide connections, not only does the Hawai‘i State Archives contain numerous files of 
correspondence with foreign nations, both directly with foreign governments and between the Hawaiian government 
and its diplomatic representatives abroad, but the national archives of each country Hawai‘i had diplomatic 
relationships with contain numerous correspondence with and about the Hawaiian Kingdom as well. I myself found 
extensive Hawai‘i-related records in the German, French and Dutch diplomatic archives on research trips in 2006, 
2011 and 2015, respectively, and Mary-Lindsey Correa and myself found a large amount of such records in the 
archives of the foreign ministry of Belgium in 2009. 
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status wrong or are confused about it. The most recent example is Turan Kayaoğlu who claims 
that “Japan is the only exception to the non-Western states not claiming extraterritoriality” 
(Kayaoğlu 2010: 8) when in fact he later lists Hawai‘i as having had extraterritoriality in Japan 
from 1871 to 1894 (ibid: 67). Even a prolific international law scholar like James Crawford, 
himself an arbitrator in the 2001 Larsen v Hawaiian Kingdom case (see chapter nine) makes 
somewhat misleading statements about Hawai‘i in his 2006 edition of The Creation of States in 
International Law, saying that Hawai‘i was recognised but mentioning this within the context of 
other Pacific states that had not the same level of international recognition, and furthermore 
explicitly referencing only the unratified 1826 Hawaiian-US convention and the 1875 
reciprocity treaty as evidence of Hawai‘i’s recognition and neither the 1843 Anglo-Franco 
proclamation nor any of the equal treaties of friendship (Crawford 2006: 263). Much worse, 
political scientist Philip Roeder completely ignores the multilateral treaty relations Hawai‘i had 
and relegates the Hawaiian Kingdom to a category of states that had only one treaty partner 
(Roeder 2007: 53, 326). Thus for Roeder the islands were essentially doomed to be taken over 
by what he assumes to be their only treaty partner, as it arguably was indeed the case in places 
like Johor or Tahiti. 
This widespread ignorance about the Islands’ international status can partly be 
blamed on events in Hawai‘i’s history since the 1890s. As will be discussed in chapter nine, the 
Hawaiian Kingdom was invaded by the United States in 1893, which resulted in the installation 
of a pro-American puppet government. The dispute was settled in an executive agreement 
between the Hawaiian queen and the US president later the same year, in which the United 
States promised to restore the status quo ante. However, this was never followed up, and 
instead the United States re-invaded and occupied the Hawaiian Islands during the Spanish-
American War of 1898 (Sai 2008b). As shown in Fig. 3.16, Hawai‘i thus continues as an 
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independent state under international law, but for over a century it has been under a 
prolonged occupation. 
In Conclusion: The Exceptionality of the Hawaiian Kingdom and its Primacy in Oceania 
 
In this chapter I have given an overview of the history of the Hawaiian state from its 
proto-Polynesian roots through its classical development to its hybridisation into a modern 
nation-state in the nineteenth century. Several points stand out as particularly relevant for the 
understanding of the particular position Hawai‘i had within Oceania, and how it came about.  
First, the political development of the Hawaiian Kingdom in the nineteenth century 
cannot be properly explained without an understanding of the evolution of classical Hawaiian 
statecraft during the preceding centuries, since indigenous political concepts determined, more 
than any outside influences, the successful transformation of classical Hawai‘i into a nation-
state. Anthropological and archaeological studies of this evolution are thus of central 
importance. New Zealand anthropologist Michael Reilly has been one of the few scholars 
outside of Hawai‘i to point to this importance in his recent combined book review of How Chiefs 
became Kings: Divine Kingship and the Rise of Archaic States in Ancient Hawai‘i (Kirch 2010) and 
The Arts of Kingship: Hawaiian Art and National Culture of the Kalākaua Era (Kamehiro 2009), 
linking these two works as complementary for the understanding of the formation of the 
classical Hawaiian state and its continuity as a modern nineteenth century nation-state (Reilly 
2012). 
The Hawaiian case also confirms more generally that state modernisation as it 
happened in the nineteenth century should never be seen in a vacuum, even though the nation-
states of that time resulting from this modernisation looked quite similarly to one another on 
the surface. Rather, these states are usually the outcome of long political evolutions over 
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centuries prior, and only a thorough analysis of that deep history can provide a full 
understanding of the political systems and political cultures existing in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. In that sense, the development of complex pre-modern state institutions in 
Hawai‘i as the basis for its later successful modernisation is reminiscent of the highly 
developed Tokugawa shogunate in pre-modern [or sometimes for good reasons called “early 
modern”] Japan as a basis for that country’s later modernisation during the Meiji era 
(Tokugawa 2009). 
In comparison with other Polynesian archipelagos, the Hawaiian Islands shared with 
most other archipelagos a high degree of cultural homogeneity, which facilitated the process off 
nation-building. Where Hawai‘i stood apart from them, however, was in the degree of 
centralisation of its polities. In comparison with Fiji, for instance, Routledge notes the 
“complete absence of distinct, kin-based chiefdoms” in the Hawaiian Islands (Routledge 1985: 
137). This enabled a more efficient integration of the archipelago under its central government, 
and in consequence, since the definitive conquest of Kaua‘i in 1825 none of the challenges to 
the Hawaiian government’s authority were regionally-based.  In Tonga, the only similarly 
stratified and centralised system in classical Polynesia, regionalist challenges to George Tupou 
I’s burgeoning nation-state persisted until the 1850s.  Furthermore, unlike the centripetal 
polity of classical Tonga, the experience of centuries of peer-polity interaction between the 
several kingdoms of classical Hawai‘i facilitated the transition towards a modern state 
interacting with the global international system.  
In consequence, it is apparent that the Hawaiian endeavour of building a hybrid system 
of governance was ultimately more efficacious than most of its counterparts in the rest of 
Oceania.  Since the choices of selective appropriation were ultimately dictated by the existence 
or not of classical institutions of governance compatible with a modern state, most other 
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Oceanian leaders did not really have the choice to pursue their state-building project in the 
same way as the Hawaiian ali‘i could do.  
Secondly, Ko Hawai‘i Pae ‘Āina was more intensively exposed to international trade 
than most other archipelagos, and thus developed a capitalist economy early onwards. William 
Richards’ above mentioned lectures and Hawaiian translation of Francis Waylands’ Elements of 
Political Economy as No ke Kalaiaina (1840) appear to have played a vital role in this 
process,142 and seem to have had no equivalent on any other Pacific island, since I am not 
aware of the existence of a nineteenth-century textbook on political economy in any other 
Pacific language. Hence comparatively well trained to deal with the Western world that was 
encroaching upon their islands, Hawaiian ali‘i were able to build the most able state 
bureaucracy in nineteenth-century Oceania, leading Colin Newbury to conclude that “[t]he 
records of the Hawaiian state, and particularly those of the Ministry of the Interior from 1846 
to 1893, do not show great corruption and inefficiency compared with [other] island states 
[…]” (2001: 31). In that light, the Hawaiian Kingdom’s early recognition by the Western powers 
in 1843, explicitly based on the “existence in the Sandwich Islands of a government capable of 
providing for the regularity of its relations with foreign nations” as stated in the Anglo-Franco 
proclamation, makes a lot of sense. 
Combining both of these arguments on why the Hawaiian nation-building project was 
so exceptionally successful, in an 1874 newspaper editorial the editor comments regretfully on 
the upcoming British colonial takeover of Fiji and a then possible US takeover of Sāmoa, while 
exhorting the continuing independence of Hawai‘i by putting its political evolution in 
comparison with those of the two other archipelagos:  
                                                 
142
 In his overview of classical and contemporary Polynesian thinking, John Charlot comes to a similar conclusion 
(Charlot 1999: 543) 
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[O] ka lahui Fiji a me ka lahui Samoa he ano naaupo, a ike ole i ke ano noho aupuni naauao 
ana; aohe no hoi lakou alii nui nana e hoohui lokahi like ia lakou ma ke ano noho’na kuokoa. O 
Hawaii nei nae ua lanakila no oia no ka loaa ana o Kamehameha I, ke koa nana i hoohui na pae 
moku me ka lahui a lokahi like malalo o ka Moi hookahi, a ke paa nei ke aupuni Hawaii i nei 
wa no na makahiki he nui […]143 
 
Finally, as has already been mentioned before, including in the first quote at the 
beginning as well as the one by Kamakau later in the chapter, the Hawaiian Kingdom not only 
stood out as the most successful state in Oceania but its exceptional quality of governance was 
evident even in a global comparison. Reiterating such primary source quotations, Catalan 
linguist Rubén Fernández Asensio in a recent article on Hawaiian kingdom language policy 
stated that the Kingdom “commanded such respect because it was a stable constitutional 
monarchy based on ethnic and religious pluralism, state-funded universal education, popular 
representation and a very liberal franchise, in a time when these virtues were uncommon even 
in the West” (Fernández Asensio 2010: 10). 
Ample evidence of this respect given to the Kingdom could be observed through its 
participation in almost all international exhibits during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, where Hawai‘i was usually the only Oceanian nation represented (Imada 2010; 
Kamehiro 2011; Hoffenberg 2013). The Hawaiian exhibits, portraying the Kingdom as a nation 
at the cutting edge of modernity, yet reaching back to a long and proud history, were 
enthusiastically received by the mostly Western audiences of the expositions. At the 1867 
Exposition Universelle in Paris the Hawaiian exhibit even earned a gold medal for being one of 
the best displays at the entire exposition (Kamehiro 2011, article not paginated). In the words 
                                                 
143
 “The Fijian people and the Samoan people are somewhat uneducated, and ignorant about the enlightened ways of 
governance; also, they do not have a great chief who would unite them as one in the ways of independence.  Our 
Hawai‘i, however, has indeed been victorious because of having had Kamehameha I, the warrior who unified the 
archipelago and the people until it was one in unity under one King, and the Hawaiian state has been standing firm 
for many years.” Ka Nuhou Hawaii, Vol 1, No 12 (20 Jan 1874), p. 5, c. 3. Author not mentioned, but most likely 
editor W.M. Gibson.  
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of another historian, “Hawaiian exhibits suggested that nearly all things were possible in the 
Pacific and that such things were shaped by Hawaiians themselves.” (Hoffenberg 2013: 62). 
That such statements by recent historians are not merely expressions of their subjective 
interpretations from today’s point of view is attested by Samuel Kamakau, who in 1868 
commented on the then recent Paris exhibition:  
Pēlā ke aupuni Hawaiʻi, he aupuni ʻuʻuku, aia ma lalo loa o ka hapa haneri o kekahi mau 
aupuni liʻiliʻi iho o ka ʻāina o ʻEuropa, akā, ua loaʻa naʻe ka mahalo ʻia a me ka hoʻomaikaʻi ʻia e 
nā aupuni naʻauao o ʻEuropa. Ua hoʻokaʻawale ʻia he rumi ʻokoʻa no ke aupuni Hawaiʻi ma ka 
hale hōʻikeʻike nui o Parisa ma Farani. ʻO ke aupuni Hawaiʻi wale nō ko ka moana Pākīpika nei. 
He mea kāhāhā ko nā aupuni o ʻEuropa i ka ʻike ʻana i ka palapala hōʻike ma waho o ka rumi o 
ke aupuni Hawaiʻi.144 
 
Besides these exhibits, the Kingdom also participated in major world events by sending 
high-ranking delegations to such occasions as the Golden Jubilee of Queen Victoria in 1887 
discussed at the beginning of the first chapter, or the coronation of Tsar Alexander III in 1883 
(Iaukea 1988; Schweizer 1986). Hawai‘i also contributed to the shaping of international 
scientific exchange, as a Hawaiian delegation consisting of Privy Council member Luther Aholo 
(later to become minister of the Interior, 1886-1887) and Surveyor-General William D. 
Alexander participated in the International Meridian Conference in Washington, D.C., in 1884, 
which set the longitude of Greenwich as the international standard zero-degree meridian 
(Fitzpatrick and Moffat 2004: 30)145  
                                                 
144
 “Like this is the Hawaiian kingdom, a tiny state, much less than one hundredth of some of the small states of the 
continent of Europe, but it has received the thanks and compliments from the enlightened states of Europe. A 
separate room was set aside for the Hawaiian kingdom in the hall of the great exhibition in Paris in France. The 
Hawaiian kingdom is the only one [represented there] from the Pacific. It is something to astonish the people of 
European states when they see the sign outside the room of the Hawaiian kingdom.” Kamakau in Ke Au Okoa, 23 
Sept 1869, p. 1. Reprinted in Ke Aupuni Moi, p. 311. 
145
 The relevance of this episode for contemporary Oceania became apparent to me in the following anecdote: In 
2013 I was witnessing an argument between a Fijian and a Samoan about which of the two countries was really the 
first to see the new day. The Samoan argued it should be Sāmoa, since the International Date Line had recently been 
shifted to the east of Sāmoa. The Fijian argued that this was merely a recent political decision that could be changed 
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In conclusion, it is clear that the combination of a long history of classical political 
evolution and a successful adaptation and hybridisation of Western ideas of governance 
created an extraordinary type of state in the Hawaiian Islands that was unique in Oceania and 
stood out as very peculiar in the entire world. It was this exceptionality that made the Hawaiian 
Kingdom the natural leader of the region of Oceania, not as an imperial conqueror such as 
Tonga had been among its neighbours in Western Polynesia, but as primus inter pares among 
Oceania’s emerging states.  
Having thus explored how the Hawaiian Kingdom gained its unique and exceptional 
status, I will now, in the following chapter, examine to what extent the Hawaiian Kingdom 
operated within the paradigms of parity, similitude and hybridity as I have defined them in 
chapter two, and thus position the nineteenth-century Hawaiian state within the global 
phenomenon of hybridity in the non-Western world.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
any time again, whereas the true geographical dateline follows the 180
th
 meridian, which runs through eastern Fiji. 
The Samoan countered that the position of the 180
th
 meridian was an irrelevant argument, since the designation of 
Greenwich as the zero degree meridian had been done by Westerners without consulting Pacific Islanders. When I 
corrected him on this statement, showcasing that a Hawaiian delegation participated in the international conference 
designating Greenwich as the zero meridian, the Samoan gave in, admitting that Oceania had thus been represented 
at the conference, and that hence the 180
th
 meridian was not an imposed Western feature but something of 
international validity that Pacific Islanders had had their part in creating.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
Parity, Similitude and Hybridity in Nineteenth-Century Statecraft 
 
 
All countries of the West have schemes for engulfing the East by force and we must devise 
plans for defence against them. To do this we must set up a new ‘civilised state’ here… We 
need to build up a European civilisation here on par with that of European civilised states. 
(Marquis Inoue Kaoru, Japanese minister of foreign affairs, 1887)146 
 
We should not admire everything from abroad and dislike everything Siamese and vice versa, 
because in every country and everybody, there are always good and bad things mixed 
together. We should try to follow and adopt positive things deriving from other places and at 
the same time, not only should we preserve our own customs and traditions, but we should 
also enrich them. (King Chulalongkorn of Siam, 1898)147 
 
Oriental Civilisation is the rule of Right; Occidental civilization is the rule of Might. The rule of 
Right respects benevolence and virtue, while the rule of Might only respects force and 
utilitarianism. […] Pan-Asianism is based on the rule of Right, and justifies the avenging of the 
wrongs done to others. […] Therefore now we advocate the avenging of the wrong done to 
those in revolt against the civilisation of the rule of Might, with the aim of seeking a 
civilisation of peace and equality and the emancipation of all races. (Dr Sun Yat-sen, President 
of the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China, 1924)148 
 
Introduction 
 
As the most developed state in Oceania, and globally the first non-Western state to be 
fully recognised by the Western powers, the Hawaiian Kingdom played an important role in the 
nineteenth-century world. Having provided an analysis of the origins, classical evolution and 
post-encounter development of the Hawaiian state in the previous chapter, I will now return to 
the theoretical concepts of parity, similitude and hybridity from the second chapter, and 
examine to what extent these concepts can be applied to the Hawaiian Kingdom. For this 
analysis, it is important to regard Hawai‘i not as an isolated case but instead to put it in a global 
                                                 
146
 Cited in Gong 1984: 190. Provenance of English translation from presumed Japanese original not indicated. 
147
 Speech given on 1 January 1898 after his first voyage to Europe. Quoted, in English translation from Thai, by 
Sud (2009:452).  
148
 Excerpts from speech given in Kobe, Japan, 28 November 1924. Translation into English from Chinese original 
by T’ang Leang Li; reproduced in Saaler and Szpilman 2011, Vol. 2, 78-85.  
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comparative perspective. Hence, the following examination of aspects of parity, similitude and 
hybridity in the Hawaiian Kingdom will be done in comparison with the various other 
contemporary non-Western states that were introduced in the historical overview in chapter 
three, both within and without Oceania.  
While I have already pointed out the hybridity of the nineteenth-century Hawaiian 
political system, the analysis in this chapter focuses on the agency of its proponents, both 
native and non-native, as well as on the wider cultural and social aspects of Hawaiian hybridity 
in a globally comparative context.  
The first section of the chapter deals with the issues of agency in the relations of non-
Western states with the West. This includes first a discussion of the position in general of these 
states vis-à-vis the Western powers, and the agency of the former in shaping relations with the 
latter, and secondly the agency of natives and foreigners within the governments of non-
Western states.  
In the second part of the chapter I analyse the hybrid aspects of the material culture 
associated with statecraft and nation-building that was created in the process, and matters of 
collective identity related to them such as religion. Aspects of material culture to be discussed 
include dress and architecture, state symbols such as flags and seals, and articles of utility 
manifesting state authority such as coins and postage stamps. Besides such iconic state 
symbols, two of the most prominent manifestations of material culture associated with nation-
state building, print culture and cartography, are discussed in more detail.  
Lastly, I will explore the changing discourse of the native agents themselves while 
engaged in these processes, as exemplified in the three quotes above, the first reflecting a will 
basically to westernise and use similitude to achieve parity, the second selectively to 
appropriate to produce hybridity, the third a rejection of Western cultural values and the 
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construction of something new based on traditional values. I have deliberately used quotes 
from non-Western states other than the Hawaiian Kingdom, in order to showcase that these 
discourse debates were common in all non-Western nations during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. The analysis of this changing discourse is of central importance, as it 
provides the context in which the pan-Oceanianist discourse and policy of the Hawaiian 
Kingdom, to be discussed in the subsequent three chapters, is to be framed.  
 
Issues of Agency  
 
Agency of non-Western states 
 
Pivotal diplomatic missions by the emissaries of nineteenth-century Polynesian states, 
such as that of Ha‘alilio in 1843 to achieve international recognition of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s 
independence, and that by Le Mamea in 1878 to negotiate Sāmoa’s first international treaty, 
point out the agency of native governments in shaping treaty relations, a factor that has often 
been underestimated or dismissed altogether in historical narratives. Hence, while Meiji Japan 
stands out as an unquestionably powerful country matching the Western powers both 
militarily and economically from at least the 1880s onwards, the standing as truly independent 
states of some of the other late nineteenth century non-Western countries – particularly those 
in the Pacific – has often been questioned. Especially in Marxist and postcolonial scholarship, it 
has been common to dismiss those states as “quasi-colonial” entities.  
Benedict Anderson, for instance, in his “Studies of the Thai State”(1978) questions 
Siam’s position as truly independent during the late nineteenth century, using arguments 
similar to those that have been employed by other late twentieth/early twenty-first century 
scholars to call into question the independence of the Hawaiian Kingdom. Sally Merry, for 
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instance, dismisses the Richards’ achievement of international recognition for the Kingdom in 
1843 as a “[...] temporary postponement of colonial annexation by the United States […]” 
(Merry 2000: 13), and Robert Stauffer goes even further in his dismissal, suggesting that the 
Hawaiian Kingdom was “[...] little more than a de facto unincorporated territory of the United 
States,” since “[t]he kingdom’s government was often American-dominated if not American-
run”  (Stauffer 2004: 73).   
While in Siam’s case, the country’s standing has been defended against Anderson’s 
allegations by numerous other scholarly works, in the case of the Hawaiian Kingdom and other 
nineteenth-century Pacific Island states, comparable deconstructive historiography such as 
Merry’s and Stauffer’s and often been even more radical in its dismissal than Anderson’s, has 
dominated scholarship until recently.  I will thus take a few paragraphs here to critically 
analyse Anderson’s 1978 essay and thereby discuss the issue of native agency in non-Western 
states on more general terms, with the aim of providing a wider context for the debate on 
native agency in Hawaiian and other Pacific Islands history.  
Anderson argues that in contrast to Meiji Japan, which he considers truly independent, 
nineteenth-century Siam was “indirectly colonised” (p. 199ff). He bases this allegation on three 
main elements, namely, the absence of true military power wielded by Siam, its unequal 
treaties, and the presence of foreign advisors in the government.  
 While I respect Anderson’s work, and consider his more well-known work Imagined 
Communities (1991) as an important basic theoretical source for this dissertation, I strongly 
disagree with the analysis brought forward in his 1978 article. His assertion about an “indirect 
colonisation” is not convincingly argued. First of all, Anderson does not clearly define the term 
“indirectly colonized,” which he uses indiscriminately for both native states under the indirect 
rule of a colonial empire [such as the Princely states within British India, or the Malay 
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sultanates under British protectorate] on one hand, and native states not part of any colonial 
empire [such as Siam] on the other.   
Secondly, none of the three arguments why Siam should be considered “indirectly 
colonised” [i.e. similar or equal to a colonial protectorate, I suppose] are conclusive. If, in the 
nineteenth century, all countries that had no effective military power but relied on playing the 
diplomatic card instead to secure their existence would be considered “indirectly colonised,” 
then many of the smaller European countries, such as Switzerland and Luxemburg, or the 
lesser Italian and German states before their respective unification, should be considered to 
have been “indirectly colonised” as well.  
The existence of unequal treaties was, as discussed above, an indication of not being 
fully recognized, i.e. not having achieved full parity. But I would hardly see it as evidence of 
“indirect colonization”.  Japan was in exactly the same situation before its treaties were revised 
in the 1890s. The only difference with Siam in that sense is that it took the latter four decades 
longer to achieve treaty revision. If unequal treaties signify “indirect colonization”, Meiji Japan 
before 1894 must have been “indirectly colonised” too, an argument not made by Anderson.  
The last point, the hiring of foreign advisors, does not give any hard evidence of 
“indirect colonisation” either. There is a fundamental difference between “Resident 
Commissioners,” “Resident Advisors” or similar agents of the dominant power in states under 
colonial protectorate, who were forced upon the native rulers by the colonial government and 
revocable only by the latter, on one hand; and foreign advisors hired by an independent state 
like Siam at its own initiative, which could be fired at the native government’s will if they did 
not do their job properly, on the other. In the case of a colonial protectorate, agency resided 
with the colonial government and its advisors, in Siam’s case it resided with the native 
government. 
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It should be clear that the agency of native states dependent on one particular colonial 
power as protectorates thereof, or as “princely states” within a larger colonial realm, is by 
definition much more limited, because important aspects of their sovereignty have been 
transferred to the particular Western state, which now controls their foreign policy. The 
restoration of the native state’s freedom to act independently on the international level is thus 
dependent on the will of the protecting power. 
Independent states like Siam, that were “not fully admitted into the Family of Nations” 
to paraphrase Westlake, but which were nevertheless not claimed as a colonial dependency or 
protectorate by a specific Western state, clearly conserved much more agency for themselves. I 
do accept Horowitz’ term “semicolonial,” which is quite different in its implications from 
Andersons confusing term “indirectly colonial,” because those states did have a second-class 
status in international society and through their unequal treaties were open to economic 
exploitation by the West as a whole, since every co-equal of the Family of Nations could in turn 
impose an unequal treaty modelled after those of other Western states. While their agency was 
of course more limited than that of a fully recognised state, it was nevertheless still existent, 
because a state subjected to the “semicolonial” regime was free to pursue its own foreign policy 
and thus had the possibility to re-negotiate unequal treaties. As soon as only one full member 
state of the Family of Nations could be found to agree on an equal treaty, a precedent could be 
set, and eventually a revision of all unequal treaties would follow. This strategy was first used 
by the Hawaiian Kingdom in the 1840s and 1850s to revise its concession-burdened treaties. 
Later Japan used a similar strategy in the 1890s, and most other non-Western states followed 
suit in the 1920s, 30s and 40s, as recounted in chapter three. Tonga started this process in the 
1870s as well, albeit unsuccessfully. 
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 Particularly interesting in this case is the role that could be played by a non-Western 
state that had successfully completed the process of treaty revision and achieved full 
diplomatic parity.  While she might use her newly acquired status to act as an imperial power 
herself and force unequal treaties on her less successful neighbours, as Japan did to Korea and 
China, she might also do this at first but then use her standing to help out another non-Western 
state by setting a precedent for treaty revision, such as the Hawaiian Kingdom first attempted 
to do for Japan in 1881 and actually succeeded in 1893,149 and as it attempted through its 
unequal treaty with Sāmoa in 1887 as will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven.  
Furthermore, unlike a state under colonial protectorate, an independent state under an 
unequal treaty regime, while under pressure to transform its institutions to confirm to the 
“standard of civilisation,” was free to selectively choose which Western state its institutional 
reforms would be modelled on, as well as where to hire foreign advisors from. Thus, almost all 
of the non-Western states carefully picked and chose institutions to adopt and adapt from 
different Western countries and thereby created their own distinct versions of state 
modernisation (Horowitz 2005: 456-457). 
Nonetheless, as long as the international system was shaped and dominated by Western 
states, i.e. at least until the numerical majority of states became non-Western in the 1960s, the 
manoeuvring space for non-Western countries, both in diplomatic negotiations and domestic 
transformation of state institutions, was limited, as mentioned above.  Although there have 
been significant improvements over time, one can argue that similar issues continue to be faced 
by post-colonial and other non-Western states today, which, in a pattern of double standards, 
                                                 
149
 During King Kalākaua’s visit to Tokyo in 1881, the Meiji Emperor asked the Hawaiian King to revise its treaty 
and thereby create a precedent for the Western powers to follow, a scheme that may have succeeded if it had not 
been prematurely leaked to American and British diplomats by a traitor within Kalakāua’s entourage (Armstrong 
1977: 47-51; Keene 2002: 347). Immediately prior to the 1893 overthrow, Queen Lili‘uokalani instructed her 
minister in Tokyo that Hawai‘i was renouncing all extraterritorial rights in Japan stemming from the 1871 treaty 
(Exchange of Notes between Hawaii and Japan respecting Consular Jurisdiction. 18 January 1893/10 April 1894. 
The Consolidated Treaty Series, 1648-1919, Vol. 180: 125). 
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are still by and large under more intensive scrutiny to perform according to Western norms 
than the West itself. 150    
 
The hybridity of agency: Complex identities of native leaders and foreign advisors  
 
Within the larger question of agency of nineteenth-century non-Western states, the 
roles and identities of the individuals involved in policy-making are of particular interest.  I 
have already addressed Anderson’s allegation that Western individuals serving in non-Western 
governments were evidence of “indirect colonialism.” Unsurprisingly, similar statements have 
been made about foreigners working for the Hawaiian Kingdom.  
First of all, these statements are mainly the results of misrepresentations of the roles, 
positions and power of non-aboriginal Hawaiian Kingdom officials. For instance, when 
describing the 1842-44 Hawaiian diplomatic mission which she does not credit with much 
success in the first place as mentioned above, Sally Merry adds insult to injury by designating 
William Richards as the active agent in the diplomatic mission, while relegating Ha‘alilio, who 
in fact was the head of the delegation, to a secondary status (Merry 2000: 84-85). In fact, no 
foreign official in the Hawaiian government could act without being appointed to his position 
by the King or other high-ranking ali‘i, and the latter could fire them at will if they did not 
perform their job as directed. For instance, Gerrit Judd, another former missionary who played 
an important role in the government of Kamehameha III, was fired after he started pushing his 
                                                 
150
 For instance, non-Western states are usually criticised much more heavily by European governments for 
practicing the death penalty and torture of suspects than is the United States which uses the same practices. 
Similarly, Iran’s current alleged plans to acquire nuclear weapons are being severely condemned by Western states 
who own thousands of such weapons themselves. And Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula 
of Crimea is being more heavily condemned by the international community than France’s 2011 illegal annexation 
of the Comorian island of Mayotte [ironically, France is one of the countries calling for economic sanctions against 
Russia in this context] or the United States continuing illegal rule over the Hawaiian Islands [the US being another 
country calling for sanctions against Russia]. Furthermore, Turan Kayaoğlu has recently argued that the post-WWII 
global network of extraterritorial US military bases has recreated a system of imperial extraterritoriality analogous 
to that of the nineteenth and early twentieth century (2010: 295-203). 
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own agenda instead of implementing the Kingdom’s best interest, which is seen by Beamer as 
an important example of ali‘i agency (Beamer 2014: 170). 
Secondly, while pointing out native agency within the governments of non-Western 
states, it is also important not to create a simplified dichotomy between natives and foreigners. 
As mentioned in chapter one, many individuals of Western origin that were active as advisors 
or government officials in non-Western states had themselves become culturally hybridised 
and adopted what Beamer calls a “complex identity” just as Hawaiian ali‘i had themselves 
adopted a hybridised identity (2008: 28). 
A perfect example for a Hawaiian official of foreign origin with a complex identity is the 
above-mentioned William Richards. Already in 1827 when still a missionary and charged with 
libel by another Westerner, Richards had submitted himself to Hawaiian chiefly authority by 
stating to the ‘Aha ali‘i:  “With you is my life, with you is my death”, referring to the Hawaiian 
saying I ka ‘ōlelo nō ke ola, i ka ‘ōlelo nō ka make (“In speech there is life, in speech there is 
death”), which paraphrases the power of the ali‘i over life and death of their subjects (Arista 
2010: 664). As Hawaiian historian Noelani Arista points out, through this ingenious use of a 
proper Hawaiian idiomatic expression, “he presented his haole (foreign) body before the 
Hawaiian chiefs with the audacious claim that he should be treated like Hawaiian subjects” 
(ibd: 664). 
While visiting the United States as Ha‘alilio’s assistant and interpreter during the winter 
of 1842-43, Richards became involved in an incident, later reported in a French newspaper, 
which exposed the two envoys to the ugly face of American racist bigotry and lack of etiquette, 
and thereby placed an unprecedented test on their relationship:  
Mercredi dernier, Haalilio s’embarqua à New York, pour New Haven, sur le steamboat Globe, 
avec le révérend Richards, qui lui sert de compagnon et d’interprète dans son voyage 
diplomatique. Lorsque vint l’heure du déjeuner, un des employés donna au révérend deux 
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billets d’admission, dont un pour lui et l’autre pour son domestique. M. Richards expliqua 
comme quoi le prétendu domestique n’était rien moins que l’un des plus hauts et puissants 
seigneurs du royaume de Sandwich, ambassadeur auprès du gouvernement des Etats-Unis. 
L’employé, après avoir examiné Haalilio de la tête aux pieds, répliqua qu’il ne connaissait rien 
à la diplomatie, mais qu’il savait distinguer de blanc du noir, et qu’en conséquence, 
l’ambassadeur étant d’une couleur cuivrée très-foncée, déjeunerait à la table des 
domestiques, ou ne déjeunerait pas du tout. Il fut fait appel au capitaine Stone, qui refusa de 
la réformer. Le révérend, alors, ne voulant pas se séparer de son illustre compagnon, alla 
prendre part, avec lui, au repas des domestiques. (Le Globe, 27 February 1843; emphasis in 
the original)151 
 
Similar to the incident before the ‘Aha Ali‘i fifteen years earlier, Richards once more chose to 
identify as a Hawaiian subject, loyally serving his ali‘i Ha‘alilio and suffering humiliation with 
him, rather than retaining his original identity as a white American and choosing to abandon 
Ha‘alilio and eat his lunch with the other white Americans.152 It was thus not surprising that as 
soon as a legal mechanism for naturalisation was created, Richards formally renounced his 
American citizenship and became a naturalized Hawaiian subject on 8 may 1845 
(Naturalization records, Hawai’i State Archives).  
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 “Last Wednesday, Ha‘alilio embarked in New York for New Haven, aboard the steam boat Globe, together with 
the reverend Richards, who serves him as companion and interpreter on his diplomatic voyage. When the time came 
for lunch, one of the employees gave to the reverend two admission tickets, one for himself and one for his servant. 
Mr. Richards explained that the alleged servant was none less than one of the highest and most powerful lords of the 
Sandwich kingdom, and the ambassador to the government of the United States. The employee, after having 
examined Ha‘alilio from head to foot, replied that he does not know anything about diplomacy, but that he knows 
how to distinguish white from black, and that in consequence, Ha‘alilio, being of a very dark copper colour, would 
have lunch at the table of the servants, or he would not have lunch at all. This decision was appealed before the 
captain Stone, who refused to alter it. Thus the reverend, not wanting to separate himself from his illustrious 
companion, went to take part with him at the lunch of the servants.” The newspaper clipping was found in file B3, 
box 40, Oceania files, Centre for Overseas Archives, Aix-en-Provence, France. The same incident was also reported 
in the New York Times, 23 January 1843. I acknowledge Ronald Williams for pointing this out to me. 
152
 Richards’ solidarity with Ha‘alilio contrasts markedly with the attitudes of supposedly “liberal” Americans of the 
1970s when facing a similar situation. When famed Hawaiian surfer Eddie Aikau was invited to a surf championship 
in South Africa with a group of other surfers from Hawai‘i in the early 1970s, he was refused admission to a luxury 
hotel with the rest of the delegation [who except Aikau were all whites] because he was “too dark” to stay there. 
Unlike William Richards 150 years earlier, there was no solidarity from the white surfers who comfortably stayed in 
their “white only” hotel and let Aikau search for a third class “blacks allowed” accommodation himself. This 
anecdote is recounted in Hawaiian: The Legend of Eddie Aikau, documentary film by Sam George, 2013. 
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Westerners like Richards ready to assimilate partly into the society of the native rulers 
they served and take on complex identities can be found in other non-Western states as well. 
For example, French army officer Joseph-Anthelme Sève, who was hired by Khedive Meḥmet 
‘Alī of Egypt as a military advisor and drillmaster in the 1820s, ended up becoming 
permanently a subject of the Khedivate, converting to Islam and taking up the name Süleyman 
Paşa (Konrad 2013). And Swiss engineer Alfred Ilg was first hired by Emperor Menelik II of 
Abyssinia [Ethiopia] to plan the new capital of Addis Abeba and build a railway line to the coast 
and ended up being granted an Abyssinian title of nobility and appointed the empire’s foreign 
minister (Woker 2016). Similarly, in the 1860s Englishman David J. Moss was adopted by King 
George Tupou I, hired as his secretary and took the name of Tubou Haabai [Tupou Ha‘apai] 
(Lātūkefu 1974: 192). Some of the earliest haole in Hawaiian governmental service similarly 
adopted Hawaiian names such as John Young who was known as ‘Olohana in Hawaiian.  While 
Richards did not change his own appellation [apart from the Hawaiianisation of his last name 
to Rikeke in Hawaiian texts], he named his daughter Harriet Keōpuōlani after the highest 
ranking widow of Kamehameha I whom Richards had been particularly close to (Williston 
1938: 48). Walter Murray Gibson, another particularly loyal haole serving in the Hawaiian 
government whose important contributions to Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism will be discussed in 
the next chapter, also took steps of partial cultural assimilation. When writing in Hawaiian 
newspapers he exclusively went by Kipikona, a Hawaiianisation of his last name, and he 
preferred the Hawaiian spelling Talula for the name of his daughter Tallulah. Later, some of 
Gibson’s Hawaiian-born grandchildren, even though genetically fully European, would be given 
Hawaiian middle names, namely Hooulu [after King Kalākaua’s governing motto Ho‘oulu Lāhui, 
“to increase the Nation”], Kanaiaupuni [“the Conqueror,” an epithet of Kamehameha the Great], 
210 
 
and Kuliakanuu [“Strive for the Summit,” the personal motto of Queen Kapi‘olani] (Gibson 
1973: 100). 
Generally, recent studies have shown that nineteenth century Polynesian states were 
having more agency than previous histories assumed, and more specifically, it was usually the 
native rulers who were in control of those states, and agency was delegated to foreigners only 
if they were considered loyal subjects. Evidence of native agency in that sense can be found for 
most islands states. For instance Shelley Sayes has questioned the generalised importance of 
contacts with Europeans in the rise and consolidation of power by Fijian matanitū (Sayes 1982: 
172-179). One might add that the early European settlement in Levuka did not significantly 
strengthen the local chief, Tui Levuka, whose chiefdom remained subordinate to the matanitū 
of Bau throughout the period of Levuka’s growth as a port town (Derrick 1950: 94; Ralston 
1978: 97-98).  
Similarly, Cedric Sampson has conclusively argued that Tahiti was not a “missionary 
kingdom” but rather that decision-making of the Tahitian kingdom was primarily controlled by 
Tahitian ari’i (Sampson 1973). Of all the Polynesian polities described as “missionary 
Kingdoms” by Laux, only catholic mission centres like Mangareva were possibly missionary-
controlled, since the 1869 Mangarevan constitution is indeed the only one that assigns to 
Christian clergy a formal position of political power.153 Nonetheless there remains the question 
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 According to the constitution, the King’s executive advisory council had to include three priests, who were also 
members of the legislature, and parish priests were ex officio honorary presidents of district councils (Constitution 
Mangarévienne du 13-12-1869. Codes Mangaréviennes du 18-1-1870. French manuscript translation of unlocated 
Mangarevan original. Microfilmed copy in UH Hamilton Library, call number MICROFICHE D 30053). 
Consequently, French Admiral Théophile Aube wrote during the late 1870s that “[a]ux Sandwich et à Taiti, le 
gouvernement est une monarchie constitutionnelle, aux Tonga, une monarchie absolue,[…]; enfin, à Mangaréva et 
aux Wallis, sous les dehors d’une royauté sans pouvoir, le gouvernement n’est qu’une théocratie catholique” [“In the 
Sandwich [islands] and in Tahiti, the government is a constitutional monarchy; in Tonga, an absolute 
monarchy,[…]; finally, in Mangareva and in the Wallis [islands], under the appearances of a royalty without power, 
the government is nothing but a catholic theocracy”].Quoted in Laux 2000: 204. 
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whether the priests really controlled the kings or whether they were rather in a mutually-
beneficial partnership.154 
Returning to Hawai‘i, the variety of fields in which a re-examination of agency needs to 
be undertaken is indeed wide-ranging. Anthropologist Peter Mills for instance, found that the 
historical site on Kaua‘i today marketed to tourists as “Russian Fort Elizabeth” actually existed 
under that name for less than a year in 1817, when a German adventurer in Russian service 
allied himself with King Kaumuali‘i, who had local workers re-arrange a classical Hawaiian 
structure known as Pā ‘Ula‘ula o Hipo into a Western-style fort, before the entire Russian 
colonisation scheme was aborted a few months later. The more profound historical importance 
of that hybrid structure was played out later under its Hawaiian name, in the Kaua‘i rebellion 
against the Hawaiian Kingdom of 1824-25, followed by several decades as a Hawaiian 
government fort (Mills 2002). In summary, there can be little doubt that Polynesian states in 
general, and the Hawaiian Kingdom in particular, were native-controlled, and not “puppet,” 
“indirectly colonised” or otherwise compromised entities.  
  
                                                 
154
 The fact that besides various religious materials, in 1851 the Catholic mission printed a Mangarevan-language 
book containing the history of the classical Mangarevan kings, obviously for use by the people of Mangareva 
themselves (Puputauki 1851) provides evidence that the King of Mangareva had his own agenda and enough power 
to compel the Catholic mission to promote it. I acknowledge D. Keali‘i MacKenzie for re-discovering a copy of this 
rare book in the collections of the American Antiquarian Society in Worcester, Massachusetts and bringing it to my 
attention.  
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Cultures of similitude and hybridity 
 
While the global context of ever-expanding Western 
imperialism and the resulting Eurocentric framework of 
international law coerced non-Western states throughout the 
nineteenth century to reform their political institutions so that 
they were recognisable by the West, each of them concurrently 
attempted to conserve its own distinct national identity. It was 
common to use strategies similitude in certain contexts, while 
in others, tradition and non-Western identity were stressed. 
The images of Prince Itō Hirobumi, Japan’s first prime minister, in a Western-style uniform or 
suit when portrayed as a statesmen while 
dressed in kimono when sitting for a family 
portrait may serve as an instructive example 
[fig. 5.1 and 5.2].  Similarly, the government 
under Itō’s leadership was building railways 
and factories while simultaneously restoring 
centuries-old Shinto shrines.  The 1889 
Japanese constitution, while in its 
institutional technicalities quite similar to 
those of Imperial Germany and Austria-
Hungary, contains a preamble declaring governance of the empire to be grounded in the 
principles of the eternity [i.e., by implication, divinity] of the imperial lineage, quite unlike the 
reference to a ruler “by the grace of God”, as it was formulated in Western monarchies (Takii 
2007).  
Fig. 5.1: Prince Itō 
Hirobumi (1841-1909). 
Colour photograph by 
unknown photpgrapher. 
Copyright expired. 
Source: Wikipedia. 
Fig. 5.2: Prince Itō with his family. Photograph by 
Herbert Ponting, early twentieth century. US 
Library of Congress collection. Copyright expired. 
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In one way or another, hybridity was thus a central feature of all non-Western states 
interacting with the West in the nineteenth century, and the political institutions created or 
modified in the modernisation processes undertaken by the countries described in this chapter 
all reflect  both traditional and Western concepts of statecraft. In the words of international 
relations scholar Gerrit Gong, “In countries throughout the world, cultural compromise meant 
the fusing, sometimes consciously but often not, of the desirable elements of the European 
standard with their own historic standards of ‘civilization’. The challenge was (and is) to create 
‘modern’ states without severing historical and cultural roots” (1984: 245).  
It needs to be pointed out here that neither similitude nor hybridity in the sense 
discussed are new phenomena born out of the encounter of native policies with Western 
expansion in the modern age. Similar processes happened in many world regions before, when 
a culturally, economically or militarily dominant civilisation influenced polities in neighbouring 
regions. For instance in the centuries following Alexander the Great’s conquests, various 
ancient states in the Middle East from the Mediterranean to India were refashioned as 
Hellenistic Kingdoms, with Greek-style architecture and syncretistic religions merging the 
Greek pantheon with local deities.  
A little more recently in world history, and relevant to some of the states discussed in 
this chapter, during the second half of the first and the beginning of the second millennium AD, 
the Hindu-Buddhist civilisation of India expanded to Southeast Asia where various native 
polities of Sino-Tibetan, Austroasiatic, Thai and Austronesian ethnicity reframed themselves as 
Hindu or Buddhist kingdoms (Coedès 1968).155 Unlike the Chinese or Mongol conquests, or the 
Spanish conquest of the Americas, Coedès points out that Indic cultural extension almost 
everywhere happened peacefully, arguing that “[f]ar from being destroyed by the conquerors, 
                                                 
155
 What also needs to be pointed out in this context is the importance of the long-neglected Austronesian agency in 
bringing back this Indian influence to South East Asia after settling in parts of India in the first place (Mahdi 1999). 
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the native peoples of South East Asia found in Indian society, transplanted and modified, a 
framework within which their own society could be integrated and developed” (Coedès 1986: 
34) This is interesting for Siam, for which modernisation according to Western standards in the 
1800s was the second such process in its history, after modernisation according to Indic 
standards, and the subsequent hybridisation of native Thai and imported Indic cultures many 
centuries before. For Johor, Western-inspired modernisation in the nineteenth-century was 
even the third such hybridisation process, since its predecessor states [Srivijaya and Melaka] 
had first become indianised, then islamicised (Andaya and Andaya 2001).  
While Coedès considers Chinese civilisation more aggressive in its conquest and 
assimilation of subjected peoples than its Indic counterpart, hybridisations of native states 
under Chinese cultural influences were common as well. The most important example is early 
medieval Japan, whose leaders considered Sinic concepts of governance worthwhile to be 
transferred and modified in order to advance the 
development of Japanese statecraft (Mason and Caiger 
1997: 32, 37ff). In that sense, for Japan, Western-inspired 
modernisation during the Meiji era was also in many 
aspects a déjà-vu experience reminiscent of Chinese-
inspired modernisation centuries earlier.  
 
Hybrid Material Culture: Dress and Architecture 
 
Beyond the hybrid political institutions created in 
the process of institutional transfer and modernisation, 
aspects of hybridity become especially manifest in the 
material culture of nineteenth century non-Western states. I have already mentioned the 
Fig. 5.3: Marquis Ōkuma 
Shigenobu (1838-1922) in Court 
uniform, taken by unknown 
photographer before 1922. 
Copyright expired. Reproduced 
in Iditti 1940, p. 310. 
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dressing of political elites in those states, which often 
featured Western-style uniforms and suits, thus using a 
strategy of similitude, often by people who on other 
occasions preferred wearing traditional dress. Even the 
Western-style clothes worn by native elites often featured 
traditional cultural symbolism, for example in the details of 
the embroidery of court uniforms, for instance the kiri-mon 
[Paulownia flower crest] on the uniform cuffs of Japanese 
statesman Ōkuma Shigenobu [fig. 5.3] or the kalo and 
palapalai [fern] leaves on the chest and collar of the uniform 
of Hawaiian diplomat Curtis ‘Iaukea [fig. 5.4] as well as 
similar details in the portraits of some monarchs shown in chapter three. Such uniforms should 
hence be regarded as hybrid artefacts rather than merely imported tools of similitude.  
Similar forms of hybridity can be found in the architecture of palaces and other 
Fig. 5.4: Colonel Curtis ‘Iaukea 
(1855-1940) in diplomatic 
uniform during his diplomatic 
mission to various European 
and Asian countries in 1883. 
Copyright expired. Reproduced 
in Schweizer 1986, p. 43. 
Fig. 5.5: Chakri Maha Prasat Throne Hall, Grand Palace, Bangkok, completed 1882. Photo by Andy 
Marchand, 2013, copyright waived. Source: Wikipedia. 
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buildings of state institutions or elite dwellings, which were often either stylistic mixes of 
traditional and imported elements such as the Chakri Maha Prasat Throne Hall of the Grand 
Palace in Bangkok [fig. 5.5], or compounds consisting of both traditional and Western-style 
buildings, like for instance the compound of a traditional Japanese house and western-  
influenced hybrid-style buildings inhabited by Japanese statesman Ōkuma Shigenobu [fig. 5.6]  
  
 or the Rova [castle-palace complex] of 
Antananarivo consisting of traditional Malagasy  
buildings and two large hybrid-style palaces 
[fig. 5.7], later augmented by a western-style 
church and mansion. An interesting example of 
such a compound of traditional and Western 
buildings in the Hawaiian Kingdom is the 
complex of Hulihe‘e Palace in Kailua-Kona, the 
official seat of the governor of Hawai‘i Island, 
consisting of a two-storey Western-style stone 
palace and a hale pili [thatched house] in 
classical Hawaiian style, in which the governor 
Fig. 5.6: Home of Marquis 
Ōkuma Shigenobu, taken by 
unknown photographer before 
1922. Copyright expired. 
Reproduced in Iditti 1940, p. 
240. 
Fig. 5.7: The Rova of Antananarivo, 
drawing by John William Mears, 1873. 
Copyright expired. Source: Wikipedia. 
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actually lived [fig. 5.8].  
 
    
In a case study on late nineteenth Siam, Italian historian Maurizio Peleggi (2002)  
describes the refashioning of the image of the Thai monarchy through Western-style clothing, 
architecture, monuments and public displays, an interesting analysis of the process of 
similitude and hybridisation from a perspective of art history and cultural anthropology that 
can be useful to examine other non-Western states as well. Peleggi argues that by adopting the 
imagery of what he calls the “Victorian ecumene”, a globalized cultural complex of European 
aristocratic tradition combined with modern technology and the recently developed concept of 
the nation-state, Siamese rulers and aristocrats not only made themselves recognisable as 
equals by their European peers in a pursuit of similitude. Equally importantly, they also used 
these artefacts to promote the image of the Siamese monarchy as a modernizer to its domestic 
subjects.  
Fig. 5.8: Hulihe‘e Palace compound. Taken before 1884 by unknown photographer. US Library of 
Congress collection. Copyright expired. 
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A few years before Peleggi, Japanese historian Takashi Fujitani undertook a similar 
study on the publicly displayed imagery of the Japanese monarchy during the Meiji era, 
focusing especially on the dual role of the emperor as the simultaneous leader of 
modernisation and keeper of traditions, geographically symbolised in the opposite roles  
assigned to the two imperial 
cities of Kyoto and Tokyo 
(Fujitani 1996), quite similar 
to the roles of the 
“traditional” royal city of 
Ambohimanga and the 
modern capital of 
Antananarivo in Madagascar. 
For the latter, an excellent 
case study has been 
undertaken by Didier Nativel 
(2005) examining the hybrid 
elite architecture in 19h century Antananarivo, arguing that court architecture inspired 
successful commoners to construct similar Western-inspired mansions, leading to a reshaping 
of the urban landscape. In another recent study on global consumerism in the 1800s, American 
historian Jermy Prestholdt – whom I credited in the first chapter for developing the concept of 
similitude – analyses the hybrid material culture of the sultan’s court and urban society in 
nineteenth-century Zanzibar, focusing on state-of the art architecture and technology as well as 
the use and display of Western consumer goods. Beyond mere similitude, a particular aspect of 
Zanzibari consumerism described by Prestholds is the use of Western material culture within 
Fig. 5.9: The Beit-al-Ajaib [“House of Wonders”], the first building 
in East Africa to have electricity and an elevator [completed 1883] 
and the clock tower, both part of the Sultan’s palace complex in 
Zanzibar. Mid-1880s. Copyright expired. Original in Nothwestern 
University Library collection (Evanston, Illinois). Reproduced in 
Prestholdt 2008, p. 108. 
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native epistemological concepts, e.g. the installation of a state-of-the-art English clock, which 
however was set to traditional Zanzibari time, i.e. with the day beginning with one o’clock at 
sunrise [fig. 5.9] (Prestholdt 2008: 108).   
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of material culture displayed by native elites in modernising non-Western 
states through a lens of art history and cultural anthropology along the lines of Peleggi, Fujitani, 
Nativel and Prestholdt can be equally helpful for an understanding of Pacific Islands states. In 
the case of Hawaii, this has been recently demonstrated by Art historian Stacy Kamehiro (2006; 
2009; 2011). Her detailed examination of the second ʻIolani Palace, built by King Kalākaua in 
1879-1882 shows that the palace, equipped with its ultra-modern equipment [electricity, 
telephone, indoor plumbing], was not only a display of state-of-the-art modernity but 
Fig. 5.10: ‘Iolani Palace in Honolulu. Note the crescent-shaped arches, over 
the entrance door and in the form of the front gate, as well as the pūlo‘ulo‘u 
designs on top of the front gate columns and on the second floor railings. 
Photo taken in 2012 by Kenneth John Gill. Copyright waved. Source: 
Wikipedia. 
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simultaneously laden with classical Hawaiian symbolism, such as the recurring designs of 
hoaka [arches], and pūlo‘ulo‘u [upright sticks topped 
with a barkcloth ball marking an area as kapu and 
reserved to ali‘i] in its outlook [fig. 
5.10]. Besides, the palace is located 
on historically sacred grounds and also includes  stones from Kūki‘i Heiau on Hawai‘i Island in 
its foundation and thus had itself aspects of a modernised heiau [temple of the classical 
Hawaiian religion] (Kamehiro2006: 10-19). Similarly, the royal crown of the Hawaiian 
Kingdom, corresponding to the general outline of royal crowns in Europe, contains a 
specifically Hawaiian cultural reference. Its spikes have in the form of kalo leaves, similarly to 
the uniform embroidery mentioned above. This points to the mythological connection of 
Hawaiian ali‘i, through their ancestor Hāloa, the younger brother of the first kalo plant, to this 
essential staple food crop [fig. 5.11]. Kamehiro also mentions the   Kamehameha Statue, 
commissioned by King Kalākaua as well and erected in front of Ali‘iōlani Hale, another state-of-
the-art structure built as the main government building by Kamehameha V in 1872 [Fig. 5.12]. 
Fig. 5.11: Royal Crown of the Hawaiian 
Kingdom. Commissioned by King 
Kalākaua in 1882. Note the form of 
spikes. Unknown photographer, late 
nineteenth century. Copyright 
expired. Source: Wikipedia  
Fig. 5.12: Statue of Kamehameha I, erected in 1882, in front of 
Ali‘iōlani Hale in Honolulu. Photo by author. 
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The statue is a hybrid monument that symbolised both a connection to Hawaiian tradition and 
to Western modernity, as it uses the outline of classical Greek and  Roman statuary like 
contemporary monuments of 
national heroes in the West  
(Kamehiro 2009: 77-96;  Wharton 
2012). Furthermore, the Hawaiʻi 
National Museum and the various 
Hawaiian exhibits at world fairs 
already mentioned in the last 
chapter similarly manifestations of 
the hybrid cultural  identity of a 
nation simultaneously grounded in tradition and modernity (Kamehiro 2009: 97-126; 
Kamehiro 2011; Imada 2010; Hoffenberg 2013).  
In other Oceanian states, hybridity in material culture was also prevalent, but there are 
fewer clearly hybrid structures that survive from the nineteenth century. One example is the 
Tongan Royal Palace, built in 1867 in the style of a Victorian mansion [fig. 5. 13], a typical 
example of similitude. While there are no classical Tongan design elements in the building itself 
as far as I am aware of, the fact that the grounds in front of the palace are routinely used for 
traditional ceremonies involving the King gives the palace complex hybrid features as well.   
 
Akua and Lotu: Issues of Religion 
 
A very important aspect of state modernisation and hybridisation that I have only 
mentioned in passing so far is the question of religion. Essentially there were two choices for 
the leaders of a non-Western state, namely conversion to Christianity or retention of the 
Fig. 5.13: Royal Palace in Nuku‘alofa. Photo taken by author 
in 2005. 
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traditional religion in a form compatible with modernisation. The first option was in many 
ways the more radical and disruptive one for a native society to undertake, but since the 
European-set “standard of civilisation” was at least partly based on Christianity, conversion 
was a very promising “reform” to undertake in order to gain recognition by the Western 
powers. Of the larger non-Western states outside of the insular Pacific, Madagascar was 
virtually alone to opt for this strategy, albeit reluctantly and only after decades of hesitation 
and the use of other strategies as I have described in chapter three. Nonetheless, once 
Christianity was adopted by the Malagasy elite, it played a major role as a foundation for the 
state (Raison-Jourde 1991). The Cherokee Nation was another example of a native state whose 
leaders had converted.  
Most other non-Western states, however, did not convert,156 and instead their leaders 
reformulated the traditional religion as a “national religion”. This was done for instance in 
Japan with the recasting of the traditional polytheistic religion as “State Shinto” (Mason and 
Caiger 1997: 296), while in Thailand, Theravada Buddhism was refashioned as a “national 
religion” in the service of the modernising state under King Chulalongkorn (Keyes 1971). In 
Islamic countries the situation was somewhat different because of the more universalist nature 
of the religion, similar to Christianity. With its universalist claim and strict doctrines, a total 
refashioning of Islam into distinctive national religions of states was not possible, but there 
were nevertheless efforts to make it a “state religion”, as in the 1895 Johor constitution (Hussin 
2013), which had the effect of associating the state with a non-Western religious identity and 
therefore making it implicitly clear that its purpose was “modernization without 
Westernization.” 
                                                 
156
 Ethiopia was technically already Christian, more specifically Ethiopian Orthodox, but its branch of Christianity 
was not unambiguously accepted as an equivalent to Western Christianity by those in the West setting the “standard 
of civilisation.” Nevertheless, the Ethiopian leadership maintained its traditional church and would not convert to 
Western branches of Christianity, thus making Ethiopia more generally fall in the second category. 
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In Polynesia, the leaders of all island states at least formally converted to Christianity, 
and the Christian religion [lotu in Western Polynesian languages157] became an important 
factor in the development of Polynesian states during the nineteenth century.158 The fact that 
by the early 1840s, the Hawaiian Kingdom was for all intents and purposes a ‘Christian nation,’ 
while most other non-Western states were not, was likely an important factor in its early 
recognition as an independent state. During that early period of constitutional rule, the 
Kingdom was virtually a theocracy, since the 1840 Hawaiian constitution stated that “[a]ole loa 
e hanaia kekahi kanawai ku e i ka olelo a ka Haku, a Iehova, aole hoi i ku e i ke ano nui o ia olelo. 
E ku like no na kanawai a pau o keia pae aina me ke ano nui o ko ke Akua kanawai.”159 Most 
other Polynesian Islands contained similar, if not stronger references to the Christian religion 
in their constitutions and legislation throughout the nineteenth century.160 In Hawai‘i’s case, 
the explicit reference to Christian principles in legislation was deleted in the later constitutions 
of 1852 and 1864, and references to Ke Akua [God] and Iehova [Jehovah] were restricted to the 
preamble and the article on religious freedom.161 
That the Hawaiian Kingdom stands out among Polynesian states for making such steps 
away from the notion of a Christian theocracy towards a secular state is no coincidence.  Unlike 
in any other Polynesian archipelago, the process of political unification of the Hawaiian 
archipelago was already completed before conversion to Christianity occurred. Claire Laux 
quite accurately argues that George Tupou I and Pomare II had to build their legitimacy on 
Christian conversion, while the Kamehamehas had established themselves within the old 
                                                 
157
 According to ‘Okusitino Māhina (1988: 1), lotu is a term that referred to prayers offered to the Gods in the 
classical religion. It is thus not a neologism but a classical term that was given a new purpose.  
158
 For a comprehensive history of Christian missions in the Pacific Islands, see Garret 1985. 
159
 1840 Hawaiian Constitution. In the official English translation, the passage reads as follows: “No law shall be 
enacted which is at variance with the word of the Lord Jehovah, or at variance with the general spirit of His word. 
All laws of the Islands shall be in consistency with the general spirit of God's law.” 
160
 Even today, many of the independent post-colonial Polynesian states contain references to Atua [God] in their 
constitutions and on their coats of arms. 
161
 1852 Hawaiian Constitution, Art. 1 and 2; 1864 Hawaiian Constitution, Art. 1 and 2. 
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religious framework, and Christianity was thus not an essential foundation for their political 
system (2000: 95; 2001: 131). Nonetheless, as essential a factor as Christian conversion was to 
the state-building projects in most other Pacific Islands, its importance should not be 
exaggerated there either. Walter Fraser for instance points out the importance of the 
traditional religion in the unification of Tahitian polities, arguing that conversion to 
Christianity was only the last step in a long process that started decades earlier (Fraser 1985).  
While I would not doubt that all Polynesian leaders converted to Christianity out of 
their own convictions and were not forced to do so by missionaries – who, after all, were 
virtually powerless at their point of arrival and owed all influence they later obtained to local 
chiefs – Hawaiian leaders displayed an additional degree of native agency when they 
themselves made the decision to abolish the classical state religion in 1819 before any 
missionaries had set foot on the islands. This is another feature setting Hawaii apart from 
virtually all other Oceanian islands, where the classical religion was continuing to be practiced 
without major changes at the time the first Christian missionaries arrived. 
If the ABCFM mission had not been successful, the Kingdom would most likely have 
developed a new syncretistic state religion based on the veneration of the deified Kamehameha 
I, as it was already in the making in the early 1820s (Charlot 1985: 5-7). In this context it is 
very interesting to note how this later resurfaced in a further syncretised form during the 
reigns of Kamehamheha V and Kalākaua, both only nominally Christians, who emphasised the 
hagiography of Kamehameha I as the founding father of the nation; Kamehameha V by creating 
the Royal Order of Kamehameha I in 1865 and Kamehameha Day as a new national holiday in 
1871, and Kalākaua by having the above-mentioned statue of Kamehameha I erected in 1883.  
Furthermore, Kalākaua was also engaged in exploring alternative spiritual identities for 
the Hawaiian state in Asia, which makes the previously mentioned non-Christian examples of 
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state modernisation especially relevant. During his visits Kalākaua showed marked interest in 
Shinto, Buddhism and Islam, and especially the way such non-Christian religions could be used 
in successful state modernisation while simultaneously strengthening the respective native 
dynasties. Charlot notes that “[i]n Meiji Japan, which greatly impressed Kalākaua, such a 
religious tradition [divinity of the imperial dynasty] was being used as the ideological basis for 
the modernization of the country, demonstrating that the adoption of Christianity was not 
necessary for that process” (Charlot 1985: 62 n60). It remains a matter of speculation what 
long-term implications for the Hawaiian state would have arisen out of these ideas of Kalākaua, 
given the increasing number of Shintoism-practicing Japanese immigrants to the Hawaiian 
Islands in the 1880s and 1890s.162  In fact, at their arrival in Honolulu Harbour in 1885, 
Japanese immigrants greeted the King with gestures of religious devotion due to an emperor 
(Field 1937: 220).163 Kalākaua displayed similar interests in Buddhism, of which he 
participated in ceremonies with King Chulalongkorn in Siam (Armstrong 1977:129, 133), and 
Islam, the teachings of which were discussed with Maharajah Abu-Bakar of Johore and Khedive 
Tevfīk of Egypt (ibid 180, 189; Allen 1994: 122).   
Even within a framework of Christianity, there was ample space for asserting native 
agency against overbearing missionary conduct. The multiplicity of available Christian 
denominations interested in mission work enabled native rulers to play them off against one 
another if one threatened to become too dominant. Such a strategy was used by Kamehameha 
IV, when he converted to Anglicanism, which was theologically more compatible with a 
                                                 
162
 An interesting vision of a non-Christian statecraft synthesis for Hawai‘i in that sense, albeit a fictional one, is 
provided by Richard Ziegler and Patrick Patterson in their speculative history Red Sun, which features a scene of 
Shinto-Hawaiian syncretism in a fictional restored Hawaiian Kingdom under Japanese protection during World War 
II (Ziegler and Patterson 2001: 130-135). 
163
 Interestingly, under the impression of American indoctrination, George Washington was elevated to a Shinto 
deity by Hawai‘i-based Japanese congregations in the twentieth century (“Encyclopaedia of Shinto” website 
<http://eos.kokugakuin.ac.jp/modules/xwords/entry.php?entryID=342>). It remains another matter of speculation 
whether Kamehameha I and his successors would have been similarly deified and worshipped in Shinto shrines if 
the US occupation had not taken place. 
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Polynesian monarchy than the austere New England Calvinism of the ABCFM. Furthermore, by 
taking the initiative to invite an Anglican mission to Hawai‘i, Alexander Liholiho created a de-
facto state church the Hawaiian ali‘i could control because it was established exclusively on 
their terms.  
Quite similar to Kamehameha IV’s switch from Calvinism to Anglicanism were the 
policies of George Tupou I of Tonga, who also wished to remain Christian but escape from 
missionary dominance (Laux 2001: 131). Tupou had less theological issues with the Wesleyans 
than Alexander Liholiho had with the ABCFM, even though Tupou I also relaxed Calvinistic 
strictures in the 1860s, for instance unbanning traditional dances and other pre-Christian 
customs (Lātūkefu 1875b: 32; 1974: 187-188). Most important, however, was to escape from 
the bureaucratic structures of the Wesleyan mission headquartered in Sydney, which did not 
want to relinquish control to a Tongan-based church organisation. Tupou I thus founded an 
independent Wesleyan church as a national church of Tonga, while outlawing and persecuting 
the Sydney-based missionary church (ibid: 105-108). As we will see in chapter six, it was 
indirect influence from Hawai‘i in the 1850s that convinced Tupou I to be more assertive 
towards the missionaries.  
 
State Symbols: Coats of Arms and Flags  
 
A good assessment of the importance of Christianity in Polynesian statecraft can be 
made by comparing the coats of arms and seals of the nineteenth-century Polynesian 
kingdoms. Interestingly, the Fijian, Samoan and Tongan coats of arms contain predominantly 
Christian and/or culturally Western iconography, such as doves of peace, anchors, crosses and 
swords, with only a few symbols having local relevance such as the palm trees in the Fijian and 
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Fig.5.14: Coat of Arms of the Kingdom of Fiji. 
Adopted by King Cakobau in 1871. Enclosed in 
letter from Fijian minister of Foreign Affairs to 
his Hawaiian colleague, 12 June 1871. Hawai‘i 
State Archives. Copyright expired. 
Fig. 5.15: Seal of the Taimua and Government 
of Samoa. Adopted in 1873. On a letter signed 
by Le Mamea to the British consul, 19 
February 1877. Archives New Zealand, 
Wellington. Copyright expired. 
Fig. 5.16: Coat of Arms of Tonga. Adopted 
by King George Tupou I in 1875. Mounted 
on gate of the Palace grounds, Nuku‘alofa. 
Taken by author in 2005. 
Fig. 5.17: Coat of Arms of the Hawaiian Kingdom. 
Enclosed in correspondence from French consul to 
foreign ministry in Paris. C. 1844. French Diplomatic 
Archives, La Courneuve. Copyrighe expired. 
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Samoan coats of arms, or none at all, as in the Tongan one [see figs. 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16]. The 
displayed mottos are all making reference to God, either directly quoting from the Bible, as the 
Fijian Rerevaka Na Kalou Ka Doka Na Tui [“Fear God and Honour the King,” 1 Peter 2:17] and 
the Latin Omnia ad Deo Gloriam [“All for the Glory of God,” 1 Corinthians 10:31], on Sāmoa’s 
coat of arms, or using a Christian reference to highlight the country, as in the Tongan Koe ‘Otua  
Mo Tonga Ko Hoku Tofi‘a [“God and Tonga are my inheritance”].  
 This stands in striking contrast with the Hawaiian Coat of Arms [Fig. 5.17], on which 
the only Christian elements are the two small crosses in the centre of the crown and on top of 
it. The crown itself is arguably a culturally western symbol, but it is specifically the Hawaiian 
crown with its hybrid iconography, containing the kalo leaves as described above.  All other 
iconography, while arranged in a way of Western heraldry, is of classical Hawaiian origin. The 
motto, Ua Mau Ke Ea O Ka ‘Āina I Ka Pono [“The sovereignty of the land is perpetuated through 
righteousness”] are the words spoken by 
Kamehameha III upon the restoration of the 
Fig. 5.18: Coat of Arms of the Māori Kingdom. Adopted by 
King Tāwhiao. Reproduced from masthead of Kingitanga 
newspaper Te Paki o Matariki, 12 July 1915. Copyright 
expired. 
Fig 5.19: Coat of Arms of the Kingdom 
of Siam. Adopted by King 
Chulalongkorn in 1873. From Hugo 
Gerard Ströhl, Heraldischer Atlas 
(Stuttgart 1899). Copyright expired. 
Source: Wikipedia 
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Kingdom by Admiral Richard Thomas in 1843, and thus makes an important reference to the 
country’s history, but does not contain any explicit allusion to the Christian God. Of all 
nineteenth-century Polynesian coats of arms discussed so far, that of the Hawaiian Kingdom is 
thus most definitively culturally hybrid in character. The only other Polynesian state entity 
adopting a similarly hybrid emblem is the Māori Kingdom of Aotearoa, whose coat of arms is 
arguably even more native in its iconography, with the small Christian cross the only visible 
Western feature [fig. 5.18]. The one other contemporary non-Western coat of arms the 
Hawaiian one resembles in its hybridity is that of Siam [fig, 5.19], which similarly arranges 
items of traditional iconography in a pattern of Western heraldry, including a motto in Pali [the 
language of Theravada Buddhist scriptures, conceived here as the equivalent of Latin mottos in 
Western heraldry]. 
Arguably more important than coats of arms, the 
use of which was mostly limited to official documents 
and decorations of government buildings, were flags, 
which flew not only on government structures but often 
also on other important landmarks, as well as on ships, 
the standard means of transportation at the time. Again, 
the Hawaiian Kingdom stands out in being the first 
Pacific Island state to adopt its own flag, which was done 
by Kamehameha I in 1816 as mentioned in the previous 
chapter. With the British union flag in the upper corner, 
and the eight stripes of alternating white, red and blue 
colour, at first glance the Hawaiian flag [fig. 5.20] 
appears to be more similar to a British colonial flag than to one of an independent Polynesian 
Fig. 5.20: The Hawaiian flag, printed 
on the title page of Ka Nupepa Kuokoa, 
1 January 1861. Copyright expired. 
This was the first colour print of a flag 
in a newspaper worldwide. The 
inscription translates as “The 
Beautiful Flag of Hawai‘i. It shall fly 
forever.” 
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kingdom. However, upon a closer look, the flag is in fact an ingenious way of combining the 
flags of all the different Western nations whose ships had come to Hawai‘i at the time, namely 
Great Britain, the United States, France and Russia. Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, most recent research points to a possible symbolic reference of the three colours to 
the principal Gods of the classical Hawaiian religion.  
Most of the other nineteenth-century Polynesian states adopted flags as well, and 
thanks to international shipping, many of those were well known around the world at the time. 
For instance, an encyclopaedia of world flags originally published in several volumes in 1856 in 
Bavaria (reprinted as Siebmacher 1978) shows, under the somewhat misleading rubric of 
“Australia,” not only two flags of the British Australian colony of Victoria, but also variations of 
the Hawaiian flag, including the Hawaiian Royal Standard and the flag of the Kuhina Nui, as well 
as the flag of the 1834 United Tribes of New Zealand [plate 85 of the book, fig. 5.21]. The 
inclusion of the latter implies that the compilers were either unaware of, or did not recognise, 
the British claim of sovereignty deriving from the 1840 Waitangi treaty and continued to see 
Aotearoa as an independent entity. On the next page, one can see the flag of the Tahitian 
Kingdom under French protectorate, the flags of the three independent Leeward Society 
Islands Kingdoms, as well as of Rarotonga in the Cook Islands and of the Kingdom of Rurutu 
[erroneously labelled as part of the Cook Islands; see plate 86 of the book, fig. 5.21]. The third 
page of Oceanian flags shows an early version of the Tongan flag, the flag of ‘Uvea, an early flag 
of Samoa as well as that of Rimatara.164  
                                                 
164
 The publication of the encyclopaedia predates the formation of the Fijian and Samoan kingdoms of the 1870s, as 
well as the Tongan constitutional monarchy and designing of its modern flag in 1875, and hence I tread the 
representations of the supposed Samoan and Tongan flags, which I have seen nowhere else, with caution. All other 
flags represented match up with actual historical flags in museum displays, or depictions of them that I have seen 
elsewhere. 
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What is striking about most Polynesian flags is that they use mainly the colours of white 
and red, which are of traditional symbolism throughout Austronesia165] and often, but not 
always, combine those colours with elements of Christian iconography, such as crosses and 
stars. Hence, Polynesian flags are hybrid artefacts as well. As highly symbolic national 
representations, they were likely the material manifestations of Polynesian states finding the 
largest distribution worldwide, thanks to ships flying them, and reproductions in publications 
like the one mentioned.  
 
Material symbols of sovereignty: Currency and postage stamps  
 
While flags were important as symbols of a state, both domestically and especially to 
the outside world, the most widespread artefacts bearing the insignia of the state were 
                                                 
165
 See for example, the red-white themed flags of Indonesia, Singapore, and Madagascar for comparison.  
Fig. 5.21: Plates 85, 86 
and 87 of Die Wappen 
und Flaggen der 
Herrscher und Staaten 
der Welt, showing the 
flags of states in 
“Australia” (i.e. Oceania). 
Published in 1856. 
Copyright expired. 
Reprinted as Siebmacher 
1978. 
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currency and postage stamps.  Whereas these objects of material culture have been most 
thoroughly studied by specialist historians (numismatists and philatelists), their importance 
for national identity has also come to the attention of political scientists. In his recent 
dissertation on nation-building in East 
Timor, Jonathan Henick argues that 
“[m]odern nation-states frequently use 
stamps, coins, and paper currency to 
reproduce the symbols of the nation and 
to serve as constant and ever-present 
reminders to citizens of their national identity.” (Henick 2014: 66). Specifically regarding 
nineteenth-century non-Western states, the coins, banknotes and stamps of those states were 
manifestations of similitude, since they corresponded to Western norms for such artefacts. 
Often featuring portraits of rulers wearing Western-style uniforms, these items were crucial 
tools disseminating the image of the modernising state intended by this iconography into the 
society at large, as Peleggi argues for Siam (Peleggi 2002: 69-70). At the same time, these coins, 
notes and stamps were also manifestations of hybridity, as they featured inscriptions in the 
native language and sometimes also design elements deriving from native cultural concepts 
[fig. 5.22].  
Given the high expenses to mint a small amount of coins, most 
Polynesian states could not afford to produce their own coinage.  
Here again, the Hawaiian Kingdom stands out as an 
exception, as it first had Spanish Silver dollars – the 
common trade currency of the Pacific region – 
counterstamped with a K for Kamehameha and the 
Fig. 5.26: Siamese one siao [1/32 baht] coin dated 1903. Obverse 
showing King Chulalongkorn in uniform; reverse showing the 
guardian deity Phra Siam Thevathiraj in a pose modelled on that of 
Britannia on the contemporary British one penny coin shown on the 
right. Source: Wikipedia. 
Fig. 5.23: Spanish eight reales silver coin 
(commonly referred to as a “dollar” by English 
speakers) dated 1779, bearing an early 
nineteenth century Hawaiian counterstamp as 
well as several small Chinese counterstamps. 
Reproduced in Museo de Arte Oriental de 
Salamanca 2008: 99. 
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denomination 1 D for ‘akahi Dālā [“One Dollar”] in a wreath [fig. 5.23].  Around the same time, 
Kauikeaouli had a copper hapa haneri [“one hundredth,” i.e. one 
cent] minted in 1847 [Fig. 5. 24], in accordance with a provision 
in the 1846 organic act, which otherwise specified the Spanish 
American silver denominations as the Kingdom’s standard 
currency.166  
Almost four decades later, when the booming sugar industry had made the country 
comparatively wealthy, King Kalākaua had a series of silver coins, corresponding to U.S. size 
and weight standards, minted in 1883 [fig. 5.25]. 
Showing the monarch’s portrait and the Hawaiian coat 
of arms, these coins were clearly intended to send a 
message both to the Kingdom’s inhabitants and foreign 
visitors alike that Hawai‘i was a sovereign country with 
a strong monarchy, just like the new ‘Iolani Palace and 
the Kamehameha statue that were erected around the 
same time. The silver set was only the first step in a plan 
to replace all foreign coins in circulation in the Kingdom 
at the time with a genuine Hawaiian currency. In 1886, 
the Hawaiian government decided to have a set of gold 
coins [2½$, 5$, 10$ and 20$] struck, but due to the 
bayonet coup in mid-1887, this was never carried out. In 
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 1846 Hawaiian Organic Act, Part 3, Chapter 4, Section 1. 
Fig. 5.24: Hawaiian hapa haneri coin 
dated 1847. Coin from author’s 
collection. 
Fig. 5.25: Hawaiian silver coin set, dated 1883, 
consisting of ‘umi keneta/one dime, hapahā 
[quarter], hapalua [half] and ‘akahi dālā [one 
dollar]. Portrait of King Kalākaua on the 
obverse, Hawaiian coat of arms on the reverse. 
Coins from author’s collection. 
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1892, Queen Lili‘uokalani’s government ordered the minting of a new series of one, five and ten 
cent coins of copper and nickel, but the 1893 overthrow prevented the order from being put in 
effect (Kuykendall 1967: 93).  
The only other Pacific state that had concrete plans to mint its own coins was the 
Kingdom of Fiji, whose newly constituted government in late 1871 planned to have a complete 
series of one dollar, 50, 25, 12½ and 6¼ cents pieces in silver, and a one cent coin in copper 
minted, following the Spanish American system like in the Hawaiian Islands (Crane 1938: 116; 
Derrick 1950: 209). However, the instability of the Fijian government prevented this from ever 
being carried out.  
It was in the production of 
government-issued bank notes that 
Fiji actually preceded Hawai‘i, since in 1871, the Fijian treasury issued a series of notes in large 
[50$, 25$, 10$, 5$ and 1$] and small [50c, 25c and 12½c] denominations, the former being 
labelled in English, the latter in Fijian [fig. 5.26].  The Hawaiian treasury started issuing its own 
banknotes [certificates of deposit] in 1878 and 1880 in the denominations of 10, 20, 50, 100 
and 500 dollars [fig. 5.27]. The third Polynesian state to issue paper money in the nineteenth 
century was the Māori Kīngitanga, whose national bank, the Peeke o Aotearoa, issued a one 
Fig. 5.26: Fijian treasury notes of one dollar (left) and 25 cents/dua na silini [“one shilling,” referring to the equivalent in British 
sterling currency that native Fijians were apparently more familiar with than Spanish American dollar currency], dated 187_, with 
last digit left to be entered upon issuing. The letters C.R. stand for Cakobau Rex [Latin for “King Cakobau”]. Copyright expired. 
Originals in National Library of Australia. 
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pound note [based on the British sterling currency then used in New Zealand] in the 1880s 
(Park 1992) [fig. 5.32]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.28: Kotahi Pauna [One Pound] note of the Peeke o Aotearoa [Bank of Aotearoa] 
of King Tāwhiao, undated [c.1880s]. Original in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
exhibition room, Wellington. Photo by author. 
Fig. 5.27: Hawaiian Treasury Certificate of Deposit of ten dollars; printed in 
1880. Labellling mainly in English but value of ‘umi [ten] provided in Hawaiian 
on the sides. Copyright expired. Original in Hawaii State Archives. 
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Hawai‘i once more was first in the Pacific, and among all non-Western states, to issue 
postage stamps, starting in 1851, barely a decade after stamps were first invented in the United 
Kingdom in 1840. The first issue was labelled in English only and thus apparently aimed mainly 
to be used by local haole residents, but 
dozens of issues with Hawaiian or bilingual 
captions and showing portraits of members 
of the royal family followed during the 
following five decades [fig. 5.29].  Other 
non-Western states began issuing stamps in 
the following decades, starting with Japan in 1871. Unlike other non-Western states that 
introduced the standard European pattern of featuring their ruler’s portrait, Japan considered 
the emperor’s image too sacred for such purposes and from 1874 included the imperial 
chrysanthemum crest on their stamps instead. Siam started issuing stamps in 1883, Johor in 
1891 and Ethiopia in 1894, to cite a few other examples [fig. 5.30].  Around the same time the 
other still independent Polynesian states began producing postage stamps as well, starting 
with the Fijian Kingdom in 1871. In 1877, a private postal service started issuing stamps in 
Sāmoa, and Samoan stamps bearing the portrait of Malietoa Laupepa followed in 1892. King 
Fig 5.29: Hawaiian postage stamps, from left to right: Two cents 
of the first series dated 1851; two cents dated 1861 showing 
King Kamehameha IV; 2 cents dated 1886, showing King 
Kalākaua. Source: Wikipedia and author’s own collection. 
Fig. 5.30: First stamp issues by selected non-Western states: From left to right: Japanese 48 mon [pre-yen currency unit] 
stamp dated 1871; Japanese 1 sen stamp dated 1874 featuring the chrysanthemum as the symbol of the Emperor; Siamese one 
sik [1/16 Baht] stamp showing a portrait of King Chulalongkorn dated 1884; Johor stamp of 6 cents libelled trilingually in 
Malay, English and Chinese and showing a portrait of Sultan Abu Bakar dated 1891; Ethiopian 4 guerche [1/5 birr] stamp 
showing a portrait of Emperor Menelik II. Sources: Wikipedia and author’s own collection. 
238 
 
George Tupou I of Tonga issued his first stamp series [labelled in English] in 1886, followed by 
a bilingual one in 1892 [fig. 31].  
 
 
Print Culture and the creation of “Imagined Communities” 
 
While the objects mentioned in the previous two sections are symbols of state 
sovereignty, a political entity needs more than just a government producing such symbols in 
order to be recognisable as a nation-state, namely a national population and a defined territory. 
While the second will be mentioned below, I will first discus the importance of populations 
having a national consciousness, and how this was played out in the hybrid states of nineteenth 
century Oceania. 
In his seminal work Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson makes the argument 
that the development of printed matter in a standardised language is one of the key factors in 
the building of modern nations, since it promotes the idea of an imaginary community of 
readers and writers of this language (Anderson 1991: 33-46). This is well applicable to the 
development of national consciousness of the European peoples engaged in the creation of the 
prototypical “national state” in the early modern age, which happened simultaneously with the 
spread of modern printing. As far as non-Western states in the nineteenth century are 
concerned, printing technology was one of the most important technical tools that spread along 
with the European model of the state.   
Fig. 5.31: First stamp issues of other Pacific states, from left to right: Fijian 1 penny [overprinted two cents; the letters 
CR standing for King Cakobau, cf. fig. 5.30] dated 1871; Five shillings stamp issues by the private Samoan postal 
service Express Mail, dated 1877; Samoan stamp valued 2½ pence, showing the portrait of King Malietoa Laupepa, 
dated 1892; Tongan one penny stamp showing the portrait of King Tupou I labelled in English dated 1886; Tongan 1 
shilling stamp of the second bilingual series dated 1892. Sources: Wikipedia and author’s own collection. 
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In all of the non-Western states, the introduction of Western print technology, or of 
writing in general for those that did not have a writing system before the encounter with the 
West, played a major role in the transformation from traditional polity to modern nation-state. 
More often than not, the initial agents disseminating this technology were Christian 
missionaries, most prominently those of the London Missionary Society (LMS) who were active 
in places like Tahiti and the other Society Islands, (Gunson 1978), Samoa (Robson 2009), 
Madagascar (Brown 2006: 133-146) and China (Reed 2004: 40-41), as well as those of the 
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions who were active in the Hawaiian 
archipelago  and from there in various eastern Micronesian islands (Loomis 1970), in Siam 
(Thanet 2009: 422), China (Reed 2004: 30) and in the Cherokee Nation (Robinson 2007). Even 
when the missionaries encountered no significant interest in their religion, like in Siam and 
China, the print technology introduced by them had a major impact on the emergence of a 
public sphere, the development of a national language and ultimately very dynamic native-
owned printing industries in both countries (Thanapol 2009; Thanet 2009; Reed 2004).  Also, 
Westerners often started English-language presses in the main port towns or other commercial 
centres such as in Honolulu (Chapin 1996: 19-22), Levuka and Apia (Ralson 1978: 184-185), 
Antananarivo (Brown 2006: 194), Bangkok (Thanapol 2009: 373), Shanghai (Reed 2004: 52) 
and Nagasaki (Huffman 1997: 26ff).  
The situation was slightly different in Japan, where during the Tokugawa shogunate 
Christianity was strictly banned, and thus missionaries, although later during the Meiji era 
active to some extent with very moderate success, played no central role in the technological 
modernisation of Japanese printing. It also needs to be pointed out here that unlike most other 
non-Western civilisations,  Sinic civilisation had invented its own printing technology centuries 
earlier, so that changes brought by the introduction of industrial printing in the nineteenth 
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century were less revolutionary in China, Korea and Japan than they were in other non-
Western countries. Especially in Japan during the Tokugawa era, the dissemination of printed 
texts and images among a wide range of people was much further advanced than in most other 
parts of the non-Western world (Berry 2006). 
Nonetheless the introduction of highly mechanised and industrial forms of printing 
changed the nature of language use everywhere, no matter the previous level of technology.  
Newspapers, the first type of mass media, dramatically changed the dynamics of written 
language by providing new texts to be read by the general public on a very frequent [weekly or 
daily] basis. One of the longest-standing effects of these social developments, in combination 
with a simultaneously occurring modernisation of the state, was the creation of standardised 
“national languages,” in which both official documents and private media were composed 
(Anderson 1991: 43-45).   
This was most visible for countries with no previous widespread writing systems such 
the Pacific Islands, where missionisation in each archipelago created a standardised written 
and printed language in the earlier part of the nineteenth century (Lingenfelter 1967; 
Parsonson 1967). The case was similar in the Cherokee nation, where the invention of a 
distinctive syllabary script for the hitherto only spoken Cherokee language enabled the 
production of a national print language, including what was most likely the first newspaper in 
any non-Western language worldwide, the ᏣᎳᎩ ᏧᎴᎯᏌᏅᎯ/Cherokee Phoenix [1827-1830] 
and in Madagascar, where the Romanisation of the Merina dialect of the highlands used by the 
LMS in its Bible translation became, as standard Malagasy, the national language of the country 
(Brown 2006: 139, 218). Even in a state with an advanced native printing culture like Japan, 
the creation of a standardised national Japanese language only occurred during the Meiji 
period with its political and technological innovations (Howard 2002: 63; Yeounsuk 2010). 
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Even in European colonies, where there was no native government consciously 
promoting a nation-building program, industrialised print culture, especially newspapers, 
played a major role in the development of national consciousness that would come to full 
fruition in anti-colonial nationalist movements later during the twentieth century, such as in 
the future Indonesia (Ahmat 1995), in Vietnam (McHale 2004) and in Fiji [where a native-
language news press only emerged after British colonisation]. 
Since virtually none of the languages in the insular Pacific had an indigenous writing 
system,167 the impact of literacy and print culture on the formation of national consciousness 
was likely of even greater importance there than in most other non-Western societies.  While in 
most of the latter, literacy even in their own traditional writing systems was a matter of the 
elites and remained so for most of the nineteenth century, the introduction of the written word 
to Polynesia quickly affected the entire society. The emphasis of evangelical protestant 
theology on the printed scriptures to be read by everybody, combined with the fact that 
Polynesian societies were comparatively small in size and relatively stratified ensured a rapid 
alphabetisation of the island peoples, which very quickly became almost universally literate. 
Parsonson (1967) thus speaks of a “literate revolution.”168 Nineteenth-Century literary 
production in Pacific Islands languages thus rivals if not surpasses that of many Asian or 
African languages, despite the much higher numbers of speakers of the latter. 
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 There was a hieroglyphic writing system on Rapa Nui known as rongorongo, but its meaning and relation to the 
spoken language is not well understood. German linguist Thomas Barthel (1993) argues that there is evidence for 
rongorongo to be not a local Rapanui invention but originating in central Polynesia where it was subsequently 
abandoned. 
168
 While I like Parsonson’s term “literate revolution,” I strongly disagree with his assessment that literacy was 
believed to be a “magical” key to Western pre-eminence and did not fulfil its promise, which I would consider a 
very orientalising interpretation [remindful of the one on Captain Cook being a God]. Rather, the tremendous 
success stories of native Polynesian literacy rates rising from zero to among the highest in the world within a few 
decades is “revolution” enough, and furthermore, its long-term impact can be seen even today, as in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, independent Polynesian nations like Tonga, Sāmoa and Tuvalu still have the highest 
literacy rates among countries with comparable levels of development. 
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For Hawai‘i, this is well attested by primary source evidence. As early as the 1830s, 
ABCFM missionary wife Laura Judd mentioned that the literacy rate of the Hawaiian Kingdom 
was only surpassed by those of Scotland and the New England states of the US (cited in 
Nogelmeier 2010: 71), and four decades later, visiting Baltic-German Count Reinhold Anrep-
Elmpt described how he saw virtually everyone in Hawai‘i literate (Anrep-Elmpt 1885: 61, 
111). The sheer amount of print materials produced in the Hawaiian language is enormous. An  
incomplete  bibliography published in the late 1970s lists 654 known volumes published 
between 1822 and 1899 (Judd et al. 1978), whereas a more recent comprehensive bibliography 
of Hawai‘i-related materials includes 1,000 volumes in Hawaiian during the same period, 
including government documents and broadsheets (Forbes 1999-2003). Furthermore, between 
1834 and the turn of the twentieth century, seventy-five different Hawaiian-language 
newspapers, most of them weeklies, a few of them dailies, appeared (Mookini 1974). 
Altogether, several hundred thousand pages were printed in the Hawaiian language, with 
between a few hundred and several thousand copies each. It not only appears that this corpus 
far exceeds anything printed during the same period in other Polynesian languages, as well as 
in all indigenous languages of the Americas (Nogelmeier 2010: 59), but in my own estimate, it 
is likely to constitute the largest body of printing in any non-European language written in the 
Roman alphabet during the nineteenth century.  
 Print production in several other Polynesian languages is quite impressive in volume as 
well. The second-largest corpus of nineteenth-century Polynesian-language newspapers is that 
of Aotearoa. According to an online database169 there were thirty titles of newspapers in Māori 
published between 1842 and 1900. Apparently there existed a very vibrant literary culture, 
aided by the fact that unlike other Polynesians, Māori lived scattered over a huge landmass, 
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 <http://www.nzdl.org/cgi-bin/library.cgi?gg=text&c=niupepa&a=d&cl=CL1> [accessed 10 April 2016] 
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which made writing a welcome tool to facilitate long-distance communication, and thus the 
various papers certainly contributed to the formation of a Māori national consciousness. On the 
other hand, the early presence of the British colonial settler state, which itself used Māori-
language newspapers such as Te Karere Maori to disseminate its propaganda, made it much 
harder to use literacy and print-culture as a tool to establish a Māori nation-state, even though 
the Kīngitanga vigorously attempted to do so with some success, including its mouthpiece 
newspapers Te Hokioi [1862-63] and Te Paki o Matariki [1892-1935] (Curnow et al. 2002; 
Paterson 2006, 2010, 2013).   
In Tahiti, the London Missionary Society (LMS) produced some small periodicals in the 
1830s and 1840s, while a more substantial native-language press emerged only during the 
French protectorate and colonial periods, notably the weekly one-page newspaper Te Vea 
Tahiti (1850-1859), but overall, it remained quite limited throughout the 19th century. 
Similarly, in Sāmoa, the LMS started printing its paper O Le Sulu Samoa in 1839, which was 
irregularly continued in different formats throughout the century. In Tonga, native-language 
papers started in the 1870s, including the government monthly Koe Boobooi (1875-1877) as 
well as the independent Niu Vakai in the 1880s (Barney 1974). Fijian-language newspapers 
started only with the publication of Na Mata by the British colonial government in 1884. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, newspapers appeared in Rarotongan (Cook Islands 
Māori) as well.170  
Despite the smaller amount of print matter produced in comparison to Hawai‘i, the 
process of language standardisation worked similarly and contributed to the formation of 
distinct national identities in the other archipelagos as well. Especially in Western Polynesia, 
where communities speaking a greater variety of languages and dialects had interacted with 
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 For a comprehensive list of newspapers published in Oceania during the nineteenth century, see appendix 3 at the 
end of this dissertation. 
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one another for centuries, the creation of three major literary languages [Samoan, Tongan and 
Fijian] contributed to the consolidation of national identities for each of the three larger 
archipelagos, each of 
which became coterminous with nation-state building projects towards the end of the century. 
This was most striking in Fiji, where the dialect of an influential but relatively small community 
in the Rewa delta region and adjacent islands, already used as a lingua franca in eastern Fiji 
before Western contact, became the literary language for the entire archipelago (Croasdell 
2001: 18). Due to particular circumstances a few smaller islands [Niue, ‘Uvea, Futuna and 
Rotuma], ended up with their own literary languages and hence developed distinct national 
identities [map 5.1]. It is striking how political boundaries in Western Polynesia today largely 
correspond to these literary language spheres created in the nineteenth century. 
Map 
5.1 
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Returning to the Hawaiian Islands, the importance of literacy and print production for 
the elevated political status of the Hawaiian Kingdom was already pointed out by nineteenth-
century Hawaiian historian Samuel Mānaiakalani Kamakau when commenting on the Hawaiian 
exhibit at the 1867 world fair already mentioned in chapter four: 
Ua hoʻopāhaʻohaʻo  ʻia ko lākou manaʻo me ka ʻōlelo iho, he aupuni a he lāhui ʻai kanaka ko ke 
aupuni Hawaiʻi, aia kā, he rumi ko lākou, a i ka nānā ʻana i nā mea i hana ʻia ma ke aupuni 
Hawaiʻi, he ʻaʻahu hulu manu. He lei hulu manu a me kēlā mea, kēia mea i hana ʻia i ka wā 
kahiko a me nā mea a pau i hana ʻia i kēia wā ma nā mea ulu, ke kōpaʻa, ka malakeke, ka raiki, 
ke kope a me ke ʻano o nā mea i hana; ʻaʻole i hoʻopāhaʻohaʻo ʻia ko lākou manaʻo, akā, i ka ʻalo 
ʻana i ke keʻena waihona palapala o ke aupuni Hawaiʻi, ua hoʻomaka ʻia nā buke, mai ke kumu 
mua o ka ʻike o ka pīʻāpā, a nā buke liʻiliʻi, a nā buke nui, a nā baibala, a nā buke nūpepa e 
hoʻomaka ana i Ka Lama Hawaiʻi, a me Ke Kumu Hawaiʻi, a hiki i Ke Au ʻOkoʻa a me Ke Kūʻokoʻa; 
mai nā buke hoʻonaʻauao a hiki i nā palapala ʻāina, mai nā kumukānāwai a hiki i nā kānāwai, a 
ua piha ke keʻena waihona palapala Hawaiʻi mai luna a lalo. Kāhuli aʻela ka haku ʻōnohi o ka 
poʻe naʻauao hohonu o ka ʻāina a ka naʻauao i hoʻokumu ai ʻo ʻEuropa me ka ʻōlelo iho, aia ka 
ʻāina ʻai kanaka i kapa ʻia i mua, a ʻo ka ʻāina nona ka mālamalama i hope.171 
More recently, the important role of print culture for the formation of Hawaiian national 
consciousness and for the development of native intellectual history has been highlighted in 
the research of Noenoe Silva (2008), Kamana Beamer (2008, 2014), Puakea Nogelmaier (2010) 
and Tiffany Ing Tsai (2014). Similarly, political scientist P. Kalawai‘a Moore has underlined the 
crucial importance of this process of national consciousness formation for state-building In the 
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 “Their mind has been bewildered by the talk that the Hawaiian kingdom was a nation of cannibals, but they have 
a room [at the exposition], and when they look at the things made in the Hawaiian Kingdom, there is a feather cloak. 
There is a feather garland, and various items made in the olden times, and all the things that are being made today, 
agricultural products like sugar, molasses, rice, coffee and the way the items were made; their mind was not 
bewildered, but nearby is the library room of the Hawaiian Kingdom, beginning with the books, from the first origin 
of knowledge of the alphabet to small books, to large books, to Bibles and newspapers, beginning with Ka Lama 
Hawaii and Ke Kumu Hawaii, all the way to Ke Au Okoa and Ke Kuokoa, from textbooks to maps, from the 
constitutions to the laws, and the Hawaiian library room is full from bottom to top. Then the eyeballs of the people 
with the deep knowledge of the land where knowledge was founded, i.e. Europe, turn around, and they say, the land 
called a land of cannibals is ahead, while the land of knowledge is behind.” Kamakau in Ke Au Okoa, 23 Sept 1869, 
p. 1. Reprinted in Ke Aupuni Moi, p. 311-12. 
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case of Hawai‘i, since “[n]ationalism as an awareness of a nation of Hawaiian people [was] later 
channelled into a state based nationalism after the creation of a constitutional monarchy […] 
and formal recognition of the Hawaiian State […]” (Moore 2010: 205-06). Moore’s analysis 
resembles that of ‘Umi Perkins, who sees the development of modern nationalism in nineteenth 
century Hawai‘i as aligned with similar developments in Europe during the same time:  
As with Hegelian and Wagnerian pre-unification ‘German’ notions of patriotism and the 
Vaterland, Hawaiian identification was originally with the specific place but evolved in the 
nineteenth century to an identification with the nation as a whole. The shift toward a 
‘Hawaiian’ national identification was a response to threats against that nationhood (Perkins 
2013: 73). 
 
Similar to the German case mentioned by Perkins, literacy and print culture also facilitated the 
writing down and publication of “national” histories and myths that were thereby refashioned 
as national “classics.” Among the very outstanding examples are Kamakau’s monumental 
historical accounts, and the publication of the Kumulipo, a classical Hawaiian cosmogonic 
chant, by King Kalākaua in 1889, and  countless other classical Hawaiian mo‘olelo that were 
published and re-published in various versions in Hawaiian newspapers.172 Similar cases of 
using writing and printing to re-record and publish classical materials and create national 
historical narratives can be found in some other Polynesian societies such as the publication of 
the classical history of Mangareva by Matia Puputauki (1852) or the manuscript history by 
mid-nineteenth century Malagasy historian Raombana (Ayache 1979). 
While the model of creating imagined communities sharing a standardised printed 
national languages in order to consolidate nation-states works well for most non-Western 
states discussed here, three important divergences from Anderson’s model can be observed in 
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 See for instance the recent study of the publication history of the mo‘olelo of Hi‘iakaikapoliopele by Ku‘ualoha 
Ho‘omanawanui (2014). 
247 
 
nineteenth century Oceania. First, there were several instances where language 
standardisation was not coterminous with the formation of modern states, i.e. several states 
formed within one language sphere. This is most evidence in the Tahitian literary language 
sphere, which greatly exceeded the Tahitian state, and six different states [Tahiti, Huahine, 
Raʻiātea, Porapora, Rimatara, Rurutu, Rapa] used Tahitian as their official language [see map 
3.1 in chapter 3]. Similar developments took place in the Rarotongan-language sphere, where 
several small chiefdoms formed state-like political structures, and in Fiji, in which initially 
several states emerged, all using standard Fijian as their official languages, as has been 
mentioned in chapter three.  
Such a situation was not unique to Polynesia, however and could be found in many 
other part of the world. Within larger Austronesia, the many sultanates within the Malay 
language sphere come to mind, for instance. In Europe, Italy and Germany would be other 
major examples where “imagined communities” of standard language readers and writers 
predated political unification as a modern nation-state. German, for instance, had become a 
standardised print language in the 1500s through Martin Luther’s Bible translation - similar to 
the LMS Tahitian-language Bible and other missionary literature – but remained politically 
fragmented into multiple feudal states until most [but not all] parts of the German language 
sphere were politically unified as the German Empire in 1871. Since unification did eventually 
happen, and most “subnational” identities liked to the previous feudal states were quickly 
forgotten within a few generations, the German example confirms rather than contradicts 
Anderson’s thesis of the power of print language. Similarly, in the Polynesian cases of print 
language spheres that were not politically unified, there are indicators that political unification 
was well on the way or would have eventually followed if Western colonial intervention had 
not happened. In Fiji, political unification, at least in theory, happened shortly before 
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colonisation in 1871 and the several Rarotongan-speaking microstates formed a confederation 
in 1891 under a British protectorate. Similarly, without French colonial intervention, political 
unification of the Tahitian language community might have been achieved by the end of the 
century, since the process was already well on the way by the 1880s, with Rai’ātea and 
Porapora being ruled by junior lines of the Pomare dynasty, due to a policy of Queen Pomare IV 
to marry off her many children strategically.173 
Secondly, also diverging from the classical Andersonian model, Polynesian states in the 
nineteenth century countries all pursued a policy of bilingualism in their native language and 
English, due to the relative smallness of the native language communities and the prominent 
presence of Westerners in each country. Varying during different time periods, English was 
more or less favoured and sometimes actually preferred over the native language in the 
national education systems, such as in the latter era of the Hawaiian Kingdom, where by 1886 
the majority of public schools used English as the medium of instruction (Reinecke 1969: 70), 
as well as in Tonga, where the highest educational institution, Tupou College, was English-
medium as well (Campbell 2001: 95, 97). This was markedly different from the larger non-
Western countries such as Japan and Thailand, whose foreign settler populations were 
statistically minimal, and whose governments focused more exclusively on the standardised 
national language when modernising their educational systems (e.g. Wyatt 1969).174 In some of 
the smaller Polynesian states, the English-language press was arguably more important than 
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 In this context, it is interesting how the quite arbitrary decision by LMS to create a separate written language for 
Rarotongan early on, instead of using literary Tahitian like they did in the Austral and Tuamotu Islands [whose 
spoken languages do not diverge less from spoken Tahitian than Rarotongan or other Cook Islands dialects do], 
demarcated the Cook Islands from the 1830s on as a proto-nation distinct from that of Tahiti. The later colonial 
boundary between French and British colonial territories [presently the post-colonial nation-state of the Cook 
Islands and the French overseas entity of French Polynesia] only confirmed this division, but it was not at its origin. 
174
 Nevertheless, in both Siam and Japan, there was an important amount of English bilingualism as well, especially 
in the early modernisation phases. See for instance the importance of the English press in Bangkok, or the bilingual 
English and Japanese inscriptions on early Meiji era coinage and stamps. Similarly, the Kingdom of Madagascar 
also featured a prominent English press in Antananarivo. 
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the native one, as in Sāmoa, where an English-language settler press existed since the 1870s, 
and especially in Fiji, where newspapers in English, starting with the Fiji Times in 1869,175 
predated the native press by two decades.  
Third, diverging significantly from most contemporary states, the Hawaiian Kingdom’s 
citizenry comprised not primarily only natives and Westerners but also an increasingly large 
number of foreign immigrants from other parts of the world. Instead of developing into a 
typical Andersonian “imagined community” of nationals sharing the same language and culture, 
Hawai‘i was thus transforming progressively towards a multi-ethnic nation, prefiguring trends 
visible in most other states only a century later. The Kingdom’s last census report of 1890 lists 
40,622 aboriginal Hawaiians among a total of 48,107 subjects of the Kingdom, and 41,873 
resident aliens, primarily Chinese, Japanese and Portuguese nationals (Sai 2004: 63). The 
Hawaiian government and its loyal supporters among the public thus undertook various efforts 
to incorporate the newcomers into the national body politic. An unnamed editorialist, for 
instance, wrote in 1865:  
Iwaena o ka poe kuleana paa ma keia aupuni, aole makou makemake e ike he ili-keokeo a he 
ili-ulaula, aka he ili Hawaii ka pono. Aole Amerika; aole Enelani; aole Pake; aole Farani; aole 
Aferika; aka; he Hawaii wale no! Aole Akau, aole Hema, aole keokeo, aole ulaula, aole eleele; 
aka, he Hawaii wale no, Hawaii loa, Hawaii pau ole! (Ka Nupepa Kuokoa, 25 June 1865, p. 2)176 
 
Most Asian and European immigrants who decided to stay did indeed become loyal Hawaiian 
subjects. But the tiny yet influential American minority constantly caused problems because 
                                                 
175
 Besides the nineteenth-century Honolulu mission paper The Friend which is still published today as a newsletter 
of the Hawaiian United Church of Christ, and the Pacific Commercial Advertiser that arguably continues in the 
guise of the Honolulu Star-Advertiser, the Fiji Times is the only other nineteenth century Pacific Islands newspaper 
still published today. 
176
 “Among those who have permanent rights in this country, we do not want to see white skin and dark skin, but 
only Hawaiian skin. No Americans; no English; no Chinese; no French; no Africans; but only Hawaiians! No North, 
no South, no white, no brown, no black; but only Hawaiian, Hawaiian far and wide, Hawaiian forever!” Cited in 
Basham 2007: 228. I acknowledge Willy Kauai and Keao NeSmith for discussing the importance of this passage 
with me on multiple occasions. 
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many of them refused to assimilate and be loyal to the Hawaiian crown, and their unruly 
behaviour would eventually lead to the nation’s virtual destruction (Vann 1997).  
That all the naturalised subjects were to be considered Hawaiian, and encouraged to 
identify as such, however, did not necessarily mean that they were compelled to assimilate 
fully and give up their own native languages. Thus, besides the well-known Hawaiian- and 
English-language press, there exists also an important corpus of Hawaiian newspapers 
published in Chinese (starting in 1881), Portuguese (starting in 1882) and Japanese (starting in 
1892) (Chapin 1984), which is unique for 19th century Oceania but has scarcely been accounted 
for by scholars of the Hawaiian Kingdom yet. Furthermore, the increasingly multi-ethnic, multi-
lingual and multi-cultural nature of the Hawaiian state should caution us against seeing it 
through an ethnocentric lens that is uniquely focused on the aboriginal majority (Sai 2008a; 
Kauai 2014). This is especially important given that some of the most prominent advocates, 
proponents and implementers of Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism that will be discussed in the 
following chapter were not of aboriginal Hawaiian descent. 
  
Cartography and the creation of national “Geo-Bodies” 
 
As mentioned earlier in chapter two, one of the most defining qualities of the modern 
nation-state is its territorial boundedness. In the twentieth century, this was enshrined in the 
1933 Montevideo Convention, in which “defined territory” was one of the three qualifications 
of a state (Crawford 2007: 45-62). As a codification of customary international law, the 
convention reflected the completion of a process that had been in the making throughout the 
nineteenth century, at the end of which the entire world, at least in theory, was covered by 
states separated by boundaries, which was clearly not the case at the beginning of the century 
(Horowitz 2004: 476).  The delimitation of boundaries through surveying in order to create 
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territorially defined states was thus a major part of state modernisation throughout the world 
in the 1800s. 
Given this importance of territoriality, cartographic surveys using modern technology 
were undertaken in most of the countries mentioned in this chapter as an essential part of the 
modernisation process during the nineteenth century. However, the degree in which this 
process changed spatial conceptualisations of the state varied considerably, depending on the 
pre-existing situation.  
In states that traditionally had no concept of fixed territorial boundaries, modern-style 
surveying constituted a major innovation. In Siam Mapped (1994), Thai historian Thongchai 
Winichakul describes how under pressure by surrounding Western colonial powers to create 
clear borders between their colonies and the Thai state, the Siamese government started 
surveying its boundaries, in the process creating a territorially bounded “geo-body” of the 
nation. In stark contrast, in Japan spatial organisation with fixed territorial boundaries had 
existed for centuries, and modern surveying, as undertaken by pioneer surveyor Tadataka Inō 
in the early 1800s (Hoyanagi 1967) and later by surveying agencies of the Meiji government 
towards the end of the century was comparably less revolutionary, merely putting traditional 
boundaries on a geo-referenced grid and making maps more accurate in detail. Historical 
geographer Kären Wigen thus argues that Thongchai’s theoretical framework is only applicable 
in a limited sense to Japan, where something like geo-bodies, at least at the provincial level, had 
long been in existence (Wigen 2010: 121-125).  
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In Madagascar, while the densely 
populated core provinces of Imerina [i.e. the 
central highlands] were traditionally organized 
as delimited territories,177 most of the rest of the 
country was thinly populated and thus more akin 
to the then thinly populated states in Southeast 
Asia or the traditional states on the neighbouring 
African continent. The visualisation of the vast 
island as one “geo-body” on a map based on 
modern surveying thus most likely had a 
profound impact on the spatial perceptions of the 
Malagasy kingdom. From a picture of a governor 
of an 
outlying province posing in front of a printed map of the 
island [fig. 5.32] one can gather that in the late nineteenth 
century, maps of Madagascar were used as nation-building 
tools by the Malagasy government. Today, the Republic of 
Madagascar goes as far as using the outline of its map in its 
national seal [fig. 5.33], giving it an even more prominent 
position than the Thai map outlines mentioned above.  
 
As archipelagos, most Pacific nations have relatively natural boundaries – similar to 
Japan and Madagascar in that sense, but smaller in scale – and hence their national geo-body 
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 See for instance, the maps in Raison-Jourde 1991 on pages 43 and 70. 
Fig. 5.32: Governor Ramaka of 
Ambohimarina posing in front of a map of 
Madagascar, c. 1880s. Reproduced in 
Raison-Jourde 1991: unnumbered plate 
between p. 380 and 381. 
Fig. 5.33: current coat of arms of 
the Republic of Madagascar, in use 
since 1993. Source: Wikipedia. 
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did not necessarily have to be defined by survey lines. This was particularly true for the 
Hawaiian Kingdom, which had a very clearly defined territorial system of spatial organisation 
with fixed boundaries [palena] in place centuries before the Western encounter, as described in 
the previous chapter. Selective appropriation of surveying and cartography was thus not as 
revolutionary a concept in Hawai‘i either, but rather a way to create permanent records of a 
system already in place.  
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Maps of Hawai‘i from a perspective of the native land management system were 
produced as early as in the 1830s, in order to show boundaries and names of moku and 
ahupua‘a land divisions, as opposed to the charts made by Western visitors from an offshore 
perspective, focusing on harbours and landings (Fitzpatrick and Moffat 1986; Beamer 2008; 
see fig. 5.34). The introduction of the specialist technology of copperplate engraving by the 
Fig. 5.34: Map entitled Nā Mokupuni o Hawai‘i Nei [“The islands of our Hawaii”], drawn by S.P. 
Kalama. Hand-coloured copperplate engraving print, Lāhaināluna, 1837. Copyright expired. 
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ABCFM mission to the Lāhaināluna seminary on the island of Maui enabled the creation of a 
centre of map production there, which had no equivalent anywhere else in the Pacific including 
its north-eastern rim, producing numerous maps of both Hawai‘i and other parts of the world 
for instructional use in the Kingdom’s schools, and even a Spanish-language map of California 
for Mexican use (Forbes 2012: 168). The second stage of Hawaiian cartography begun with the 
creation of the Land Commission in 1845 and the subsequent complex process of land tenure 
reform known as the Māhele (Perkins 2006; Beamer 2008, Preza 2010). The creation of written 
land titles warranted the survey of many pieces of land, and thousands of survey sketches were 
created in the process, many of which are attached to awards issued by the Land Commission, 
others attached to reports of the Boundary Commission [formed in 1862 to clarify boundaries 
of konohiki titles issued by name only], and some are separately on file in the Hawai‘i Survey 
Fig. 5.35: Hawaiian Government Survey map of the Island of O‘ahu. Drawn by R. Covington. Dated 
1881. Copyright expired. Original in Hawai‘i State Survey Division. 
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Division (see also Fitzpatrick and Moffat 1995). In a third phase, the Ana ‘Āina Aupuni  Hawai‘i 
[Hawaiian Government Survey] was created in 1870 in order to undertake a systematic 
cadastral survey of the entire Kingdom as well as a hydrographical survey of the harbours 
essential for inter-island communication (Alexander 1889; Lyons 1903; Fitzpatrick and Moffat 
1994; fig. 5.35).  Maps of the Hawaiian Government Survey, at the cutting edge of technological 
modernity, were also featured in international exhibits, contributing to the self-representation 
of the Kingdom to the world as a modern nation (Greenlee 2015). 
As Beamer and Duarte (2009) point out, the maps created in those processes were 
based on traditional Hawaiian palena (boundaries of classical land divisions), and the 
surveyors merely recorded these boundaries through the new technology of the map. In an 
earlier thesis, Beamer described Hawaiian Kingdom cartographic practice as “mapping out pre-
existing usages of the land” (2005: 126), similar to mapping practices in early modern Europe, 
as opposed to the mapping of colonies to overwrite and thereby erase such pre-existing usages 
by native peoples.  
In the other island states of Polynesia, surveying and mapping enterprises during the 
nineteenth century were at their very beginning if existing at all. The Fijian Kingdom, during its 
short three years of existence attempted to copy the Hawaiian model to a large extent and 
created a Royal Commission to Quiet Land Titles, in order to examine land claims by foreign 
residents and confirm them through so-called Crown Grants (Routledge 1985: 161-2). Given its 
short time of existence and the overall political instability of the Fijian Kingdom, the 
commission never examined and surveyed more than minuscule selected areas of the 
archipelago.  Similarly in Sāmoa, during the Hawaiian Intervention in 1887, Hawaiian envoy 
John E. Bush drafted a “Temporary Scheme of Government for Samoa” which contained a 
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section proposing the creation of a land commission based on the Hawaiian model,178 but, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter, it came to no fruition, and like in Fiji, no systematic 
surveying was undertaken in Sāmoa prior to the colonial period. In Tonga, a substantial land 
reform was implemented in 1882, creating a three-tiered structure in which the King grants 
land to estate holders, who in turn are obligated to grant parcels of land to individual 
commoners (Maud and Sevele in Crocombe 1987: 121). While the land grants were recorded in 
writing, it appears that land surveying was only conducted in the twentieth century under the 
British Protectorate.   
The Hawaiian Kingdom was thus the only Polynesian state to map out its geo-body in 
the same sense that the larger non-Western states did during the same time. Having had a 
territorial spatial organisation with fixed boundaries since classical times, the Hawaiian Islands 
were in some way similar to Japan and other East Asian states, as in both cases geo-body 
formation was for the most part merely a matter of recording pre-existing usages.  
Returning to the Hawaiian Islands, it is interesting to observe that similar to the 
Siamese and Malagasy cases mentioned above, the cartographic geo-body of the Hawaiian 
archipelago also gained a symbolic value as an iconic outline of national identity. The outline of 
the eight islands, probably first popularised among the Kingdom’s subjects by Kalama’s 1837 
map and other similar Lāhaināluna prints, has become ubiquitous today as a symbol of local 
identity and as such is featured for instance on surf wear, as a car sticker and as a tattoo.  
 
  
                                                 
178
 Temporary Scheme of Government for Samoa. 21 June 1887. Folder 1887 Samoan Affairs , Hawn. Envoy to 
Samoa (Bush) Dispatches, June-August, FO&Ex, Hawaiʻi State Archives. This will be discussed in detail in chapter 
eight. 
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Networking between Non-Western States: Pan-Asianism and related movements 
 
As we have seen so far, during the nineteenth century most non-Western polities were 
compelled to undergo processes of modernisation and develop into nation-states largely based 
on the Western model, in order to achieve recognition by the Western hegemonic powers as 
co-equals in the international system. However, even if they modernised as profoundly as for 
example Meiji Japan and the Hawaiian Kingdom did, and achieved full parity in a legal and 
diplomatic sense, they were often still discriminated against because of their non-Western 
origins – the “stigma” argument made by Zarakol –, or simply out of racism for not being 
“white.” The latter could even be an issue for non-white settler states or ex-colonies such as 
Liberia and Haiti or Latin American nations whose elite was partly Native American or Mestizo 
(Schulz 2014).179 At the Versailles Peace Conference at the end of World War I, for instance, 
Japan’s delegation pressed for the inclusion of a prohibition of “racial discrimination” into the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, but the proposal was rejected by the overwhelming 
majority of Westerners at the conference (Aydın 2007: 141). 
In reaction to the ever increasing frustration with the arrogance and bigotry met by the 
West, one can observe the discourse of many leaders of modernising non-Western states 
shifting over the years from one of parity and similitude, through one of ambiguity and 
hybridity to one of civilizational difference, as reflected in the three quotes at the beginning of 
the chapter. This shift of discourse however, did not usually mean a rejection of Western 
technology and modernisation, but rather to separate the latter more consciously from 
Western culture and civilizational values and selectively appropriate modern technology and 
knowledge in order to advance within a framework based on traditional values. In an 
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 The latter was most likely also the main reason for the forceful dissolution and involuntary incorporation into the 
State of Oklahoma of the five autonomous Native American republics under US federal protectorate mentioned in 
chapter three and the rejection of their alternative proposal to merge together and join the union as the native-
majority “State of Sequoyah” in the early 1900s (Conley 2005: 197-202). 
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appropriately named essay “Modernization vs. Westernisation in the East,” Japanese scholar 
Hideo Kishimoto argued that “the East should be able to modernize their own culture 
independently from the western cultural influences. The modernization of genuine Eastern 
culture should be possible.” (Kishimoto 1963: 873) More assertively, in a seminal speech given 
in Kobe, Japan, in 1924, Hawaiian-educated Chinese statesman Sun Yat-sen,180 who had earlier 
in his life been an advocate of Christianising China, insisted on a fundamental civilizational 
difference between the West and the East, and called for all of the East to bond together in 
order to create a new world order to replace the then current Eurocentric one, as quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter. This insistence on civilizational difference from the West has since 
become commonplace among many non-Western political leaders and intellectuals, 
demonstrated for instance in today’s self-understanding of China as a “civilizational state” 
(Zhang 2012), or the concept of Russia’s distinct “Eurasian civilization” (Dugin 2014). 
In his 2007 book The politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia, Turkish historian Cemil Aydın 
provides a thorough global overview of Pan-Asian and Pan-Islamic thought during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Rather than merely basing their opposition to the West 
on a reactionary reassertion of native cultural identity, Aydın argues that many of the leading 
Pan-Asianist thinkers were actually embracing universalist humanitarianism as articulated by 
the Western Enlightenment, but at the same time pointing out the contradictions between the 
Western discourse of enlightened civilisation and its violent and disrespectful behaviour, based 
on raw power alone, towards the rest of the world. The above quoted speech by Sun Yat-sen, 
who earlier went through a period of fascination with Western cultural values but returned to a 
discourse of civilizational difference at the end of his life based on his experience with Western 
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 The profound importance of Sun Yat-sen’s Hawaiian education will be discussed in more detail in the concluding 
chapter nine. The exact date of the speech, on 28 November 1924, is also remarkable, as it coincides with the 
Hawaiian national holiday Lā Kū‘oko‘a [Independence Day], commemorating Hawaii’s recognition in 1843. 
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imperialism and discrimination against non-Western states and their citizens, gives a perfect 
example of these complexities of Pan-Asianist thought. 
As Aydın points out, two countries, Turkey and Japan, stand out as the globally leading 
non-Western powers during the late nineteenth and early nineteenth century, and both were at 
times looked upon as leaders of the non-Western world.  The Pan-Islamic movement, arising 
partly among Muslim Indians in opposition to the British Raj as well as other Muslims suffering 
from or threatened by Western colonial expansion, looked upon the Ottoman Empire as its 
potential leader. This was partly a projection by Islamic peoples as long as the Ottoman sultan 
held the Caliphate but at various times also actively promoted by the Ottomans themselves, for 
instance during World War I (Aydın 2007: 106-111). When in the aftermath of the lost war, 
Turkey embarked on a more radical Westernisation course and abolished the Caliphate in the 
1920s, it lost most of that appeal (Aydın 2007: 137-139), but Atatürk’s Turkish Republic 
remained an interesting example of successful modernisation among non-Western states. For 
instance, Turkey’s full international recognition, shared with Japan alone during the time, was 
duly acknowledged by Sun Yat-sen in his 1924 speech (Sun 2011: 83). 
More global in its reach as a model and potential leader of a global non-Western 
alliance, however, was Japan, which did not suffer from any internal troubles even remotely 
comparable to those of the Ottoman Empire, and which, unlike the latter, constantly increased 
its military strength. As a “success story” in that sense, Meiji Japan became quasi-universally 
acknowledged as the primary model of non-Western modernization.  In particular its 1905 
military victory over Russia [arguably not fully Western itself as debated above, but widely 
regarded as a Western “Great Power” by Westerners and non-Westerners alike at the time] had 
wide repercussions among non-Western intellectuals and political leaders throughout the early 
twentieth century (Aydın 2007: 71-92).  
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Even within the Islamic world, one could observe a shift from the moribund Ottoman 
Caliphate to the “Rising Sun” of Japan as the guiding model to be looked upon, for instance 
among Malay states such as the Sultanate of Johor mentioned above, or the Dutch-overruled 
Sultanate of Riau across the Singapore Strait (Andaya 1977). Leading intellectuals in Persia also 
looked to Japan as a model of modernisation, as German historian Anja Pistor-Hatam (1996) 
argues. Similarly, in the Ottoman Empire, many progressive-minded intellectuals who had 
turned away from Islamic traditionalism saw the Meiji Empire as a prototype for their own 
vision of modernity (Worringer 2004). In a comparable way, Malagasy scholar Faranirina 
Esoavelomandroso argues that both in late nineteenth century independent Madagascar and 
during the early French colonial period, Meiji Japan served as an inspirational model for 
Malagasy intellectuals (Esoavelomandroso 1988). 
While Japan, and to a more limited extent Turkey, were simultaneously seen as success 
models and leaders in a global alliance  of non-Western states, the discourse of pan-Asian 
advocates both within those countries and in the wider non-Western world oscillated between 
advocating an emulation of the West and insisting on civilisational difference. Ayşe Zarakol 
argues that similar to the later discourse of Atatürk’s Turkey, Japanese official discourse during 
Meiji era was mainly focused on the country’s successful modernization and international 
recognition, arguing that it should be a model for others to lead because it had moved more 
away from traditional civilisation than the rest of Asia (Zarakol 2011: 249). After a period of 
more assertive Asian identity in the context of the 1905 war against Russia, Japan’s 
government once more argued along the “Westernisation” line when allying with the Western 
European powers in World War I. But the disappointment at Versailles mentioned above let 
Japanese leaders rethink this Western orientation, and in the following decades Japanese policy 
became more focused on civilizational difference (Aydın 2007: 161-189).  
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Similarly ambiguous and oscillating was the place of the Japanese state itself in Japanese 
pan-Asianist discourse, as well as the balance between the ideals of pan-Asian solidarity and a 
more realist foreign policy based on power politics and opportunistic alliances. The latter at 
times turned public opinion against the government, for instance when Fascist Italy invaded 
Ethiopia in 1935, and the Japanese public was overwhelming in solidarity with Ethiopia, which 
it saw as a non-Western sister nation wronged by Western imperialism, while the Japanese 
government considered its Axis alliance with Italy geopolitically more important and declined 
to protest (Aydın 2007: 179).  Furthermore, while it is easy to rationalise Japanese belligerence 
against Western colonial powers during the Second World War as a Pan-Asianist campaign to 
free the East from Western domination, Japanese imperial ambitions at the expense of Korea 
and China are difficult to explain in terms other than Japanese expansionist aggression. 
Referring to the complexity of the issue, Indian historian Prasenjit Duara mentions “[t]hat 
Japan’s Pan-Asian civilizational discourse had a violent dimension is well known” but cautions 
that “the ideology itself cannot be dismissed merely as disguised imperialism.” (Duara 2001: 
111). 
The reason pan-Asianism, and particularly Japan’s role within that political philosophy, 
is important for this dissertation is that it both parallels, and is intertwined with, an earlier 
policy of Pan-Asia-Pacific regionalism by the Hawaiian Kingdom. Not only was the pan-
Asianism of early twentieth century Japan and Sun Yat-sen’s China predated by Hawaiian King 
Kalākauas’ 1881 suggestion for a confederation of Asian and Pacific states – an idea going back 
as far as the 1840s, as we will see in chapter six –, but the role the Hawaiian Kingdom played in 
Oceania throughout the second half of the nineteenth century could also be seen as a 
microcosmic mirror of the role of Imperial Japan in the non-Western world at-large during the 
early twentieth century. 
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Like in Japan, the policy of Hawaiian leaders shifted from one of similitude as a strategy 
to achieve parity, which predomininated in the middle of the century, to one of cultural 
assertiveness that gained ground towards the end of the century, especially during the reigns 
of Kamehameha V and Kalākaua.  I have already mentioned that both monarchs were only 
nominally Christians and supported the resurgence of classical Hawaiian ceremonial practices, 
while especially Kalākaua was exploring alternative spiritual identities for the Hawaiian state.  
At least under Kalākaua’s reign, this lead to changes in the country’s foreign policy, for 
instance when Kalākaua used not merely principles of international law but Hawaiian 
traditions in order to support the Hawaiian sovereignty claim over Midway atoll mentioned 
above. In the mid-1880s, Kalākaua also began writing official letters to fellow heads of state in 
Hawaiian and had an English translation attached, for instance to the President of Guatemala 
and to the Shah of Persia in 1886.181 Unlike those leaders who were usually fluent only in their 
native language and routinely needed translations into English or French done by interpreters 
in their foreign offices, Kalākaua was perfectly fluent in English. That he chose to author letters 
in his native language nonetheless, without a technical need to do so, testifies to his assertion of 
cultural difference from the Victorian mainstream, even though he was more familiar with it 
than any of his contemporary non-Western monarchs. 
 
Conclusion: Global non-Western Hybridity as a Context for Polynesian state-building 
 
In this chapter, I have discussed the issues faced by the nineteenth-century non-
Western polities in general, and Hawai‘i and other Polynesian states in particular, and their 
reactions to it in order to strengthen their standing and survive as sovereign nations if possible. 
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 Kalākaua to General Manuel L. Barrillos, President of the Republic of Guatemala, 30 June 1886; Kalākaua to 
Nasser Eddine Shainshah, Emperor of Persia, 30 July 1886. Copies of both in Miscellaneous Foreign 1886, FO&Ex, 
Hawai‘i State Archives. 
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This included the employment of similitude in order to achieve parity, and the resulting 
hybridity of their political institutions and their material and intellectual culture. In conclusion, 
I would argue that the creation of a successful hybrid political system was always a matter of 
combining traditional and modern features in a meaningful way, to secure political 
independence, internal stability, and economic prosperity while conserving unique cultural 
identity. Just like Japan did that most successfully in Asia, the Hawaiian Kingdom did it most 
successfully in Oceania. 
I have also discussed different and changing attitudes of non-Western leaders to 
Western influence, embracing it as a tool of modernisation, sometimes to the point of virtual 
Westernisation, or rejecting it in a conservative effort of self-strengthening without 
Westernising. Between such extremes, a balanced approach most non-Western nations 
eventually settled on in one way or another was to “modernise without to westernise”, and to 
use technological modernity to promote a geopolitical counter-movement to Western 
hegemony, most prominently known in the guise of Pan-Asianism.  
However, what is usually overlooked in histories of Pan-Asianism and other pan-
movements in non-Western societies is that in the Hawaiian Islands, another such non-
Western pan-ideology, pan-Oceanianism, emerged as early as the 1840s and 1850s, and thus 
predates any other such movements by several decades. Later during Kalākaua’s reign, this 
project actually merged with early Pan-Asianism to become a pan-Asia-Pacific project. It is thus 
now appropriate to discuss the long history of Hawaiian diplomacy in Oceania, and the origins 
and development of Hawai‘i’s pan-Oceanian and pan-Asia-Pacific ideologies and political 
projects in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
“Not Only Permanently Independent But Powerful:” Charles St. Julian 
and early Hawaiian pan-Oceanian diplomacy 
 
Our present King, in the last paragraph of the gracious speech which he delivered to us on the 
7th of this month, holds out the idea of inducing the inhabitants of other Polynesian groups, 
who assimilate with the Hawaiian race, to come to and settle on these islands. I myself think 
well of this project, and if it should be adopted, the relations established by Mr. St. Julian 
would enable him, with ease, to organize on an extensive scale, such a plan. (Hawaiian foreign 
minister Robert Wyllie, 1855)182 
 
The only country which has taken measures to place its relations with Central Polynesia upon 
a satisfactory footing is the young kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands. […] The natural mission 
of the Hawaiian nation seems to be that of political and social leadership among its southern 
brethren, who have as yet no recognised international rights. […] Such a confederation would 
be a power in the world in the real as well as in the political sense of the term. (Hawaiian 
Commissioner Charles St. Julian, 1857)183 
 
Je rêvais de poursuivre, à l’aide de moyens tout pacifiques, l’œuvre commencée par 
Kamehameha Ier, de rattacher peu à peu ces divers groupes [d’îles] au mouvement politique 
de l’Archipel [Hawaïen], de les civiliser par le travail et le commerce, de leur faire considérer 
Kamehameha V, sinon comme leur roi, tout au moins comme leur protecteur, comme leur 
représentant dans le grand congrès des nations. (Former Hawaiian foreign minister Charles 
de Varigny, 1874)184 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous two chapters, the nature of the Hawaiian Kingdom as the most 
developed hybrid state of Oceania has been extensively documented. Based on this position of 
regional pre-eminence, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Kingdom initiated and 
developed a pan-Polynesian, pan-Oceanian and eventually pan-Asia-Pacific policy and used its 
network of diplomats to promote that policy. Getting back at the third of my research questions 
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 Report of the Minister of Foreign Relations, The Polynesian, 9 June 1855, p. 1. The cited speech of King 
Kamehameha IV is not reproduced in the newspaper. 
183
 Compilation of quotes (St. Julian 1857: 20, 29). Emphasis in the original. 
184
 “I dreamt of continuing, by all peaceful means, the work of Kamehameha I, to tie the various island groups, one 
after the other, to the political movement of the Hawaiian Archipelago, to civilize them through work and 
commerce, and to make them consider Kamehameha V, if not their king, at least their protector, their representative 
in the great council of nations.” Varigny 2002: 200 
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from chapter one, the following two chapters will explore how Hawai‘i formulated its pan-
Oceanian vision, how this vision developed over the time, and who the main thinkers who 
developed this visionary policy were.  
As the three quotes at the beginning of the chapter indicate, the idea that it was 
Hawai‘i’s mission or kuleana [responsibility] to assume a leadership position among the 
nations of Oceania was first formulated in the 1850s, and Hawaiian diplomat Charles St. Julian 
plays a central role in formulating this idea, while other leading members of the Hawaiian 
government continued to support this vision throughout the following decades.  
The present chapter lines out the origins of this discourse and its articulation within 
intellectual circles within in the Hawaiian government as well within diplomatic 
correspondence throughout the region. This preceded more active  moves to implement pan-
Oceanianist policy towards the end of the century, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Based to a large degree on primary source research, the chapter will start with a brief survey of 
the early pan-Oceanian ideas in Hawai‘i and early Hawaiian diplomacy in the Pacific region, 
before focusing on St. Julian and providing a detailed analysis of his visionary writings and 
their foundational importance. Next, I focus on the actual diplomatic moves St. Julian undertook 
as an agent of the Hawaiian Kingdom to implement some of these visions, mentioning some 
other important agents of early Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism in passing. The chapter ends with a 
description of the short but destructive attempt by domestic enemies of the Hawaiian state to 
shut down this pan-Oceanianist policy in the early 1870s during the short reign of Lunalilo, but 
as we will see in the next chapter, this was only a temporary setback as the policy was quickly 
resurrected, and taken to a new level, by King Kalākaua.   
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Early cross-Oceanian contacts and pan-Oceanian ideas in Hawai‘i 
 
The Hawaiian Islands’ encounter with the West in the late eighteenth century enabled a 
resumption of close contact with the other archipelagos of Oceania by way of Western-style 
shipping, which was swiftly embraced by Polynesians, many of whom quickly took to becoming 
sailors on Western ships, and soon even became builders, owners and captains and of such 
watercraft (Chappell 1997; Mills 2003). Such contacts had once been extensive during the early 
pre-dynastic periods many centuries earlier, but by the classical period had become at the most 
sporadic if not entirely suspended. The post-Western encounter reconnections led to an 
increasing awareness among Hawaiians that their nation did not exist just by itself, but that 
there were many other archipelagos with similar topographic and ecological conditions, and 
closely related populations. Hence, Hawaiian leaders were led to contemplate on their 
country’s position in relation to the other people of the region and envision various scenarios 
of closer relations with them in the future. 
In the earlier part of the century, contacts were closest with the islands of central 
Eastern Polynesia, which as Kahiki [Tahiti] and Polapola [Porapora] had been the traditional 
homeland and the destination of overseas voyages in the pre-dynastic period.185 According to 
Jarves – later reiterated by Varigny and Amouretti –, Kamehameha I, after having gained 
suzerainty over the Kingdom of Kaua‘i in 1810, envisioned extending his realm further south 
and conquer or otherwise acquire Tahiti and surrounding islands, including the Marquesas, as 
well (Jarves 1843: 183; Varigny 2002: 200, 310; Amouretti 1897). While there can be little 
doubt about this historical narrative being part of later official Hawaiian government discourse, 
LMS missionary William Ellis, who was personally acquainted with important figures of 
                                                 
185
 While the meaning of Kahiki shifted to become a generic term for foreign lands in modern Hawaiian, the Society 
Islands were usually collectively designated as Polapola or variations thereof in nineteenth-century Hawaiian 
sources. 
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Kamehameha I’s court, in his extensive 1825 book Polynesian Researches expressed doubts 
about the late king having had such plans of conquest (Ellis 1969: 385). However, Ellis does 
mention plans by Kamehameha to forge marriage alliances with the Pomare Family, attempting 
to arrange for his son and successor Liholiho [the future Kamehameha II] to marry one of 
Pomare I’s daughters, and for his daughter Kekauluohi [future kuhina nui under Kamehameha 
III] to marry Pomare II (Ellis 1969: 94; Jarves 1843: 204).186  
While the scheme apparently failed due to the untimely death of Pomare I in 1803, the 
relations established with the Tahitian archipelago had important consequences for the future 
development of Hawai‘i. Jeffrey Sissons argues that the overthrow of the classical Hawaiian 
state religion in 1819 was at least partly influenced by Pomare II’s conversion to Christianity 
and military victory over his traditionalist rivals in 1815, a story that had soon thereafter 
become familiar in Hawai‘i (Sissons 2011: 209). 
After the arrival of the ABCFM missionaries in 1820, Hawaiian-Tahitian contacts 
increased. Several Tahitian Christians affiliated with the LMS mission and its temporary 
emissary to Hawai‘i William Ellis played crucial roles in the conversion of leading Hawaiian 
ali‘i, the translation of the Bible into Hawaiian and the following transformation of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom into a Christian state. Among these were Auna, Kahikona, Moe, Taamotu, 
Tau‘ā, Toketa, and Tute.187 While Auna and possibly some others returned to the Society 
Islands, Kahikona, Tau‘ā and Tute stayed in the Hawaiian Islands, were elevated to kaukau ali‘i 
status and received konohiki lands in the 1848 māhele (Kame‘eleihiwa 1992: 143, 276). 
                                                 
186
 Whichever of the two narratives is true, both would be a continuation of strategies employed by classical 
Hawaiian mō‘ī to extend their power over other polities, either through warfare or through alliances. 
187
 Some of these names were apparently Hawaiianised, since the letter k does not exist in Tahitian. Important 
primary source texts were produced by or about some of those individuals in Tahitian and Hawaiian. On Auna, see 
“Te Parau No Auna,” Te Faaite Tahiti, No 3 (1837) 24-27 and No. 4 (1837): 37-39 as well as Maude 1973. On 
Toketa, see Barrère and Sahlins 1979. On Kahikona, see Barrère 1989.  
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With this prominent presence of Tahitians near the Hawaiian court, a pan-Eastern 
Polynesian consciousness thus emerged during the reigns of Liholiho and Kauikeaouli. 
Maintaining relations with Tahitian ari’i became common for Hawaiian ali‘i. For instance, in 
1821, Kaumuali‘i of Kaua‘i planned to visit Tahiti (Jarves 1843: 226) and one of the earliest 
examples of written Hawaiian is a letter by Kamehameha II to Teuheiti of Huahine about the 
progress of missionary work in Hawai‘i.188 There are also unconfirmed reports on a visit by 
Liholiho himself to Central Eastern Polynesia.189 In any case, Hawai‘i’s reputation as a strong 
Polynesian state spread to the islands in the south, and a decade later, King Tapoa of Porapora 
wrote to Kamehameha III asking for military assistance in his protracted war against 
neighbouring Ra’iātea and promising Kauikeaouli in return a share in the lands to be 
conquered.190 Apparently the Hawaiian king never replied, likely because of being preoccupied 
with the troubles between traditionalist and Christian ali‘i going on during the time.191 
                                                 
188
 Kamehameha II to Teuheiti, 18 Feb 1832. Reproduced and translated by Kamanamaikalani Beamer (2014: 85-
88). 
189
 In a personal communication, Hawaiian linguist Keao NeSmith reported remembering coming across an article in 
a Hawaiian-language newspaper about Kamehameha II visiting Tahiti when looking for another subject, but 
unfortunately he was unable to remember the paper and date, and a search on the not yet completed database of 
digitised Hawaiian newspapers www.nupepa.org yielded no results. Furthermore, a 1993 article in a newspaper 
edited by an organisation claiming to represent the restored government of the Hawaiian Kingdom, later reiterated in 
an article published by Etienne Teparii in Tahiti in 1997, recounts a visit by Liholiho to the island of Maupiti [a 
small island in the Society Islands west of Porapora] where he allegedly met with a Malietoa titleholder from Sāmoa 
and various ari’i/ariki of the Austral and Cook Islands (“A Portrait of Pride: Kalaninui Liholiho” in ‘Iolani: News of 
the Kingdom, Vol. 1, no. 5 (August 1993): 1-2; Teparii 1997). While this mo‘olelo sounds fascinating, I am very 
cautious about it, because, first, careful inquiries done about its veracity with the supposed source persons in Tahiti 
and a Tahitian linguist hailing from Maupiti island itself yielded no results but actual denials of the story’s veracity, 
and secondly, several aspects of the story itself appear puzzling. For example, why would the Hawaiian king only 
visit the small island of Maupiti and not the centres of political power of the Society Islands such as Tahiti and 
Ra’iātea? And why would a pan-Polynesian meeting involving people of such importance as the mō‘ī of the 
Hawaiian Islands and the Malietoa titleholder of Sāmoa only include chiefs of minor Eastern Polynesian islands 
relatively distant from Maupiti but none of the powerful contemporary Society Islands ari’i such as Tamatoa III of 
Raiatea, Tapoa II of Porapora, Teriitaria of Huahine or a high official of the Pomare Kingdom of Tahiti? Lastly, why 
would such an important meeting not be recorded and its minutes preserved among the Hawaiian Kingdom 
government records, especially since it would have been an important precedent for Hawai‘i’s later pan-Oceanian 
activities of the 1850s-1880s? 
190
 Tapoa to Kauikeaouli, 14 Oct. 1834, FO&Ex, Chronological Files 1834, Hawai‘i State Archives. 
191
 A few years earlier, in consequence of these troubles, Hawaiian traditionalist ali‘i Boki Kamā‘ule‘ule had left the 
Hawaiian Islands with a large group of followers on two Western-style sailing ships to conquer islands in what was 
then called the New Hebrides [today Vanuatu] islands in order to harvest sandalwood, a commodity then nearing 
exhaustion in the Hawaiian Islands. According to Kamakau, Boki’s party visited Rotuma and the ship under his 
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At the same time, the awareness of being part of Oceania was also becoming 
disseminated through two of the key tools of modernity, print and cartography. The very first 
Hawaiian-language newspaper published over an extended period, Ke Kumu Hawaii (1834-
1839) contains multiple articles relating to Central Eastern Polynesia, usually focusing on LMS 
                                                                                                                                                             
command went on to the New Hebrides, where it was apparently lost at sea, whereas the other ship, formerly under 
the command of Manuia, returned to Honolulu (Kamakau 2001: 60-61). According to another narrative, Boki’s ship 
wrecked in Sāmoa and Boki’s party settled there. Apparently, the 1887 Hawaiian embassy to Samoa found evidence 
of this, including objects from Boki’s ship and people claiming descent from Boki (Marques 1893).  
Fig. 6.1: Map of the ‘Āina Moana [Oceania], from the school atlas titled He Mau Palapala Aina, Lāhaināluna 
1840. Copyright expired. 
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missionary work there.192 The first Hawaiian-language school atlas, published in Lāhaināluna 
in 1840 (He Mau Palapala Aina 2011), after starting with a map of the world, shows a map of 
the ‘Āina Moana [“Lands of the Sea,” possibly a literal translation of “Oceania,” fig. 6.1] before 
displaying one of the Hawaiian Islands similar to fig. 5.39.193  
Close relations between the Hawaiian ali‘i and Tahitian ari‘i continued through the mid-
1840s, when the Tahitian Kingdom was invaded by the French. In an exchange of letters, Queen 
Pomare asked Kamehameha III for help, and the latter first offered the Tahitian queen political 
asylum but eventually recommended her to find an arrangement with the French instead of 
abandoning her people.194 Despite the French protectorate, which from 1847 disabled the 
Tahitian kingdom from conducting its own foreign affairs – including  formal diplomatic 
relations with Hawai‘i – personal  relations between the leading families of the two 
archipelagos endured, including intermarriages (Topolinski 1975, 1981; Klieger 2015: 346, 
351).  
Without the unfortunate success of French imperial aggression, Hawaiian pan-
Oceanianism would surely have been built on the close relations with Tahiti first and foremost, 
and based on linguistic similarity and related oral histories, the pan-Oceanian network would 
then have been extended to the rest of Eastern Polynesia, and eventually from there to Western 
Polynesia. By the second half of the nineteenth century, there was a clearly a consciousness 
among the Hawaiian intellectual elite that all of triangular Polynesia was related. For instance, 
Historian Samuel Mānaiakalani Kamakau in an 1867 article provides an analysis of Hawaiian 
                                                 
192
 E.g. A. B. [Artemas Bishop?], “No Na Kanaka o Polunesia,” Ke Kumu Hawaii, 10 Dec. 1834: 21-22; Baluina 
[Dwight Baldwin], “Ma Pakete [Pape‘ete?]. He leka mai Tahiti mai,” Ke Kumu Hawaii, 30 Sept 1835: 155-156; “No 
ko Borabora: He leka mai Rarotonga mai.” Ke Kumu Hawaii, 2 March 1836: 17-18. 
193
 The same sequence, showing a large-scale map of a continent and then a more detailed map of the largest country 
within that continent, continues through the atlas, where a map of the Americas is followed by one of the United 
States. For a deeper discussion of the very intriguing term ‘Āina Moana and its ramifications see Chang 2016: 129-
132. 
194
 Copy of letter in Hawaii State Archives. English translation reproduced in Kame‘eleihiwa 1992: 189-190 and 
Schweizer 2005: 249-50. 
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oral traditions connecting them to place names in New Zealand, the Society Islands and Sāmoa 
(Kamakau 1867).  
As a basis for building a political confederation of Polynesian states, however, Tahiti 
under French and Aotearoa under British rule had been thrown out of the picture. Hawai‘i thus 
needed to look elsewhere and engage with Oceanian islands not under Western imperial rule.  
 
Settlers, Missionaries and Consuls: Mid-century relations 
 
In the far western Pacific, in a region later identified as north-western Micronesia, two 
schemes of Hawaiian overseas settlement were undertaken in the first half of the century. As 
early as 1810, a group of Hawaiians sailing on an American vessel attempted to colonize 
Agrihan, a then uninhabited small volcanic island in the Marianas, but they were expelled by 
the Spanish authorities in Guam who claimed the entire Marianas as a Spanish colonial 
territory.195 Two decades later, British consul in the Hawaiian Islands Richard Charlton sent a 
party consisting of several dozen Hawaiians and a few Westerners to the Bonin Islands, a few 
hundred kilometres to the north of Agrihan, in order to establish a future British colony. Since 
London never sanctioned this move, the settlement turned into a de-facto independent 
community that remained on the islands throughout most of the century, and gave the islands 
an unique, predominantly Hawaiian cultural and linguistic identity that outlasted the 
archipelago’s annexation by Japan in 1876 (Kramer and Kramer  2013; 2015). However, there 
appears to have been no political connection of the Bonin Islands settlement to the Hawaiian 
state, and after 1876 they apparently did not play any role in the important Hawaiian-Japanese 
relations discussed below. 
                                                 
195
 According to Encyclopedia Britannica: <http://www.britannica.com/place/Agrihan>. Having found no other 
source for this anecdote, I am not sure about the political context of this colonization scheme, and whether it had any 
connection to Kamehameha I’s government. 
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By the 1840s, discussion on Hawai‘i being a central part of a wider Polynesian 
community had spread not only among Hawaiian ali‘i but also among resident haole loyal to 
the Kingdom and close to the court. In 1840 James J. Jarves, an American journalist and scholar 
residing in Hawai‘i founded an English-language newspaper which he named The Polynesian. 
After Jarves naturalized as a Hawaiian subject in 1844, the paper became the official English-
language government press of the Kingdom.196  The name of the paper and its sponsorship by 
the government testifies to an increased interest in seeing the kingdom not merely by itself in 
isolation but as a major actor in Polynesia. In an editorial, Jarves commented on the opening of 
the Hawaiian legislature in 1845, setting the tone for Hawaiian regional foreign policy to come: 
A similar scene probably never before occurred near the waters of the Pacific and certainly 
constitutes an important feature in the history of Polynesia. May other indigenous nations 
arise and follow the example until all this extensive portion of the globe rejoices under free 
and constitutional governments (The Polynesian, 24 May 1845, cited in Diamond 1990: 36). 
 
It was not long before another such “arising indigenous nation” in Polynesia stepped 
forward to seek advice from the Hawaiian Kingdom. In 1849 Sāmoa-based LMS missionary 
George Pritchard on behalf of several Samoan chiefs wrote to the Hawaiian government asking 
for Hawaiian advice on the functioning of a modern government, and in return Kauikeaouli 
drafted a letter, which was to be sent to Samoa together with copies of the Hawaiian 
constitution and laws (Gilson 1970: 191). According to Gilson, the letter was never sent, 
however, probably due to disagreements between the King, Wyllie and other members of the 
Privy Council.197 
                                                 
196
 Curiously, The Polynesian’s Hawaiian-language equivalents as the Hawaiian government’s official papers, first 
Ka Elele (“The Messenger”) and then Ka Hae Hawaii (“The Hawaiian Flag”) did not carry an equivalent reference 
to the larger Pacific region in their titles. 
197
 Privy Council meeting of 4 March 1850, Privy Council minute book, Vol. 3B, Hawai‘i State Archives. When in 
1853, the first Hawaiian consul in Apia was appointed, Wyllie once more attempted to send the 1849 draft letter as 
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More protracted political connections between the Hawaiian Kingdom and other Pacific 
Islands developed out of missionary enterprises directly affiliated with the Hawaiian Calvinist 
church. In a tacit agreement, the ABCFM and its Hawaiian offspring, the Hawaiian Missionary 
Society [HMS, founded 1853 (Morris 1987: 82)] were assigned the islands of Oceania north of 
the equator as its mission field, while the LMS worked on those to the south. Starting with the 
establishment of a mission station on Kosrae in 1852, a large number of Hawaiian and Hawai‘i-
based American missionaries were present on the eastern Carolines, the Marshall and the 
Gilbert Islands from the 1850s and 1860s until the early twentieth century (Loomis 1970: 53-
141; Morris 1987).  
This Hawaiian or Hawai‘i-connected presence had the effect of introducing the 
Hawaiian Kingdom as a political model into the awareness of the inhabitants of these 
archipelagos. The very foundational document for the mission to Kosrae was a letter written by 
Kamehameha III that the missionaries delivered to King Lupalik I, also known as “King George” 
of Kosrae.198 Where haole missionaries of the ABCFM were present, the Hawaiian influence was 
of course often outweighed with that of New England. But on islands where aboriginal 
Hawaiian ministers alone were running the missions, as it was the case especially on the 
Gilbert Islands, connections with the Hawaiian Kingdom became very intricate, and eventually 
the Hawaiian state came to be regarded as a political model and potential protector by several 
Gilbertese chiefs, as will be discussed in more detail below. 
                                                                                                                                                             
part of the consul’s instructions, but this suggestion did not find the approval of other Privy Councillors. Minutes of 
2 May 1853, Privy Council minute book, Vol. 7, Hawai‘i State Archives. 
198
 A translation of the letter is reproduced in Buck 2005: 38-39. 
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The other Hawaiian mission field that was exclusively staffed by native HMS ministers 
was in the Marquesas Islands.199 Brought about by the demand by a chief from Fatu Hiva 
visiting Honolulu for missionaries to be sent to his home island in 1853, Hawaiian pastors 
maintained several mission stations in the archipelago until 1909 (Morris 1987: 101-107).  The 
missionary enterprises in Pekuhiwa or Nu‘uhiwa [as the archipelago was often collectively 
called in contemporary Hawaiian publications, after the islands of Fatu Hiva and Nuku Hiva] 
had important repercussions in Hawai‘i, as it re-established close contacts with another 
ancestral homeland, whose tongue is closest among all other Polynesian languages to 
Hawaiian.  However, since France claimed the Marquesas as a colonial possession from 1842 
[even though it did not actually rule most islands until the 1880s], explicitly political 
connections between Marquesan chiefs and the Hawaiian Kingdom could not be established 
without provoking Paris, and thus unlike in the Gilberts the Hawaiian missionaries focused 
almost exclusively on religious matters.200   
The other important basis for Hawaiian connections to the rest of Oceania was inter-
archipelagic trade. Already during Kamehameha I’s time, the Hawaiian Islands had become a 
hub for the trans-Pacific trade between the Americas and Asia, and in 1801, French scholar 
Claret Fleurieu predicted that Hawai‘i would become the “caravansary of the Pacific” (Chaplin 
in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 69), and in his recent biography of Kamehameha III, Christiaan 
Klieger  argues that in the 1830s and 1840s, Honolulu was “a centre, rather than a periphery, of 
the Pacific World” (2015: 352 n.15). While most of its trade was directed east or west, 
economic relations also involved the islands to the south.  
                                                 
199
 Located South of the Equator, the Marquesas were originally intended by the LMS as its mission field, then 
divided into ABCFM and LMS spheres, but after several brief attempts both gave up the archipelago in the 1830s, 
until the HMS resumed the mission on its own account in 1853 (Garret 1985: 266-269).    
200
 In the end, the Hawaiian Protestant mission in the Marquesas was unable to compete against the better funded 
and government-supported French Catholics, and its overall impact on Marquesan politics was minimal. 
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It was in the context of these expanding trade relations that the Hawaiian Kingdom 
established a wide range of consulates and consular agencies around the world, several of 
which were located in Oceania. The first such posts were appointed in the early 1850s, and 
with the ever increasing volume of trade, more were created during the following decades.  
While the number of these posts fluctuated, often depending on the availability of individuals 
to fill them, there were altogether four Hawaiian consular post in the independent Pacific 
Islands, namely in Apia, Samoa [1853-1858], Vava‘u, Tonga [1855-?], Levuka, Fiji [1857-59, 
1871-76] and Jaluit, Marshall Islands [1881-1887], as well as three on Pacific Islands under 
Western colonial rule, namely Auckland [1850-1900] and Dunedin [1871, 1892-1898] in New 
Zealand and Pape’ete in French Oceania [1881-1896]. On the western Pacific Rim, the Hawaiian 
consulate in Sydney, New South Wales [1850-1900] also needs to be highlighted here, since it 
became centrally important for the networking of the Hawaiian Kingdom with the smaller 
Pacific islands as we will see in the next section. 
 
Charles St. Julian: Envisioning a Hawai‘i-centred Oceania 
 
The early instances of pan-Oceanian thought, activism and diplomacy mentioned thus 
far set the stage for the prolific writings and diplomatic activity by Australian journalist and 
politician Charles St. Julian during the 1850s. Since St. Julian was the pioneer in developing a 
comprehensive Hawaiian-centred pan-Oceanian ideology envisioning a Hawai‘i-centred 
Oceania and thus made a decisive contribution to shaping Hawaiian foreign policy and 
diplomacy in this regard, it is worth examining the biography and political thought of this 
extraordinary Hawaiian diplomat in some detail here.  
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The life of a visionary diplomat 
 
One of the ironies of his biography is that St. 
Julian never set foot on Hawai‘i. The little we know 
about his early life is that he was born in 1818 or 
1819, probably near London, of English and French 
ancestry, and baptized a Catholic. In the late 1830s 
he migrated to South Australia and moved on to 
Sydney in New South Wales in 1839, where he 
settled down and founded a family. Talented as a 
writer, as well as quick to understand law and 
politics, he became a leading journalist for the 
Sydney Morning Herald, writing mainly as a court 
reporter but also on a variety of social and political 
topics. Within the political spectrum of colonial 
New South Wales, he positioned himself as a liberal 
and moderate advocate of social reforms (Diamond 1990: 1-31). He was also an opponent of 
more radical political reform movements, especially of republicanism, and ardently defended 
the system of constitutional monarchy against such critics, possibly, as his biographer Marion 
Diamond speculates, under the influence of Alexis De Tocqueville’s criticism of the political 
system of the United States of America (ibid: 27). Later in his life, during the 1860s, St. Julian 
became actively involved in New South Wales local politics and served in various municipal 
governments in the suburbs of Sydney (ibid.: 85-119).  
As a journalist, St. Julian soon became interested in the insular Pacific, with which the 
Australian colonies had increasing commercial relations in the mid-nineteenth century. While 
Fig. 6.2: Charles St. Julian (1819-1874), 
wearing the robe of the Chief Justice of the 
Kingdom of Fiji and the insignia of the 
Knight’s Commander of the Royal Order of 
Kamehameha. Engraving published in the 
Illustrated Sydney News, 16 Jan 1875, based 
on a photograph or sketch done 1872-1874. 
Copyright expired. 
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this Australian trade was mainly with the islands of central Polynesia, and much less with the 
Hawaiian Islands, Hawai‘i’s position as the only island nation with an internationally 
recognized government, as well as its more developed capitalist economy compared to the rest 
of Oceania, was not lost on St. Julian. After exhaustive research, he wrote a series of articles for 
various Sydney newspapers, later publishing them in book form as Notes on the Latent 
Resources of Polynesia, in which he concluded, among other things, that “[t]he Hawaiian nation 
may, as a whole, be fairly appealed to as affording a proof of what the Polynesian race is 
capable of” (St. Julian 1851: 65).  
Being already somewhat familiar with the Hawaiian Kingdom’s particular position 
within Polynesia, in 1848 St. Julian contacted The Polynesian’s editor James J. Jarves, whose 
book on the Hawaiian Islands he had read, and suggested the establishment of closer 
commercial and political ties between the Hawaiian Islands and the Australian colonies and 
suggesting the establishment of a Hawaiian consulate in Sydney, since he had repeatedly 
noticed stranded Hawaiian sailors in need of consular assistance.201 While apparently nothing 
came of this first attempt of soliciting the Hawaiian government’s attention, St. Julian once 
more contacted Honolulu when he sent a copy of his 1851 book to Hawaiian minister of foreign 
affairs Robert Wyllie.  
As mentioned in Chapter four, Wyllie [fig. 6.3], who had headed the Hawaiian ministry 
of foreign affairs since 1846 (Kamakau 2001: 247) had been from the beginning a critique of 
ABCFM influence in the Hawaiian government and advocated a more secular state. As an 
unyielding champion of the Hawaiian monarchy, Hawaiian independence and international 
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 St. Julian to Jarves, 29 April 1848, FO&Ex, Chronological Files, 29-30 April 1848, Hawai‘i State Archives. 
Cited in Marion 1990: 36-37. 
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neutrality, he was probably the most loyal and efficient among the non-native advisors to 
Kauikeaouli and Alexander Liholiho as well as during the early reign of Lota Kapuāiwa.202  
St. Julian’s 1851 letter to Wyllie initiated an intensive and constructive dialogue 
between the two that lasted for almost a decade, 
while St. Julian continued his research on the 
Pacific Islands. He soon developed the idea that all 
of Polynesia should be united into a large political 
entity led by its most powerful state, the Hawaiian 
Kingdom. These ideas impressed upon Wyllie, and 
in 1853 Kamehameha III appointed St. Julian as 
“His Hawaiian Majesty’s Commissioner, and 
Political and Commercial Agent, to the Independent 
States and Tribes of Polynesia,” and in 1855 he also 
took charge of the Hawaiian Consulate-General for 
New South Wales and Tasmania (Diamond 1990: 
42, 47). 
In his new official capacity, St. Julian attempted to increase the Hawaiian Kingdom’s 
sphere of influence, disseminate knowledge about Hawai‘i among the other island rulers, and 
promote the Hawaiian Kingdom’s constitution as a model for them to follow. The idea of 
bringing immigrants from the other islands of Oceania to the Kingdom was also first 
contemplated at the time, as mentioned in the quote at be beginning of the chapter. Between 
1855 and 1857, St. Julian attempted to broker a deal with the Hawaiian Kingdom and a Sydney-
based British adventurer in order to have Hawai‘i annex the Polynesian atoll of Sikaiana near 
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 The fact that Wyllie was the only person ever interred in the Mauna ‘Ala Royal Hawaiian Mausoleum who was 
neither a member nor an in-law of an ali‘i nui family testifies to the extraordinary status he enjoyed among the ali‘i.  
Fig. 6.3: Robert Crichton Wyllie (1798-
1865), Photograph taken between 1847 
and 1855 by unknown photographer. 
Copyright expired. Source: Wikipedia. 
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the Solomon Islands, thereby extending the Hawaiian Kingdom’s domain south of the equator 
(Horn 1951: 24-32).  
While nothing really came of the Sikaiana annexation scheme, St. Julian’s diplomacy had 
more lasting impacts on Tonga. In 1853, King George Tupou I of Tonga visited Sydney where he 
met St. Julian, and the latter subsequently communicated with him, sent him a copy of the 
Hawaiian constitution, and suggested modernizing the Tongan system of government along its 
lines, as well as establishing a close political relationship between Tonga and Hawai‘i (Lātūkefu 
1975b: 30-32; Diamond 1990: 66-71). During the same time, St. Julian also involved himself in 
the affairs of Sāmoa, which at the time had no centralised authority but was in a constant state 
of struggle between high-ranking titleholders for pre-eminence as described in chapter three. 
After communication with Samoan chiefs, St. Julian drafted a 
constitution for a “Republic of Upolu [the main island of the 
archipelago]” for them in 1854, which was partly modelled on 
the Hawaiian constitution (Diamond 1990: 58-59).  
In 1857, St. Julian published his second book, an 
Official Report on Central Polynesia presented to the Hawaiian 
Government, which contained a detailed gazetteer of all 
Central Polynesian islands and chiefdoms, compiled by 
Edward Reeve [Fig. 6.4], St. Julian’s chancellor and later 
successor in office, which should be regarded as one of the 
most detailed compilations of knowledge of the islands available during the mid-nineteenth 
century (St. Julian 1857). In the report, St. Julian reiterated and refined his vision of a Polynesia 
modernized along Hawaiian lines and unified under Hawaiian primacy.  
Fig. 6.4: Edward Reeve (1822-
1889), wearing the insignia of 
the Royal Hawaiian Order of 
Arossi. Reproduced from 
Sydney Illustrated News, 10 July 
1871. Copyrigt expired. 
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After Wyllie passed away in 1865, the Hawaiian government became less wholehearted 
in its support for St. Julian. King Kamehameha V was deeply involved with domestic issues, and 
Wyllie’s successor as minister of foreign affairs, Charles de Varigny, while enthusiastic in his 
general support for Hawaiian primacy in the Pacific as noted in the quote at the beginning of 
the chapter (Varigny 2002: 200, 310), made few concrete moves to implement it. Charles C. 
Harris, de Varigny’s successor as Kamehameha V’s foreign minister in 1869, however, renewed 
Honolulu’s political support for St. Julian and sent him on a diplomatic mission to Fiji in 1871, 
his first actual voyage to any Pacific island.  
As will be discussed in more detail in the eighth chapter, Fiji had then recently formed a 
constitutional monarchy under King Cakobau based on the Hawaiian model, and St. Julian’s 
mission was to assess the feasibility of a possible Hawaiian protectorate over Fiji (Diamond 
1990: 129-38). While his efforts in that direction failed, the trip made him an ardent advocate 
of the new Fijian government, and on his return to Sydney he published a pamphlet urging 
Fiji’s international recognition as a sovereign state (St. Julian 1872). This endeared him to the 
Fijian government leaders, who offered him an appointment as Chief Justice and Chancellor of 
Cakobau’s kingdom, which he gladly accepted (Diamond 1990: 140-41). In terms of protocol, 
this made him the second-highest official, and he represented King Cakobau when reading the 
King’s speeches at the opening of the Fijian legislature in his absence in 1872 and 1873 
(Routledge 1985a: 170, 179).  
When after a few years, due to of internal instability, settler racism, and foreign power 
hostility, the Fijian Kingdom ended up being annexed by Great Britain in October of 1874, St. 
Julian’s visionary life ended rather tragically. In ill health and lacking formal legal training, and 
possibly also because of his pro-native politics, St. Julian was not rehired as a judge in Fiji by 
the incoming British colonial administration and passed away soon thereafter, on November 
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26, 1874, in Fiji’s capital of Levuka. His most important legacy in Fiji was his firm stance, 
together with Cakobau’s chief secretary John B. Thurston, on preserving Fijian land rights 
during the annexation negotiations with the British (Diamond 1990: 149-151).  
 
St. Julian’s political thought: Pan-Oceananism and Liberal monarchism  
 
Unlike some other important actors in Hawaiian politics, St. Julian was a prolific writer, 
so we can gain a quite thorough insight into his political thought. An enormous amount of 
correspondence in the Hawaiian Archives, mainly with Wyllie during the 1850s, testifies to St. 
Julian’s unwavering interest and passion for the Hawaiian Kingdom and the role he envisioned 
for it in the future of Oceania. Furthermore, his three published works on Oceania helped to 
disseminate this political thought to a wider range of English-language readers. The only regret 
is that his writings were never translated into Hawaiian and thus not distributed to the wider 
body politic of the Hawaiian Kingdom.203   
In his various letters to Wyllie, St. Julian carefully developed a political vision of an 
Oceania consisting of independent native-ruled states that would be unified in a type of 
confederation or league under the leadership of the Hawaiian Kingdom as its most politically 
and economically developed member.  
                                                 
203
 This was most likely because St. Julian himself did not speak any Pacific language, and Wyllie, despite being a 
polyglot who frequently wrote official letters in French and Spanish, was not fluent in the Hawaiian language either. 
Those in the Hawaiian cabinet and Privy Council who were bilingual in Hawaiian and English and could have made 
good translations were ABCFM-affiliated antagonists of Wyllie, and their main agenda was to keep Hawaiian 
commoners ignorant of the wider world by not teaching them English and translating only selected materials into 
Hawaiian. The same is true for other Polynesian languages. Having the Report on Central Polynesia available in 
Tongan, Samoan and Fijian would have made an important impact in spreading pan-Oceanian consciousness in 
those archipelagos. But like in Hawai‘i, bilingualism there was almost exclusively the domain of LMS and 
Wesleyan missionaries, whose interests were also antagonistic to St. Julian’s. A few decades later, the situation had 
dramatically changed, and bilingual Hawaiian pan-Oceanists like W. M. Gibson, John E. Bush, W.L. Bishop and 
John T. Baker did produce writings in Hawaiian, and non-speakers of Hawaiian with similar convictions took care 
to have some of their writings translated into Hawaiian, as did C.C. Moreno. 
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It is my conviction – and in my private capacity I have, as you are doubtless aware, had 
frequent opportunities of expressing that conviction – that, as the first and greatest of the 
Polynesian States, the Kingdom of Hawaii is, in its relationship with the states and tribes of 
the various archipelagos and Islands of the Pacific to be classed as a “great power” in the most 
complete sense of the term.204 
 
Out of this position of pre-eminence among the states of Polynesia, St. Julian argued 
further, arose a sense of responsibility – if he had known the Hawaiian language he would have 
said kuleana – for the Hawaiian Kingdom, “as the first constitutional sovereignty of Polynesia, 
[to be] peculiarly bound to aid and to guide, as far as it can, the younger states of that vast 
region in their efforts for moral, social and political improvement.”205 In another letter he 
clarified that his argument for Hawai‘i to become the guardian of Oceania was not coming out 
of a particularly love for the Hawaiian Kingdom, but rather out of a pragmatic analysis of 
Hawai‘i’s strength: 
The great end at which I aim is the political regeneration of the Polynesian communities; and 
the Union, to a certain extent, of Polynesian interests. I seek to work for Hawaii not because 
she is Hawaii, or because I have any greater regard for the Hawaiian nation than for any other 
race of Polynesians; but because I look upon her as the natural head of these communities; 
and because I believe that by a steady pursuit of the policy I advocate, she and they may be 
rendered not only permanently independent but powerful. 206 
 
Once this scenario became reality, he predicted, Oceania would have the clout to be, as 
quoted at the beginning of the chapter and in the title of this dissertation, “a power in the 
world.” Hence, one and a half centuries prior to Epeli Hau‘ofa, St. Julian was essentially 
formulating the idea that Oceania should not be seen as small scattered islands but as a vast 
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 St. Julian to Wyllie, no. 13, 7 Aug 1854, partly quoted in in Kuykendall 1967: 306. 
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 St. Julian to Wyllie, Memorandum with no. 15, 7 Aug 1854, in Kuykendall 1967: 306-307. 
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 St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 28, 21 December 1854, FO&Ex, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, Sydney, Nov-Dec 1854, 
Hawai‘i State Archives, p.8. Partly cited in Horn 1951:44.  
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maritime polity that had the potential to be a force to be reckoned with globally. The following 
quote testifies to his personal passion for this vision to be implemented: 
I shall be able, if God spares my life and health and if I retain the confidence of His Majesty 
and yourself, to carry into practice my theory (which I dare say you once thought exceedingly 
visionary) of a strong Polynesian Union with Hawaii at its head: – one sufficiently powerful to 
speak with a voice Imperial in the councils of the world.207  
 
It appears that St. Julian developed this mission at least partially under the influence of 
the contemporary national unification movements in Germany and Italy, as is argued by 
Diamond (1990: 2, 44). Indeed there is some evidence for this in his writings, as in one of his 
letters he wrote that the Hawaiian Kingdom shall be, “In Polynesia regarded as the guide the 
guardian and the natural head of small sovereignties:  – Occupying, in short a position not 
dissimilar from that which is filled by Austria in connection with the small German States.” 208 
In his 1857 Report on Central Polynesia, St. Julian reiterated most of what he had written 
to Wyllie in 1854 and 1855. As the book was partly addressed to a European colonial audience, 
many of whom were presumably in favour of Western colonial interventions in the region, St. 
Julian put the Hawaiian Kingdom in perspective to Western governments. He argued that 
Hawai‘i “will bear a comparison with those of the best-ruled states of Europe, and will be found 
greatly superior to most of them” (St. Julian 1857: 2). After evaluating each of the potential 
colonising powers in the region (Great Britain, France and the USA), he concluded his analysis 
with the observation that:  
[t]here is another country, which, though infinitely less powerful than Great Britain, France 
or the United States, could acquire and maintain such a supremacy in many of the countries 
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 St. Julian to Wyllie, private, 7 Nov 1854, quoted in Kuykendall 1967: 307. 
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 St. Julian to Wyllie, No. 17, 2 October 1854, FO&Ex, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, Sydney, Hawai‘i State 
Archives. Quoted in Diamond 1990: 44.  
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of Central Polynesia, with greater ease than either of these powerful nations. This is the 
little Kingdom of the Hawaiian Islands. (St. Julian 1857: 11) 
 
While a Hawaiian-led pan-Oceanianism was the central theme of St. Julian’s thought, 
he had also very concrete ideas about the political system and society he envisioned for 
Oceania.  Having already positioned himself as a liberal monarchist within the politics of British 
colonial Australia, St. Julian was even more of staunch opponent of republicanism in Oceania, 
because he found it incompatible with native aristocratic traditions. In a letter to Wyllie he 
noted, “Republican Institutions, I am satisfied, never did and never will, answer with 
Polynesians. They have been tried at Raiataia [sic] and failed most signally.209”  
His espousal of monarchism, however, did not make him a social reactionary or 
conservative. To the contrary, St. Julian espoused some truly progressive social ideas. For 
example, he suggested reforming marriage laws to include abuse of the wife by her husband as 
a legal reason for divorce (St. Julian 1857: 70), and unlike most contemporary Anglo-Saxons, 
who considered “racial mixing” abhorrent, St. Julian prophesized that “the Polynesians of the 
future will, in fact, be a mixed race,” but that in that case “the race of Polynesian islanders 
would still be a distinct one” (ibid.: 7, 16), which has become the reality on most Polynesian 
archipelagos in the twenty-first century. Interestingly enough the two Hawaiian diplomats who 
in 1887 would begin to implement St. Julian’s vision of a pan-Polynesian federation, John E. 
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 St. Julian to Wyllie, 11 May 1855, p. 3. FO&Ex, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, Sydney, Hawai‘i State Archives. It 
is not exactly clear what incident St. Julian refers to. There was an attempt by a certain faction of the Raiatean 
district governors and legislators to overthrow King Tamatoa V and ask for American protectorate, but this was four 
years later in 1858 (See Boston Semi-Weekly Advertiser, 2 October 1858 as well as some of the primary sources 
reprinted in Flude 2012). In the gazetteer in St. Julian’s 1857 Report on Central Polynesia no incident of 
“republicanism” is mentioned under the entry for Ra’iātea. However, according to the unpublished dissertation on 
the history of Ra’iātea by Anne-Liste Shigetomi-Pasturel, there was a major period of instability and factional 
rivalry on the island between 1852 and 1855, and in the course of these troubles, King Tamatoa IV was temporarily 
deposed and replaced with a leader elected by the district governors from 1853 until 1855, when Tamatoa IV was 
restored to the throne (Shigetomi-Pasturel 2000: 239-250, 509). It is most likely this episode that St. Julian refers to 
as Ra’iātea’s failed experiment with republican institutions. 
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Bush and Henry Poor, were both hapa haole [of mixed native and white ancestry] who strongly 
identified as Hawaiians, just like St. Julian had predicted. 
Furthermore, despite sometimes displaying a paternalistic tone towards native 
islanders as it was typical of Europeans of the time, he urged white settlers to respect native 
Polynesian governments, postulating that “[a]ny effort, therefore, on the part of resident 
foreigners to destroy the authority of the native rulers is absolutely treasonable, and may 
lawfully be so dealt with” (ibid.: 28), in other words, St. Julian acknowledged native agency as 
something that deserved the utmost respect by outside newcomers.  
What can also be seen is that St. Julian’s political vision for Oceania included aspects of 
parity, similitude and hybridity. As he wanted the islands to gain legal recognition from the 
Western powers, he was an advocate of parity, even more so than others as he envisioned 
Oceania as a whole to become an actual political power on par with the great powers. His vision 
for the island societies was to a large degree one of similitude, since he considered the political 
system of constitutional monarchy as it had evolved in the West as a model to be emulated by 
Pacific archipelagos. Yet, as he advocated not necessarily its direct transfer from the West but 
rather a re-adaptation to other archipelagos of the existing constitutional system of Hawai‘i – 
which  itself was already a hybridisation of classical Hawaiian and Anglo-Saxon principles of 
governance – , what he advocated was in fact a further hybridisation of the Hawaiian political 
system through its adaptation to other island polities, hence he also included indigenous 
concepts of governance into his constitutional drafts.  
Besides the strictly institutional, his prediction of a merging of Polynesian natives and 
European immigrants to form the “mixed, yet still distinct, Polynesian race of the future” is a 
very astute vision of societal hybridity. The fact that unlike many Westerners in Hawaiian 
service before or after him St. Julian could not be described as culturally assimilated into 
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Polynesian society – at least not before his relocation to Fiji towards the end of his life – makes 
his deep insights into Oceanian politics and society in St. Julian’s thought all the more 
remarkable.  
 
St. Julian’s actions and achievements as a Hawaiian diplomat 
 
Aside from being the pioneer of formulating Hawaiian pan-Oceanist thought, St. Julian 
was also very active as a Hawaiian diplomat and some of his initiatives had lasting impacts on 
the Hawaiian Kingdom and the region of Oceania. As mentioned above, St. Julian’s first major 
project in the service of Hawai‘i was to extend the sovereignty of the Hawaiian state to a new 
island. In 1851, Sikaiana, then referred to as the “Stewart Islands” [fig. 6.5] had allegedly been 
sold by its chiefs to Ben Boyd, a Sydney-based Scottish adventurer and entrepreneur, who was 
Fig. 6.5: View of Sikaiana atoll in 1851. Watercolour by John Webster. Sent as an attachment to a 
letter by St. Julian to Wyllie dated 9 May 1855. FO&Ex, Hawai‘i State Archives. Copyright expired. 
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cruising the southwestern Pacific with his lawyer and business associate John Webster in order 
to acquire islands not claimed by any recognised state in order to create a state-like entity 
similar to other settler-adventurer “states” mentioned in chapter three.210 During the cruise, 
Boyd disappeared and Webster took over all of the land claims for himself. Webster desired to 
cede Sikaiana to the Hawaiian Kingdom, probably in the hope of getting himself appointed as 
the atoll’s governor or proprietor and thereby securing his claim under an internationally 
recognised government. When a quick reply from Honolulu was not forthcoming, Webster 
moved away to Hokianga in New Zealand and turned over all his land claims to St. Julian, who 
during the following years attempted to complete the annexation deal with Hawai‘i.211 
While St. Julian’s cession of Sikaiana to Hawai‘i was accepted in several Hawaiian 
Cabinet and Privy Council resolutions, ultimately King Kamehameha IV declined to implement 
the arrangement, worried about technical constraints in administrating such a far outlying 
possession, and also discouraged by the ABCFM/HMS mission’s disinterest in opening a 
mission on the atoll in case of Hawaiian annexation (Horn 1951: 28-30). Despite the ultimate 
failure of the Sikaiana annexation scheme, what makes it extremely interesting is that the Privy 
Council resolution of 29 February 1856 to annex the atoll included a provision that a plebiscite 
was to be held among the Sikaianans to ratify the annexation of their atoll to the Hawaiian 
Kingdom (ibid.: 26, 28), a progressive idea unheard of at the time. Representing the first 
instance of the right of native peoples to self-determination being acknowledged anywhere in 
the Pacific Islands, the response of the Hawaiian government to St. Julian’s cession proposal 
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testifies once more of the progressiveness of Hawaiian policy. That all of this arose out of 
Boyd’s and Webster’s dubious settler adventurism resembling that of O’Keefe on Yap or of 
Dutrou-Bornier on Rapa Nui is one of the many ironies of Pacific history. 
The ultimately failed Sikaiana annexation scheme led to another important contribution 
of St. Julian to the Hawaiian Kingdom, namely the founding of the first Hawaiian order of merit. 
Unlike generally assumed (e.g. in Medcalf 1963), the Royal Order of Kamehameha I, founded by 
the conqueror’s grandson Kamehameha V in 1865, was not the first such order.212 A decade 
earlier, St. Julian and Reeve had founded the “Order of Arossi,” based on St. Julian’s land claims 
over Sikaiana and Makira in the eastern Solomon Islands acquired from Webster. Arossi is a 
name for the island then known as San Cristóbal and today as Makira, and it is also the name of 
one of its several native languages, apparently the language of those Makira islanders who had 
allegedly “ceded” their island to Boyd in a similar fashion to the chiefs of Sikaiana, but which 
appears more tenuous in Makira’s case.213 Thus claiming for himself the title “Muara of Arossi 
and Sovereign Chief of Sikyana [Sikaiana], St. Julian created the Order of Arossi “for the reward 
of those who have materially aided the social and political advancement of any Polynesian 
government or people”214 By way of Foreign Minister Wyllie, King Kamehameha IV accepted 
sovereignty over the order and assented to its constitution.215 However, apart from a handful of 
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 According to Christiaan Klieger, citing an earlier statement by Albert Pierce Taylor, the first Hawaiian Royal 
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St. Julian’s staff in Sydney, the order was never conferred onto anyone and apparently largely 
forgotten in Honolulu until its existence resurfaced in 1884 (Horn 1951: 31-32; Diamond 1990: 
81). Eventually, St, Julian was also appointed a Knights Commander of the Royal Order of 
Kamehameha I by Kamehameha V in 1872 (Diamond 1990: 141).216  
Even though much of St. Julian’s initiatives might have been failed ventures in terms of 
his personal ambitions, the impact of his pan-Oceanist diplomacy on Pacific politics was far 
from negligible.  Fiji historian David Routledge described him as a “man of ability, and Walter 
Gibson’s biographer Paul Bailey considers St. Julian “one of the most important men in 
Hawaiian history” (1980: 197). As we will see in more detail in chapter eight, the nineteenth-
century constitutions of Fiji, Tonga and Sāmoa all bear strong resemblance to that of Hawai‘i, 
and this similarity is ultimately traceable to St. Julian’s efforts. Arguably, the most lasting 
impact he had was in Tonga. Dutch anthropologist Paul van der Grijp considers him one of the 
two most important foreign advisors to King George Tupou I, second only to Methodist-
missionary-turned-Tongan-Prime-Minister Shirley Baker (Van der Grijp 1993: 662). And unlike 
in any other Pacific Island nation, St. Julian is officially remembered in Tonga today, as the 
Tongan history textbook for secondary schools sympathetically mentions his role in the 
formation of the Tongan constitutional monarchy (Boutell and Campbell 1993: 16-17).  
One intriguing question about St. Julian’s activities that remains without a conclusive 
answer is why he never displayed the same energy for the emerging island states in Eastern 
Polynesia as he did for those in Western Polynesia. Tahiti, the Marquesas and Aotearoa, of 
course, had formally become Western colonial possessions or protectorates by the time, so 
they were no longer available to be developed into modern states following the Hawaiian 
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model and included in a Hawaiian-led Polynesian confederation. But there remained the 
Leeward Society Islands Kingdoms of Ra’iātea, Huahine and Pora-Pora, as well as the small 
island king- and chiefdoms in the Austral and Cook Islands.  While Reeve’s 1857 gazetteer 
mentions all these islands in intricate detail, St. Julian only skims over them in his political 
report to which the gazetteer was attached and in his correspondence with Wyllie. St. Julian’s 
above mentioned cryptic reference to the failed republican movement in Ra’iātea in the 1850s 
proves that he must indeed have been very knowledgeable about the Eastern Polynesian 
islands as well. However, he argued that the Leeward Islands Kingdoms were overshadowed by 
French influence in Tahiti, so there was no potential for them to become important 
independent states under Hawaiian influence, as he saw for Sāmoa, Tonga and Fiji (St. Julian 
1857: 3). 
Since the Leeward Islands were explicitly acknowledged as independent and politically 
separate in the Anglo-French Jarnac declaration of 1847, one might question St. Julian’s 
assessment that they were under French influence from Tahiti during the time. While France 
clearly developed designs on the Leeward Islands in the 1880s and would eventually 
incorporate them into her Tahiti-based colony, there was little French inclination to break her 
agreement with Great Britain during the 1850s. Since St. Julian’s did not concern himself with 
the Cook Islands either, which were even less on the radar of French colonial interests during 
his time, his location in Sydney was perhaps simply too geographically distant from Eastern 
Polynesia to consider involving himself there. From Honolulu, the view was clearly different, as 
Hawaiian historian Samuel Kamakau clearly demonstrated when he referred to the Leeward 
Islands Kingdoms in his detailed Hawaiian history in 1868.217  
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Lunalilo’s temporary shutdown of pan-Oceanianism  
 
It is not surprising that it was Lota Kapuāiwa [Kamehameha V] who gave St. Julian a 
new boost for his pan-Polynesian diplomacy in the early 1870s, since the last of the 
Kamehamehas  “was a decidedly nativist, yet internationalist, leader who sought to modernize 
the kingdom while bolstering the fortitude of chiefly rule” (Kamehiro 2011, article not 
paginated). Kamehameha V’s subsequent correspondence with King Cakobau of Fiji also 
testifies of his personal interest in strengthening a fellow Polynesian monarchy.  
Unfortunately, however, Kapuāiwa passed away at the end of 1872, at the very time the 
strongest of Hawaiian support would have been necessary to back up the burgeoning but 
fragile Fijian Kingdom. Since Kamehameha V had no heirs, he would have to appoint a 
successor, an in absence thereof, a new monarch would have to be elected by the legislature.218 
After Kapuāiwa’s first choice as a successor, his cousin Princess Pauahi, refused the throne, the 
dying Mō‘ī faced the dilemma that the ali‘i he considered 
most able, Prince David Kalākaua, an experienced 
newspaper editor and government administrator with 
similar political views as the king, was lower in rank than 
the popular but politically inexperienced Prince William 
Charles Lunalilo (Mellen 1956: 234-235, 283). Thus he 
declined to appoint either of them his successor and left 
the decision to the legislative power.  
Lunalilo [fig. 6.6] unsurprisingly won and became 
the first elected Hawaiian sovereign. While it appears he 
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had only good intentions, his short reign of less than a year proved a disaster for Hawaiian pan-
Oceanianism, since of all possible choices, Lunalilo’s made the unwise decision to appoint 
Charles Reed Bishop the new foreign minister. Bishop, a Hawaiian banker of American birth, 
was a close associate of what would be called the Missionary Party,219 i.e. the sons and 
grandsons of the original ABCFM missionaries to Hawai‘i, most of whom were lawyers or 
businessmen, and who despite their Hawaiian birth were for the most part disloyal to the 
Hawaiian state and worked towards its destruction and takeover by the United States. As 
foreign minister, Bishop not only was involved in such treasonous actions as hosting and 
entertaining two American spies, upon whose suggestion he considered offering to cede Ke 
Awalau o Pu‘uloa [Pearl Harbour] to the US,220 an offer that was fortunately rescinded by the 
King after massive popular protests (Schweizer 2005: 259-261).221 Bishop also sabotaged 
Hawaiian pan-Polynesian policy and shut down the Hawaiian Commission to Central Polynesia 
in February of 1873, in order to “end all that Polynesia business once and for all,” as Horn 
succinctly paraphrased it (1951: 41). St. Julian’s successor Edward Reeve was demoted to 
being simply Hawaiian consul-general to Australia, over his vigorous protests.  
Reeve subsequently did all he could to keep alive the project he and St. Julian had 
dedicated decades of their lives. After his pleas to Bishop went unheard, he unsuccessfully 
attempted to transfer the allegiance of the pan-Polynesian movement to Tonga, and discussed 
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with Tongan Premier Shirley Baked to build the “Power in the World” from a Tongan instead of 
a Hawaiian base (Horn 1951: 42 n. 39).222  
Being a closeted American imperialist despite his Hawaiian nationality, Bishop thus 
tried to destroy all that St. Julian had built in over two decades, and apparently the King let him 
do so. To put a nice face to it, Lunalilo informed King Cakobau of Kamehameha V’s passing and 
his accession to the throne, and Bishop wrote an accompanying letter to his Fijian 
counterpart.223 But for all intents and purposes, Bishop, acting in the name of Lunalilo, 
succeeded in killing off Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism, for the time being. Fortunately for the 
Kingdom, Lunalilo reign, and Bishop’s tenure in the foreign department, lasted only for a year, 
and his successor Kalākaua would within days of having acceded to the throne overturn his 
decisions and take up pan-Oceanianism from where Kamehameha V had left it, as we will see 
next. 
 
Summary, critical evaluation and conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have examined the inception of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s policy 
towards the rest of Oceania through the early and middle of the nineteenth century and 
explored its diplomatic relationships with other Oceanian States during that period, with a 
focus on the central role played by Hawaiian diplomat Charles St. Julian in developing that 
policy and its underlying ideology. While his contributions were certainly innovative, they also 
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need to be seen as one important step in the development of Hawai’i’s inter-Oceanian 
interactions in the longue durée, following and evolving from four previous steps:  
First, in the pre-dynastic and early dynastic periods of Hawaiian history, i.e. around 
eight hundred to a thousand years ago, contacts with the islands to the south, referred to as 
Kahiki, were frequent, and Kahiki was acknowledged as a source of religious concepts and 
political ideas as well as the origin of kahuna and ali‘i lineages. This is important, as the 
memory of those ancient connections and origins later provided a historical context and 
reference when Hawai‘i reconnected with those islands. Secondly, after several centuries of 
classical Hawaiian political evolution in isolation, the Hawaiian state reconnected with Kahiki 
during Kamehameha I’s time, specifically Tahiti and the other Society Islands, which the Na‘i 
Aupuni intended to bring into his sphere of influence, by either peaceful alliances or conquest. 
Under the Conqueror’s sons Liholiho and Kauikeaouli the transition to the third phase took 
place. While the Society Islands were not taken over by Hawai‘i, contacts with Tahitians 
intensified, which was reinforced when the ruling classes of both societies converted to 
Calvinist Christianity. This led to the development of what I would term a pan-Eastern-
Polynesian consciousness through the 1820s to 1840s, attested by the close connections 
between Hawaiian ali‘i and Society Islands ari’i during that time. French intervention and 
colonial takeover of Tahiti prevented these connections from developing into durable political 
relations, which they otherwise undoubtedly would have.  
In the fourth phase, around the middle of the nineteenth century, political relations are 
scattered, revolving around trade-related consulates and Hawaiian mission stations in some of 
the islands, mainly in Eastern Micronesia.  It is during this period, however, that within 
diplomatic circles a highly sophisticated Pan-Oceanian policy project is being developed, 
spearheaded essentially by St Julian, with the support of Wyllie in Honolulu and some of St. 
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Julian’s Sydney-based staff. Under St. Julian’s ideas, the underlying ideology of Hawaiian foreign 
policy thus extends from having merely a pan-Eastern-Polynesian focus to encompassing all of 
Polynesia (or rather ‘Oceania’ in more recent terms). It was also under St. Julian’s advice that 
the Hawaiian Kingdom made its first attempt to annex an island in the South Pacific, viz. 
Sikaiana, in the 1850s, and in the 1870s established close political relations with another 
Oceanian state – Fiji – for the first time after French imperialism had interrupted those 
relations with Tahiti.  
In Hawai‘i, a survey of newspapers indicates that St. Julian’s activities were noted from 
early onwards. Foreign minister Wyllie referred to him in his annually published reports on 
foreign relations,224 and St. Julian’s 1857 Report on Central Polynesia was duly reviewed in The 
Polynesian.225  Later some of his diplomatic correspondence with Wyllie was also published and 
commented on.226 St. Julian was ranked among the Kingdom’s top diplomatic representatives 
abroad, heading the list of addressees receiving Wyllie’s circular announcing Hawaii’s 
neutrality in the Crimean War of 1854.227 Another article noted his very diligent exercise of 
consular duties228 and later, the Hawaiian Gazette in its annual almanac of Hawaiian 
government officials showcased St. Julian as one of only seven Hawaiian diplomats with the 
rank of chargé d’affaires.229 His mission to Fiji and possible Hawaiian annexation of that 
archipelago was discussed in the Kingdom’s legislature,230 and his passing away in Levuka was 
commented on in an extensive obituary.231 Later, during Kalākaua’s reign, reference to his 
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pioneer writings and activities were frequently made in editorials supporting Hawaiian foreign 
policy.232 
Remarkable, however, is the absence of references to St. Julian in the Hawaiian-language 
press during his lifetime. Except for a small notice mentioning his honorary membership in the 
Roya Hawaiian Agricultural Society,233 I have not seen any mention of his name in Hawaiian-
language papers.234 One might thus assume that his ideas remained mainly constrained to a 
smaller circle of loyal haole affiliates of the Kingdom government around Wyllie, Jarves and 
others but were not really disseminated among the Kingdom’s wider body politic.   
 
However, the fact that the correspondence between St. Julian and Wyllie was not 
disseminated to the Hawaiian public at-large does not make it any less relevant to the 
development of Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism. Deliberations among intellectual circles in small 
back room offices or via exchanges of letters have often been at the outset of grand ideas that 
ended up having wide impacts on history, for the worse or for the better. One example that was 
later painfully felt in Hawai‘i was American overseas imperialism, a project which was 
essentially thought out by little circles of individuals in New England – who unfortunately for 
Hawai‘i had connections to the ABCFM missionary families there – and only widely discussed in 
the broader American public when it had already begun being implemented in the 1890s (see 
Coffman 2009: 69-90, 108). A more positive example was late nineteenth-century Filipino 
nationalism, starting among a small circle of intellectuals who communicated with each other 
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in Spanish and were well connected to other anti-imperialist intellectuals within the Spanish 
colonial empire, but whose writings were only later translated into Philippine languages 
(Salazar 1998: 183-212; Anderson  2007).  
Also noting the absence of a wide-ranging publication of St. Julian’s ideas, Paul Hooper 
comes to a similar conclusion of assessing their overall value as very important:  
Nonetheless it was a consequential era. The very fact that Hawaii did become involved during 
this period created a precedent for international activism that has since been cited regularly 
and has been a factor in encouraging any number of more substantial activities. Even more 
important, the explanation for internationalist involvement which originated at this time – 
the notion that an advanced and superior Hawaii has a responsibility to become involved and 
provide at least exemplary leadership for other Pacific Island cultures – established a 
rationale that, with certain refinements, has been used to justify virtually every 
internationalist venture undertaken since that time. In other words, the union of thought and 
action basic to the local internationalist movement owes its existence to that period (Hooper 
1980: 43). 
Lastly, one might also be tempted to criticise the pan-Oceanian discourse spearheaded 
by St. Julian as paternalistic, as it justifies Hawai‘i's position as the leading power in the Pacific 
by presenting it as the most civilised and advanced Polynesian nation, and the others as more 
backward.  Such a tendency is also visible in Varigny’s writing, where he advocates for Hawai‘i 
to “civilise” the other archipelagos. While those types of statements sound indeed regretful 
from the point of view of today’s sensibilities, they should not blind us from seeing the overall 
progressive and indeed anti-colonial message in the discourse articulated by St. Julian, Wyllie, 
Reeve, Varigny and others. I have already mentioned St. Julian’s own rationalistic approach to 
the question, where he argued that Hawai’i’s mission to unify Oceania solely arises from its 
better position in international law to do so, but not from any inherent cultural supremacy 
among Polynesian peoples.  
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But the most striking example for this genuinely altruistic current in early Hawaiian 
pan-Oceanianism is undoubtedly Kamehameha IV’s attitude towards Sikaiana, when he 
insisted on a plebiscite to be held among the people of the atoll before any annexation to 
Hawaiʻi would take place. This represented a very early occurrence of the concept of self-
determination that was unheard of at the time. None of the nineteenth-century imperialist 
powers would have even remotely considered letting the people of a territory vote on whether 
or not they wanted to become its colony.  
These clearly progressive and anti-imperialist notions of Hawai‘i’s early pan-Polynesian 
projects set the tone for what was to follow under King Kalākaua’s reign. As much as I have 
pointed out the central importance of St. Julian’s political thought for the development of 
Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism, it did of course remain largely theoretical.  It was King Kalākaua 
and his close advisors and confidents, both kānaka and haole, who would take up the task of 
reformulating pan-Oceanianism as a coherent Hawaiian government policy and begin 
implementing it on the ground, which will be discussed in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7:  
Ka Hoku o Osiania: Hawaiian Pan-Oceanianism under Kalākaua 
 
His Hawaiian Majesty's Government, speaking for the Hawaiian people, so happily prospering 
through national independence, makes earnest appeal to the governments of great and 
enlightened States, that they will recognize the inalienable right of the several native 
communities of Polynesia to enjoy opportunities for progress and self-government, and will 
guarantee to them the same favourable political opportunities which have made Hawaii 
prosperous and happy, and which incite her national spirit to lift up a voice among the 
nations in behalf of sister islands and groups of Polynesia. (Hawaiian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Walter M. Gibson, 1883) 
 
Heaha o Hawaii? Oia anei kekahi o na mana nui o ka honua nei? A pehea la e ae wale ia mai ai 
kana mau olelo kuahaua? Aohe o Hawaii kekahi, aka, o ka mana o kana mau hooponopono 
ana malalo o na kuikahi ua lilo oia i keia la kekahi o na mana o ka moana Pakipika. (Honolulu 
resident W.L. Bishop Jr., 1887)235 
 
Das letzte unter den nicht randständigen, sich selbst bestimmenden Reichen Malaio-
Polynesischer Herkunft war Hawai, dessen Geschichte deshalb das Bestreben widerspiegelt, 
das politische Schicksal des Grossen Ozeans aus seiner Inselwelt heraus zu bestimmen. 
(German scholar of Geopolitics Karl Haushofer, 1920s)236 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I have discussed the inception of a pan-Oceanian Hawaiian 
foreign policy during the third quarter of the nineteenth century, which was spearheaded by 
senior Hawaiian diplomat and Charles St. Julian. We have also seen how after St. Julian’s 
resignation from his position to become Chief Justice of Fiji, and after the end of the 
Kamehameha dynasty, pro-American interests hostile to pan-Oceanianism exerted strong 
influence over the Hawaiian government and temporarily shut down the policy. However, 
barely one year later, a new King, Kalākaua, acceded to the throne, and, in the words of Paul 
Hooper, “initiated a more vigorous internationalist program than even St. Julian had 
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envisioned. Indeed, in certain respects, internationalist endeavours during his reign reached a 
level unsurpassed to this day” (Hooper 1980: 44). A detailed discussion of these endeavours is 
the topic of the present chapter.  
The three introductory quotes illustrate the import of Kalākaua’s internationalist 
endeavours. The first, part of an official declaration of the Hawaiian government in 1883 and 
the second one, a guest editorial in a Hawaiian newspaper in 1887, show that by the 1880s, the 
vision formulated three decades earlier had become not only official Hawaiian government 
policy but had also been disseminated through the vernacular media to wider society.  Finally, 
the quote by German scholar Haushofer four decades later puts Hawai‘i’s late nineteenth 
century pan-Oceanian policy in a geopolitical context of the Pacific peoples’ struggle for self-
determination in the longue durée. 
The chapter will start with a description of Kalākaua’s early pan-Oceanian activities in 
the 1870s. Next explored will be the role of two other worldly Westerners, Celso Moreno and 
Walter Gibson, who both became Kalākaua’s advisors and contributed to the development of a 
pan-Oceanian, pan-Austronesian and pan-Asian awareness among the Hawaiian elite. This had 
the effect of re-orienting Hawaiian foreign policy when the King embarked on his 1881 
circumnavigation and formulated a vison of a pan-Asianist future for the Asia-Pacific region 
while visiting Japan and other non-Western nations, with whom Hawai‘i maintained close 
relations in the following. In the mid-1880s, Kalākaua’s policy culminated in a new departure 
towards a coherent pan-Oceanian foreign policy of the Kingdom, which will be discussed next, 
with a focus on the 1887 Hawaiian diplomatic mission to Sāmoa and its ramifications for 
Hawaiian political discourse back home.  
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Rebooting Pan-Oceanianism in Kalākaua’s early reign 
 
When Lunalilo passed away without an heir after barely a year on the throne another 
election took place, and Kalākaua [fig. 7.1] won against Kamehameha IV’s widow Queen 
Dowager Emma Kaleleonālani. Since it was Bishop and his cronies who as the temporary 
council of regency had run the election, 
which was fraught with controversy, 
Kalākaua was in a way beholden to them at 
the beginning of his reign and needed to 
tread carefully in rebuilding what Bishop 
had destroyed. 
Nonetheless, Oceanian relations 
were immediately back on the agenda at 
the Palace. Merely four days after his 
election to the throne, Kalākaua wrote to 
King Cakobau, informing him of his 
assumption of the chief executive and 
expressing his desire to continue cordial 
relations with the Fijian Kingdom.237 A year later, when Kalākaua returned from the United 
States in early 1875, where he had successfully negotiated a treaty of commercial reciprocity, 
he was accompanied by Sāmoa’s Premier Albert Steinberger who was also returning from a 
diplomatic voyage to the US. During the weeklong passage, the king advised Steinberger on 
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 Kalākaua to Cakobau, 16 February 1874. Copy enclosed in Set 11-29/1874, Chief Secretary’s Office, Naval and 
Consular Correspondence, National Archives of Fiji. Unfortunately Kalākaua’s renewed intention to nurture 
Hawaiian relations with Fiji came to nothing, as by the time Cakobau received Kalākaua’s letter, the Fijian King had 
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(Routledge 1985a: 186-210). 
Fig. 7.1: King Kalākua (reg. 1874-1891). Photo by 
unknown photographer, c.1882. Copyright expired. 
Spurce: Wikipedia.  Original in Hawai‘i State Archives. 
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matters of governance for the emerging Samoan state (Robson 1980: 56-59). Later that year 
the Ta‘imua of Sāmoa sent a letter to Kalākaua asking for Hawaiian recognition of their 
government, which he promptly answered in the affirmative. The profound impacts of this 
connection on Samoa’s political development will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. For Kalākaua, this involvement with Sāmoa early in his reign started a dedication to 
pan-Oceanianism that would last throughout most of his reign.  
In the enthusiasm and prospect of economic prosperity following the conclusion of the 
reciprocity treaty, pan-Polynesian ideas spread to wider sectors of society, even to those 
hitherto opposed to them. In the latter part of the 1870s there was a short moment when even 
parts of the Missionary Party were ready to join in a resurrection of St. Julian’s ideas. Editor 
Henry Whitney, an ABCFM missionary son, in the Hawaiian Gazette advocated and predicted 
for the Hawaiian Kingdom as the “ruler of the Pacific” to “become the mother of the scattered 
Polynesian groups and bring to them the blessings of Christianity, Commerce and 
Civilization.”238  Although the motivations were obviously rather a mix of missionary 
paternalism and self-serving economic interests than a desire to strengthen the standing of 
Polynesian peoples in the world, the episode shows that Kalākaua’s pan-Oceanianism was not 
necessarily and at all costs opposed by his domestic haole opponents. During the same time, 
the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, originally founded by Whitney in the 1850 as a Missionary 
Party organ to oppose the loyalist Polynesian, slowly moved away from the opposition to the 
government side, and its editor during the late 1870s, Henry Sheldon, a naturalised Hawaiian 
of American birth and father of future Hawaiian nationalist author and editor John Kahikina 
Sheldon,239 gave his full endorsement to a proactive pan-Oceanianist foreign policy. In a 
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comprehensive 1877 editorial discussing the troubles in Sāmoa following the collapse of the 
political order created with Steinberger’s and Kalākaua’s help, Sheldon pointed out the 
importance of maintaining the independence of Polynesian archipelagos by making 
comparisons across the Pacific and advocating their unification:  
The question of Polynesian independence is one which should interest all Polynesian 
Islanders. Already the Maoris of New Zealand have allowed the British to get a definite 
footing in their Islands, Their independence is now lost for ever. With all the advantages of 
British rule, they are certainly not as far advanced, socially or religiously, as the independent 
Hawaiians. The Tahitians and Marquesans have partly fallen under the French regime. 
Neither can they compare with the Hawaiians. On the neighboring continents of North and 
South America and Asia, the colored races have not advanced under the whites either socially 
or religiously, like the people of the Hawaiian Islands. The conclusion is, that the Polynesians 
ought to strive to maintain what suits them the best their national independence and, save 
existing rights, their best policy would be to adopt a common flag.240 
 
Commenting on plans by the British to consider taking over the Samoan archipelago for 
the alleged good of the natives, Sheldon argued that “this object might be more legitimately 
obtained by establishing the national principle of “Polynesia for the Polynesians.”” Citing the 
plans by Wyllie, whom he regarded as a great statesman, for a Polynesian confederation as a 
precedent, and linking the whole idea to the earlier project of the great Kamehameha, Sheldon 
went on to advocate a revival of these plans: 
[I]f their Hawaiian kinsfolk and themselves [i.e. the Samoans] could come to some 
understanding about the adoption of a common Polynesian Independent native national flag, 
subsequently to be unfurled over all the independent native Polynesian, Micronesian and 
Melanesian Islands, we think that such a step could do no manner of harm whatever either to 
the Hawaiians or Samoans, and might ultimately prove the dawning day of a new era of 
grandeur for the native Polynesian people. The grand old heathen Monarch who laid the 
foundation of this prosperous and flourishing United Hawaiian Kingdom, is said to have even 
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contemplated the establishment of a great Polynesian Empire. The native Kings or all 
Polynesia could not do better than revive and accomplish this magnificent policy of a United 
Polynesia foreshadowed by the most illustrious of Polynesian warrior Kings of the olden time 
– Kamehameha the Conqueror.241 
 
With this editorial, a brilliant advancement of St. Julian’s thought, one would expect 
Sheldon to have become Kalākaua’s chief advisor on pan-Oceanian policy. However, as it turned 
out, Sheldon was to play a secondary role, and his position, both as the editor of the Pacific 
Commercial  Advertiser and as the mouthpiece of Hawaiian pan-Oceananism were taken by 
Walter Murray Gibson, and to a lesser degree by Celso Cesare Moreno, whose contributions to 
the development of Hawaiian diplomacy in Oceania we will examine next.  
 
Gibson, Moreno and the establishment of Pan-Malay and Chinese connections  
 
Walter Murray Gibson’s pan-Austronesianism 
 
Gibson, born in England in 1822, came to the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1861 as a Mormon 
missionary, having already lived an adventurous life on three continents.  When he was a child, his 
family had migrated first to Canada and then to the United States, where he had had a successful 
career as a merchant, diplomat, and lecturer and author about his overseas adventures (Bailey 
1980; Adler and Kamins 1986). 
His association with the Mormon Church was short-lived and relatively inconsequential 
for the role he was to play in Hawaiian politics. Much more important was the impact of his travels 
to the Malay Archipelago in the 1850s. Already fascinated with the idea of serving a native ruler in 
his struggle against Western encroachment, Gibson had set out on an adventure that took him to 
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the city of Palembang on the island of Sumatra in the Dutch East Indies [today’s Indonesia, see 
map in fig. 7.3], where he intended to offer his services to Sultan Abdulrahman Nazaruddin of 
Jambi, then still an independent realm but threatened with a possible Dutch colonial takeover 
(Locher-Scholten 2003: 101-14). However, his letter to the sultan was intercepted by the Dutch 
colonial authorities, who had Gibson arrested and jailed in Weltevreden, a suburb of the Dutch 
colonial capital of Batavia [now Jakarta] on Java, until he was rescued after more than a year, due 
to US consular intervention. During his long confinement as a prisoner, Gibson studied the Dutch 
and Malay languages, and gathered a wide range of information on the Malay Archipelago. Back in 
the United States, he recounted his adventures in a best-selling book, The Prison of Weltevreden 
(Gibson 1855). 
When he arrived in the Hawaiian 
Kingdom in June of 1861, he immediately 
befriended Hawaiian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Robert Wyllie, who took a great interest 
in Gibson’s expertise on the Malay 
Archipelago, and who, in turn, introduced 
Gibson to Charles St. Julian’s ideas of a Hawai‘i-
led independent Polynesia (Adler and Kamins 
1986: 55-56). In an article published in The 
Polynesian shortly after his arrival, Gibson 
combined the two visions into a call for pan-
Asia-Pacific independence, stating that 
“Malaysia, (i.e. all Asia, Polynesia and all 
shades and qualities of races and nations,) has 
Fig. 7.2: Walter Murray Gibson (1822-1888). Photo 
taken by unknown photographer. Source: Wikipedia. 
Original in Honolulu Advertiser collection. 
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within itself, the qualities from which must be built up the outward and visible form of its 
institutions.”242 This set the tone for Gibson’s political thought for the rest of his life.  
After leading the Hawaiian Mormon community for three years, and ending up being 
excommunicated by the Church leaders in Utah for disobeying church directives and teaching 
false doctrines 1864 (Adler and Kamins 1986: 69-76), Gibson [fig. 7. 2], having gained full fluency 
in Hawaiian, decided to remain in the Kingdom and became a naturalized Hawaiian subject on 
March 26, 1866.243 Living as a rancher on the island of Lāna‘i, and residing part of the time in 
Lāhaina, Gibson began a journalistic and political career in Honolulu. His first official mission for 
the Hawaiian government was in 1868, when Kamehameha V sent him to Washington as an 
attaché to a Hawaiian diplomatic mission to start the negotiations that eventually led to the 
reciprocity treaty with the United States. Gibson was to continue on a world tour to go to 
Singapore to arrange for Malay immigration to Hawai‘i, but due to miscommunication these plans 
could not be carried out.244 
In February of 1873, he started Nuhou: The Hawaiian News, a bilingual newspaper that 
strongly advocated for the protection of Hawai‘i’s independence and denounced schemes that 
might jeopardize this independence, such as the lease of Pearl Harbour Lagoon to the United 
States proposed by the treacherous Charles Bishop and his cronies of the Missonary Party (Adler 
and Kamins 1986: 90-95). In contrast to this group, who were Hawaiian subjects only on paper, 
Gibson took his Hawaiian allegiance seriously and employed his newspaper vehemently  to 
oppose this group of potential traitors, continuing the tradition of the earlier Hawaiian nationalist 
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press of the 1860s such as Ka Hoku o Ka Pakipika and Ke Au Okoa that had been edited by future 
King Kalākaua and future diplomat John Kapena (Mookini 1974: vii–viii; Silva 2004a: 63-86). 
Gibson also used his newspaper to familiarize Hawaiians with the Malay world, just as he 
had done with his 1855 book for English-speakers. For that purpose, he serialized “Ke Kaao o 
Lakamana. Ke Koa Nui o ka Poe Malae,” a Hawaiian rendering of a Malay epic story,245 and “Saipa 
(Sayeepa), Ke Kaikamahine Kaula o ka Mokupuni Sumatera” (“Sayeepa, the diviner girl of the 
Island of Sumatra”), a romantic story of his own experiences in Sumatra and Java as recounted 
earlier in The Prison of Weltevreden.246 Unlike the ‘exoticism’ of those places he had presented to 
his Western audiences in the latter book, in his Hawaiian writings he emphasized the linguistic, 
genetic, and cultural similarities between Hawaiians and Malays, and he concluded that the two 
peoples should unite to protect their independence. In an article titled “No Hea Mai Na Kanaka 
Hawaii” [“Where Are the Hawaiians From”], he wrote:  
O na kupuna mua o keia lahui noloko mai no lakou o na pae aina nui o Malae. [...] I na e hiki 
kekehi kanaka Hawaii ma Iawa (Java) a komo oia i kolaila mau aahu e like me lakou e noho ala 
ma ko lakou aina; aole oia e hoomaopopoia he malihini ; a ina hoi e hiki mai ana i Hawaii nei 
kekahi mau kanaka Iawa, a wahine Iawa paha a komo i na aahu e like me kakou, e kohu like no 
ka nanaina me he Hawaii ala. E ano iki ana no ka lakou olelo, no ka mea, ua hookaawaleia lakou 
mai ka nohona o na aina Polunesia no na haneri makahiki he nui. […] 
I ke au o ka noho Alii ana o Kamehameha V., ua hoopuka ae kekahi luna aupuni nui mai Akina ae 
a makou i halawai pu ai ma Wasinetona “e mareia na ’lii o na pae aina Hawaii me na alii o Malae.” 
Ina e ulia wale mai ka hookoia e like me ia, alaila e hookahua paa loa ia ke Kuokoa o Hawaii nei; a 
e loaa no hoi na manao lana o ke ola o ka lahui, nokamea, e holo mai no na kanaka oia lahui like 
me Hawaii nei, a hoonuiia ka ulu ana o na keiki Hawaii.247 
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 “The original ancestors of this national population are indeed from inside the large archipelagos of Malaysia. […] 
If a Hawaiian person comes to Java, and puts on the cloths of over there in the same fashion as those who are living 
in their country; he is not seen as a stranger; and if in turn Javanese men or Javanese women are coming here to 
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 Two years later, in a pamphlet entitled Address to the Hawaiian People Gibson reiterated 
this train of thought, vigorously rejecting the then common argument made by Westerners that 
the demographic collapse of the Hawaiian population was evidence of them being an “inferior 
race.” Pointing to the significant population growth observable in the Malay Archipelago whose 
people were of the same stock, Gibson urged Hawaiians to invite Malay people to move to the 
Kingdom and intermarry with them to reinvigorate the population while keeping its Austronesian 
character (Gibson 1876: 4-5).  
Gibson’s insights on Austronesian linguistics and migration history were not  only 
remarkable for the time, his promotion of pan-Austronesian identity and political activism also 
proved highly influential in furthering Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism by extending it from the insular 
Pacific to include the closely related Austronesian peoples of the Malay archipelago. Soon, this 
would influence official Hawaiian government policy, as we will see below.  
While Gibson had endorsed Lunalilo in 1872, during the 1874 election the pan-
Austronesian champion threw his full editorial support behind Kalākaua, whose victory thus 
brought Gibson one step closer to the centre of political power. His 1878 election to the House of 
Representatives marked the beginning of his career as a political officeholder. He was re-elected in 
1880 and 1882, and in 1880 was also appointed to the King’s Privy Council and the Board of 
Health, of which he became president in 1882.248 In the latter capacity, he published a bilingual He 
mau Olelo Ao e Pili ana i ke Ola Kino o na Kanaka Hawaii/Sanitary Instructions for Hawaiians, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hawaii and are putting on clothes like us, they will be in their general appearance exactly like Hawaiians. Their 
language will be only little alike because they have been separated from the way of life of the lands of Polynesia for 
many centuries. […]  
During the reign of Kamehameha V, a high diplomat from Acheen [Aceh] with whom we conferred in Washington 
declared that “the chiefs of the Hawaiian Islands should be married to the chiefs of Malaysia.” If suddenly it were to 
be carried out like that, then the Independence of our Hawai‘i would become firmly established; and there would 
also be hopes for the survival of the national population, because people from that national population so similar to 
that of our Hawai‘i would come, and the growth of Hawaiian children would increase.”  Nuhou: The Hawaiian 
News, 14 October 1873: 2–3. 
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 Hawai‘i State archives, Office record for Gibson, Walter Murray 
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first book of its kind systematically, and in a way sympathetic to the Hawaiians, to tackle the 
prevalent problem of dramatic native population decrease due to introduced diseases and 
unfamiliar ways of life brought by the influx of Western culture (Gibson 1882). In addition to 
concerning himself with the health of the Kingdom’s subjects, as a legislator Gibson continued his 
support for Kalākaua’s increasingly assertive nationalist projects, such as the King’s 1881 tour 
around the world, as well as the new royal palace and the statue of Kamehameha the Great 
mentioned above  (Adler and Kamins 1986: 113, 122, 128).  
At the same time, Gibson remained active as a publisher and editor of the Hawaiian 
patriotic newspapers Ka Elele Poakolu (1880-1881), Ka Nupepa Elele Poakolu (1882-1885), Ka 
Elele Poaono (1885), and Ka Nupepa Elele (1885-1887) (Mookini 1974: 49). Moreover, in 1880, 
Gibson had procured a government loan from Kalākaua’s minister of the interior, John E. Bush, to 
purchase the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, which he definitively converted into a loyal voice of 
the Kingdom and fierce opponent of the Missionary Party (Adler and Kamins 1986: 121). In both 
the Advertiser and English sections of his Hawaiian-language papers, Gibson exposed the 
missionary descendants – self-proclaimed “responsible citizens” – for what they really were, a 
racist and elitist minority out of touch with the mainstream of Hawaiian society, stating that it was 
“very shallow work to discuss political problems from the standpoint of the minority and utterly 
to ignore the sentiments, the inherited ways and ideas, of the vast majority of the population.”249 
Having won the King’s backing, and having become the leader of loyalist public opinion 
through his newspapers, Gibson had set himself up to become Kalākaua’s leading political advisor.  
But right before Gibson would rise into the innermost circle of the court, another sympathetic 
Westerner with pan-Austronesian connections would enter the scene.  
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 The Wednesday Express, English section of Ka Elele Poakolu, 15. September 1880, p. 6. 
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Celso Cesare Moreno’s Malay and Chinese connections 
 
When Gibson in his 1873 article on Hawaiian origins in the Malay Archipelago referred to 
the Acehnese envoy he met in Washington D.C. during Kamehameha V’s reign, he was probably 
not anticipating meeting him again in 1880 in Honolulu. The diplomat in question was Celso 
Cesare Moreno, an Italian with a worldview quite similar to that of Gibson. Born in Piedmont in 
1831, Moreno had taken to the sea as a young man, and after earning an engineering degree from 
the University of Genoa travelled throughout the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and Asia as a 
ship captain. Similar to Gibson, he was a polyglot and had developed a passion for the plight of 
non-Western peoples and a desire to serve native leaders in their fight against imperialism.  In 
India he had participated in the 1857-58 Sepoy mutiny against British rule, and after the rebellion 
had failed, he went via Burma to Aceh (Vecoli and Durante 2014: 17-52). 
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 Like Jambi, Aceh [see map in fig, 6.6] was a native Sumatran sultanate struggling for the 
survival of its independence in the face of the expanding Dutch colonial empire.  With his worldly 
skills and displayed sympathy for the case of Acehnese independence, Sultan Alauddin Ibrahim 
Mansur Syah made Moreno his close advisor and allowed him to marry one of his daughters. Due 
to internal political troubles, Moreno had to leave Aceh in 1862 (ibid.: 54), but before his 
departure the sultan apparently commissioned him Aceh’s plenipotentiary to negotiate with 
Western powers on his behalf.  After a pan-Islamic appeal to the Ottoman Empire had failed to 
protect Aceh from Dutch imperial aggression, the sultan’s new strategy was to seek an alliance 
with another Western power in order to outbalance the Netherlands, at the price of ceding a piece 
Fig. 7.3: Mid-eighteenth- century map of Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula and the northwestern tip of 
Java by Jacques-Nicolas Bellin, reprinted in 1852, labeled in German and French. Copyright expired. 
Source: Wikipedia. The names of states and cities relevant to the dissertation’s narrative have been 
superimposed by the author in red.  
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of Acehnese territory to that power, and Moreno was tasked to establish such an alliance (Reid 
1969: 85-86).   
After an intermezzo in China, Moreno 
returned to Italy in 1864, and from there to 
France. His negotiations with both governments 
to get them involved with Aceh went as far as 
having personal audiences with King Victor 
Emanuel II and Emperor Napoleon III, but both 
ultimately failed (Vecoli and Durante 2014: 59-
88). Frustrated with European powers, Moreno 
[fig. 7.4] went on to the United States and stayed 
for a prolonged time in Washington where he 
attempted to lobby leading American politicians 
to take an interest in Aceh, and more generally in 
Asia, launching a public relations campaign that 
included the publishing of a book (Moreno 1869).  
At the same time, he conceptualised and began promoting the laying of a trans-Pacific telegraphic 
cable between the US and China (Vecoli and Durante 2014: 105-121). 
It was during his stay in France that he most likely learned his first detailed information 
about the Hawaiian Kingdom, as he visited the 1867 Universal Exposition (ibid.: 80), at which the 
Hawaiian Kingdom’s exhibit won a gold medal as I mentioned above.  Closer connections were 
established in Washington in 1868-69 when Moreno met Gibson on his planned diplomatic world 
tour to recruit Malay immigrants to the Hawaiian Kingdom. It must have been in this context that 
Moreno suggested to Gibson the marriage alliance between Malay rulers and Hawai‘i.  While 
Fig. 7.4: Celso Cesare Moreno (1831-1901). 
Photo by unknown photographer before 
1901. Copyrigt expired. Source: Wikipedia.  
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Moreno failed in getting either the US or Hawai‘i interested in Aceh, he stayed in the US for the 
next decade as a lobbyist for the cable and for the rights of Italian immigrants. In 1874, he met 
Kalākaua in San Francisco when the King was on his way to Washington.  The two men were 
immediately impressed by each other, and Moreno compared the Hawaiian King to “my father in-
law the Sultan of Aceh,” only “a little more civilised” (Vecoli and Durante 2014: 117-118). The King 
also shared Moreno’s enthusiasm for a trans-Pacific cable and offered to have a mid-Pacific 
substation built in the Hawaiian Islands (Moreno 1880a: 7). 
In 1876, Moreno’s lobbying efforts bore at last some fruits, as the US Congress granted him 
and his associates the rights to lay and operate a trans-Pacific cable, but it was left to his Pacific 
Cable Company to raise the capital needed for the project (ibid.: 114-115). Moreno departed once 
more to China, where he was able to gain the support of Chinese merchants and of China’s 
government leader Li Hongzhang, who viewed the project favourably as it fit well into his 
program of “self-strengthening” the Chinese empire. In the same sense, Li had founded the 
privately owned but government-subsidised China Merchants Steam Navigation Company 
[CMSNC], in order to create a Chinese-controlled merchant marine to compete with the Western 
steamship companies both in the domestic trade between Chinese ports and Chinese commerce 
overseas (Lai 1994).  
Having gained the Qing Empire’s backing for his cable project, Moreno came to the 
Hawaiian Islands as a CMSNC agent aboard one of the company’s steamships in late 1879.  His 
twofold mission, to gain Hawaiian government support and funding for the trans-Pacific cable and 
to establish a coaling station for CMSNC ships in Honolulu harbour, immediately had King 
Kalākaua’s support, as well as that of the wealthy local Chinese community, who had invested 
significant money into the CMSNC (Lai 1994: 224). Moreno’s mission was also connected with the 
formal opening of a Chinese consulate in Honolulu in March of 1881, headed by local Chinese 
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businessman and former Hawaiian privy councillor Chun Afong (Dye 1997: 146-151). As always a 
brilliant PR strategist, Moreno had a pamphlet on his pan-Pacific cable project, containing the 
proposed Hawaiian charter to support the cable company , Moreno’s 1876 testimony before the 
US Senate’s foreign affairs committee, and reprints of earlier supportive articles from the 
American and Hawaiian press, printed in English and Hawaiian (Moreno 1880a and b). 
After nine months of lobbying the Kingdom’s political institutions, Moreno had gained the 
King’s trust and support. Being somewhat frustrated with his current cabinet ministers, especially 
interior minister Samuel Wilder who was an associate of the Missionary Party, in August of 1880, 
Kalākaua  replaced them with a new cabinet headed by Moreno as minister of foreign affairs. 
Immediately prior to his appointment, Moreno had given up his Italian and US citizenships to 
become a naturalized Hawaiian subject.250 Moreno’s appointment created uproar among the 
Missionary Party who tried to stir up hatred against the new minister in public meetings. They 
were joined by British Commissioner James Wodehouse and American Minister James Comly who 
stirred up similar antagonism among the other foreign diplomatic representatives, including 
French commissioner J.L. Ratard, all of whom refused to recognise Moreno in his ministerial office 
and deal with him (Mellen 1958: 90-91; Vecoli and Durante 2014: 173-180).  
Faced with this common front of the foreign diplomats conspiring with his domestic 
opposition, Kalākaua had no other choice than ask for Moreno’s resignation and appoint a new 
cabinet dominated by Missionary Party members to calm the situation. At the same time, he asked 
London, Washington and Paris to recall their representatives who had unduly interfered in 
Hawaiian domestic politics. The King also commissioned the departing Moreno as special envoy to 
the courts of Europe and entrusted to him three Hawaiians to be educated there as part of the 
studies abroad programme that had just been passed by the Hawaiian legislature (Mellen 1958: 
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 Naturalization Index, Hawai‘i State Archives. 
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91-92; Kuykendall 1967: 220-223; Quigg 1988).  
The short and stormy nature of the “Moreno affair” should not be dismissed as some kind 
of a fancy capriole of Kalākaua, as many previous historians have done (e.g. Daws 1968: 215-216). 
In fact, Kalākaua’s relationship with Moreno was part of a much larger, carefully developed plan 
by the Hawaiian Mō‘ī to strengthen the Kingdom’s international position and fortify its internal 
stability. As historian Kathleen Mellen points out, Kalākaua’s frequent changes of cabinet 
ministers, both before and after his appointment of Moreno, were not erratic moves as they may 
have appeared, but rather tactic maneuvers the King made in consultation with Gibson in a 
strategy to remove the Missionary Party from positions of power within the Kingdom that they 
had usurped during the power vacuum on the throne during Lunalilo’s politically inexperienced 
reign (Mellen 1958: 115-128). Like Gibson, Moreno had recognized the danger posed to the future 
of Hawai‘i by the Missionary Party with its pro-American leanings, and thus the imminent need to 
eliminate them from any sort of political influence (Vecoli and Durante 2014: 169-170). 
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Secondly, what made Moreno particularly attractive to have in the King’s inner circle was 
the trans-Pacific cable project. Kalākaua, who had a lifelong passion for modern science and 
technology, immediately understood the enormous benefits the cable would bring to the 
Kingdom. As Moreno wrote in his advertising pamphlet, once the cable was laid, the Hawaiian 
Islands would “immeasurably rise in political, strategical, maritime, commercial, financial and 
international importance and become the Singapore, Java, Borneo, Penang and Sumatra of the 
Western Hemisphere […]” (Moreno 1880a: 17). An 1870 map of telegraph lines in place and under 
construction clearly shows how the cross-Pacific section was the only one missing from 
completing the global cable network [fig. 7.5].251 Hence Moreno’s project was neither outlandish 
nor ahead of its time but actually very timely and realistic for the year 1880. Furthermore, to no 
longer have delays in communication with the rest of the world would have been an insurance 
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 For a discussion of telegraphy in the Pacific region during the nineteenth century, see also Laborie 2013. 
Fig. 7.5: 1870 map of telegraph lines in operation (green), under contract (red) and contemplated 
(blue). Drawn by J. H. Colton. Copyright expired. US Library of Congress collection.  
318 
 
policy against the shady dealings of the Missionary Party with or without American diplomats, as 
they were played right during Moreno’s tenure in the foreign office, and as they would be played 
again in 1887 and 1893 as will be discussed in chapter eight.252 With a cable in place, the 
government’s version of those events would have been immediately disseminated worldwide, and 
there would have been no chance for anti-Hawaiian propaganda to spread through print media 
the way it did after 1893.  In that sense, the cable deal alone should be seen as one of Kalākaua’s 
genial visionary projects.  
Third, and most importantly perhaps, was the weight of Moreno’s ideas and political 
connections for Hawai‘i’s geopolitical interests. Like St. Julian, Sheldon and Gibson before and after 
him, Moreno advocated a unification of Polynesia under Hawaiian leadership. Making an 
interesting allusion to the then quite recent unification of Italy, Moreno wrote in an 1886 open 
letter to Kalākaua how he had discussed the issue with the King in 1881:  
[Y]our Majesty ought to have imitated IL RE GALANTUOMO253 in everything, especially in the 
choice of the right man and means in carrying out the grand, humane and generous idea of 
uniting under your sceptre the whole Polynesian race and make Honolulu a monarchical 
Washington, where the representatives of all the islands would convene in Congress (Moreno 
1887: 11; emphasis in the original). 
 
Besides this, and his connections to Malay sultanates, with which both Gibson and Moreno 
advocated close relations to strengthen the Hawaiian population, what made Moreno specifically 
interesting was that he offered close connections with the Chinese Empire.  
It was these geopolitical considerations that best explain the unprecedented actions of the 
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 As Australian amateur historian Stephen Dando-Collins (2012: 164-165, 221-222) has well documented, Queen 
Lili‘uokalani’s protest against the 1893 conspiracy between the Missionary Party and the American Minister to 
overthrow her was delivered by the Hawaiian Foreign Office via steamer to the Hawaiian consulate in Auckland, 
and from there fed into the British telegraphic cable system, arriving within a few hours in the US where it had the 
effect of balancing the Missionary Party’s anti-Hawaiian propaganda. However, since the steamship carrying that 
propaganda had arrived in San Francisco considerably earlier than the steamship carrying the Queen’s message did 
in Auckland, the Missionary Party could enjoy a significant head start to tell its version of the story. 
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 Italian for “The Gentleman King,” referring to Victor Emanuel II, the unifier of Italy. 
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foreign diplomats.254 As a Republican close to James Blaine, a key figure in the emerging US 
imperialist circles who later brought about the 1893-1898 occupation of Hawai‘i,255 Comly saw 
the rising Chinese influence in the islands as antagonistic to long-term US strategic interests in the 
region, while for Hawaiian strategic interests it would have been most welcome. As a cable and 
trade hub between China and the US, and with major Chinese capital investments matching those 
from the US, Hawai‘i’s neutrality would have become more enhanced, and any prospect of 
unilateral US domination would have been precluded. 
This was also one of the rare cases all the rivalling Western powers saw eye-to-eye. They 
were all equally wary of China’s rise to become a geopolitical rival, and especially of its closing of 
ranks with another non-Western nation, which would threaten Western imperial hegemony. Once 
China had gained a foothold in the Hawaiian Islands and became a maritime power in the Pacific, 
it would have been hard for the Western powers to continue their bullying tactics against the 
Celestial Empire. While the US saw Hawai‘i in its own orbit, the western powers as a whole saw it 
in their extended spheres of influence too. Its alliance with China would thus have realigned the 
entire power structure of the Northern Pacific to the benefit of non-Western peoples.256 In that 
sense, what Li Hongzhang and Kalākaua wanted to promote with Moreno’s help was a sort of early 
pan-Asianism, an idea the King would soon develop further.  
The failure of this project, for the time being, taught Kalākaua important lessons for his 
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 Vecoli and Durante found evidence that Comly was angry at not being invited to join Moreno’s cable company 
(2014: 117). But this alone would hardly justify engaging in the interference in the internal affairs of the host 
country, a significant breach of diplomatic protocol, and even less that the other diplomats would join him in such a 
venture. The argument brought forward that Moreno was unsuited as Hawaiian foreign minister because he was an 
“adventurer” who had only recently arrived was also invalid, since in precedent cases in the 1840s, American 
adventurers John Ricord and Wiliam Little Lee had also been appointed cabinet ministers within a short span of 
their arrival in the islands, and that had been accepted as a sovereign decision of Kamehameha III by all foreign 
consuls at the time. 
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 On the importance of Blaine and the rising circle of US expansionists for Hawai‘i’s occupation, see Coffman 
2009. 
256
 Such a vision was expressed a year later in the pagoda built by the Chinese merchants of Honolulu to greet King 
Kalākaua on the return from his world tour, which bore the inscription “Hawaii Kui Lima Me Kina” [“Hawaii 
Joining Hands with China”] (Mellen 1958: 112) 
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further pursuit of foreign policy.  The “Moreno Affair” was the first instance of the diplomatic 
corps – all Westerners at that point257  – siding close-banded with domestic enemies of the 
Kingdom. Kalākaua thus realized that unlike his predecessors, he could no longer rely on 
European powers to side with the Kingdom against subversive activities of the US-affiliated 
Missionary Party. Hence, in order to safeguard Hawaii’s independence, it was more expedient than 
ever to reach out to other non-Western nations more powerful than Hawai‘i such as China and 
Japan. If that had failed in Moreno’s case with China for the time being, it was worth to try over 
and over again, by any necessary means.   
 
Kalākaua’s world tour and the development of Hawaiian Pan-Asianism  
 
Ka‘apuni Honua: The King’s 1881 world tour 
 
Almost immediately after the setback of the Moreno affair, Kalākaua took the reins of 
state back in his hands. He knew he needed to wait a little more before he could get rid of the 
post-Moreno cabinet dominated by Missionary Party associates and replace them with loyal 
Hawaiian patriots. But he was ready to engage again in overseas diplomacy, this time himself in 
person, by departing on a diplomatic voyage around the world, thereby becoming the first 
sitting head of state in history to do so. Quite surprisingly, he chose two ABCFM missionary 
sons, Charles Judd and William Armstrong as members of his suite. This was another tactical 
move of the King, as long as he had not been able to subdue the Missionary Party yet: Annoying 
as the two would be to him, taking them along the trip would keep the domestic enemies from 
complaining and fomenting more trouble in his absence from the country.  
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 Japan was diplomatically represented in Honolulu since 1875, but this representation was effected by Westerners 
acting as Japanese commercial agents. A Japanese consulate staffed by Japanese subjects was not established until 
1885 (Watanabe 1944: 183) 
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Leaving the Islands in January of 1881, the King travelled via San Francisco to Japan and 
from there to China and Hong Kong. He then visited Siam, Singapore and Johor, Malacca and 
Burma. From Calcutta he travelled overland through British India to Bombay, and sailed from 
there via Aden to Egypt. From there he crossed the Mediterranean to Italy, visited Rome and 
the Vatican, and travelled on via Paris to London. He further visited Brussels, Berlin and 
Vienna, Paris again, and then Madrid and Lisbon. Traveling back through Spain and France, he 
crossed the channel to England again, visited Scotland and departed from Liverpool to cross 
the Atlantic to New York. In the United States he visited Washington D.C. and its environs, and 
took the transcontinental railway to reach San Francisco again, from where he returned to 
Honolulu on 29 October of the same year (Pacific Commercial Advertiser Co. 1881; Armstrong 
1977; Kuykendall 1967: 227-237) [see map 7.6].  
While Kalākaua was cordially received by the heads of state or their representatives in 
almost every country he visited, arguably the most elaborate and intimate welcomes he 
received from the rulers of non-Western states he called upon. It is telling that details of the 
King’s visits to Japan, China, Siam and Johor take up more than four fifths of the pages in the 
official English-language report of the King’s voyage (Pacific Commercial Advertiser Co. 1881). 
This is not surprising, as interests were mutual between Hawai‘i and these nations. For the 
other non-Western countries, who were treated by the Western powers as second- 
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Map 7.6: 1881 world map with the itinerary of Kalākaua’s 1881 circumnavigation and highlighted 
countries relevant to Hawaiian geopolitics during his reign superimposed by the author. 
323 
 
class members of the international order and hence subjected to unequal treaties, the Hawaiian 
Kingdom was a beacon of hope, because it was the only one among their fellow non-Western 
states to have achieved full diplomatic parity with the Western powers. In other words, Hawai‘i 
was seen by the other non-Western states as the one among them who had already entered the 
club they all wanted to join. 
For Hawai‘i, what was to be gained was a diversification of its foreign relations and a 
prospect of getting out of an unilateral dependence on the Western powers, which, while 
treating Hawai‘i as a diplomatic equal, had nonetheless recently interfered in its internal affairs 
Fig. 7.7: King Kalākaua during his visit to Japan in 1881. Standing: Hawaiian Chamberlain Colonel 
Charles H. Judd, First Secretary of the Japanese Ministry of Finance Tokuno Ryosuke, Hawaiian 
Attorney-General and Commissioner of Immigration William N. Armstrong. Sitting: Prince 
Komatsu Akihito, King Kalākaua, Japanese Minister of Finance Count Sano Tsunetami. By unknown 
photographer. Copyright expired. Source: Wikipedia. Original in Hawai‘i State Archives. I 
acknowledge Cemil Aydın for helping to identify the Japanese officials. 
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when they collectively refused to recognize the new Hawaiian minister of Foreign Affairs. By 
helping non-Western powers gain full recognition, Hawai‘i might thus gain powerful allies it 
could rely on and use as leverage in case it was faced again with a common front of hostile 
Western powers.  
Hence, while in Tokyo [fig. 7.7], Kalākaua proposed to change the 1871 Hawaiian-
Japanese treaty in order to abrogate Hawaiian privileges of extraterritoriality and thereby 
create a precedent for the Western powers to follow. The strategy may have succeeded if it had 
not been prematurely leaked to American and British diplomats by Armstrong, who thus 
revealed himself as a traitor to his King (Armstrong 1977: 47-51; Keene 2002: 347). A few days 
later, during a private meeting with the Meiji Emperor, Kalākaua, likely referring to the recent 
diplomatic outrage against his minister Moreno, made the most extraordinary proposal, which 
discloses a lot about his political thought and the rationales for his trip: 
The purpose of my travels this time has been to promote something that has been on my 
mind for many years, a league of the countries of Asia. The European countries make it their 
policy to think only of themselves. They never consider what harm they may cause other 
countries or what difficulties they may cause other people. Their countries tend to work 
together and cooperate when it comes to strategy in dealing with the countries of the East. 
The countries of the Orient, on the other hand, are mutually isolated and do not help one 
another. They have no strategy for dealing with the European countries. This is one of the 
reasons why the rights and benefits of the East are now in the hands of the European 
countries. Consequently, it is imperative for the countries of the East to form a league to 
maintain the status quo in the East, in this way opposing the European countries. The time for 
action has come.  
 
After the Emperor had expressed its interest in knowing more about the King’s plans, Kalākaua 
went on: 
During my trip, I intend to meet with the rulers of China, Siam, India, Persia, and other 
countries and to discuss with them the advantages and disadvantages of forming a league. 
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However, my country is a tiny cluster of islands and its population is insignificant; it lacks the 
strength to carry out a great plan. Your country is exactly as I have heard – not only has your 
progress been truly astonishing, but the people are numerous and of a hardy disposition. 
That is why, if a league of the countries of Asia is to be initiated, Your Majesty must step 
forward and be its leader. I will serve Your Majesty as his vassal and devote my energy to the 
cause. If Your Majesty becomes the head of the league and works to carry out its purpose, it 
will surely compel the European countries to abandon extraterritoriality. (Kalākaua, quoted 
in Keene 2002: 347-348)258 
 
Meiji was generally interested in the idea but opined that the time was not ripe for the 
league to be formed yet, especially as there was at the time enormous rivalry and mutual 
distrust between China and Japan – which would eventually lead to the Japanese-Chinese War 
of 1895. Kalākaua’s two other proposals to the Emperor, to resurrect the trans-Pacific cable 
project with Japanese support, and to seal a marriage alliance between the two dynasties by 
having his niece Ka‘iulani marry Japanese Prince Sadamaro could also not be realised at the 
time (ibid.: 349). 
 Notwithstanding its failure for the time being, Kalākaua’s remarks are truly fascinating, 
as they represent pan-Asianist thought long before it became prevalent among Asian leaders 
and intellectuals during the early twentieth century (Aydın 2007). Contrasting this with the 
common historiography of Kalākaua’s voyage that has been dominated by Armstrong’s biased 
account (Armstrong 1977), Meiji’s most extensive English-language biographer Donald Keene 
thus considered Kalākaua as having “greater political insight than anyone in Hawaii suspected” 
(Keene 2002: 350). With this visionary speech, Kalākaua clearly needs to be acknowledged as 
one of the pioneers of pan-Asianism. 
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 Keene quotes the verbatim transcript of Kalakaua’s speech from 明治天皇紀 (the official chronicles of the Meiji 
reign). 
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Quite interesting in Kalākaua’s speech is his humble dismissal of Hawai‘i’s importance 
as a “tiny cluster of islands,” certainly meant as a polite rhetorical understatement to humble 
himself in the face of the Meiji Emperor, similar to the then common expression “your most 
humble servant” that was used even by superiors in letters addressing their subordinates.259 
While there was a certain truth to this assessment in terms of population and land surface, it 
clearly does not reflect the importance of the Hawaiian Kingdom as the leading nation of 
Polynesia with its potential, as St. Julian had suggested three decades earlier, to become a 
“power in the world” once it had succeeded in federating all of Oceania under its leadership. In 
an editorial published during Kalākaua’s trip, Gibson thus explicitly combined the King’s visit to 
Japan with the pan-Oceanian discourse that was already prevalent at home, weaving Hawaiian 
pan-Oceanianism into the discussion of Japan as an emerging power of Asia: 
The generous and magnificent hospitality of the Emperor of Japan, and of his Princes and 
dignitaries, to our King calls for the warmest and liveliest expression of gratitude on the part 
of the Hawaiian people; because, evidently, the great honor and distinction accorded, was 
intended for them, as well as to mark a personal regard for the Sovereign. Japan during her 
short association with western civilization appears invariably in a noble and enlightened 
attitude. She reflects great honor on Eastern civilization. Let a regenerated Polynesia respond 
to an enlightened Japan; and Hawaii, speaking for Polynesia, will send a heartfelt and 
enthusiastic aloha of gratitude to His Imperial Majesty Mutsuhito and to his People.260 
 
After leaving Japan, Kalākaua visited China and had an equally cordial reception by Li 
Hongzhang in Tianjin. Resuming where Moreno as a liaison had left off, Li and Kalākaua once 
more discussed the laying of the cable and the use of Honolulu as a coaling station for the 
CMSNC (Dye 1997: 178-179). Unfortunately, during the 1880s, the CMSNC got in major 
troubles due to mismanagement by officials (Li 1994: 231-237), which probably explains why 
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 For instance, Wyllie and St. Julian – his subordinate – constantly address each other that way in their various 
communications cited above. 
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 Editorial, Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 23 Apr 1881, p. 2 
327 
 
the plans to gain a foothold in Honolulu were not further pursued. During Kalākaua’s stay in 
Bangkok, relations with King Chulalongkorn of Siam were similarly warm and deep, and 
included the mutual conferral of high decorations. Documentation of what exactly might have 
come out of possible discussions about Siam joining the proposed pan-Asian league has not 
been found so far.  
During the following visit in Johor, relations between the Hawaiian King and another 
non-Western ruler reached another climax. Not only was Maharajah Abu-Bakar the first non-
Western brother monarch he met who was as fluent in English as Kalākaua so they could talk 
without an interpreter, the King also found him physically very similar to a Hawaiian ali‘i, 
specifically the late prince Leleiohōkū I261 as Kalākaua remarked in a letter to his brother-in-
law, stating that “[i]f [the Maharajah] could have spoken our language I would take him to be 
one of our people the resemblance being so strong.”262 While Abu-Bakar could not speak 
Kalākaua’s native language, the two monarchs compared words in Hawaiian and Malay, and 
within a few minutes could identify a number of them that both Austronesian languages had in 
common, and reflected on the common origins of their peoples (Armstrong 1977: 44; 
Requilmán 2002: 164). Back home, Gibson was delighted to see his long-time vision of pan-
Austronesian relations finally become reality and used the comparison between the two realms 
to point out flaws in the current state of affairs in the Hawaiian Islands:  
We are very glad that our Hawaiian visited a Malay sovereign, the Maharajah of Johore: that His 
Majesty recognized striking evidences of kinship between Hawaiian and Malay: that His Majesty 
observed that these brown cognates of Johore were healthy, prolific and an increasing people, 
though living under the guidance and dominion of the European race; that His Majesty 
recognizes that there is no natural law, or destiny, that the brown races shall pass away in the 
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 William Pitt Leleiohōkū I (1821-1848) was the son of Kamehameha I’s kālaimoku Kalanimōkū and a member of 
the House of Nobles, a Privy Councillor and governor of Hawai‘i Island under Kamehameha III. 
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 Kalākaua, letter to Governor of O‘ahu John O. Dominis, 12 May 1881 from Singapore. Reprinted in Kalākaua 
1971: 82. The King’s observations were also published in Hawaiian in Ka Elele Poakolu, 13 July 1881, p. 4. 
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presence of the whites, as is alleged in Polynesia; and that evidently decay and decline among 
His Majesty’s native people must be the results of some mischievous interferences with the 
natural order of things, and of hurtful radical changes affecting the sanitary condition of the 
aborigines of Polynesia. 263 
 
For reasons unknown, Kalākaua did not visit Persia as originally planned, but he later 
communicated and exchanged decorations with Shah Nasser Eddine in 1886.264 In Egypt, 
Kalākaua was received by Khedive Tewfik and besides having fruitful discussions with him also 
established relations with the Empire of Abyssinia, whose ambassador he met in Alexandria 
(Pacific Commercial Advertiser Co. 1881: 69). Furthermore, since the Egyptian Khedivate was 
formally a vassal state within the Ottoman Empire, Kalākaua established relations with the 
latter too, and conferred Hawaiian decorations upon Sultan Abdülhamid II and other Ottoman 
officials (Kalākaua 1971: 96, 99-100).  
Kalākaua’s encounters with fellow non-Western monarchs and their subjects 
contributed to changing Hawaiian perceptions about the Kingdom’s place in the world. While 
the King was and remained highly interested in Western culture, such as European music, for 
instance (Kalākaua 1971: 105; Wernhardt 1987), it was not lost on the King that in most other 
non-Western countries traditional culture was a significantly more important component 
within modern statecraft than it was in the Hawaiian Islands. Of course, as I discussed in 
chapter five, by the late nineteenth century, all non-Western states that had relations with the 
rest of the world had practiced some sort of selective appropriation that had led to a 
hybridisation of their traditional social and political systems. However, the degree to which 
similitude was used as a tool to achieve parity varied significantly; in other words there were 
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 Editorial, Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 16 July 1881, p.2. 
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 Nasser Eddine Shainshah to Kalākaua, King of Hawai‘i, and Kalākaua to Nasser Eddine Shainshah, Emperor of 
Persia, 30 July 1886. FO&Ex, Miscellaneous Foreign 1886, Hawai‘i State Archives. 
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differences in the quantity of the Western component within the hybrid socio-political system 
of the modern state that was being built.  
Arguably in the Hawaiian Kingdom, the Western component had been significantly 
larger than in most of the other non-Western countries, since for instance most Hawaiians had 
become Christians, and formal dress being worn by ali‘i and wealthy commoners alike included 
little elements from classical Hawai‘i. Whereas Meiji-era Japanese officials easily switched 
between wearing Western clothes and kimono, as shown on fig. 5. 5, and even the most 
progressive Qing imperial officials like Li Hongzhang wore only traditional dress [fig. 3.3], no 
Hawaiian ali‘i during the second half of the nineteenth century has been documented ever 
publicly wearing a barkcloth malo [loincloth], pa‘ū [skirt] or kīhei [cape]. All that remained 
from traditional dress were ‘ahu ‘ula [feather cloaks] that high-ranking ali‘i might occasionally 
don over a Western-style suit or uniform during ceremonies of state. Maka‘āinana in rural 
areas were still occasionally photographed wearing malo, but commoners in the city would 
normally wear Western clothing as well.  
While until the 1880s there appeared to have been little documented criticism of this 
tendency to value Western dress, the impressions King Kalākaua gained in other non-Western 
states began to change that. In an editorial entitled “He Leo i na Hawaii Ponoi” (“A Plea to 
Hawaii’s Own [people]”) of August of 1881, Gibson exhorted Hawaiians to identify as non-
Westerners and refuse cultural Occidentalisation. Describing how in anticipation of Kalākaua’s 
return, Hawaiians have been encouraged to both wear formal Western dress and stop 
venerating the King as a sacred ruler by Missionary Party affiliates, Gibson went on:   
[A]laila, olelo ae – “he oiaio, he ulaula kou ili, aka oiai he aahu haole kou, nolaila he haole oe.” 
Ea! aole anei oia ka oi o ka hilahila? O wai la ke kanaka e makemake ana e holoi i na 
hoomanao aloha ana no kona mau kupuna a me ka lakou mau hana mai kona puuwai aku?  
330 
 
Pehea ka poe o Siama? I ka hoea ana o ka Moi ilaila, aole lakou i hele mai maluna o na kaa 
me na aahu o ka haole; aka, maluna o na Elepani, ke ano holoholona a ko lakou mau kupuna i 
malama hanohano ai, a me a aahu o ko lakou mau kupuna. Pela no ma Johore, kekahi 
kulanakauhale Malae – o na hana a ma na ano o ko lakou mau kupuna, oia kai pahola ia mai. 
Pela ma Kina. Ma Iapana, ua pai ia ke kii o ka Moi me ka aahu o na’lii o keia aupuni, a pela no 
me kahi mau wahi e ae.  
Nolaila, e ala oukou e na Hawaii, a e hoike aku oukou i ko ke ao, he mau Hawaii Ponoi 
oukou, aole he poe haole. O ka leo keia o kekahi puuwai haole I ake e ola o Hawaii a e holomua 
no ka manawa pau ole. E lawe mai i na waa pakahi, na kaulua, na peleleu, na ahi kukui kapu, 
na pololu, na ihe, na mahiole, na palau, na maa, ka aha kapu o na’lii, na aahu o na wa kahiko, a 
me na ano e ae i maa i na kupuna o ka lahui Hawaii me ka lakou mau hookipa ana i na’lii o ko 
kakou aina, a i malama ia ai hoi ko lakou kapu ma ka eehia.265  
 
As an appeal to reject similitude and re-embrace a truly hybrid identity based on native 
culture, this editorial is another early instance of Pan-Asianist thought, prefiguring the 
discourse of Asian values and identity of pan-Asian intellectuals in the early twentieth century 
such as the one quoted at the beginning of the fifth chapter. Being printed in Hawaiian, in a 
paper with a circulation between 4,000 and 7,000 (Chapin 1996: 77) the editorial presumably 
reached a very wide audience and thus provides evidence that this type of mana‘o 
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 “Then one will say, “Truly, your skin is brown, but since you are wearing Western clothes, you are a Westerner.” 
Say, is this not the highest of shame? Which person in the world wants to wash away the affectionate memory of 
their ancestors and of their deeds from their heart? 
     How about the people of Siam? During the King’s arrival there, they did not come on carriages in Western dress, 
but on Elephants, a type of animal that their ancestors have held in high regards, and wearing the clothes of their 
ancestors.  It was alike in Johore, a Malay city – it is the activities and ways of their ancestors that are being 
continued. The same is true for China. In Japan, the picture of the King was printed in the dress of the nobles of that 
country, and in the same manner it went with other places [Note: it is unclear whether “Moi” here refers to the Japanese 
Emperor, of whom portraits dressed in kimono are well known, or whether Kalākaua was sitting for a photo in kimono during his 
visit, which is well possible, but no such picture is known today]. 
     Therefore, wake up Hawaiians, and show those of the world that you are Hawai‘i’s Own, and not Westerners. 
This is the plea of a white man’s heart that yearns for Hawai‘i to live and to progress forever. Take the single 
canoes, the double-hulled canoes, the large catamarans, the sacred kukui nut fires, the long spears, the javelins, the 
feather helmets, the war clubs, the slings, the sacred sennit cords of the chiefs, the clothes of the olden times, and the 
other ways that were accustomed to by the ancestors of the Hawaiian nation when they were welcoming the rulers of 
their land, and so that their sacredness will be taken care of with awe.” Ka Elele Poakolu, 24 August 1881, p. 4. 
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[thought/discourse] was not limited to intellectual circles in the royal court but was 
deliberately disseminated to the population at-large. 
Contrary to what many twentieth-century historians have claimed, the point of such 
editorials was not to “stir up racial antagonisms” between aboriginal Hawaiians and haole.266 
Far from fomenting a narrow-minded Hawaiian ethnocentrism based on xenophobia and 
racism – a ridiculous accusation in itself, given the fact that Gibson, Sheldon and other writers 
of the Elele Poakolu’s editorials were themselves Hawaiian patriots but not of aboriginal 
descent – this and similar editorials were meant to raise an awareness that modernity did not 
require a cultural Westernization, and that Asian states had demonstrated that the latter was 
indeed unnecessary to build a modern state. In other words, Hawaiian hybrid modernity 
should have a larger native cultural component instead of relying solely on similitude.  Another 
quote of a speech given by Gibson after Kalākaua’s coronation in 1883 summarises the same 
thought very well in English: “You must retain the best of the past but prepare yourselves for a 
changing future… You must advance – but do so as Polynesians…” (quoted in Mellen 1958: 
182). 
 
Follow-up relations with Japan and other non-Western states 
 
Of all countries Kalākaua visited during his circumnavigation, the trip probably had the 
most profound consequences on relations with the Japanese Empire. Japan’s strategy of 
“modernisation without Westernisation,” or more accurately, the creation of a model of 
hybridity with a more dominant native cultural component clearly fascinated royal circles in 
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 An evaluation of the writings and speeches of Gibson, Kapena, Baker and other Hawaiian patriots in that sense 
has been made, for instance, by Horn (1951: 57), Kuykendall (1967: 187, 282), Adler and Kamins (1986: 198) and 
Andrade (1996: 14, 23, 29), all based on a selective reading of primary sources containing the Missionary Party’s 
anti-government propaganda. 
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Hawai‘i. Historian Matt Matsuda, after discussing the Meiji reforms, points out that “[a]cross 
the Pacific, David Kalakaua was an observer of Japan’s transformation” (Matsuda 2012:241), 
John Charlot likewise points out Kalākaua’s fascination with Meiji’s Empire (1985: 62 n.60), 
and the King himself commented his attachment in his diary when departing: “Adieu Japan – 
Beautiful Japan. I felt as if I would have a continual longing to see this interesting country with 
its kind and hospitable inhabitants of a long long time. Aloha Nui.” (cited in Marumoto 1976: 
62). 
As a follow-up to the royal visit, two further Hawaiian diplomatic missions to Japan, by 
John Kapena in 1882 and by Curtis ‘Iaukea and Henry Poor in 1884, consolidated relations 
between the countries and led to a 1886 Hawaiian-Japanese convention that enabled the 
immigration of Japanese subjects into the Kingdom (Iaukea 1986: 102; Watanabe 1944: 99-
131). When the first contingent of Japanese immigrants under the new agreement arrived, 
Kalākaua greeted them at the harbour and they acknowledged him with the gestures of 
devotion due to a Japanese emperor, prostrating themselves and shouting “Banzai!” [literally 
“May you rule for ten thousand years”] (Field 1937: 220). On the Hawaiian side, youths Isaac 
Harbottle and James Haku‘ole were sent to Japan to study as part of Kalākaua’s study abroad 
programme in 1882 (Quigg 1988: 195-196),267 later followed by Thomas Cummins (son of 
aboriginal Hawaiian sugar planter John Cummins) who went to Japan for several months to 
study the language in 1884.268 Kalākaua continued to promote his special attachment to Japan 
when he included a story called “The Iron Knife” in his 1888 Myths and legends of Hawai‘i, an 
account of the first attempted unification of the Hawaiian Islands by twelfth-century Hawai‘i 
Island Mō‘ī Kalaunuiohua, in which a samurai sword brought by Japanese castaways plays a 
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 A third Hawaiian student, James Kapa‘a, was sent to study Canton in China, indicating that Hawai‘i was 
interested in maintaining equally good relations with Li Hongzang’s government, and was not trying to place all his 
eggs in the Japanese basket. 
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 Nupepa Elele Poakolu, 2 June 1884, p.2. 
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central role (Kalākaua 1971: 177-205).269 Later this closeness to Japan would at least partly 
pay off for Hawai‘i, as the Japanese Consulate-General in Honolulu would refuse to go in line 
with the diplomats of Western powers and not accept the ipso facto situations created in the 
1887 and 1893 Missionary Party coups against the Hawaiian government (Watanabe 1944: 
138ff; Horne 2007: 166ff). 
On the other hand, Japan was to gain a lot from its friendly relations with Hawai‘i as 
well. Japan regarded Hawai‘i as a potential keystone in its foreign policy, since under the 1871 
Hawaiian-Japanese treaty, Kalākaua’s kingdom was in the unique position of being one of 
Japan’s unequal treaty partners enjoying extraterritorial privileges, yet was not a Western 
power, but another native monarchy like Japan. In an ironic twist to the common Western 
discourse of the time, Hawaiian Envoy Kapena referred to extraterritorial rights as a “relic of 
barbarism” in a discussion with Japanese Foreign minister Inoue Kaoru (Watanabe 1944: 102).  
As mentioned above, due to Armstrong’s treachery, the treaty could not be revised 
during Kalākaua’s visit as originally planned, but the project was not forgotten, and the 
Hawaiian Kingdom did eventually become the first treaty power to relinquish 
extraterritoriality in Japan: Immediately prior to the 1893 overthrow of her government, 
Queen Lili‘uokalani instructed the Hawaiian minister in Tokyo that Hawai‘i was renouncing all 
unequal rights stemming from the 1871 treaty, which was accepted by Japan on 10 April 
1894.270 This was several months before Great Britain renounced extraterritoriality in July of 
the same year, upon which all other Western powers followed suit between 1894 and 1898 
(Perez 1999; Kayaoğlu 2010).  
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 For a rhetorical analysis of Kalākaua’s Myths and legends of Hawai‘i and the importance of this English-
language publication in the overall political strategy of the King, see Ing Tsai 2003. 
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 Exchange of Notes between Hawai‘i and Japan respecting Consular Jurisdiction. 18 January 1893/10 April 1894. 
The Consolidated Treaty Series, 1648-1919, Vol. 180: 125) 
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Kalākaua’s visit also led to the appointment of new Hawaiian consuls in Shanghai, 
Bangkok and Singapore,271 mainly to maintain close connections with the Imperial Chinese 
government and the courts of Siam and Johor. In Johor’s case there was also a diplomatic 
follow-up visit, when ‘Iaukea and Poor were received by Maharajah Abu Bakar on their way to 
Japan in 1884.272 
 
Kalākaua’s Hawaiian Renaissance under Gibson’s Premiership 
 
“A New Departure in Hawaiian Politics” 
 
Within less than a year after his return from the world tour, Kalākaua at last succeeded 
in removing the Missionary Party from positions of political influence and in May of 1882 
appointed a fully loyalist cabinet headed by Gibson as minister of Foreign Affairs (Mellen 1958: 
115-128; Adler and Kamins 1986: 128-129). This also marked the return of the position of 
kuhina nui to Hawai‘i’s political system, as Gibson was referred to as such in Hawaiian, and as 
“premier” in English.273 Furthermore, in February of 1883, the King had Charles Bishop 
removed from the position of president of the Board of Education, in which capacity he had 
continued to cause damage to the country’s development by promoting only mediocre 
education at the Kingdom’s public schools while trying to contain high-level scholarship to the 
children of the Missionary Party and their affiliates (Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua 2014). Gibson was 
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 Kalākaua mentions these new acting consuls in a letter to Gov. John Dominis, 12 May 1881 from Singapore. 
Reprinted in Kalākaua 1971: 82-83. 
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 Reports from Hawaiian Consul in Singapore, FO& Ex, Hawaiian Officials Abroad – Singapore 1878-1888, 
Hawai‘i State Archives. See also Iaukea 1986: 102. 
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 It does not appear that this was strictly speaking constitutional, as I am not aware the 1864 constitution was ever 
amended to create such an office, but the designation of Gibson as premier/kuhina nui was widespread in the 
newspapers of the time, including when countersigning the promulgation of official acts. 
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appointed in Bishop’s place, cumulating that position with those of Premier/Foreign minister 
and Board of Health president.274  
The period of Gibson’s premiership from 1882 to 1887, self-identified by the kuhina nui as 
a “new departure in Hawaiian politics” (Kuykendall 3: 254), marked the heyday of King Kalākaua’s 
rule, which is often referred to as the ‘first Hawaiian renaissance’ or the ‘Hawaiian golden age.’ 
Under the leadership of Kalākaua, Gibson, and their associates like Kapena, Bush, ‘Iaukea and 
Aholo just to name a few, the Kingdom pursued a policy of nationalist prestige and native cultural 
revival, culminating in 1883 in an elaborate coronation ceremony for the King that in an 
extraordinary display of hybridity combined Western royal splendour with classical Hawaiian arts 
and performances (Kamehiro 2009: 26-54). This hybrid Hawaiian renaissance included the 
development of other activities initiated in a similar direction, for example, the formation of the 
Hale Nauā society to study and promote Hawaiian cultural practices (Karpiel 1999) and the 
publication of the Kumulipo, a classical epic chant of cosmic origins composed for Kalākaua’s 
ancestor Ka‘i‘imamao four generations earlier (Kalākaua 1889). 275 In general, there was indeed a 
renaissance of classical Hawaiian art forms such as hula and chant throughout the period, which in 
term was being hybridized with European arts such as classical music, opera and theatre (Bailey 
1980: 193-197; Silva 2004a: 87-122; Kamehiro 2009).  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, it was during the same era that the status of 
Christianity as a virtual state religion, especially in its form taught by Western missionaries, was 
being challenged increasingly openly by people in and around Kalākaua’s court. Rooted in the 
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 Office record for Gibson, Walter Murray; Hawai‘i State Archives. Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua skips over Gibson’s tenure 
as Board of Education president, highlighting Bishop’s terms before and after him, and another major recent study 
of Hawaiian Kingdom education policy (Makekau-Whittaker 2013) focuses on an earlier period up to the 1860s. 
Gibson’s main biographers (Mellen 1958; Bailey 1980; Adler and Kamins 1986) have not looked into the details of 
his educational policies either, focusing more on his achievements in foreign and health policy. An analysis and 
assessment of Gibson’s work in this important position at a crucial point in time has yet to be done.  
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 Eight years later, Kalākaua’s sister and successor published an English translation (Liliuokalani 1897). For a 
critical comparative analysis of the Queen’s translation with that produced by ABCFM missionary descendant 
Martha Beckwith (1972), see McDougall 2015. 
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disillusionment with the Calvinist puritanism of the ABCFM that of all Christian denominations 
was most incompatible with Polynesian culture and lifestyles, this had become reinforced by the 
realisation gained by the King during his world tour that his country had more in common with 
other non-Western nations that were not Christian than with the Christian powers of the West.276 
Nothing symbolised this more than the new Hawaiian national anthem “Hawai‘i Pono‘ī” written by 
the King in 1874 as an unambiguously non-Christian spiritual exaltation of Kamehameha I who is 
addressed as “Makua Lani e” [“Heavenly Father”] and the three estates of the kingdom – Mō ‘ī, ali‘i 
and lāhui – to replace the previous anthem that was essentially a prayer to the Christian God to 
preserve the King (Charlot 1985: 15-23).  On the more mundane level, a humorous anecdote 
published in Gibson’s Nupepa Elele Poakolu poked fun at Biblical teachings while identifying 
classical Hawaiian religious traditions as more appropriate for Hawaiians to follow:  
Ninau aku la kekahi kumu kula Sabati i kana mau haumana i kekahi Sabati, “Owai na kanaka 
mua?” Pane aku la kekahi wahi keiki kolohe, “O Papa ma laua o Wakea.” Ia manawa huhu mai la 
ke kumu, a olelo maila, “O Adamu a me Ewa.” Pane aku la ua wahi kolohe nei, “Pono no hoi paha 
ia ina oe i ninau mai nei i na haole mua; alaila o Adamu io no hoi a me Ewa ka’u e hai aku ai. No 
ko ninau ana mai nei hoi ia’u i ke kanaka mua, nolaila, o Papa a me Wakea na kanaka mua;” ia 
manawa, lohaloha iho la ua kumu kula Sabati la; a  hene iki iho la hoi ka aka a na haumana  kula 
Sabati.277 
 
Unsurprisingly, one of the key elements of this reassertion of Hawaiian political, cultural 
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 Even Kalākaua’s consort, Queen Kapiolani and his sister Princess Lili‘uokalani who unlike him was a practicing 
Christian, during Queen Victoria’s 1887 jubilee celebration in London immediately bonded with the royal family 
members of the other non-Western powers present, viz. Japan, Siam and Persia, with whom they, “although unable 
to speak a common language,[…] were soon on the most cordial terms,” (Warinner 1975: 36)  
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 “One Sunday, a Sunday School teacher asked his pupils, ‘Who were the first kānaka [people]?’ A certain rascal 
child replied, ‘Papa together with Wākea.’ At this time, the teacher became angry and said, ‘Adam and Eve.’ The 
rascal replied, ‘That might have been correct if you had asked for the first haole [strangers]; then indeed I would 
have said Adam and Eve. But because you asked me for the first kānaka, therefore I said Papa and Wakea were the 
first kānaka.’ At this time, the teacher conceded defeat, and the Sunday school students started giggling in laughter.” 
According to classical Hawaiian tradition, Earth Mother Papa and Sky Father Wākea were the progenitors of the 
Hawaiian Islands and also of the kalo plant and the kānaka [humans]. The anecdote plays with the word kānaka, 
which can mean human beings in general, but also specifically Hawaiian or Polynesian people as opposed to haole 
[strangers]. Ka Nupepa Elele, 27 Feb 1884, p. 3. 
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and spiritual identity during Gibson’s premiership was a public reiteration of the concept of 
‘Hawaiian Primacy in the Pacific.’  Shortly after the King’s return from the world tour, Gibson had 
once more written an editorial urging that “[t]he policy of this kingdom should be to assist, in 
every way that is practicable, to preserve the independence of all those communities of Polynesian 
race which have not already been driven by circumstances to seek the protection of foreign 
Powers,” and went on to mention “the significant fact that twenty years ago the Hawaiian 
Government had been thus represented in the South Pacific by a Commissioner, Mr. St. Julian, 
whose assistance had been gladly availed of by the inhabitants of the islands.”278 When this 
proposal was ridiculed by the Missionary Party press, Gibson had provided a lengthy Hawaiian-
language rebuttal, written as a fictional discussion between a Hawaiian diplomat and the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the island of Rarotonga.279  As the new head of the foreign office, Gibson had 
now full access to the department’s archives and further studied St Julian’s earlier correspondence 
with Wyllie (Bailey 1980: 200-201). Being of like mind with the King in this matter, the two men 
now intended to bring those visionary ideas to full fruition at last.  
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 “Hawaiian Primacy in Polynesia.” Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 19 November 1881, p. 2. 
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 Ridicule of Gibson’s proposal in Saturday Press, 26 November 1881, supplement page. Rebuttal in Ka Elele 
Poakolu, 30 November 1881; reprinted in English translation in Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 3 December 1881, 
supplement page. 
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At the same time, during the years 1882-83 petitions 
were received from Butaritari and Abaiang in the Gilbert Islands, 
asking for Hawaiian protection or outright annexation by the 
Kingdom (Horn 1951: 62). One such petition hat already been 
received in 1878 from Tabiteuea in the same archipelago (ibid.: 
60), which had led to detailed discussions in the English-language 
press, referring back to Wyllie’s and St. Julian’s earlier project.280  
Replying to these requests, Kalākaua refused outright Hawaiian 
annexation but declared his intent to establish closer political 
relations with the islands’ leaders and unsuccessfully invited 
them to his coronation, which they were probably unable to 
afford (Ibid.:63). In May of 1883, the king of the Tokelauan atoll of Fakaofo also wrote to Kalākaua, 
requesting him to bring back his people who had left the island.281 To follow up with the 
Gilbertese chiefs, in July of 1883, Gibson commissioned Alfred Tripp [fig, 7.8], a ship captain 
involved in the recruiting of Gilbertese labourers who had been a member of Kalākaua’s privy 
council since 1874, as “Special Commissioner for Central and Western Polynesia.”  Tripp’s mission 
was cut short because his ship was wrecked in the Gilbert Islands, but he communicated with all 
major chiefs of that archipelago and brought home more petitions for Hawaiian aid or 
protection.282 
Encouraged by obvious interest in other archipelagos for closer relations with Hawai‘i, 
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 King Tetaulu of Fakaofo to King Kalākaua, 4 May 1883. FO&Ex, Miscellaneous Foreign 1883, Hawai‘i State 
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 File “Special Mission to Central Polynesia 1883,” FO&Ex, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, Hawai‘i State Archives. 
See also Horn 1951: 64-67. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
Fig. 7.8: Alfred Newton 
Tripp (1840-1913). Source: 
Obituary in Hawaiian 
Gazette, 30 December 
1913, p. 2. Copyright 
expired. 
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Gibson announced the new direction for Hawaiian foreign policy in an editorial in August 1883, 
arguing that “if anyone is to interfere to prevent further aggrandization of foreign and distant 
powers in the Pacific, Hawaii ought to do it.”283 In line with this stance, on August 23, 1883, Gibson 
wrote a formal diplomatic protest to the governments of twenty-six countries of the world against 
the colonial partitioning of Oceania by Western powers (Horn 1951: 70-71), which is worth 
quoting in full:   
Whereas His Hawaiian Majesty's Government, being informed that certain sovereign and 
colonial States propose to annex various islands and archipelagoes of Polynesia, does hereby 
solemnly protest against such projects of annexation, as unjust to a simple and ignorant people, 
and subversive, in their case, of those conditions for favourable national development which 
have been so happily accorded to the Hawaiian nation. 
The Hawaiian people, enjoying the blessings of national independence, confirmed by the joint 
action of great and magnanimous States, ever ready to afford favourable opportunities for self-
government, cannot be silent about or indifferent to acts of intervention in contiguous and 
kindred groups, which menace their own situation. 
The Hawaiian people, encouraged by favourable political conditions, have cultivated and 
entertained a strong national sentiment, which leads them not only to cherish their own political 
State, but also inspires them with a desire to have extended to kindred, yet less favoured, 
communities of Polynesia like favourable political opportunities for national development.  
And whereas a Hawaiian Legislative Assembly, expressing unanimously the spirit of the 
nation, has declared that it was the duty of His Hawaiian Majesty's Government to proffer to 
kindred peoples and States of the Pacific an advising assistance to aid them in securing 
opportunities for improving their political and social condition: His Hawaiian Majesty's 
Government, responding to the national will, and to the especial appeals of several Polynesian 
Chiefs, has sent a Special Commissioner to several of the Polynesian Chieftains and States to 
advise them in their national affairs. 
And His Hawaiian Majesty's Government, speaking for the Hawaiian people, so happily 
prospering through national independence, makes earnest, appeal to the Governments of great 
and enlightened States, that they will recognize the inalienable right of the several native 
communities of Polynesia to enjoy opportunities for progress and self-government, and will 
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guarantee to them the same favourable political opportunities which have made Hawaii 
prosperous and happy, and which incite her national spirit to lift up a voice among the nations in 
behalf of sister islands and groups of Polynesia.  
By order of His Majesty in Council. 
Walter M. Gibson 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Iolani Palace,  
Honolulu, August 23, 1883284 
 
In an explanatory letter to French Consul and Commissioner in Honolulu Henri Feer, 
Gibson provided a more detailed rationale for the Hawaiian protest by listing the multiple 
communications the Hawaiian government had received from Pacific Islands, viz. 1) the King of 
Tonga had declared his intent to sign a treaty with the Hawaiian Islands as he had done with 
Germany and Great Britain; 2) the King and Chiefs of Sāmoa had asked Hawai‘i to expressly 
recognise their independence; 3) The Chiefs of the Stewart Is. [Sikaiana] had negotiated for the 
annexation of their island to Hawai‘i; and 4) the kings or sovereign chiefs of Butaritari, Apaïung 
[Abaiang], Apemama [Abemama] and Torua [Tarawa] had in different circumstances 
addressed Hawai‘i for help and advice.285 In an entry in his private diary sometime during this 
major Hawaiian foray into international power policy, Gibson ultimately linked the success of 
the Kingdom’s pan-Oceania policy to the fate of Hawai‘i itself: “May kind providence be with us 
in this new move. Only by protecting the freedom and independence of all Polynesia can we 
guarantee our own” (cited in Mellen 1958: 150). 
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 Letter from Gibson to Feer, 8 September 1883, File B29, Box 41, Océanie, Centre for Overseas Archives, Aix-
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Interestingly, the protest was not only addressed to Western powers who had imperial 
ambitions in the Pacific but also to all other countries Hawai‘i had any kind of relations with, 
including the non-Western states Kalākaua had recently visited (Horn 1951: 71). Although 
most countries did not reply to the protest, it was duly received and usually well preserved in 
the recipient country’s foreign affairs archives.286 Within the British Empire, the colonial 
government of New Zealand even printed the Hawaiian protest as an enclosure to an official 
document on colonial policy.287 But only two countries truly engaged with its content. The 
United States recommended that the Hawaiian government should soften its tone but took no 
position either opposing or condoning the protest (Horn 1951: 72). Of all the powers 
addressed, ironically only Gibson’s former jailors, the Netherlands, expressed their explicit 
support for the Hawaiian position. Subsequently, the Dutch government recognized Hawai‘i as 
one of the relevant regional powers and in 1884 invited the island kingdom to an international 
conference to create a convention against the arms and liquor trade in the Pacific.288  
Following moves by Germany towards a colonial takeover of Sāmoa in late 1884, Gibson 
sent another diplomatic appeal to Germany, the United States, Great Britain, France and the 
Netherlands, asking them to preserve Sāmoa’s independence and grant recognition to the 
Samoan government in April of 1885 (Horn 1951: 74-77; Tate 1960: 396). Copies of the 1875 
correspondence between the Ta‘imua of Samoa and Kalākaua’s government, including an 
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English translation of the 1875 Samoan constitution were attached.289  Further, in late 1885, 
Gibson sent H.A.P. Carter, the Hawaiian minister in Washington D.C. on a diplomatic mission to 
Great Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands to plea for a guarantee to keep islands yet 
unclaimed by any power independent and instead foster native state-building under Hawaiian 
guidance and support there. While Carter was promised British support for Hawaiian-led 
nation building in Eastern Micronesia, by early 1886 Britain and Germany in fact went ahead 
with their negotiations to delimitate spheres of influence in the area, and Germany 
immediately claimed territories on its side of the line as colonial possessions (Horn 1951: 78-
92; Tate 1960: 390-394). This left essentially only Sāmoa, Tonga, the Cook Islands and a few 
smaller islands unclaimed by Western powers. Nonetheless, Gibson’s and Carter’s diplomatic 
actions had drawn the world’s attention to the fact that Hawaiian Kingdom was a regional 
power that mattered in Oceania.  
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Kalākaua’s and Gibson’s “New Departure” into pan-Oceanianism also involved 
intensified data and item collecting.  Building upon St. Julian’s correspondence and reports, 
including Reeve’s invaluable 1857 gazetteer, Gibson’s department was interested in extending 
its knowledge of the region. An 1989 index of registered maps290 lists about a hundred maps of 
Oceania other than the Hawaiian Islands in the Hawaiian Government Survey’s collection , most 
of them British and US naval charts, others manuscript maps, some of them possibly made by 
Hawaiian expeditions to these islands.291 In the same vein, the first English-language textbook 
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Fig. 7.9: Map of Oceania in the Hawaiian History textbook for the Kingdom’s public schools (Alexander 
1891), between pages 18 and 19. Copyright expired. 
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on Hawaiian history for the Kingdom’s public schools, published in 1891 but likely prepared 
throughout the 1880s, repeats the pattern of the 1840 Lāhaināluna atlas by displaying first a 
map of Oceania [fig. 7. 9] before one of the Hawaiian islands, confirming the perspective of 
Hawai‘i belonging in Oceania.   
Along similar lines of collecting and disseminating knowledge of the Oceania, the 
Hawaiian National Museum, founded by Kamehameha V in 1872 (Kamehiro 2009: 101), was 
explicitly re-conceptualised as a pan-Oceanian institution in the 1880s. According to Mellen, in 
April of 1882, shortly before his appointment as premier Gibson advocated in the legislature 
for a museum “for the preservation of Polynesian literature and culture” (1958: 119), which 
Gibson reiterated in a long editorial in November of the same year,292 and the same author 
quotes Gibson again in 1883 envisioning it as a “Polynesian National Museum” (ibid.: 186). 
Artefact collections for the National Museum thus became part of Hawaiian diplomatic 
missions to Oceania, and both the 1883 Tripp mission to Kiribati and the 1887 Bush mission to 
Sāmoa discussed below were under orders to collect materials for the Hawaiian National 
Museum, which they extensively did.293 
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 Hence, contrary to common perceptions, it was not the Bernice Pauahi Bishop Museum (into which the National 
Museum was forcefully incorporated by the perpetrators of the 1893 overthrow) that started ethnographic research 
in Oceania in the early twentieth century. In fact the Bishop Museum’s extensive research expeditions throughout 
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Bush and the Ka‘imiloa:  Seeking the implementation of pan-Oceanianism 
 
The second half of the year 1886 and the 
first half of 1887 marked in many ways the 
climax of Hawaiian pan-Oceanianist policy. 
Nothing symbolised this more than the “Oihana 
Kea Hoohanohano Alii o ka Hoku o Osiania,” or, 
in English, “Royal Order of the Star of Oceania,” 
which King Kalākaua devised on December 16, 
1886.294  Inspired by the several existing official 
orders of decoration of the Hawaiian Kingdom, 
such as the Royal Order of Kamehameha I, as 
well as the Order of Arossi that had been created 
earlier by Charles St. Julian in the 1850s as mentioned above,  the Royal Order of the Star of 
Oceania, according to its statutes, was to be awarded in recognition of services “in advancing the 
good name and influence of Hawai‘i in the Islands of Polynesia, and other groups of the 
surrounding Ocean in order to promote harmonious cooperation among kindred people and 
contiguous states and communities”295 Its insignia [Figure 7.10], featuring a beacon over the sea, 
likely symbolizing Hawai‘i, radiating out to six stars, probably symbolizing the other archipelagos 
of Oceania, were designed by one of Kalākaua’s court artists, Isobel Strong, the daughter-in-law of 
Scottish author Robert Louis Stevenson (Medcalf 1962: 46). Interestingly, the underlying political 
ideology was clearly meant to combine a pan-Oceanianist with a pan-Asianist approach, as for the 
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purpose of awarding the order, Kalākaua defined ‘Oceania’ quite broadly in the statues:   
O ka Oihana Kea Hoohanohano o ka HOKU O OSIANIA, ke kukulu ia nei no ka makana ana aku no 
na hana kaulama i lawelawe ia no Makou a no ko Makou Aupuni paha, a ma ka hookaulana ana i 
ka  inoa a me ka mana o Hawaii mawaena o na lahuikanaka o na Paemoku o na Moana Pakipika 
me Inia a me na aina e pili kokoke mai ana. 
 
THE ORDER OF THE STAR OF OCEANIA is hereby established for the recompense of 
distinguished services rendered to Us or to Our State and in advancing the name and influence of 
Hawaii amongst the native communities of the Islands of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and on 
contiguous Continents.296 
 
A few days later, on 22 December 1886, the King 
commissioned John Edward Bush as “Envoy Extraordinary 
and Minister Plenipotentiary to the King of Samoa, Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the King of 
Tonga, and High Commissioner to the Sovereign Chiefs and 
Peoples of Polynesia” (Horn 1951: 105). Henry Poor, who had 
accompanied ‘Iaukea on his diplomatic tour to Russia, Japan 
and other countries in 1883, was appointed secretary to 
Bush’s mission. Bush [Figure 7.11], also known by his 
Hawaiianized name of Ailuene Buki, at that time had already 
been an experienced Hawaiian government official and a close 
confidant and associate of the King and both Moreno and Gibson. Bush was born in 1842 in 
Honolulu of mixed Hawaiian and European descent. In his youth he had worked in the printing 
office of the Polynesian and the Hawaiian Gazette, and had thus become familiar with the 
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newspaper business, to which he would later in his life make important contributions.297 He also 
took an early interest in travel and adventure, and he spent some time as a sailor on a whaling 
ship. In mid-life he embarked upon a bureaucratic career, starting as a clerk in the Department of 
Interior, and eventually becoming appointed kia‘āina of Kaua‘i in 1877 and a member of King 
Kalākaua’s Privy Council in 1878. In the 1880 cabinet led by Moreno as Minister of Foreign affairs, 
Bush initially served as minister of the Interior and later took Moreno’s portfolio in an acting 
capacity after the latter had been forced to resign. At that time, the King also appointed him a 
member of the House of Nobles as well as president of the Board of Health.  Under Gibson’s 
premiership, Bush served as a minister of Finance from 1882 to 1883.298     
Bush’s diplomatic instructions were to first go to Sāmoa, deliver a letter by King Kalākaua 
to Malietoa Laupepa, the leading contender for Sāmoa’s Kingship, and confer upon the latter the 
Grand Cross of the Royal Order of the Star of Oceania. He was to open a Hawaiian legation there, 
help the Samoan government to establish political stability in the archipelago and convince it to 
enter into a treaty of political confederation with Hawai‘i. He was then to proceed to Tonga, 
deliver another royal Hawaiian letter to King Sioasi Tupou I, negotiate a Hawaiian-Tongan treaty 
of friendship and commerce, and if possible invite the King of Tonga to join the Hawaiian-led 
confederation. As the next step, the Cook Islands were to be invited to join also. At a later point, 
Bush was to appoint HMS missionaries in Kiribati as Hawaiian consular agents and eventually 
work towards a Hawaiian annexation of the Gilbert Islands (Horn 1951: 107). In his capacity as 
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Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Bush outranked any diplomatic representative 
of the Western powers in the region, none of whom had a higher rank than consul, and he would 
thus become ex officio dean of the diplomatic corps on every island he visited (Cook 2011: 273). 
The renewed focus of Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism on Sāmoa was also reflected in 
Kalākaua’s identification of the homeland of the twelfth-century culture heroes Pa‘ao, the priest 
bringing important elements of what would become the classical Hawaiian religion to the islands, 
and Pili, the ancestor of the ruling ali‘i line of Hawai‘i Island whom Pa‘ao installed, in his Myths and 
Legends of Hawaii as Sāmoa (Kalākaua 1972: 71).  Previous historians had usually referred to it 
more ambiguously as Kahiki (e.g. Malo 1987: 6; Keauokalani 1932: 59). This was quite an 
important statement because all nineteenth century Hawaiian monarchs ultimately descended 
from Hawai‘i Island’s line of ali‘i nui. Locating that lineage’s origin in Sāmoa hence made the chiefs 
of the latter archipelago the kua‘ana [older sibling] of Hawai‘i’s rulers. As Sāmoa’s kaina [younger 
sibling], Hawai‘i was thus obligated to help out its kua‘ana. 299 
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After having set up the Hawaiian legation in Apia and negotiated with Malietoa Laupepa 
and other Samoan government officials, Bush concluded a Treaty of Political Confederation 
between Hawai‘i and Sāmoa with them on 17 February of 1887 [fig. 7.12]. The first concrete step 
to implement the Oceanian confederation envisioned by St. Julian and Wyllie three decades earlier 
was thus being done. In the treaty, Malietoa pledged that he would “conform to whatever 
measures may hereafter be adopted by His Majesty Kalākaua and be mutually agreed upon to 
promote and carry into effect this Political Confederation,” basically agreeing to Hawaiian 
suzerainty over Sāmoa. Following consultations with leading chiefs and European settlers, Bush 
Fig. 7.12: The Samoan ratification of the 1887 Hawaiian-Samoan treaty of Confederation. Signed by 
King Malietoa Laupepa, his secretary William Coe, Samoan secretary of the Interior M.K. Le Mamea, as 
well as eight Ta‘imua and eight Faipule. Original in FO& Ex., Samoan Affairs 1887, Hawai‘i State 
Archives. Photo by the author. 
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drafted a “Temporary Scheme of Government for Samoa” in June of 1887, strengthening 
Laupepa’s position but also, at the suggestion of Samoan government leaders themselves, placing 
key positions in the Samoan government under direct Hawaiian control, which, in Bush’s words, 
was “desirable until the government is well established.”  
The confederation with Hawai‘i had important implications for Sāmoa’s relations with the 
Western powers, since shortly before signing the treaty, Laupepa with Bush’s and Poor’s advice 
had appointed Hawaiian Minister to the United States H.A.P. Carter to serve as Samoan minister as 
well and empowered him to negotiate for a revision of Sāmoa’s unequal treaties with Germany, 
Great Britain and the United States (Horn 1951: 113, 121-123).  
A few months later, the 
Hawaiian government 
dispatched to Sāmoa its newly 
acquired only naval ship, the 
HHMS Kaimiloa [‘The Far 
Seeker”], which Gibson, now 
also secretary of war and the 
navy, had specifically 
procured for the mission [fig. 
7.13], in order to support 
Bush’s legation and by showing the flag demonstrate to the Samoans that Hawai‘i seriously 
intended to support their independence against interference by the Western powers (Horn 1951: 
97-170; Cook 2011: 201-76). While its impression on the Western powers with their multiple 
ironclad warships present in the region could only be symbolic, the Kaimiloa’s effect on the 
Samoan people was not negligible, since it displayed to them that the technology of modern 
Fig. 7.13: His Hawaiian Majesty’s Ship Kaimiloa, displaying the 
Hawaiian naval flag, in early 1887. Copyright expired. Original in 
Hawaii State Archives.  
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statecraft and empire-building could be in the hands of fellow-Polynesian peoples, and thus 
eventually in their own hands as well if only they strived with Hawaiian help to achieve durable 
self-sufficient independence and full international recognition. As Kealani Cook put it, “[t]he 
Kaimiloa, despite its many faults, symbolized a developmental distance between the Hawaiians 
and the Samoans that the Samoans deeply desired to overcome” (2011: 240). 
Thanks to the extensive correspondence by Bush and Poor,300 as well as the logs kept by 
several of the Kaimiloa’s officers, the details of the Hawaiian mission in Sāmoa are well known, 
and have been extensively documented and analysed by Jason Horn (1951: 97-188) and Kealani 
Cook (2011: 201-276).  In summary, the staff of the Hawaiian legation and the crew of the 
Hawaiian navy ship did their best to assist the Samoans in strengthening their government’s 
independence. While supporting Laupepa’s claim to the Samoan kingship that was being 
challenged by other high titleholders, the Hawaiian emissaries carefully negotiated with 
Laupepa’s rivals and tried to convince them all to accept a centralised constitutional government 
in Apia.  While it appears that a peaceful resolution of the kingship dispute in the Hawaiians’ sense 
was on its way, there were two main challenges, which unfortunately led to the mission’s failure. 
One was a lack of discipline and coordination within the Hawaiian diplomatic and naval services. 
Crew discipline aboard the Kaimiloa was often insufficient and both the ship’s captain and 
Minister Bush apparently drank quite heavily. Further, petty rivalries arose between Bush and 
Poor, as they subsequently also developed between Laupepa and his assistant secretary of state 
William Coe on the Samoan side, with the effect of undermining concerted action of the Hawaiian 
mission and undermining its efficiency.  
Secondly, the Hawaiian mission’s goals to unify and strengthen the Samoan government 
ran contrary to the interests of the Western powers, chiefly Germany and Great Britain, who had 
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for decades actively sabotaged any attempts to create political stability and preferred to maintain 
internal chaos by supporting rivalling Samoan titleholders against one another.  When the 
Hawaiian initiative eventually failed, this was most of all due to German gunboat diplomacy. The 
German Empire went as far as threatening war against the Hawaiian Kingdom for ‘interfering’ in 
Sāmoa, while a few months later, in August of 1887 German naval forces themselves intervened, 
or more accurately invaded the archipelago, declared war on Malietoa Laupepa, kidnapped him, 
and installed his main rival, Tupua Tamasese Titimaea, as a German puppet king (Stevenson 2009: 
36-44; Meleiseā 1987: 39). It is one of the ironies pointing to the unique position of the Hawaiian 
Kingdom in the late nineteenth-century world order that just a month prior to the letter authored 
by German Chancellor Bismarck threatening a declaration of war against King Kalākaua, dated 
August 7, 1887 (Horn 1951: 181), Princess Lili‘uokalani had been socialising on most friendly 
terms with Prince Wilhelm, the future German Emperor Wilhelm II in late June during Queen 
Victoria’s Jubilee celebrations mentioned in the opening of the dissertation and described the 
Prince as “a most sociable neighbour, and an agreeable conversationalist” (Liliuokalani 1990: 156-
157). 
Bush’s legation was also prevented from accomplishing any other parts of its mission to 
strengthen Oceania by saving its remaining free parts from Western imperialism, since the 
Kingdom itself came under attack during the same time. Preoccupied with Oceania-focused 
foreign policy, Gibson “utterly neglected his first duty in protecting the king and his own 
government: to have more guns than the opposition” (Adler and Kamins 1986: 181). Unwilling to 
accept living in a multi-ethnic nation based on Hawaiian cultural values, and insisting on white 
supremacy, members of the Missionary Party,  with the help of the Honolulu Rifles, an armed 
militia of ostensible ‘volunteers’ for the Hawaiian military, overthrew the Hawaiian government in 
late June 1887, chased Gibson out of the country after attempting to lynch him, and forced the 
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fittingly called “Bayonet Constitution”  on King Kalākaua, which rendered him and his subjects 
virtually powerless (Liliuokalani 1990: 177-84). Unsurprisingly, the coup also “marked the 
beginning of a lengthy eclipse in Island internationalist activity,” (Hooper 1980: 65) and as they 
had already done once before during Lunalilo’s reign, once the Missionary Party members had 
usurped power, they shut down each and every of the Kingdom’s pan-Oceanian, pan-Asian and 
globally connected projects. Hence, shortly after the ‘Bayonet’ coup, the Hawaiian legation and the 
Kaimiloa were recalled to Honolulu. Bush, who had acquired substantial capacities in the Samoan 
language, remained in Sāmoa to serve as an advisor to Malietoa and other chiefs, and privately 
returned to Honolulu in late November.301 
The latest component of Kalākaua’s pan-Oceanian policy before the 1887 coup was to 
resume official contacts with the Tahitian Kingdom that had long been dormant.  Apparently, the 
Hawaiian King planned to visit Tahiti in mid-1887 in order to reconnect with the Tahitian royal 
family, despite the fact that Tahiti had been annexed as a French colony in 1880. Pomare V, who as 
part of the 1880 agreement had kept his title of King and all personal honours connected to it for 
the rest of his life, upon hearing of Kalākaua’s plans, had attempted to obtain the French 
government’s consent to create a Tahitian ‘Royal Order of Pomare V,’ in order to have something 
to reciprocate a Hawaiian decoration he anticipated to receive from the Hawaiian King if he had 
visited.302 Likely due to the ‘Bayonet’ coup and the subsequent disavowal of pan-Oceanianism by 
the usurpers serving as the Hawaiian King’s cabinet, the projected visit to Tahiti was not further 
pursued, while Paris refused Pomare’s request to permit the creation of his royal order.  
Kalākaua’s interests to renew contacts with Tahiti raise the question why Bush was only 
commissioned for Sāmoa, Tonga and the Cook Islands, but not for the Leeward Islands kingdoms. 
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While France had, in violation of the 1847 Jarnac convention, declared a protectorate over Ra’iātea 
in 1880, Porapora and Huahine remained independent and would not be claimed by France until 
after an agreement was reached with Britain to rescind the Jarnac declaration in November of 
1887.303 It might be possible that Kalākaua was simply too afraid of provoking France, because of 
the well-known memories of ruthless French gunboat diplomacy the Hawaiian Islands had 
experienced in the 1830s and 1840s, and, if that was true, he must have in turn underestimated 
Germany’s capacity to be just as aggressive when it saw its ‘sphere of influence’ challenged in 
Sāmoa. 
 
“Kau ka iwa, he lā makani:” Ramifications of Kalākaua’s Pan-Oceanianism 
 
Despite its short life of barely six months, from late 1886 to mid-1887, and its ultimate 
failure to produce the desired results, the Hawaiian mission to Sāmoa had a profound impact on 
both Hawai‘i and Sāmoa. The detailed report given upon his return by Kalākaua’s court artist 
Joseph Strong,304 who had accompanied the Hawaiian mission to document it by painting and 
taking photographs and to collect Samoan artefacts for the Hawaiian National Museum, highlights 
the stabilising  effect both the Hawaiian diplomatic mission and the Kaimiloa had on Samoan 
politics, since they were making sincere efforts to bring all actors on one table without the use or 
threat of violence, and in one case actively interceded to prevent a skirmish between rivalling local 
war parties. 305 Several other testimonies from returning legation officials306 and Kaimiloa crew 
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members mentioned that the leading Samoan chiefs deeply regretted the recall of the mission, 
since it removed a stabilising factor from the complex local political scene.307 
Had the mission been more successful, it would ultimately have led, in Newbury’s terms, 
to a reversal of status for Sāmoa. Ironically it was the political confederation with Hawai‘i, 
putting Sāmoa into a subordinate position towards the latter, that offered Sāmoa this 
possibility of status reversal, since the global network of Hawaiian diplomatic representations 
was made available to represent Samoan interests as well. Unfortunately, Minister Carter, the 
first Hawaiian diplomat to be explicitly commissioned to also represent Sāmoa, was obsessed 
with the futile task of renewing the reciprocity treaty with the United States, which took away 
energy from focusing on the Samoan issue (Sewall 1900: 12, 20).308 Nonetheless, on other 
occasions Carter did carry out his duties properly and in January of 1887 made a brilliant 
strategic suggestion to Gibson, recommending to first make an unequal treaty granting the 
Hawaiian Islands extraterritorial rights in Sāmoa like the three Western powers, using this to 
claim for Hawai‘i the status as a treaty power equal to them, and then relinquishing these 
powers in order to create a precedent for the Western powers to follow, just like Hawai‘i had 
done, or was about to do, with Japan.309 If this strategy had been used, it might have led to a 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the Kaimiloa. Mr. Poor's Influence Avert a Fight Between Supporters of Malietoa and Those of 
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 These were Henry Poor and Gibson’s secretary for foreign affairs J. S. Webb who had gone to Samoa aboard the 
Kaimiloa. Bush, who after his falling out with Poor had become a close personal confidant of Malietoa Laupepa, 
had decided to stay behind and switch his allegiance to the Samoan government. 
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more secure international status of Sāmoa and thus put a future confederation with Hawai‘i on 
a more solid footing. 
Meanwhile, the Samoan mission had important impacts at home in Hawai‘i as well. A 
perusal of Hawaiian-language newspaper editorials and letters to the editor published before and 
during Bush’s mission points to a widespread awareness of the Hawaiian government’s pan-
Oceanian policy and the important implications this had for Hawaiian international relations at-
large.  In a bilingual editorial published immediately after Bush and Poor were commissioned,  the 
pro-government Nupepa Elele argued for the altruistic character of the mission, which was done 
out of Polynesian solidarity, in contrast to the selfish motives of the Western powers: 
Ua hoomaopopo iho makou, ua makemake na Aupuni nui o Europa a me Amerika e 
hooponopono na Samoa. Ke hoike mai nei lakou aole o lakou makemake ia Samoa. Aka, e 
hoopololei iaia, i hiki ai iaia ke lawelawe ina Oihana o ka Nohona Aupuni. Nolaila, o ka 
makemake wale no o keia mau Aupuni nui, o ka hooponopono ia Samoa no ka pomaikai o ka 
hana: ka pono o ka Oihana Kalepa e na kanikele o keia poe Aupuni Nui i makemake hoi e 
hoohana ma Samoa. He mau pono e ae no kekahi o kakou mawaho ae o ka hana kalepa. He 
nohona aloha ko kakou no ka pono o Samoa.  
O na Alii, a me na makaainana kai noi ikaika mai i ko kakou Moi a me kona Aupuni e kokua 
aku ia lakou. Aole lakou i noi pela ia Enelani, Amerika, a Geremania paha. Aole kakou e hoea 
aku ana malaila me ko kakou mau moku a pu paha, a i ole o kekahi mana nui e ae, aka, mamuli 
o ko kakou ano Polunesia; a e ike no auanei ka Moi Malietoa i ka hilinai nui mamuli o ka launa 
aloha ana me ka Moi Kalakaua mamua o ka launa ana me Victoria, Emepera Uilama, a me 
Peresidena Cleveland paha. He mea kupono keia, ua hiki no ia kakou ke hoolohe aku i ke noi a 
ko Samoa. 
 
Now, we understand that the Great Nations of Europe and America want to regulate 
Samoa. They declare that they don’t want Samoa, only to set her in order, so that she may 
carry on the business of government. Now, these great nations merely want to put Samoa in 
order for the sake of business, for the sake of trade that the adventurers of these great 
countries may want to undertake in Samoa. We have another interest besides mere business. 
We have a neighborly interest in the welfare of Samoa.  
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Her chiefs and people have appealed earnestly to our King and government to help them. 
They have not so appealed to England, America or Germany. We are not appealing to them 
because we have ships or guns, nor are we any great power, but because we are Polynesians, 
and King Malietoa would feel a greater confidence in close and friendly relations with King 
Kalakaua than with the Queen of England, Emperor Wilhelm or President Cleveland. This 
natural – We can afford to give heed to the appeal of the Samoans.310 
 
It is striking how this argument, presenting a dichotomy of an imperialistic West driven by 
greed on one hand, and the morally superior, mutually solidary Oceanian nations on the other, 
resembles King Kalākaua’s speech to the Meiji Emperor six years earlier, as well as the 
arguments made by early twentieth century pan-Asianists like the quote by Sun Yat-sen at the 
beginning of chapter five, moving away from a discourse of similitude to one of civilizational 
relativism. More than anything else, the editorial quoted here embeds the 1887 Hawaiian 
mission to Sāmoa into the wider context of a pan-Oceanianist ideology pioneered by the 
leadership of the Hawaiian Kingdom.  
That these ideas of Hawai‘i’s role in Oceania and the wider world were not merely 
disseminated by the government and its media organs but were actually profoundly discussed in 
Hawaiian society at-large is demonstrated by a lengthy letter to the editor by Honolulu resident 
W.L. Bishop, Jr., amounting to a guest editorial of sorts, that was published on the front page of Ka 
Nupepa Elele on 9 April 1887.311 Under the title “Kau ka Iwa, he La Makani” [“The frigate bird is up 
in the sky, it is a windy day”] a ‘ōlelo no‘eau [proverb], which on a symbolical level may refer to a 
well-dressed person (Judd 1965: 213; Pukui 1983: 193), Bishop provides an astonishing treatise 
on Pacific geopolitics. While mildly critical of the Hawaiian Government’s handling of the relations 
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with Sāmoa, he supports the overall approach of uniting the Pacific under Hawaiian leadership, 
and argues that Hawai'i has become one of the powers of the Pacific and needs to act accordingly: 
Heaha o Hawaii? Oia anei kekahi o na mana nui o ka honua nei? A pehea la e ae wale ia mai 
ai kana mau olelo kuahaua? Aohe o Hawaii kekahi, aka, o ka mana o kana mau hooponopono 
ana malalo o na kuikahi ua lilo oia i keia la kekahi o na mana o ka moana Pakipika. 
Ua ae mai kona mau olelo kuahaua no ka mea, oia ka paionia o na aupuni liilii o ka moana 
nana i hoouna i ka Lamaku o ke Ola, ka nauaao a me ka malamalama, he mau kumu pono 
maikai ia na Hawaii e ku ai a paio me na Aupuni naauao apau o ka honua, a lilo i mea ole ko 
lakou mana kaua. 312 
 
Bishop goes on to argue essentially on to levels:  First, since Hawai‘i is destined to become 
the leading power of Oceania, it should increase its military expenditures and acquire a proper 
navy. Instead of purchasing a half-rotten ship and have it fitted out as a third-rate gunship 
(meaning the Kaimiloa), the Kingdom should have bought an ironclad warship, as they were being 
sold in England for as little as  60,000 dollars at the time, and eventually put together a small fleet 
of those. This way, Hawai‘i could take a strong stand within its own sphere of influence in the 
Pacific. On the other hand, Bishop argues that raw military power alone is no longer the only 
measurement of a country's international standing, but that rules of international law are being 
developed to protect state sovereignty, citing the Alabama claims case that had been negotiated in 
Switzerland.313 Hence, while maintaining a standing army to secure internal stability against 
domestic enemies and a navy to control its burgeoning Oceanian empire, Hawai‘i should use and 
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359 
 
enhance its treaty relations to secure its standing in relation to outside powers: 
[H]e mea maikai no kakou ke loaa ona aumoku manuwa, no ka mea, ke hele aku nei na kanawai 
a me ka mana o Hawaii e hoomalumalu iho ma na welelau hema o ka moana Pakipika. […] 
Nolaila, heaha ka hewa ke hoomakaukau kakou i moku manuwa a i puali koa kupono me ka 
makaukau mau e pale i ko kakou mau enemi kuloko, a me ko kakou mau panalaau, aole no ke 
kaua aku ia waho, oiai ua lawa ko kakou kaua ana me waho mamuli o na kuikahi.314 
  
Almost a year earlier, during the legislative session of 1886, Gibson had defended Hawai‘i’s 
visionary foreign policy against the constant attacks by the Missionary Party who insisted that the 
island kingdom was too small a power to matter in the Pacific and should not venture into foreign  
diplomacy: 
What was Prussia but a one-horse State a few years ago, and others that can be mentioned? 
What was Rome but a one-horse State at its beginning? There is a legend about the small wall 
which Remus jumped with his horse, at which Romulus was so indignant that he slew him. 
Now, I do not propose to fall on and slay my brother Dole [a Missionary Party opposition 
member of the legislature, who had viciously attacked the pan-Oceanian foreign policy]. What 
are we in the midst of the broad Pacific that great nations should send their captains and 
officers to do honor to us. At the time of the Coronation a French Admiral had sent a letter by 
one of his Captains expressing regret that his ship was too large to enter the harbor, or he 
would have been present in person to do honor to the occasion. See how the Czar of Russia 
honored our King, and how the Prince of Wales received Colonel Iaukea. These are the 
sentiments of international courtesy. The Great Powers never think of us as a one-horse 
State.315 
 
Gibson’s argument, pointing to the fact that all the great powers treated Hawai‘i as a 
country that mattered in the word, thus exposed the Missionary Party’s true colours, namely that 
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they were not modest and cautious Hawaiian patriots as they pretended, but rather closeted US 
imperialists who wanted to keep Hawai‘i down so she could more easily be taken over by the 
United States in the future. This context of the domestic political debate makes Bishop’s essay 
even more important. Bishop’s writing not only represents the most succinct foreign and defence 
policy analysis I have ever come across in any Hawaiian-language newspaper, it also testifies to 
popular support for Kalākaua’s pan-Oceania policy and thus debunks the idea promoted by 
several writers that it was merely Gibson who was pushing that policy (e.g. Horn 1951; Adler and 
Kamins 1986).316 In any case, it is clear that with all the important contributions Gibson made 
before and during his premiership, he was never the only driving force of Kalākaua’s pan-
Oceanianism. In 1889, more than a year after Gibson’s passing, the Mō‘ī stated in a private letter 
his personal passion for the Sāmoan mission and defended it against his critics: 
Of course I did send Bush but it was from a repeated call from Samoa as well as all the other 
South Sea Islands a call of Confederation or solidarity of the Polynesian Race.  …Our Mission was 
simply a Mission of philanthropy more than anything but the arrogance of the Germans 
prevented our good intentions and… we had to withdraw the mission…”317  
 
Summary, critical evaluation and conclusion 
Summary 
 
In this chapter, I have examined the Hawaiian Kingdom’s policy towards the rest of 
Oceania during Kalākaua’s reign and explored its diplomatic relationships with other Oceanian 
States, with a focus on the contributions various Hawaiian political leaders, diplomats and 
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intellectuals made to develop and refine  that policy and its underlying ideology during that 
period.  
In summary, one can see the policy evolving into two more phases during the Kalākaua 
era, following the four phases up to St. Julian’s time that I recounted in the conclusion of the 
last chapter. Towards the beginning of his reign, Kalākaua’s policy initially remains within the 
paradigm lined out by St. Julian, namely to foster nation-state-building and promote Hawaiian 
regional leadership in an area covering the islands in the Pacific to the south and southwest of 
Hawai‘i[interchange ably referred to as Polynesia or Oceania]. In the next, fifth phase, however, 
this ideology of Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism is further extended to encompass all of 
Austronesia, including the Malay Archipelago. While LMS missionary William Ellis was 
probably the first person with Hawaiian connections to write about comparative Austronesian 
linguistics (Ellis 1858), other Hawai‘i-based scholars and politicians like Fornander and 
Varigny wrote about Malayan origins of Polynesian peoples as well. But the greatest boost for 
the development of Hawaiian pan-Austronesianism clearly came from Gibson, who had actually 
spent time in the Malay world, as had Moreno.318 In terms of actual Hawaiian pan-Oceanian 
policy, it had received a serious setback under Lunalilo’s short reign, but Kalākaua immediately 
began to resurrect it when he assumed power in 1874, and began to develop it further, 
incorporating the pan-Austronesian reach advocated by Gibson and Moreno, as demonstrated 
by the particularly close relations he established with Johor.  
Virtually simultaneously, the fifth phase rapidly transitions into the sixth, as Kalākaua 
extends the pan-Oceanian ideology to actually incorporate not only all Austronesian peoples, 
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but peoples of all of Asia, and by extension the entire non-Western world, of which he realises 
the Hawaiian Kingdom is part.  Kalākaua’s pan-Asia/Pacific project becomes manifest in the 
political relations he seeks with the Qing Empire through Moreno, his meetings with, East 
Asian, Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern rulers during his circumnavigation, and the close 
political relations he develops with Meiji Japan. All the while, Kalākaua and Gibson reconnect 
the project of global non-Western solidarity with St. Julian’s pan-Polynesian origins by 
beginning the creation of a Hawaiian-led confederation of Polynesian states, starting with 
Bush’s diplomatic mission in Samoa in 1887. In the words of Kealani Cook, this “represented a 
new type of political relationship between Polynesian polities that challenged the 
Euro/American vision of a colonial Pacific” (2011: 233).   
Unfortunately, this culmination of the sixth phase also marked the abrupt end of an 
active, state-driven Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism due to the simultaneously coinciding above-
mentioned Missionary Party’s ‘Bayonet’ coup in Hawai‘i and the German invasion of Sāmoa of 
mid-1887. Despite this premature abortion of Hawai‘i’s pan-Oceanian political project by its 
foreign and domestic enemies, the project’s effects on the Hawaiian Kingdom, the other Pacific 
islands and the wider Asia-Pacific was clearly profound. For the people of Hawai‘i, the policy 
helped to boost their self-confidence and provided a powerful discourse of nationalist grandeur 
to counter that of the Missionary Party who constantly attempted to belittle Hawai‘i and 
ridicule both its socio-political and cultural-civilizational heritage.  
In that sense, the pan-Oceanianism was part of a campaign by the leaders and citizenry 
of the Hawaiian state to strengthen and protect their country against both its foreign and 
domestic enemies. W.L. Bishop’s essay expresses this discourse most elaborately. Countering 
the misinformed discourse by twentieth-century historians that Hawaiians were passive 
observers to an alleged constant process of erosion of political sovereignty throughout the 
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nineteenth century, i.e. the typical ‘fatal impact’ school of historiography (e.g. Daws 1968: 291), 
there is ample evidence of a strong sense of self-confidence of those loyal to the Hawaiian 
Kingdom. They were convinced that its policies were righteous and that the Mō‘ī and his 
advisors would stay in power despite the opposition’s shady moves to overthrow them. For 
instance, in the face of constant predictions by the press organs of the Missionary Party of the 
fall of the Gibson-led cabinet, the loyalist press called upon “oukou e na enemi o Hawaii” [“you, 
the enemies of Hawai‘i”] that they would have to count “i hookahi anahulu makahiki – e lua 
anahulu makahiki – e kolu anahulu makahiki – e pela aku – a pela aku” [“a decade, two decades, 
three decades, and so on, and so on”] for that to happen.319 Similarly, in the same newspaper 
Sereno Bishop, a Missionary Party representative known for his particularly hateful anti-
Hawaiian rhetoric was declared a madman and recommended to be put in the insane asylum 
for suggesting such outlandish an idea as the creation of a white-led republic to supplant the 
Hawaiian Kingdom in 1884.320  
While strengthening Hawaiian self-confidence at home, Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism also 
had important impacts on the peoples of the islands that the policy was aimed towards. As the 
only island state having achieved international recognition, the Hawaiian Kingdom was a 
“nation for which Polynesians generally had enormous respect” (Gilson 1970: 192), a fact that 
can be confirmed by a contemporary statement by Scottish author Robert Louis Stevenson, 
who in 1892 wrote from Sāmoa about Hawai‘i’s reputation:  
[I]n the eyes of Polynesians the little kingdom occupies a place apart. It is here alone that men 
of their race enjoy most of the advantages and all the pomp of independence; news of Hawaii 
and descriptions of Honolulu are grateful topics in all parts of the South Seas; and there is no 
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better introduction than a photograph in which the bearer shall be represented in company 
with Kalakaua. (33) 
 
Just like it was symbolised in the design of the Royal Order of the Star of Oceania, 
Hawai‘i thus became a beacon of hope for other islanders. As an internationally recognised 
state ruled by and for Pacific Islanders, the Hawaiian Kingdom offered a conceptual alternative 
to the dichotomy that was presented to the islanders in most archipelagos, i.e. that there was a 
choice only between maintaining classical society unchanged – an unrealistic scenario given 
the irreversible changes brought by the Western encounter –, and a gradual Westernisation 
that would lead to colonial rule by one Western power or another. While Hawaiian diplomacy 
was ultimately unable to prevent the colonial takeover of most islands by foreign powers, it did 
succeed in at least one example, namely in Tonga, which under its Hawaiian-derived 
constitution survived the era of colonialism and today still operates under the hybrid 
nineteenth-century political system brought to its islands by St. Julian in the name of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom.  
In a slightly different way, Hawai‘i also played an important role in Asia and other non-
Western countries around the world, as it was not only the single Pacific Island country to gain 
full international recognition but also the first non-Western state worldwide to fall in this 
category of full parity. Hence, the kingdom played an important role in world history that has 
often been neglected. Even though its economic and military clout was clearly negligible on an 
international scale, its unique status as an independent international actor gave it a high 
standing among those non-Westerners who were aware of its existence. This global appeal of 
the Hawaiian Kingdom was even understood by the press in a settler colonial setting such as 
the New Zealand Herald, which, despite a somewhat Eurocentric evolutionary tone typical of 
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the time, commented favourably on the Hawaiian protest of 1883 and extended its impact onto 
the entire non-Western world and its anti-imperialist struggles: 
The Hawaiian Kingdom is confessedly a remarkable illustration of the capacity of a dark and, 
so called inferior race for a constitutional self-government; and if any country has the right to 
raise its voice against the onward march of the pale faces, in the absorption of the interests of 
the coloured races, that country is Hawaii, where peace, order, and good government have 
shown themselves in the contentment, happiness and prosperity of a people who are but a 
generation removed from savage life.321 
 
The fact that Hawai‘i was sought after by imperial China as a partner to wrest control of 
maritime trade in the north Pacific from the hands of Western capitalists, and that Hawai‘i used 
its international standing to create the precedent for Meiji Japan that would lead to the latter 
gaining the same status of a fully recognised independent state testify to that appeal of the 
island kingdom beyond the insular Pacific.  
Critical evaluation 
 
However, in order to complete the evaluation of Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism, we also 
need to examine it critically. It easily lies at hand to see the pan-Oceanian discourse as 
paternalistic, and even chauvinistic and imperialistic, depending on the tone, as the pan-
Oceanianist discourse often justifies Hawaiian supremacy in the region by presenting it as 
civilised and advanced, and the other Oceanian nations as more benighted. One can be tempted 
to see this paradigm in some sense as a replication of Western colonial and imperialistic 
discourse, as for instance the American Monroe Doctrine, which disguised the United States’ 
hemispherical imperial ambitions as ‘solidarity’ towards Latin American states against 
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European powers. In that sense it is highly problematic to refer to Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism 
as a Hawaiian ‘Monroe Doctrine’ for Polynesia, which has been done by several historians.322 
Clearly there were instances of Hawaiian chauvinism and notions of imperialism within 
Pan-Oceanianist discourse. This was first of all prevalent in the discourse of the ABCFM 
missionaries in their early Hawaiian-language publications, in which other islands that had not 
yet been converted to Christianity, were referred to as ‘ai kanaka [cannibals], hihiu [savage] 
and na‘aupō [ignorant], as opposed to the Hawaiian Islands that thanks to the missionaries had 
become na‘auao [enlightened/civilised].323 As Kealani Cook has well documented in his 2011 
dissertation as well as a recent article, this discourse was replicated by aboriginal Hawaiian 
missionaries of the HMS who described their neophytes in Micronesia and the Marquesas 
Islands in similar terms, placing Hawai‘i in a middle ground, not yet as na‘auao as the Christian 
West, but much more so than the other islanders, who were at times ridiculed as and incapable 
of governing themselves. Hence, some Hawaiian missionaries argued for Hawaiian 
protectorates over, or outright colonisation of the archipelagos in question, in order to 
assimilate the natives there to the more civilised level of Hawai‘i (Cook 2011: 84-137; Cook 
2015).   
But this type of chauvinistic discourse cannot be solely being blamed on the ABCFM 
missionaries and their native affiliates. Missionary discourse might have been at its origin, but 
if that was so, secular Hawaiian leaders must have picked it up from them. For instance, 
Hawaiian newspaperman and political leader Simona Kaai, a future minister for instance under 
Kalākaua and clear opponent of the Missionary Party, argued in a comment on a mele inoa 
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[name chant] composed by Kamehameha I for Kauikeaouli in Ka Hoku o ka Pakipika that the 
Hawaiian language should be taught to the Marqueas Islanders with the goal of Hawaiianising 
them and replacing their own language.324  Reference to other islanders as na‘aupō remained 
frequent in the Hawaiian-language press.325  
Similarly, Kealani Cook points out that during the diplomatic mission to Sāmoa, John 
Bush, and even more so his secretary and successor Henry Poor, both secular Hawaiian 
nationalists who detested the Missionary Party, in their dispatches and private letters to 
Honolulu displayed a significant degree of paternalism toward their Samoan ‘brethren,’ which 
was indeed quite similar to the attitude most Europeans had toward Polynesians in general 
(Cook 2011: 201-73). While Christian missionary discourse certainly had a problematic 
influence on Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism, its chauvinistic dimensions clearly transcend mere 
Christian zealotry. Coming from a different perspective, Japanese historian Tomoko Akami, 
argues that “[i]t had an undercurrent of imperial ambition for Hawai‘i to establish its 
hegemony in Polynesia.” In Akami’s analysis, Hawaiian leaders, “claimed that Hawai‘i had a 
special mission in the Pacific (or more precisely in Polynesia) and possessed a superior culture 
and environment to achieve this goal” (Akami 2008:19). Clearly, this “superior culture” was 
based on the practicing of Calvinist Christianity only in the eyes of HEA missionaries, but for 
secularists like Kalākaua, Gibson, Bush and Poor it must have been conceptualised much 
broader.  
In some ways, Hawaiian pan-Oceanianist discourse is thus quite similar to the Japanese 
discourse of the Meiji, Taishō and early Shōwa eras on other Asian countries, which covers a 
similar range from pan-Asian solidarity, through Japanese paternalism to chauvinistic 
imperialism. Hence the question arises whether Hawaiian policy of ‘Primacy of the Pacific’ 
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 Ka Hoku o ka Pakipika, 3 October 1861, p. 4. I acknowledge Puakea Nogelmeier to bring this to my attention. 
325
E.g in the editorial in Ka Nuhou Hawaii, 20 Jan 1874, p. 5, which is quoted in chapter 4. 
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could indeed be seen as a form of imperialism analogous to Japan’s attitude the rest of East 
Asia, for instance Japan’s policy in Korea, where it first supported establishing a modern 
Korean state modelled on Meiji Japan but ultimately swallowed it up as a sort of colonial 
possession (Conroy 1960). Hence, if the Hawaiian-led ‘Polynesian Confederation’ had been 
successful, would it ultimately have resembled the Japan-led ‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere,’ which, to a large extent was a cover-up for a quasi-colonial empire in fact, one might 
ask. Akami poses the same question, but already provides some hints towards an answer in the 
negative: 
This [Hawaiian] imperial inclination with the slogans of anti-European colonialism reminds 
us of Japanese Pan-Asianism. On this account, the rejection of the Meiji Emperor to join 
Hawai‘i’s proposal in 1881 to challenge European dominance and to promote independence 
movement in Asia and the Pacific is interesting. […] Like Japanese-led Asianism, Hawai‘i’s 
political leaders (native or Euro-American) used the rhetoric of liberation from European 
colonialism to expand Hawai‘i’s power in the region, although, unlike Japan, Hawai‘i did not 
actually colonize the other Pacific islands. (Akami 2008: 38, note 31). 
 
Indeed, since Hawai‘i never actually established colonial rule over another Pacific 
island, and even in the Samoan case never exercised the oversight over the Samoan 
government the latter had agreed to in the 1887 treaty, the question remains largely a 
theoretical one. From various incidences, however, we can gather evidence that Hawaiian pan-
Oceanianism was not intended to serve Hawaiian imperial interests at the expense of other 
islanders, and that Hawaiʻi seriously cared for the Polynesian peoples of the region out of an 
altruistic sentiment of kuleana.  In my analysis, these examples largely outweigh the instances 
of Hawaiian chauvinism mentioned above.  
We have already discussed St. Julian’s rationalistic approach to the question, where he 
argued that Hawai’i’s responsibility solely arises from its better position in international law to 
implement a pan-Oceanian policy, and not from any inherent Hawaiian cultural supremacy. In a 
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similar sense, both Gibson and King Kalākaua refer several times to this altruistic sense of 
kuleana, coupled with the idea of strengthening Hawai‘i itself by strengthening the other 
islands, in other words making a case for pan-Oceanianism as a win-win game, not one in 
which Hawai‘i  would win at the detriment of other archipelagos. 
Conclusion 
 
While it is thus clear that Hawaiian Kingdom did not pursue policies that could be 
characterised as colonial or imperialistic, there are indeed very compelling parallels to Japan as 
far as the changing Hawaiian discourse on its role in the world in general and in Oceania in 
particular are concerned. In analysing Hawaiian government discourse over the second half of 
the nineteenth century, one can observe how this discourse changes from one of parity and 
similitude that embraces the standards of Western civilisation, to a discourse of civilizational 
difference that emphasises a pan-Oceanian and ultimately pan-Asia-Pacific identity for the 
Hawaiian Kingdom.  
This discursive transition is traceable through the writings of St. Julian that are still 
chiefly oriented towards similitude and parity with the West but already emphasise certain 
elements of Oceanian civilizational particularity, and those of Gibson, who as early as 1861 
argued against assimilationist similitude and for a separate Malayo-Polynesian modernity built 
upon Austronesian civilizational principles. The various writers in secular nationalist Hawaiian 
newspapers from the 1860s to the 1880s, and of course King Kalākaua himself in his Tokyo 
speech reiterated and re-articulated this view. As I have mentioned before, this is quite similar 
to the change of discourse happening in Japan and other Asian nations a few decades later as it 
is so aptly described and analysed by Aydın (2007). The important point however is that 
Hawaiian pan-Oceanianist discourse predates Japanese and other Asian pan-Asianist discourse, 
and, given the fact of Kalākaua’s meetings and communications with various Asian leaders, 
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makes it at least plausible that Hawai‘i had some part in pioneering and inspiring pan-
Asianism. 
For Hawaii at least, the long-term consequences of nineteenth-century pan-
Oceanianism cannot be underestimated, as Hooper succinctly argues: 
[T]he internationalist undertakings of this era were at least partially successful in achieving 
Kalakaua’s original objective of rekindling pride in the Hawaiian tradition. While such things 
are difficult to assess, the fervor with which Hawaiians defended the monarchy even after its 
fall and the extent to which the Kalakaua era has become a symbol in the contemporary effort 
to revive Hawaiian consciousness suggest that the undertakings of the period may be as 
noteworthy in socio-political terms as they are in internationalist terms (Hooper 1980: 64) 
 
Having thus presented, in this and the previous chapter, a description and analysis of 
the development of Hawaiian policy and diplomacy towards the rest of Oceania and other non-
Western nations, as well as the underlying discourses and ideologies, I will now examine the 
practical political impacts Hawaiian pan-Oceanianist policy had on the various archipelagos it 
was aimed at, as well as other non-Western societies it affected. For this purpose, in the next 
chapter, I provide a study of the institutional transfer of the Hawaiian political system to other 
Oceanian archipelagos and its further hybridisation with systems of governance previously 
existing there. 
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CHAPTER 8:  
Mo‘okū‘auhau Kumu Kānāwai: Genealogies of Institutional Transfer 
 
In approaching your Majesty I do so with the most profound respect for your Majesty’s Throne 
and person, and desire to inform your Majesty of the steps I have taken towards the 
inauguration of responsible Government throughout my dominions, and seek your Majesty’s 
countenance, support and recognition. (King Cakobau of Fiji to Kamehameha V, 1871)326 
 
I he g. aho ka ha’u te mau hiki ae Konisitutone nai o Vaihi ke mea ki ai ae fonua ni, he koe 
Konisitutone ia oku behe e he kakai boto toko lahi i ho mau fonua, koe tohi ia e aoga ki he g. 
fonua ni, ke faifaitaki ki ai i he g. mea lahi. (Editorial in Tongan newspaper Koe Boobooi, 1875)327 
 
A degree of pride is swelling the hearts of our people – they are cognizant of the kind feeling of 
your Government – today we are neither rich nor powerful, but by the blessings of God we will 
prosper and prove ourselves worthy of the advanced recognition by Hawaii of this Kingdom.  
(Samoan premier Albert Steinberger to Hawaiian minister of foreign affairs, 1875)328 
 
This is my Hawaii. Here I was brought up and educated; and it was here that I came to know 
what modern, civilized governments are like and what they mean. (Chinese revolutionary leader 
Sun Yat-sen during a visit to Honolulu, 1910)329 
 
Introduction 
 
After having discussed the origins, main proponents and stages of development of 
Hawaiian pan-Oceanian policy in the previous chapter, I am now turning my attention to the 
fourth of my research questions, namely how this Hawaiian vision and policy actually 
influenced hybrid nation-building processes in other Pacific archipelagos. Whereas the 
previous chapter was written mainly from the viewpoint of the Hawaiian Kingdom, 
highlighting the writings of its government officials, diplomats and policy advocates in the 
development of a Hawaiian pan-Oceanian policy, the present chapter will take a different 
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 Manuscript letter, not dated. FO& Ex, Miscellaneous Foreign 1871, Hawai‘i State Archives. 
327
 “In the days the constitution of Hawai‘i was being created, a constitution that enjoyed the support of the 
knowledgeable people of the country and has been followed by many other countries” Translation by Professor 
Michael Horowitz, ‘Atenisi University.” Untitled editorial, Koe Boobooi, Vol. 2, no 1 (1 March 1875), p.3. 
Unsigned but authored likely by the newspaper’s editor, Shirley W. Baker. 
328
 Letter from Albert B. Steinberger to William L. Green, 30 October 1875. FO& Ex, Miscellaneous Foreign 1875, 
Hawai‘i State Archives. 
329
 Quoted in article “Sun Yat Sen in Honolulu” by Albert Pierce Taylor, Paradise of the Pacific, Vol.41, No. 8 
(August 1928), p. 10. Requoted in Lum and Lum 1999: 5 
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perspective and look at institutional transfer from Hawai‘i and other types of Hawaiian 
influence on state-building in other parts of Oceania from the point of view of the islands that 
were recipients of these Hawaiian influences. 
The four quotes above illustrate how the Hawaiian policy of ‘Primacy of the Pacific’ was 
being received by several political leaders of countries in Oceania and other non-Western 
nations. All of them testify to the high standing the Hawaiian Kingdom enjoyed throughout the 
Asia-Pacific region, and to which the leaders of other nations in the region were looking up to. 
While the King of Fiji and the premier of Sāmoa in the first and third quote state their high 
regard for the Hawaiian Kingdom and ask for its support and recognition of their governments, 
the editor of the Tongan government newspaper in the second quote explicitly refer to the 
Hawaiian political system as a model and inspiration for the reforms and transformations of 
their own systems that were about to take place.  The fourth quote makes a similar reference to 
the Hawaiian political system as a model and attests to its influence even beyond the Pacific 
Islands region, to a country as globally significant as China, a topic that needs to be discussed in 
detail elsewhere but will be briefly touched upon in the concluding chapter. 
In the following I will first provide an overview of institutional transfer in the Pacific 
Islands region from the classical time to the nineteenth century. After briefly looking into the 
first major example of such transfer in the early nineteenth century, namely the transfer and 
influence of the legal system of the Tahitian Kingdom throughout the surrounding islands of 
Eastern Polynesia as well as parts of Western Polynesia, the main focus of the chapter is on the 
transfer and influence of the political system of the Hawaiian Kingdom throughout Oceania. 
Hence, after reiterating the main features of the Hawaiian constitutional system that made it a 
suitable form of government for hybrid Oceanian states, I will then look more closely at the 
political systems of the three emerging states in Western Polynesia that were significantly 
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influenced by Hawaiian diplomacy, and provide an analysis of their nineteenth-century 
constitutions in comparison to that of Hawai‘i.  
In Fiji and Tonga, a direct institutional transfer from Hawai‘i took place, but its success 
rate was radically different, as the system failed to create a stable state in Fiji, while it excelled 
in Tonga, where a modified version of the Hawaiian political system it is still operating today. 
In the case of Sāmoa, the Hawaiian constitution also influenced the emerging Samoan state to a 
significant degree, but the creation of its political system was a more complex process. Sāmoa 
was also the only archipelago in which the Hawaiian government directly intervened in the 
state-building process, which warrants discussion in a separate section. However, similar to 
Fiji, these efforts to create a stable native state under Hawaiian influence failed in the long run. 
Finally, I will also discuss Hawaiian influence on state-building in Eastern Micronesia, which 
existed at a far lesser institutional degree, but was still very significant, particularly in Kiribati.  
Throughout the chapter, an especially in the concluding section, I will evaluate the 
impacts of Hawaiian institutional transfer to each of the archipelagos discussed. This includes 
an analysis of the compatibility of the Hawaiian constitutional order with the classical political 
systems of the archipelago in question, as well as a critical evaluation of native agency in the 
transfer processes and the resulting hybrid political systems. Lastly, and perhaps most 
importantly, I will look at language use in the transfer processes, which is a crucial factor in 
evaluating the impact of the transfers and political influences. Before getting to these detailed 
analyses, however, let us situate the nineteenth-century exchanges of political systems and 
ideas in the longue durée of Oceanian political and cultural development. 
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Institutional transfer and peer-policy interaction in Oceania 
 
In the wider sense of archipelagic societies influencing one another, and of new-socio-
political concepts being brought from one island to another to be absorbed or adapted by the 
receiving society, institutional transfer is nothing new in Oceania. The arrival of a party of 
outsiders that brings with them new political and cultural ideas, which then in turn 
significantly restructure society is a recurring theme in the classical histories of Oceanian 
islands. One of the most famous examples is the arrival of Pa‘ao and Pili in Hawai‘i island from 
‘Kahiki,’ identified as either Tahiti or Sāmoa or both, as I already mentioned in the previous 
chapter. Similar high-profile outsiders who brought new ideas of statecraft and/or founded 
new dynasties occur in the classical histories of most other Polynesian islands, such as for 
instance the innovations brought by the foreign culture hero Lo‘au to Tonga, which has lead 
‘Okusitino Māhina to speculate on Central Eastern Polynesian origins of some of Tonga’s 
classical institutions (1986: 40-42). As in the case of the Pa‘ao-Pili tandem in Hawai‘i, more 
often than not such institutional transfer is linked to what Marshall Sahlins refers to as the 
‘stranger-king’ phenomenon (Sahlins 1981; 2008), i.e. a ruling dynasty is being founded by an 
outsider. Other examples that could be cited are the foreigner-founded Saudeleur dynasty and 
the highly stratified  system of statecraft it brought to Pohnpei, similar to the later arriving 
Isohkelekel who in turn helped overthrow the Saudeleur while importing yet another, more 
decentralised political system (Hanlon 1988a:  9-25), as I have mentioned earlier. 
It was the astonishing open-ocean sailing skills of the Austronesian peoples that 
enabled such institutional transfer to take place. A map drawn by by David Lewis (Lewis 1972: 
22-23) represents classical Oceania as a conglomerate of voyaging spheres, within which 
interaction was frequent, and long-distance exchanges between those voyaging spheres.    
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Within the Hawaiian Archipelago, one of these voyaging spheres, a constant exchange of 
both goods and ideas took place during classical times, as mentioned above. Between the four 
main Mō‘ī-doms that were all genealogically linked by multiple intermarriages of their ruling 
families, new political ideas and concepts were constantly interchanged in what Kirch (2010: 
219; 2012: 230, 291, 297) refers to as a dynamic of peer-polity interaction, as I have discussed 
extensively in chapter four. While taking place within one culturally integrated sphere and not 
in between such spheres, this can easily be seen as another form of institutional transfer. For 
instance, the ahupua‘a system of organising administration and land tenure based on territorial 
units, invented by O‘ahu’s Mō‘ī Ma‘ilikūkahi was institutionally transferred within one or two 
generations of peer-polity interaction to all the kingdoms of the pae ‘āina.  
After the encounter with the West, more new ideas were brought into the region from 
the outside, which lead to more significant modifications and hybridisations of the islands’ 
socio-political systems, as I have discussed extensively in chapters three, four and five. 
Simultaneously, communications between the archipelagos, especially over long distances, 
became much more frequent due to the new availability of Western shipping. Under the 
impression of these two new factors, institutional transfer between Oceanian archipelagos 
moved to a next level. 
As mentioned earlier, a result of institutional transfer from the West and its 
hybridisation with classical political institutions, Polynesian kingdoms of the nineteenth 
century were the first non-Western states to develop constitutional forms of government. 
Pioneering with the first Tahitian constitution of 1825 and the first Hawaiian one of 1840, a 
significant number of constitutions developed in Polynesia throughout the century, while in the 
entire non-Western world outside of Oceania proper only five constitutions were enacted 
during the entire century, viz. the 1827 Cherokee constitution, the constitution of the Ottoman 
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Empire of  1876 [to be revoked and absolute rule restored merely two years later], the 1889 
Meiji Constitution of Japan, the 1895 Johor constitution and the 1899 ‘constitution’ of the 
Korean Empire [in fact merely a written reiteration of absolute imperial authority].330 As I have 
pointed out before, even if the West itself is included, Polynesian constitutions are among the 
world’s first, since many Western nations remained absolute monarchies until the second half 
of the nineteenth century.331 
What makes nineteenth-century Polynesian constitutions all the more intriguing is that 
the two pioneer constitutional systems of Tahiti and Hawai‘i in turn became the sources of 
institutional transfer or influence for the transformation and hybridisation of the political 
systems of other Oceanian archipelagos. The interconnection of these systems has already been 
pointed out by Tongan historian Sione Lātūkefu (1982) in a pioneering study of nineteenth-
century Polynesian constitution-making. As mentioned earlier, Lātūkefu provides a good 
overview over the constitutional history of the countries he was most familiar with, i.e. Tonga, 
Sāmoa and Fiji, and he correctly identifies the Hawaiian constitution as the major external 
model for the three countries.  However, his study is incomplete, as it overlooks the Tahitian 
constitution of 1825 as well as some of the Fijian constitutions. Furthermore, Lātūkefu’s 
analysis of Hawaiian constitutional development is seriously flawed, as he reproduces 
erroneous and ridiculing statements on the Hawaiian monarchy made by US imperial 
historians and others influenced by the latter.332  
                                                 
330
 For a timeline of early constitutions in Oceania and the wider non-Western world, see appendix 2. 
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 See for instance, Hawaiian historian Kamakau pointing this out in the 1860s (2001: 198) as well as modern 
German political scientist Marquardt highlighting that Hawai‘i precedes such important a European state as Prussia 
in transforming itself into a constitutional monarchy (Marquardt 2009: 478), both of whom I have quoted in chapter 
four. 
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 As mentioned before, it is my hypothesis that Gavan Daws is the main culprit for insulating Hawai‘i from the 
otherwise progressive scholarship of the ‘Canberra School’ of Pacific Historiography, of which Lātūkefu was part in 
both name and spirit, but Daws only in name. 
377 
 
More recently, Australian political scientist Peter Larmour has reiterated the 
importance of nineteenth-century processes of institutional transfer to and between Oceanian 
states as a predecessor to similar processes going on in the post-colonial Pacific from the late 
twentieth century to the present (Larmour 2005: 9, 13, 67-77, 171-172, 183). While Larmour’s 
scholarship is very important to this dissertation, as he articulates the relevance of nineteenth-
century state building processes for the present, it remains largely informed by Lātūkefu’s 
1982 study and retains some of the latter’s shortcomings. 
 
Fig. 8.1 
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Acknowledging Lātūkefu’s and Larmour’s important groundwork, I am attempting to 
provide a more complete overview over nineteenth-century institutional transfer between 
Pacific archipelagos. As shown in the diagram in fig. 8.1, there were two main centres of 
political development, Tahiti and Hawai‘i, from where political institutions and influence 
spread to other archipelagos, somewhat analogous to the spread of goods and ideas between 
the voyaging zones in the classical period above.  
In order to appreciate the importance of these networks of institutional transfer, it is 
crucial to not merely look into the technicalities of systems of governance and law, but also to 
uncover the deep socio-political and cultural impacts of legal-political transformation in non-
Western societies. In his recent treatise on the 1895 Johor constitution, Malay scholar Iza 
Hussin thus comments on the importance of a textual analysis of legal documents by historians 
and social scientists, arguing that “[r]eading law as a text need not diminish their import as law, 
but should widen the analytic possibilities for early legal documents as carriers of not just rules 
but also of ideas of authority, sovereignty, legitimacy and order” (2013: 257). Furthermore, 
when dealing with institutional transfer from one linguistic and cultural sphere to another, it is 
crucial to consider the nuances of how legal-political terminology is translated, as Douglas 
Howland points out in Translating the West (2002), an analysis of the language used in 
translating Western political concepts into Japanese during the Meiji period. Following these 
approaches, I will thus trace the networks of institutional transfer between the polities of 
nineteenth-century Oceania while closely paying attention to the terminology used for the 
institutions that were being transferred and hybridised.   
Predating Hawaii, to which we will turn soon, the first constitutional system in Oceania 
and likely in the entire non-Western world was that of the Tahitian Kingdom lined out in the 
Tahitian law code of 1825. Resulting from the political unification of several large stratified 
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chiefdoms under Pomare II and the hybridisation of the resulting state with ideas of British 
statecraft and biblical models of legal order imported by the LMS missionaries, Tahiti had had 
essentially become a constitutional monarchy when its law code was revised in 1825 [fig. 8.2] 
to include considerable constitutional provisions, such as a partly elected apo’oraa fa’aau ture 
[legislative assembly]. Mainly through networks of the LMS and other British missionaries, this 
hybrid Tahitian system spread to most parts of Eastern Polynesia, and from there further west. 
Legal codes created in these areas owed much to the Tahitian model, and even if there was no 
direct institutional transfer, its influence can be traced through political concepts and 
terminology deriving from that model.  
The most striking element in the early Tahitian-language law documents is the term 
ture in their title. As the term for law in modern Tahitian, ture is derived from the Hebrew word 
תּ וֹרָה [torah] (Académie 
Tahitienne 1999: 530; 
Montiller 1997: 270-271) 
and thus intimately 
connected to the Ancient 
Israeli Mosaic concept of 
law lined out in the 
Pentateuch. Without 
understanding Biblical 
language, an early 19th 
century Tahitian would 
have no clue what a ture 
was and what it should be 
Fig. 8.2: Title page and page 26 of the 1825 Law Code of the Tahitian 
Kingdom. Copyright expired. Microfilm in UH library. Article 42 
describes the election and functioning of the legislative assembly, 
making this code the first written constitution of Oceania. 
380 
 
good for.333  
The Tahitian-language law codes contain other important political concepts that are 
designated by loanwords. One of them is basileia [pātīreia in modern Tahitian spelling], 
deriving from Greek βασιλεία [basileía] (“kingdom”), which denotes the coming Kingdom of 
God in the New Testament, but is also used for a worldly kingdom such as the Tahitian one.334 
Another one is tāvana, a Tahitianisation of the English word governor (>*gāvana>tāvana) that 
designated the heads of the formerly independent clans or chiefdoms that were re-organised as 
‘districts’ within the new Christian kingdoms. Hence the most commonly seen translation of 
tāvana is “district chief.”  
Similar to the words ture and basileia, although in this case secular and not Biblical, the 
term tāvana is not based on any native concept. Its adaptation as a cornerstone in the 
administration of the Tahitian and the other Society Islands kingdoms thus creates a specific 
innovation marking a major paradigm shift in political organisation. As historian Douglas 
Howard states about loanwords from Western languages in Meiji-era Japanese, “a loanword 
was always a neologism. And since […] it conveyed no initially meaningful content but only the 
sound of a European word, the loanword made a virtue of specificity” (2002: 87), a statement 
that is perfectly applicable to the neologisms in nineteenth-century Tahitian law books. 
The marked contrast to the terminology for the equivalent political institutions in the 
Hawaiian kingdom, viz. kānāwai, aupuni and kia‘āina, all of which derive from classical 
Hawaiian statecraft, is clearly evident. This is hardly surprising, given the nature or Pomare’s 
Kingdom and the other Tahitian-language realms as secondary states modelled on outside 
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 Nowadays, two centuries later, ture has become internalised as a Tahitian term for law, and since its foreign 
etymology is not as evident as that of English or French loanwords, it is rarely even identified as a foreign 
borrowing today. 
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 E.g. in the title of the 1842 Tahitian law code mentioned above. 
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examples, and not primary states that developed endogenously like the classical Hawaiian 
predecessor states of the Hawaiian Kingdom (Hommon 2013: 184-185).  
The details of the spread of post-1815 Tahitian legal, judicial and constitutional 
concepts throughout much of Polynesia are a separate story beyond the purview of this 
dissertation.335 Where it is most relevant, however, is where influence of the Tahitian model 
intersected with that of Hawai‘i. Before Tonga and Sāmoa, which will be discussed more below, 
this also initially included the Hawaiian Islands themselves, where Tahitian converts  and a 
Tahiti-based missionary played a significant role in converting the leading figures of the 
Hawaiian court to Christianity in the 1820s. These interactions with the Christianised Tahitian 
language sphere brought also some political influence. However, this influence was short-lived, 
and the Hawaiian political system would develop along significantly different lines. 
 
Hawaiian constitutionalism as the model for modern Oceanian statecraft 
 
 As described in the fourth chapter, the first printed laws decreed by the Hawaiian 
kingdom were port regulations concerning foreign visitors in 1822, 1824 and 1825, and 
Christian-influenced penal codes proclaimed in 1827, 1829 and 1834336 (Kuykendall 1938: 
120-121; Achiu and Akana-Gooch 2005: 15-23; 2006: 24-37; Beamer 2014: 105-115). These 
laws, while not directly copied from the Tahitian law codes published in the early 1820s, 
largely followed the pattern of the latter, due to the influence of Tahitians and Tahiti-based 
missionary William Ellis in the early Christian mission in Hawai‘i. In the 1830s, however, a 
significant divergence from the Tahitian model can be observed. As explained in chapter four, 
the first comprehensive Hawaiian law code published in 1839 incorporated not only these 
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 For a detailed analysis of this spread of the neo-Tahitian political and legal system, see Saura 1996 and 1997. 
336
 He olelo no na kanawai, o ko Hawai‘i nei Pae Aina, na Kauikeaouli ke Alii. Oahu: Mea pai palapala a na 
Misionari 1834. Copy in UH Hamilton library. Call number KFH30 1834 .A23 
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biblical-inspired penal regulations, but also codified classical Hawaiian kānāwai  and kapu 
concerning resource management (Beamer 2014: 116-127). While the more extensive later 
codes of the Tahitian model also contain codifications of certain classical resource management 
rules, the most striking feature in which the 1839 Hawaiian law code diverges from the 
Tahitian model is that it is prefaced by what is termed the Kumu Kānāwai [literally “source of 
law”] and usually translated in English as “Declaration of Rights,” a proclamation of equal rights 
for all Hawaiian subjects.  
One year later, the Kumu Kānāwai was 
extended to include a precise description of the 
functioning of government, including many 
classical Hawaiian government institutions plus, 
as new introductions, an elected lower house of 
the legislature to complement the ‘aha ali‘i as 
well as an institutionalised judiciary (Beamer 
2014: 127-130). This revised and extended 
Kumu Kānāwai was translated as “Constitution” 
in English, as it indeed resembled the few 
constitutions of Western nations then in 
existence [fig. 8.3].337 
The inclusion of religious freedom in the 
1840 Kumu Kānāwai was an important step 
towards a secular state and away from the 
Christian theocratic model of the Tahitian 
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 For the full text of the 1840 constitution, see appendix 5 at the end of this dissertation. 
Fig. 8.3: Title page of the Hawaiian law book of 
1841, containing the 1840 Kumu Kānāwai, the 
first constitution of the Hawaiian Kingdom. 
Copyright expired. 
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codes.338 With the continuing reform processed of the 1840s and 1850s, Kamehameha III and 
his advisors, especially non-missionary Westerners in his inner circle like Robert Wyllie and 
John Ricord, increased this tendency to move away from Christian utopian ideas, as they were 
cherished by Ka‘ahumanu under ABCFM influence, towards a secular modernity, since “the 
internationalisation of Honolulu demanded a more pluralistic approach to civil governance” 
(Klieger 2015: 323). The revised constitution of 1852, which further extended civil rights of 
Hawaiian subjects while continuing to reduce religious influence in the government, marked 
the completion of this process of secularisation and democratisation for the time being.  
By that stage, of the mid-1850s, Hawai‘i’s constitutional system was a perfect example 
of hybridity, as it combined a foundation of classical Hawaiian political institutions with 
elements selectively appropriated from the Western constitutional systems considered to be 
the most progressive of the time. These elements were essentially coming out of the Anglo-
Saxon tradition of constitutionalism, including the 1215 English Magna Charta, the 1689 
English bill of rights, the 1776 American declaration of independence and the 1789 United 
States constitution. But the Hawaiian kingdom’s legal-political system was neither a copy of the 
one existing in Great Britain nor of that of the United States, but something sui generis, 
elaborated from a starting point of classical Hawaiian governance, with selectively 
appropriated elements of British and American ideas of constitutionalism woven into it.339  
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 1840 Hawaiian Constitution, Art. 10. This was however worded in a way to be limited to Christian (and 
theoretically Jewish) denominations, granting every religion the right to worship Iehova (Jehovah). If a broader 
definition of religious freedom had been intended, the more general term Akua (God) could have been used.  
339
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Merry 2000: 102) are quite inaccurate. There are at least three basic differences between the then existing US 
constitution and the Hawaiian constitution of 1852. The first two are institutional, the US being a republic, the 
Hawaiian Islands a monarchy; and secondly, the USA is a federal state, while Hawai‘i is a unitary state. Thirdly, 
there is a significant difference in the way the two constitutions are organised, as the US constitution has its bill of 
rights appended as so-called amendments, whereas in all Hawaiian constitutions the declaration of rights comes 
first, as the starting point of the entire document. Since a lawyer of American descent, William Lee, was 
Kamehameha III’s key advisor in drafting the 1852 constitution, there may have been a certain “influence of 
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Shortly afterwards, with the promulgation of the Hawaiian Civil Code of 1859, a concept 
alien to Anglo-Saxon law, elements from the continental European legal tradition were added 
in as well. This also continued with the further reform of the political system in the 1864 
constitution, when in the person of Charles de Varigny for the first time a non-Anglo-Saxon 
foreigner was among the Hawaiian King’s top constitutional advisors.340 Among Western 
constitutional models, it is also striking how the nineteenth-century Hawaiian political system 
constitution is reflective of German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s concept of the 
Constitutional Monarchy, as Sai (2008: 88) has remarked. Indeed, the institutions outlined in 
the Hawaiian Constitution, including the monarch, the executive cabinet and the legislature 
representing the two other estates of the Kingdom, largely conform to the ideal political 
constitution outlined in Hegel’s 1833 Philosophie des Rechts (Hegel 1928: 377-132).  
If compared with the previously discussed, slightly older Tahitian constitutional model, 
one can see that the Hawaiian constitutional system has significant advantages over the former. 
First, from an institutional perspective, in the Hawaiian system, at least since 1852, and 
especially since 1864, there is a clearer separation of power. Like in Western countries, 
Hawaiian courts operated independently from the executive and received government salaries. 
In the Tahitian legal system, this was not the case, as was clearly pointed out by St. Julian in his 
analysis of the 1850 Tongan law code – modelled on the Huahine law code and thus deriving 
from the Tahitian model. Judges there were paid from fines, as were people denouncing 
                                                                                                                                                             
American political ideas” (Kuykendall 1938: 267), but nonetheless, it is clearly a uniquely Hawaiian, hybrid 
constitutional system. 
340
 Similar to the erroneous characterisation of the 1852 constitution as ‘American,’ the 1864 constitution has 
sometimes been identified as being ‘British’ in nature (e.g. Lātūkefu 1982: 31). This is just as much an 
oversimplification of the constitution’s hybrid nature. In fact the 1864 constitution is not more similar to the then 
existing British political system than the 1852 constitution was, actually it is less similar. For instance, the 1864 
constitution removes two key features resembling those in the British political system, namely the bicameral nature 
of the legislature and the institution of the kuhina nui that was certainly more similar to the British prime minister 
than the cabinet council of four equal-ranking ministers taking its place in 1864. Both 1852 and 1864 are in fact 
Hawaiian, hybrid, sui generis constitutions. 
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violators of behavioural prescriptions, thus opening the doors for undue collaboration between 
the executive and judiciary in order to convict as many people as possible (St. Julian 1857: 16, 
70-71). Similar provisions that facilitated arbitrary and abusive judicial decisions were 
common in most of the early Polynesian law codes modelled on those of Tahiti.341  
The second important improvement of the Hawaiian over the Tahitian model was the 
secular nature of the former. As mentioned above, Hawaiian secularism gradually evolved, with 
freedom of religion already in the 1840 constitution, and the article requiring laws to follow 
Biblical teaching removed in 1852. Further, education was gradually taken out of the mission’s 
hands, first by making it a government system still run by an ex-ABCFM missionary (Richard 
Armstrong), but then replacing him with a kaukau ali‘i government official (Mataio 
Kekūanāo‘a). No comparable secularisation ever happened in the Tahitian-influenced 
constitutional systems, where LMS or Wesleyan Protestantism was usually considered the state 
religion, and education run by missionaries.  
Third, on a deeper analytical level, what made the political system of the Hawaiian 
Kingdom more suitable as the model for modern Oceanian statecraft was that despite the 
selective appropriation of Western political institutions, in its core it remained based on 
classical Hawaiian statecraft, which was modernised and hybridised but not replaced. Unlike 
the neo-Tahitian model with its manifold newly-created institutions and lexical neologisms, 
many of the core components of the Hawaiian constitutional system originated in classical 
times and were preserved as such also linguistically.  
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 However, this assessment should not overlook the one progressive element in the Tahitian law code that was 
actually ahead of the Hawaiian one, namely the abolishment of the death penalty and its replacement with 
banishment to an outer island as the highest criminal punishment, as it was voted by the Tahitian Legislative 
Assembly in 1824 when creating the revised code of 1825 (cited in Chesneaux 1995: 170-174), a practice that was 
followed in the Leeward Islands law codes as well. This makes the Tahitian kingdom likely the first modern state to 
abolish the death penalty, an important milestone in world history. The Hawaiian Kingdom did not abolish the death 
penalty, and neither did any of the Hawaiian-derived legal systems in Western Polynesia.  
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This is most strikingly evident in the word kānāwai, which remained the modern 
Hawaiian term for law. For Hawaiians raised in the classical era, a Hawaiian kānāwai text could 
thus clearly be identified by everyone as containing rules for people to follow, without any 
prerequisite knowledge of foreign cultural concepts, unlike a ture in Tahiti or a lao, in 
Tongan.342 The same, of course is true for institutions like kia‘āina, understandable to 
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 While the early Tongan legal system was influenced by the Tahitian model, the word ture remained limited to 
Eastern Polynesian languages and did not make it into Tongan, which instead Tonganised the English word law. 
Fig. 8.4: Flow chart of Hawaiian constitutional development and institutional transfer to Tonga, 
Fiji and Sāmoa 
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Hawaiians as a governor of an island in the name of the Mō‘ī, whereas Tahitians first had to 
learn what a tāvana is before they could understand a text mentioning this institution.343  
It was at the stage of development of the mid-1850s, i.e. based on the 1852 constitution, 
that the Hawaiian constitutional system began to be institutionally transferred to other Pacific 
Islands, some of them previously influenced by the neo-Tahitian political system. Later 
institutional transfers from Hawaii during the 1870s used the 1864 constitution as the most up 
to date, of course. The flowchart in fig. 8.4 shows an overview over these institutional transfers 
and influence emanating from Hawai‘i. In the following sections I will discuss this transfer in 
detail, archipelago by archipelago.  
 
Transfer of Hawaiian constitutionalism to Tonga 
 
As discussed in chapter three, among all other Polynesian archipelagos, Tonga was most 
comparable to Hawai‘i, since it shared a similar development, from the more egalitarian tribal 
society of ancient Polynesia into a highly stratified society in its classical period (Kirch 1984: 217-
242; Kirch 2010: 27-28; Hommon 2013: 188-1999), which in turn facilitated the formation of a 
centralized monarchy under George Tupou I in the mid-1800s (Howe 1984: 177-97; Campbell 
2001: 72-84). Once he had firmly established his rule over the archipelago and converted to 
Wesleyan [Methodist] Christianity, Tupou promulgated legal codes based on those of Tahiti and 
the other Society Islands, cumulating in a unified Tongan code of 1850 (Lātūkefu 1975a: 20-24; 
1975b: 22; Campbell 2001: 81, 274).  
In 1853, King George Tupou I visited the city of Sydney upon invitation by the Wesleyan 
mission which was headquartered there. During his visit, the King met with Charles St. Julian, who 
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 For a comparative listing of key governance terms in nineteenth-century legal texts in the languages discussed 
here, see fig. 8.18 in the conclusion of this chapter 
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had just been appointed Hawaiian Commissioner to the Independent States and Tribes of 
Polynesia (Diamond 1990: 42).  Early in 1854, St. Julian’s attaché Sawkins visited Tonga and 
reported to St. Julian about the situation of the country (Rutherford 1996: 27; Diamond 1990: 67). 
In addition, Alexander Blake, who upon St. Julian’s recommendation had been appointed Hawaiian 
Consul at Vava‘u  provided St. Julian with an English translation of the 1850 Tongan law code, 
which King Tupou I had sent him. 344  
Based on his personal conversations with the King during his visit to Sydney, Sawkins’ 
report, and Blake’s translation of the 1850 Tongan law code, St. Julian started a lengthy 
correspondence with King George Tupou I during 1854 and 1855, in which he offered his advice 
in modernizing the King’s government.345 St. Julian’s detailed letters of advice did not come 
unsolicited. Responding to St. Julian’s first official letter of correspondence, King George Tupou I 
thanked the Hawaiian diplomat, and asked for further advice and support from the Hawaiian 
Kingdom in a letter dated November 24, 1854: 
CHARLES ST JULIAN, – I am thankful with a rejoicing heart this day in my receiving the letters 
which have been brought (to me) from you, my friend, to aid me and my people and my land. 
And I wish to be truly thankful to you – you and the King of Hawaii, in the manifestation of your 
true kindliness – in the manifestation of the desire of the government of Hawaii and its Council, 
to be of service to me and to my people – to elevate my kingdom. 
Yes! and are my thanks and my rejoicing unfounded? For is it your desire to injure my 
kingdom? Is it not your desire to aid me and my kingdom? Therefore, it is that I call you my 
friend. My kingdom is established in these days. It has its laws, and its people obey them. Chiefs 
are chiefs; gentlemen (matabooles) [matapule ] are gentlemen; people are people. And I greatly 
desire in these days to raise my people and my land; that they may become civilised like the 
various kingdoms in the world. And I earnestly beseech you, the King (high chief or 
commissioner) of Hawaii, that you will not cease writing nor your desire to assist me – but write 
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 Blake’s translation of the code is reproduced in full in St. Julian’s 1859 Official Report on Central Polynesia to 
the Hawaiian Government, as appendix III, pp. 70-72. 
345
 The two most detailed letters by St. Julian to King Tupou I, of 15 October 1855, are reproduced in full in St. 
Julian’s 1859 Official Report on Central Polynesia to the Hawaiian Government, as appendix II, pp. 66-69. 
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me and cease not. And this (enclosed) is the book of our Laws that I send you. Do you look into it, 
and if there be anything that seems strange or wrong to you, make it known to me, and I will 
consider respecting it. 
And this is the end of my letter to you. 
    I am 
    George Tubou [Tupou] 
       Your friend 
To the Commissioner of the King of Hawaii346 
 
After carefully analysing the Tongan Law code and Sawkins’ report, St. Julian’s main 
points of criticism in his subsequent letters to King George Tupou were the lack of religious 
freedom, missionary control of the education system, compulsory labour by the commoners for 
their feudal lords, and the lack of checks and balances in the political system, which in St. 
Julian’s analysis made it prone to corruption and prevented the country’s economic 
development and modernisation.  St. Julian suggested instead granting freedom of religion, 
secularizing the education system, replacing compulsory labour with a cash taxation system, 
and creating a separation of powers, all of which had already been done in Hawai‘i.  St, Julian 
thus attached a copy of the Hawaiian constitution to one of his letters to the King, and 
suggested modernizing the Tongan system of government along its lines, as well as establishing 
a close political relationship between Tonga and Hawai‘i (Lātūkefu 1975a: 30-32).  
King George Tupou took note of St. Julian’s recommendations but at first was reluctant to 
adopt any of the suggested changes. After waiting several years without his suggestions being 
implemented, St. Julian actually grew impatient with Tupou I and published a letter in the Sydney 
Morning Herald in 1858, in which he denounced the King’s unwillingness to modernise his 
country. Tongan Historian Sione Lātūkefu suggests that the reason for the King’s reluctance was 
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 English translation from Tongan, reproduced in in St. Julian’s 1859 Official Report on Central Polynesia to the 
Hawaiian Government, as part of appendix II, p. 66. 
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the fact that his political supremacy over rivalling chiefs was still precarious in the mid-1850s, and 
he could not afford alienating them by curtailing their feudal privileges yet (Lātūkefu 1975a: 31-
32). 
However, by the early 1860s, Tupou I had consolidated his power, and his policies changed 
towards embracing much of what St. Julian had suggested. In 1862, the King promulgated a new 
law code, which, among other reforms, liberated the commoners from compulsory labour, 
abolished some of the religious restrictions of the previous codes, and created an assembly to 
advise the king in legislative matters.347 The latter provision made the 1862 code in fact Tonga’s 
first constitution. Lātūkefu and Australian historian Noel Rutherford both agree that the 1862 
legal reforms were a belated yet incomplete implementation of St. Julian’s earlier suggestions 
(Lātūkefu 1975b: 25; Rutherford 1996: 31).  
In this first stage of Hawaiian-influenced reform, the political system of Tonga in turn 
influenced neighbouring island states. The emerging matanitū of Eastern Fiji, specifically Bua 
and Lau, and their unification with Cakaudrove as the  Tovata Confederacy under the 
leadership of Tupou I’s cousin Ma‘afu was strongly influenced by the legal and political system 
of Tonga as will be described below. Samoan political leaders also displayed an interest in the 
functioning of the Tongan government as a model for creating their own constitutional system 
in the early 1870s. 
By that time, however, King Tupou I and his advisors increasingly realized that the 1862 
reforms were still far from what St. Julian had suggested and what made the Hawaiian Kingdom 
an economically prosperous and internationally recognized nation. Particularly, foreigners 
refused to submit to Tongan laws and insisted on their homelands’ consular jurisdiction (Lātūkefu 
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 The earliest version of the 1862 code I was able to see is a 1868 revised edition, titled Koe Gaahi Lao oe Buleaga 
o Toga [...] (Togatabu: Fale Buluji oe Buleaga, 1868). An English translation is appended in Lātūkefu 1974: 238-
251. 
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1975a: 39). In order to remedy the situation, Tongan government officials began debating about 
enacting a proper constitution.   
In 1873, Former Wesleyan missionary Shirley Baker [fig. 
8.5], who had been employed as King Tupou’s chief advisor in 1872, 
visited Sydney and met with the Premier of New South Wales as 
well as with Edward Reeve, St. Julian’s successor as Hawaiian 
consul-general, to ask them for constitutional advice (Lātūkefu 
1974: 201-202). It was most likely through this meeting with Reeve 
that Baker received a copy of the 1864 Hawaiian constitution. After 
his return, Baker began editing a Tongan-language newspaper, Koe 
Boobooi, and wrote editorials explaining to the King’s subjects the 
purpose of a constitution. In one editorial in particular, Baker 
specifically mentioned the Hawaiian Constitution as being well 
suited for the country, a statements that I have used as one of the introductory quotes at the 
beginning of this chapter.  Another issue of Koe Boobooi featured an article titled “Hisitolia o Vaihi” 
(History of Hawai‘i), focusing on Kamehameha I’s unification of the Hawaiian Islands and his 
governance which is portrayed very positively.348 
By the end of 1875, the new Tongan constitution had been written, and was published in 
the September issue of Koe Boobooi, as well as in a new comprehensive Tongan law book in 
1876.349 In analysing the constitution in detail, Lātūkefu notices that the first part, the Declaration 
of Rights, follows “very closely those of the Hawaiian constitution,” as does the second part 
describing the form of government (Lātūkefu 1975a: 45). It is also important to note that the 
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 Koe Boobooi, Vol. 2, No 3 (1 May 1875): 20-21. 
349
 Koe Tohi Lao o Toga (Nukuʻalofa: Fale Buluji oe Buleaga 1876): 1-30. An English translation is provided as an 
appendix in Lātūkefu 1975b: 90-116. Both are reproduced in this dissertation as Appendix 10. Hereafter 1875 
Tongan Constitution. 
Fig 8.5: Shirley Waldemar 
Baker (1836-1903), chief 
advisor to the King of 
Tonga 1872-1875; Prime 
Minister of Tonga 1881-
1890. Photograph taken c. 
1883 by unknown 
photographer. Copyright 
expired. Source: Wikipedia. 
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Hawaiian constitution it is based on is the then current one of 1864, and not the one of 1852 sent 
by St, Julian in the 1850s, as for instance the Tongan legislature consists of nobles and 
representatives sitting together, and all other provisions not specifically altered to adapt them to 
Tongan specificities are identical with the 1864 Hawaiian constitution.350   
Specific innovations in the Tongan government structure include the office of the Palemia 
[Premier or Prime Minister] with both foreign and domestic responsibilities, an office neither 
exactly like the then obsolete Hawaiian Kuhina nui of the 1840 and 1852 constitutions, nor like 
one of the four equal-ranking ministers in the Hawaiian cabinet under the 1864 constitution, but 
somewhat more closely resembles the British prime minister, having a powerful position as leader 
of the executive cabinet, but not a status of co-regent. Furthermore, the three other ministers in 
the Tongan cabinet – Minisitā tauhi pa‘anga [Treasurer], Minisitā ‘o e ngaahi ‘api ‘o e pule‘anga mo 
e ngaahi lisi ‘o e fonua [Minister of Lands] and Minisitā ‘o e Polisi [Minister of Police] – had 
somewhat other focus tasks than their Hawaiian counterparts, except the Treasurer whose task 
was identical to the Kuhina waiwai [Minister of Finance] in the Hawaiian cabinet.351 
The second innovation added to the Hawaiian constitution by the Tongan constitution-
makers is an extensive section on land tenure. While the Hawaiian Kingdom had a complex system 
of land laws, starting from the Land Commission and the Māhele of the 1840s, these laws were 
simple organic acts and never included into the Hawaiian constitution. Tupou I and his advisors 
on the other hand found land laws of such great importance that they make up about one third of 
the constitution.  Essentially, all land was declared inalienable and subject only to leaseholds, 
while the nobles were granted hereditary estates, which in turn they could lease to other 
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 Lātūkefu repeatedly states that the similarities are with the 1852 Hawaiian constitution (e.g. 1974: 207), which is 
clearly erroneous. 
351
 1875 Tongan Constitution, Art. 55. 
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parties.352 
During the 1880s and 1890s, the Tongan constitution was amended several times (Powles 
1970: D1-D11). This concerned most substantially the section on land tenure, in which many 
details were changed, including a right of commoners to be granted hereditary land leases from 
either noble estate holders or directly from the government.  But the amendments also changed 
several core concepts that had been transferred from the Hawaiian constitution but were later 
found inappropriate by the Tongan King and his advisors, such as the strict separation of powers, 
the different constituted judicial juries for trying natives and foreigners, as well as other civil 
rights provisions and limitations to the King’s power that were much too liberal for Tupou’s taste 
(ibid. D6-D7).  To some extent, the Tongan constitution was thus re-authoritarianised from its 
more democratic Hawaiian model.  
The late 1880s also mark the resumption of official relations between Hawai‘i and 
Tonga. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Hawaiian Envoy John E. Bush was specifically 
commissioned not only as minister plenipotentiary to King Malietoa Laupepa of Sāmoa, but 
also to the King of Tonga, with instructions to proceed to the latter archipelago after 
completing his tasks in Sāmoa (Horn 1951: 105). His mission in Tonga was to negotiate a treaty 
with King George Tupou I, similar to those Tonga had concluded with Germany and Great 
Britain and was about to conclude with the US,353 and secondly, to ask Tonga to join the 
Polynesian confederation under Hawaiian leadership that Bush had initiated with Sāmoa in 
February of 1887 (ibid.: 107). While the letter of introduction from King Kalākaua to Malietoa 
Laupepa appears to be lost, a typewritten copy of the letter to King George Tupou I, which Bush 
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 1875 Tongan Constitution, Art. 109-131. 
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 According to Hawaiian foreign minister Gibson in a letter to French Consul and Commissioner in Honolulu 
Henri Feer, King Tupou himself had declared his intent to sign such a treaty with the Hawaiian Islands (Gibson to 
Feer, 8 September 1883, File B29, Box 41, Océanie, Centre for Overseas Archives, Aix-en-Provence, France) 
Unfortunately, I have not found the original communication from Tupou I to the Hawaiian government. 
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carried with him, survives in the Archives of Hawai‘i, which testifies to the friendly feelings 
Kalākaua had for his Polynesian brother monarch:  
 
KALAKAUA, by the Grace of God, of the Hawaiian Islands, King, to His Majesty, George, 
King of the Tongan Islands, Greeting:- 
Desiring to give expression to the feelings of friendship which We have always entertained 
towards Your Majesty and the Tongan People, a race so closely allied by blood to the 
Hawaiians, We have appointed Our Trusty and well beloved JOHN EDWARD BUSH, Actual 
Envoy councillor, a member of the House of Nobles of Our Kingdom, Knight Grand Cross of 
Our Royal Order of the Star of Oceania, Knight Commander of Our Royal Order of the Crown 
of Hawaii, to be Our Minister Plenipotentiary near Your Majesty. Mr. Bush is well informed as 
to Our sentiments of friendship towards Your Majesty and Our desire is to see the Tongan 
Kingdom prosperous and happy and assured of its independence and We have entire 
confidence that he will render himself acceptable to Your Majesty and will give effect to Our 
desire of preserving and advocating on all occasions the interest and well being of both 
countries and of drawing closer the bonds of friendship which already unite them, and we 
beseech Your Majesty to give full faith to all that he may say in Our name and more especially 
when he shall assure Your Majesty of Our friendship for Him and for His Royal Hose and of 
Our constant prayer for Their prosperity and that of the people of Tonga. And we pray the 
Almighty that He will ever have Your Majesty in His safe and Holy Keeping. 
Written at OUR PALACE of IOLANI in Honolulu this 
twenty third day of December A. D. 1886, and in 
the thirteenth year of Our Reign 
(M.R.) KALAKAUA,  REX. 
(countersigned.)   Walter M. Gibson. 354 
 As described above, Bush’s mission was aborted as a consequence of the ‘bayonet’ coup 
d’état taking place in June of 1887 in Honolulu as well as the German invasion of Sāmoa in 
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 F.O. & Ex, Series 418, Box 2, Hawai‘i State Archives. Cited in Cook 2011: 218 
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August of the same year. Bush was thus unable to proceed to Tonga and deliver the letter to 
King Tupou I.  Tonga itself soon fell victim to imperialist aggression too, as in 1891 Great 
Britain intervened to deport Premier Baker and impose British colonial official Basil Thomson 
as ‘deputy Premier,’ and in 1900 Tonga formally came under British ‘protection.’ Under 
Thomson’s influence, the constitution was further amended (Powles 1979: D8-D11), and more 
revisions were done in the early twentieth century under the British protectorate, including the 
creation of new cabinet ministers and the reduction of the number of legislators (Campbell 
2001: 142). Nonetheless, the essence of the constitution survived these interferences and has 
endured to this day; hence Tonga remains the only island state where a derivate of the 
nineteenth-century Hawaiian political system still operates today. 
 
Transfer of Hawaiian constitutionalism to Fiji 
 
Like in Tonga, the first major political influence from the 
Hawaiian Kingdom came to Fiji indirectly through the efforts of St. 
Julian in the 1850s. In 1857, upon St. Julian’s recommendation, 
Robert Swanston [fig. 8.6] was commissioned as the first Hawaiian 
consul in Fiji. While he held that position only for a short time and 
resigned in 1859, Swanston subsequently played an important role 
in Fijian politics, as Ma‘afu made him his personal secretary, in 1867 
commissioned him a secretary of the matanitū of Lau, and in 1870 he 
was appointed secretary of the Tovata confederacy.355  Later he 
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 Commission R.S. Swanston to be Secretary for Lau,” June 1867; Commission R.S. Swanston to be Secretary of 
the Tovata, 3
rd
 August 1870. Both in Ms 2, sect 1, no 7 (Swanston Papers), Im Thurn Papers, National Archives of 
Fiji. 
Fig. 8.6: Robert 
Swanston (1825-?), 
Hawaiian Consul in Fiji 
1867-1859; Secretary of 
Lau 1867-1870; 
Secretary of the Tovata 
Confederacy 1870-
1871; Fijian Minister of 
Native Affairs, 1872-
1874. Taken before 
1900 by unknown 
photographer.  
Copyright expired. 
Original in Fiji Museum 
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would become a leading cabinet minister in the Fijian Kingdom, known for his administrative 
competence and pro-native attitude (Routledge 1985a: 147-148). 
While as the former Hawaiian consul Swanston likely brought some knowledge of the 
Hawaiian political system into the Lau matanitū, the main political model for the eastern Fijian 
states under Ma‘afu’s influence was Tonga under its 1862 law code, which, as we have seen was 
a hybrid based on the Tahitian law codes with the addition of Hawaiian legal ideas brought 
through St. Julian. The 1869 constitution and law code of Lau356 was thus strongly influenced 
by that of Tonga (Derrick 1950: 188 n.8), and so were other Eastern Fijian legal texts prior to 
Fiji’s 1871 unification. The 1869 constitution of the Tovata i Viti357 for instance uses the term 
lao for law, likely a direct import from the Tongan legal code, since it diverges from later Fijian 
spelling lawa.  Similarly, the matanitū of Bua, also part of the Tovata, while not having a written 
constitution, was conceptually modelled on the Tongan kingdom and created a complex 
system, of written laws, especially dealing with land tenure (France 1969: 75-78). 
 
A more direct institutional transfer from Hawaii happened in the other embryo of 
modern state-building in the archipelago, viz. the matanitū of Bau. As discussed before, Bau’s 
paramount chief Cakobau consolidated power over parts of the East Coast of Viti Levu and the 
central islands in the 1850s, partly with Tongan support, and subsequently claimed the title Tui 
Viti [King of Fiji] for himself. He also had converted to Wesleyan Christianity and gained 
paramountcy over the largest port town in Fiji, Levuka, which had a considerable population of 
Western traders. All of this made the creation of a modern state an imminent step in the eyes of 
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 Partially published in English translation as Constitution and Laws of the Chiefdom of Lau, Fiji. Sydney: S.T. 
Leigh & Co. I have not seen the Fijian original. 
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 Vunau sa Vakavuna kina na nodra bua na Tovata i Viti. The Constitution of the Tovata i Viti. Original Fijian 
manuscript with attached English translation. Ms 2, sect 1, no 7 (Swanston Papers), Im Thurn Papers, National 
Archives of Fiji. English translation printed as Constitution and Laws of the Tovata e Viti (Sydney: S.T. Leigh & Co 
1871). 
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Cakobau and his advisors in order to consolidate his power. One of his close counsels, Samuel 
A. Saint John, an American trader who had married into the Bauan chiefly family and became 
Cakobau’s secretary, had obtained a copy of the Hawaiian constitution of 1852, and upon that 
model drafted a “Constitution of the Bau Domains.”358 Based on this constitution, Cakobau was 
officially crowned and inaugurated King of Bau in May of 1867 (Derrick 1950: 163-164; 
Routledge 1985a: 112-113).359  
The 1867 Bau constitution was almost to the letter copied from its Hawaiian model, 
except for the absence of the kuhina nui, a different set of cabinet ministers – Secretary of State, 
360 Treasurer, Minister of War, Collector-General of Revenue and Minister of Police –, and most, 
importantly, no legislature, as it was apparently deemed impossible to hold elections under the 
tenuous circumstances of Cakobau’s rule. In 1869, under William Drew, a British trader who 
had succeeded St. John as Cakobau’s secretary, the constitution was amended and a bicameral 
legislature introduced, with the upper house consisting of Fijian chiefs and the lower house 
being elected by resident white settlers (Crane 1938: 33; Derrick 1950: 189). This meant that 
the articles relating to the legislative power of the 1852 Hawaiian Constitution that were 
deleted in the 1867 Bauan constitution were restored in a slightly modified form. 
Historians describing this episode agree that the Bauan constitutional government of 
the late 1860s was not efficient and barely functioned in the way it was described in the 
constitution (Crane 1938: 30-34; Derrick 1950: 190; France 1969: 78-83; Routledge 1985: 112-
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 Constitution of the Bau Dominions. 2 May 1867. Reprinted in Fiji Times, 28 June 1871. Reproduced at the end of 
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 The name of this office, absent in both the Hawaiian and British political systems, clearly reflects Saint John’s 
American background.  
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113). One of the problems was the discrepancy between Cakobau’s claim of being the Tui Viti 
while controlling little beyond the Eastern coast of Viti Levu and some of the central islands, 
while the rivalling and more sustained state building project by Ma‘afu always loomed large 
and close in the east. Secondly, the white settlers in Levuka and other parts of the Bauan 
domains, upon whose taxes the government mainly depended were for the most part not 
cooperative with Cakobau and his small group of advisors.  
In June of 1871, another attempt was made by Cakobau and settlers loyal to him to 
form a unified Kingdom of Fiji, this time with a broader power base. Forestalling agitation by 
disloyal settlers for a white republic, the King reactivated the Bauan constitution and appointed 
a cabinet representing various factions of chiefs and settlers, and held discussions with Ma‘afu 
and his allies with the goal of unifying the two embryonic states into one (Crane 1938: 38-70; 
Routledge 1985a: 126-131). A convention was held to amend the Bauan constitution, and all 
major heads of matanitū consented to merge their states with that of Bau, each becoming a 
district/province of the Kingdom of Fiji, including those previously part of the Tovata, although 
their consent to the unified Fijian state remained tenuous. 
The process of political consolidation, international negotiations and constitution-
amending that consolidated to the Fijian Kingdom for the time being featured two interactions 
with the Hawaiian Kingdom. Shortly after the initial formation of Cakobau’s cabinet, Cakobau sent 
a letter to Kamehameha V asking for support and recognition of his government, which I have 
quoted at the beginning of this chapter.361 Around the same time, the King’s newly appointed 
minister of foreign relations and commerce John T. Sagar sent Saint John to Hawai‘i and the United 
States in June 1871. Saint John carried a letter of credence by Sagar to his Hawaiian counterpart, 
asking for further constitutional advice:  
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As the Fiji constitution is based on that of the Sandwich Islands, This Government will be 
thankful for any information you can afford, relative to the general making and being of your 
Government, the appointment and pay of Officials, method of raising revenue, and yearly 
expenditure.362  
 
Secondly, in May of the same year, as mentioned in chapter six, Kamehameha V had sent 
letters to Cakobau and Ma‘afu suggesting closer relations between the two archipelagos363 and 
commissioned St. Julian as a special commissioner to Fiji364 to assess the situation there, report 
on feasibility of Hawaiian protectorate or alliance, and provide support for the Fijian 
Kingdom’s international recognition (Diamond 1990: 134-137). When St. Julian arrived in 
Levuka in August and stayed there for a few weeks to undertake his inquiry, D.W.L. Murray was 
appointed Hawaiian consul upon St. Julian’s recommendation. It was Murray who provided a 
copy of the 1864 constitution and the current Hawaiian laws to the Fijian constitutional 
convention then in session (ibid.: 136). As soon as the new constitution had been enacted, 
Cakobau wrote a formal letter to King Kamehameha V asking for drafted 
Unsurprisingly, the resulting Constitution of the Kingdom of Fiji, which was enacted by 
King Cakobau on 18 August 1871 and entered into effect on 1 October,365 was modelled on the 
1864 Hawaiian Constitution, but unlike the 1867 Bauan constitution, it was more modified to 
fit the specificities of Fiji. As in the 1864 Hawaiian constitution, there was only one house of the 
legislature, but it was fully elected by universal suffrage. On the other hand The King’s Privy 
Council, consisting of all district governors plus one other chief per district as well as the 
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cabinet ministers, in addition to being an executive advisory council was made some sort of 
upper house in the law-making process, blurring the separation between the executive and 
legislative branches.366  
The cabinet was headed by a Vunivola [Chief Secretary], an office with no Hawaiian 
precedence likely developed out of the ‘Secretary of State” in St. John’s 1867 Bauan 
constitution, and included four other ministers, one of Trade and Commerce, one of Lands and 
Works, one of Finance, and one of Native Affairs – portfolios quite different from the four 
Hawaiian ones except for the finance minister.367 The judiciary remained similar to the 
Hawaiian model, but a clause was added that one Supreme Court Judge shall be a native, which 
is quite significant because in Hawaiian Kingdom there had been no more ‘ōiwi Supreme Court 
Judge since 1868. While St. Julian filled the position of Chief Justice, Fijian lawyer Marika 
Torocā became Second Associate Justice (Crane 1938: 185). 
Beyond the constitution, the Hawaiian Kingdom also served as the source and model for 
other Fijian laws. Organic acts, similar to those in the Hawaiian Kingdom were passed to 
organise the executive ministries and the judiciary (Routledge 1985a: 131-135). The Hawaiian 
criminal and civil codes were initially adopted by executive decree of the King, then, under the 
influence of Cakobau’s mainly Australian cabinet ministers, replaced by colonial statutory law 
of New South Wales, which the first elected legislature confirmed in late 1871 (Crane 1938: 89, 
99-100), This was only a temporary measure, however, as in 1873 the Fijian parliament 
planned to adopt a specifically  Fijian civil and criminal code modelled on those of the Hawaiian 
Islands (ibid.: 207). Similarly, Fiji also adopted a modified version of the Hawaiian land 
legislation (ibid.: 109; Routledge 1985a: 161). 
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“Premier” (Routledge 1985a: 143), even though there was no such office in the constitution, and it remains unclear 
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As mentioned before, one of the main problems facing the Fijian government was the 
racism displayed by an important section of the Western immigrant population, who were 
times supported in their defiance of the government by the British consul (Crane 1938: 134-
135; Routledge 1985a: 167). Even among those declaring loyalty to the government, notions of 
white supremacy often predominated. In consequence, the legislature in 1871 passed an 
electoral act limiting the vote to white residents (Crane 1938: 122), which clearly violated the 
provisions of universal suffrage in the constitution. However, during the preceding first 
election apparently hardly any native Fijian had taken advantage of this right, and the 
legislature thus was composed only of white settler representatives (Crane 1938: 91-92). In 
1873, the legislature once more passed an act excluding native Fijians and other Pacific 
Islanders from voting for representatives, but the Privy Council and the King vetoed it, as it was 
obviously unconstitutional (Derrick 1950: 230; Routledge 1985a: 179). Cakobau then dissolved 
the legislature and together with the white leaders loyal to him – especially Chief Secretary 
John B. Thurston368 – prepared for an active campaign to enrol all native subjects for an early 
election, which once more led to fierce protests by racist settlers (Crane 1938:  216, 223-224, 
226-229). At the same time, Great Britain considered annexing Fiji and sent a commission to 
the country to assess the situation. 
Cakobau’s loyalists responded by cancelling the election and proclaiming a new, 
significantly amended constitution by royal decree in late 1873,369 with the intent of 
reasserting their power in the face of both the country’s domestic enemies and the British 
commission. Drafted by loyalist advisors John Thurston and George Woods (Derrick 1950: 
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237), and likely also by St. Julian, the new constitution remained similar to the Hawaiian one in 
format, but it was more significantly adjusted to the different conditions in Fiji. The declaration 
on rights remained mostly identical to that in the 1871 constitution, but the suspension of 
these rights in provinces under martial law and the drafting of subjects into the military was 
facilitated, given the protracted guerrilla war in the interior of Viti Levu. The executive position 
of the King was strengthened, the number of ministers reduced to three and the Privy Council 
changed to an executive advisory body consisting of governors, cabinet ministers and other 
royal appointees with no direct legislative functions, i.e. more similar to the original Hawaiian 
model. The most important innovation in the 1873 constitution was the composition of the 
National Assembly, as the legislature was to be called. It comprised twelve native members 
appointed by the King to represent each province upon the nomination of that province’s 
governor; eight members elected by foreign residents, and eight members appointed by the 
King by the advice of the Privy Council who had to be native or naturalised subjects.370 
The 1873 constitution never entered into effect, however, as shortly after its enactment 
the British commission arrived. While not openly supporting the government’s domestic 
enemies, the commission nonetheless systematically demoralised and sabotaged the Fijian 
government, until by mid-1874 not much of it was left functioning, and Cakobau and by 
October of that year, the principal provincial governors were compelled to sign the document 
of cession to Great Britain, not as Fijian Kingdom government officials but as ‘native chiefs,’ as 
if their constitutional government had never existed (Crane 1938: 246-292; Derrick 1950:242-
250; 186-210).  
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The Fijian Kingdom with its Hawaiian-derived constitution and former Hawaiian 
diplomats St. Julian and Swanston in high positions was, according to historian David 
Routledge, “more successful than any previous political institution in Fiji” (1985a: 216). 
Nonetheless, it operated only for three years, never achieved full international recognition, and 
was rather unceremoniously brushed aside by the incoming British colonisers, in sharp 
contrast to the previously discussed example of Tonga where a Hawaiian-derived political 
system has been in existence for over a century. The question thus arises why the Hawaiian 
model did not work in Fiji, at least not in the long run.  
Mid-twentieth century historian R. A. Derick addressed this question by arguing that the 
Hawaiian model was itself created under Western pressure and was thus not good for the 
Hawaiian people in the first place (Derrick 1950: 163), hence, by implication he argues that the 
Hawaiian model, not even working at home, was unsuited for Pacific island polities to emulate. 
Concerning Sāmoa, which we will discuss next, R.P. Gilson made a similar argument of the 
Hawaiian political system being unsuitable for Hawai‘i itself and therefore a bad export to 
Samoa (1970: 191), while more recently anthropologist Nicholas Thomas yet again replicated 
this line of  argument for Fiji (2010: 243). 
The argument made by Derrick, Gilson and Thomas is based on a false assessment of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom, obviously based on American propaganda ‘history,’ which was replicated 
and spread to the South Pacific by mid- and late-twentieth century historians such as Daws, but 
which has recently been debunked in Hawai‘i by scholars such as Sai (2011) and Beamer 
(2014), as I have discussed at length earlier in this dissertation. The argument that the political 
system did not work in Hawai‘i itself is thus clearly erroneous. Secondly, the fact that in Tonga, 
the Hawaiian Kingdom’s political system did perfectly function after it was institutionally 
transferred and modified to suit local conditions shows that such a modified transfer of 
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Hawaiian institutions to another Pacific nation could indeed be successful. Hence, there must 
be factors internal to Fiji that made the Hawaiian model difficult to operate there. 
The best analysis in that sense is provided by Routledge (1985: 137-139), whose 
argument centres on the much different classical socio-political structures between the two 
archipelagos. Kin-based chiefdoms like they existed in classical Fiji were absent in classical 
Hawai‘i – in fact they had long before evolved into primary state structures, as argued by 
Hommon and Kirch –, thus it is not surprising that a system that is in fact a modernised version 
of the classical Hawaiian state perfectly functions in the Hawaiian Islands, but is difficult to be 
transplanted to Fiji where no classical state structures existed. Routledge’s analysis makes 
even more sense when looking at the successful transfer of Hawaiian state institutions to 
Tonga, which like Hawai‘i also had a state-like classical system. Unsurprisingly, in Sāmoa, 
where also no ‘primary state’ structures existed in the classical era, the Hawaiian political 
system was just as hard to take root as we will see in the next section below.  
Another important feature that needs to be pointed out here is that the institutional 
transfer from Hawai‘i to Fiji happened through the medium of English, and of all the Hawai‘i-
derived Fijian constitutions, only one – that of 1871 – is known to have been officially 
translated and published in Fijian. Unfortunately, through this process, some of the hybrid 
character of Hawaiian system was lost, and in consequence, there are much more English 
loanwords in the legal texts of the Fijian Kingdom than in those of its Hawaiian model. For 
instance, law is rendered as lawa in the 1871 Fijian constitution, and governor as kovana. If 
translated directly from kānāwai and kia‘āina, perhaps some equivalents grounded in classical 
Fijian governance could have been found, even though the absence of equivalent primary state 
structures in Fiji would probably still be a challenge.  
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Despite all these problems, the archival record shows that the Hawaiian Kingdom was 
eager to assist Cakobau and his kingdom as much as it could, even at the very end of the latter’s 
existence. As mentioned above, Kalākaua only four days after his accession to the throne sent a 
letter to Cakobau reiterating the friendly relations between the Oceanian sister kingdoms. At 
the same time, on the ground in Levuka, while British colonisation was about to happen, the 
Hawaiian consul informed Cakobau’s cabinet “that any little influence I may be supposed to 
possess or any assistance I can offer you at this important juncture of affairs, is entirely, as it 
has ever been, at your disposal.”371 The consul also composed a detailed report showcasing 
deceptive British attitudes and policies, which was published in Honolulu.372  And even after 
British annexation, there was ongoing Hawaiian interest in Fiji, as attested by a lengthy report 
published in 1884.373  
 
The extensive Hawaiian influence on Samoan constitutional development 
 
The two preceding studies of Tonga and Fiji were the only two cases of direct 
institutional transfer of the Hawaiian political system to other archipelagos, albeit with 
adaptations and modifications, of course. The next case to be examined, that of Sāmoa, is 
somewhat different and more complex, as in the latter archipelago during the second half of the 
nineteenth century a political system sui generis was developed by selective appropriation. 
Nonetheless, Hawaiian influence was extremely important in this development, both in terms 
of advice and assistance coming from Hawai‘i to Sāmoa and in terms of direct institutional 
transfer of ideas and elements of the Hawaiian political system. 
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 As discussed in more detail in Chapter three, the classical political system of Samoa was 
very decentralised on the ground, yet contained a level of ‘national’ politics of the great chiefly 
families as well, or in the words of Samoan political scientist Asofou So‘o, it “was based on a 
substructure of autonomous village polities linked by a genealogically sanctioned 
superstructure of chiefly connections” (2008: 52). A modern Samoan state was not formed 
until the 1870s, but efforts to introduce the concept of centralised statecraft and hybridise 
these with principles of classical Samoan governance started as early as the 1830s. Initially the 
push for such developments mainly came from resident Westerners, but in time Samoans 
would themselves pick up these ideas. According to Australian historian and constitutional 
advisor to the post-colonial state of Sāmoa J. W. Davidson, two main competing models of how 
to modernise the Samoan political system were circulating among Western residents: The LMS 
missionaries advocated the model of Rarotonga, i.e. a multi-leader chiefly aristocracy stabilised 
under a law code derived from the Tahitian model, whereas traders and other non-missionary 
settlers preferred the Hawaiian model of a Kingdom with a modern secular constitution 
(Davidson 1967: 41). Similar to other mid-twentieth century historians, Davidson was 
influenced by faulty sources on the Hawaiian Kingdom, and hence erroneously identified the 
Hawaiian system as itself dominated by Westerners. Despite this error in evaluation, there was 
obviously a conflict between the Tahitian theocratic and the Hawaiian secular model, and the 
latter would be easier for a non-religious settler to live under, while both models were hard to 
harmonise with classical Samoan principles of decentralised governance by fono [village 
councils] of matai [family heads].  
While the earliest law codes implemented in several regions of Sāmoa under LMS 
missionary influence were of course influenced by the Tahitian model, the previously 
mentioned letter by George Prichard to Kamehameha III asking for a copy of the Hawaiian 
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constitution provides evidence that the Tahitian model of legal order imported by the LMS was 
considered deficient and the Hawaiian model was sought out as a potentially better political 
model, seen as more sophisticated even by an LMS affiliate himself. In this context it is also 
interesting to note that a few years later, St. Julian partly blamed the loss of Tahiti’s 
independence on the theocratic tendencies under LMS influence there (St. Julian 1857: 16).374   
As it turned out, however, Pritchard’s early efforts came to nothing. Instead, the 
Tahitian-derived legal system slowly developed punctually, and for several decades remained 
limited to the Tuamāsaga district in central ‘Upolu, where the main port settlement of Apia was 
located, while different law codes were enacted sporadically in other districts (Powles 1979: 
87-88; Soo 2008: 30).  
After Pritchard’s letter hat been left unanswered, Hawaiian influence did extend to 
Sāmoa a few years later, as St. Julian devoted considerable efforts to the latter archipelago 
when researching the politics of ‘Central Polynesia’ and drawing up his plans for a political 
reorganisation of the region under Hawaiian leadership in the mid-1850s (St. Julian 1857: 4). 
The decentralised nature of the classical Samoan system of governance and the absence of a 
central authority presented a particular challenge for the framing of a suitable modern 
constitution, as there was no native authority that could be redefined as a sovereign monarchy. 
It was thus clear from the onset that the Hawaiian political system could not be transferred to 
Sāmoa as a package as it was to Tonga and Fiji, but rather that the structure of the executive 
needed to be redesigned in a fundamentally different way.  
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St. Julian first attempted to resolve this problem by drafting a proposed constitution for 
a “Republic of ‘Upolu” in 1854, 375 which had surprisingly little in common with either the 
Hawaiian or the British systems of government, i.e. the two St. Julian was presumably most 
familiar with. Headed by an elected president and a state secretary under him, the executive in 
the draft constitution was clearly modelled on that of the United States of America, while the 
legislature was unicameral and a declaration of rights was inserted as a list of limitations that 
legislation could not infringe upon. An interesting and very innovative element was the 
requirement to have the legislature dissolved and fresh elections called in case of any 
amendment to the constitution, i.e. amendments were subject to a plebiscite in all but name. 
The one element that resembled Hawai‘i and contained references to classical Samoan 
principles was the judiciary, headed by a supreme court composed of three judges, and 
containing a clause declaring Samoan custom a source of legal precedent at par with English 
Common Law.  
St. Julian soon realised however, that a republican model was just as ill-suited for Sāmoa 
as a direct transplantation of the Hawaiian monarchical system. As quoted in the previous 
chapter, in an 1855 letter to Foreign minister Wyllie, the Hawaiian commissioner stated that 
republican institutions would not work in Polynesia, and went on to suggest a different 
approach to creating a unified Samoan government, this time as an aristocratic confederacy 
similar to the Holy Roman Empire: 
What I do feel sanguine of in reference to Samoa is the establishment of a federal union of the 
petty states now existing [referring to coalitions of nu‘u recognising a paramount title, such as 
Āʻana and Ātua] – with some (constitutional) improvements; and a central government for 
the whole – rather of a Monarchical than of a Republican Character – a sort of a Lilliputian 
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resurrection of the old German Empire upon which a more perfect system may and will be 
slowly grafted.376 
 
It neither appears that this idea never matured into a new constitutional draft, nor that 
St. Julian’s proposals and ideas ever had as much influence in Sāmoa as they did in Tonga and 
Fiji, even though they were likely disseminated to Sāmoa via St. Julian’s confidant, the Hawaiian 
consul in Apia John C. Williams (Gilson 1970: 196).  At the same time, individual Samoan chiefs 
and missionaries had also communicated with King Tupou I of Tonga, who visited Sāmoa in 
1842 and 1847 (Gunson 1990). While these communications with Tonga had hardly more 
direct impact on Samoan state formation than those with Hawai‘i, the familiarity with both of 
these functioning Polynesian states did help to reinforce the political will among an increasing 
number of Samoan matai, confronted with the ever increasing encroachments of land 
alienation and Western gunboat diplomacy, to create a centralised government for their nation. 
And it had also become clear that a direct transfer of the Hawaiian or Tongan monarchical 
system would not function in Sāmoa, but that a sovereign Samoan state could only be built on 
the basis of some sort of aristocratic collective entity.  
Finally, in mid-1873 such a representative group of seven high ranking chiefs 
representing all major districts (one of each of the first-order districts of Savai‘i and ‘Upolu, 
plus one from the eastern islands) established themselves as the Taʻimua [“Leaders”] and 
formed a Samoan national government, headquartered in Mulinu‘u next to Apia harbour, an 
area that was not a major political centre in classical Sāmoa and thus suitable as a neutral 
location for a new national capital (Meleiseā 1987: 36).   
In August of 1873, the delegates assembled at Mulinu‘u drafted and enacted a 
constitution, followed by a code of criminal laws later in the same year.377 While the criminal 
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code continued to display Tahitian LMS influence (Gilson 1970: 298 n24), the new 
constitutional system was a sui generis Samoan hybrid. In the absence of a monarch, the source 
of sovereignty of the Samoan state was identified collectively as the matai [family heads] and 
the government described as established by the Tūmua and Pule [the eight classical centres of 
political prestige in the archipelago, see map 3.3 in chapter three]. The basic governmental 
institutions were the Ta‘imua, translated in English as House of Nobles, seven matai of higher 
rank selected from each of the first-order districts for one-year terms and presided by one of 
them on a basis of rotation, and Faipule, a lower house consisting of lower ranking matai 
representing each nu‘u.  
As Guy Powles succinctly remarked, “the bicameral concept reflects the Hawaiian model 
of House of Nobles and House of Representatives which St. Julian and others had diligently 
advocated” (Powles 1979: 91). Despite this evident Hawaiian influence in the overall 
institutional framing, the two houses were in fact quite different from the two legislative 
houses of the 1852 Hawaiian constitution. The Faipule as a body of village representatives 
might have been somewhat similar to the Hawaiian lower house, but the Ta‘imua were not only 
an upper legislative chamber but also served as the executive council as well as the collective 
head of state, with such prerogatives and treaty-making and receiving diplomats usually 
assigned to a monarch in a kingdom or a president in a republic.378 Furthermore, the Ta‘imua 
would also appoint district governors as well as judges. They were also empowered to appoint 
one of the supreme titleholders to become a ceremonial monarch, but this was left as a 
possibility for the future. If any comparison with the Hawaiian Kingdom should be made, the 
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Ta’imua in the 1873 constitution would thus simultaneously fulfil the prerogatives of the Mō‘ī, 
the Cabinet, the Privy Council and the Hose of Nobles.  
Another interesting aspect was the limitation of the government to deal mainly with 
foreign nations, the resident foreign settlers and some matters of national importance, but to 
keep out of local affairs at the village and district level as far as possible, as the constitution 
stated that “the customary rights and privileges of the matais at the meetings (fonos) of the 
village or district shall not be abridged (disturbed).”379 Overall, this system was a quite 
ingenious hybrid adapting the traditional Samoan power structure to the unavoidable need of 
the time to have a national government, and apparently the Ta‘imua government worked quite 
well during the first two years of its existence (Gilson 1970: 305, 310).  
In January of 1875, the Ta‘imua enacted a more elaborate constitution,380 which defined 
the composition and prerogatives of the Faipule (now officially translated as “House of 
Commons,” six members to be selected by each first order district), the seven Ta‘imua (to be 
selected indirectly by the Faipule of each district) and the Fa‘amasino (judiciary, consisting of a 
Supreme Court with three judges  as well as up to thirty district judges – like in St. Julian’s 1854 
draft –) more precisely and in more detail. The constitution furthermore created new offices, 
first and foremost a King, to be elected from either the Malietoa or Tupua family, to be a 
ceremonial head of state but without any of the sovereign powers a monarch enjoyed in the 
Hawaiian, Fijian or Tongan constitutions, which remained with the Ta‘imua, who could also 
depose the King. To assist them in their executive functions, the Ta‘imua now also appointed a 
secretary and a treasurer, offices also reminiscent of St. Julian’s draft. The Faipule selected one 
of their members from each district to serve as a member of the Au Filifili, a sort of permanent 
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committee of Faipule who remained in the capital to attend to government business when the 
full assembly was not in session. To enforce government decisions, a national police force 
[Leoleo] was instituted.  
Coincidentally, the American diplomat and adventurer 
Albert Steinberger [fig. 8.7] arrived in Sāmoa as a special emissary 
of the US president to compile a report on conditions in the 
archipelago, right in August of 1873 when the Ta‘imua government 
was formed and its first constitution was being framed. Steinberger 
was a colourful character, and whether his final loyalty lay with 
American, Samoan, or his own interests is difficult  to determine, 
but he was clearly one of the few foreigners the Samoan chiefs 
trusted (Robson 1979: 45-54; Howe 1984: 251-252).381 Hence, 
within a short time of his sojourn, he ended up becoming the chief 
advisor of the Ta‘imua. 
Steinberger’s influence also marks a renewed input of 
Hawaiian ideas into Samoan state-building. On his way, the American emissary had already 
passed through Hawai‘i and met with King Lunalilo (Stathis 1982: 89), so it is highly likely he 
was already familiar with the Hawaiian system of government when arriving in Sāmoa. During 
his second stay in the archipelago in 1875, his association with the Hawaiian Kingdom was 
even clearer.  Not only returned he to the US via Hawai‘i again in late 1873,382 but after a longer 
sojourn in the United States and Germany, Steinberger once more stopped over in Honolulu in 
early 1875 before returning to Sāmoa. On the first leg from San Francisco to Honolulu, 
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Fig. 8.7: Albert B. 
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the Kingdom of Sāmoa 
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Steinberger accompanied King Kalākaua who was returning from his state visit to Washington 
D.C. where he had successfully lobbied for the Hawaiian-U.S. reciprocity treaty. During the long 
interaction with the Hawaiian King, Steinberger became familiar with the Hawaiian political 
system, and Kalākaua pleaded his support for an independent Samoan state (Torodash 1977: 
54-55; Robson 1979: 55-59). Kalākaua himself was cautious about disclosing too much details 
about Steinberger’s plans, but expressed his clear support for him in the bilingual speech he 
delivered at his homecoming celebration at Kawaiaha‘o Church:  
Me makou i holo pu mai nei maluna o ka moku hookahi o Colonel Steinberger, he Komisina i 
hookohu ia e ke Aupuni o Amerika i ke Aupuni o Samoa. Ua hoolilo keia Alii Koa i ke kau nui 
ana o kona aloha maluna o kela lahui kanaka ano kupaianaha, a he hiki ia kakou ke kapa'ku he 
koko hookahi me kakou.  
 
Colonel Steinberger, who came in the same ship with us to Honolulu, is U. S. Commissioner to 
Samoa. We do not know the precise nature of his mission, but we do know that it is 
humanitarian in effect, and that this officer has already displayed his devotion to a 
remarkable people whom We are proud to call kinsmen.”383 
 
 The editor of the Pacific Commercial Advertiser was more straightforward about the 
commissioner’s mission, suggesting that it was “the policy of Col. Steinberger to bring the chiefs 
of the several Islands together, for the purpose of bringing about a consolidation of all into one 
bead government, under a code of laws similar to the Hawaiian.”384 
As it turned out, the exposure to Hawaiian statecraft clearly did influence Steinberger’s 
further involvement in Samoan affairs. Considering the 1873 constitution insufficient, 
Steinberger drafted a new Samoan constitution which he hoped to convince the Ta‘imua to 
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adapt. In his first draft of the constitution, Steinberger included a provision to have a Samoan 
king elected by universal suffrage to be the founder of a new dynasty (Gilson 1970: 314n78), a 
concept likely influenced by a similar provision in the 1864 Hawn constitution, following which 
both Lunalilo and Kalākaua had been elected to the throne, events Steinberger likely had 
analysed in conversations with Kalākaua aboard ship. 
After further discussions with a large variety of Samoan leaders, a modified version of 
Steinberger’s draft was adopted by the Taʻimua as the new Samoan constitution in May of 
1875.385 Reflecting the previous Samoan constitution, Steinberger’s American background and 
his familiarity with the Hawaiian Kingdom, the constitution was a hybrid of American, 
Hawaiian and Samoan ideas of statecraft. It contained the American notion of popular 
sovereignty and actual wording from the US constitution, including the words “We the People 
of Samoa” as the source of the constitution at the beginning of the Declaration of Rights 
preceding it, and a provision for a referendum to transform the political system from a 
kingdom to a republic.386 At the same time, it also contained phrasing from the Declaration of 
Rights in the Hawaiian constitution, but curiously not from the then current one but from that 
of 1840, including the theocratic notion that “no law shall be enacted at variance with the word 
of our Lord,” which by that time had long been removed from the Hawaiian constitution.387 
The main political institutions remained similar to those in the preceding August 1873 
and January 1875 constitutions, but important details were changed, bringing those more in 
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line with the Hawaiian model.388 The Ta‘imua (House of Nobles, their number now raised to 
fifteen, with two from each larger and one from each smaller first-order district) were in the 
future to be appointed by the King upon nomination by the people of their districts, and, 
modelled on the 1864 Hawaiian constitution, sit together in one legislative council with the 
Faipule (Representatives) who were to be elected by ballot, and their number significantly 
reduced to about twenty. The constitution defined the process for filling the office of the King 
more clearly, with the King now to be elected for a four-year term by the by the Taʻimua and 
Faipule, alternating between the Malietoa and Tupua families. While still far from being a 
sovereign from whom all powers emanate, the Samoan King now had some powers previously 
exercised by the Ta‘imua, e.g. to appoint district governors (upon nomination by the leading 
matai of the district), to make treaties and to receive diplomats. Like in the 1840 Hawaiian 
constitution, he was also to be Chief Justice ex officio.389  
While the current Ta‘imua were acknowledged as the country’s “Supreme Power,” their 
executive powers in the future was to be significantly reduced and limited to an advisory 
council to the King.390 The main executive organs under the King were to be a Ta‘imua Sili 
[Premier, literally “Supreme Leader”] with significant powers, and two cabinet ministers 
heading executive departments, of the interior and of finance, respectively. The Supreme Court 
was completely restructured, now consisting of the King, the Premier and four other judges 
appointed by the legislative council.  
Soon after the constitution was enacted, Malietoa Laupepa was elected as the first King, 
to be succeeded four years later by the holder of the highest title of the Tupua family, which by 
the time was under dispute. Most significantly, after resigning his American diplomatic 
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commission Steinberger was appointed Premier, making him one of the most powerful figures 
in the Samoan government. This was not as surprising as it might appear. Having already 
gained the trust of most Samoan leaders during his first stay, Steinberger was regarded as a 
benevolent yet politically neutral figure who could be assigned powers no Samoan chief could 
dare to assume for himself without provoking immediate discord and partisan divisions. In the 
words of historian R.P. Gilson, “only a trusted European, without Samoan partisan affiliations 
or leanings, could have performed these functions successfully” (Gilson 1970: 315). The 
Hawaiian-language Missionary Party newspapers Ka Lahui Hawaii and Nupepa Kuokoa would 
later compare Steinberger’s role in Samoa to that played previously by ABCFM missionary 
physician Gerrit Judd in Hawai‘i as Kauikeaouli’s advisor during the Paulet affair in 1843,391 
and in the early twentieth century American diplomat H.M. Sewall called Steinberger the 
“Gibson of Samoa” (Sewall 1903: 14) 
Immediately after proclaiming the constitution, even before the appointment of King 
and Premier, the Ta‘imua wrote to Kalākaua, announcing the formation of the new government, 
attaching a copy of the constitution and asking the Hawaiian King for recognition.392 King 
Kalākaua responded with a formal acknowledgement of the Samoan government “as a nation 
among the nations of the earth.”393 A few months later, after the new institutions had settled in, 
Premier Steinberger wrote a letter to Hawaiian Foreign Minister to William L. Green which is 
quoted at the beginning of this chapter, in which he suggested to further formalise Hawaiian-
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Samoan relations by concluding a treaty between the two nations, of which he attached a 
draft.394  
With all the obvious importance given to relations with Hawai‘i, the latter was not the 
only Pacific nation the new Samoan government looked at as a political model and pursued 
closer relations with. Around the same time, the Taʻimua also sent a delegation to Tonga, in 
order to learn about the Tongan system of monarchical government,395 building on the 
connections between the neighbouring archipelagos re-established in the 1840s and ultimately 
going back to classical times. 
Overall, the political system initiated in 1873 and improved by the 1875 constitution 
seemed to be a workable compromise between the Samoan tradition of decentralised 
governance and the need for a central government to deal with the settlers and with foreign 
powers (Davidson 1967: 53-55; Soo 2008: 35-39). The large powers given to collective bodies 
representing nu‘u or coalitions thereof, i.e. the Taʻimua and Faipule, and the more ceremonial 
role of the monarch, “accorded well with Samoan ways” (Howe 1984: 251), while the at least 
temporary assignment of the executive to a trusted foreigner neutralised the struggle between 
the various chiefs contending for power.   
What is also intriguing about the Samoan constitutional system is that despite the 
absence of classical state-like political structures, the vocabulary created for concepts of 
modern statecraft was remarkably traditional in origin, much more than the equivalent terms 
in Tongan and Fijian.396  For instance, the Samoan term used for law is tulāfono, a concept 
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clearly grounded in classical concepts of governance. Similarly, the term used for district 
governor was ta‘ita‘itū (Powles 1979: 93), referring to someone leading [ta‘ita‘i] a district [itū, 
short for itūmālō].  Some other terms for innovative institutions were literal translations, such 
as failautusi [“someone doing writing/accounting”] for ‘secretary,’ i.e. cabinet minister, but 
there were very few words that were direct borrowings from foreign languages comparable to 
Tahitian ture and tāvana or Tongan lao and minisitā.  
In the end however, the constitution failed to produce a stable government, but this due 
to antagonistic foreign interests, agitation by settlers and naval intervention. In early 1876, 
Steinberger was arrested and deported by a visiting British warship due to a conspiracy of the 
US and British consuls who objected to the premier’s pro-Samoan policies, especially his 
commitment to examine fraudulent land sales in the past and prevent further such sales 
(Gilson 1970: 321-331).  
In the resulting chaos, the Ta‘imua deposed Laupepa from the kingship, who then set up 
a rebel government. Without all parts of the constitution fully operating in a normal manner, 
the Ta‘imua continued to run at least the external affairs of the government for a while, which 
included Le Mamea’s diplomatic mission and the signing of the 1878 and 1879 treaties 
mentioned before. After multiple crises and hostilities between the rivalling parties, Malietoa 
Laupepa was restored to the kingship in 1880, with Mata‘afa Iosefo, another paramount title 
holder, serving as premier, but the government’s authority remained tenuous (Gilson 1970: 
332-382; So‘o 2008: 39-41). Nonetheless, the Samoan government published a new set of laws, 
of which a copy was apparently sent to the Hawaiian government.397 
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In the absence of Steinberger or another trusted European, the position of premier 
apparently was abolished and a more extensive executive cabinet created instead. By the mid-
1880s, this cabinet included a Failautusi Sili (Secretary of State), Failautusi mo Sāmoa 
(Secretary of Interior, literally “secretary for Sāmoa), Failautusi Teu Tupe (Secretary of 
Treasury), Failautusi o Taua (Secretary of War), Failautusi o Fanua (Secreatry of Lands), 
Failautusi o Galuega (Secretary of Works), the Faamasino Sili (Chief Justice) and a Failautusi 
Faamau-upu (Registrar).398 The American-derived terminology for these offices reflected the 
continuing legacy of Steinberger’s political ideas. 
 
Samoan State-building under Hawaiian intervention 
 
 The removal of Steinberger, which was reported and discussed in great detail in the 
Hawaiian press,399 and the resulting political instability in Sāmoa throughout the 1870s and 1880s 
apparently prevented the draft Hawaiian-Samoan treaty of 1875 to be further discussed,400 and in 
fact brought formal Hawaiian-Samoan relations to a state of abeyance. Nonetheless there was 
continued Hawaiian interest in Samoa, of which multiple newspaper articles provide evidence.401  
Since the Hawaiian Kingdom had been involved in the creation of the Samoan government of 
1875, which was in fact Kalākaua’s first major involvement in pan-Oceanian policy, the Hawaiian 
government looked with great regret at the failure of the Samoan State-building process.  
When in the early 1880s, Kalākaua’s government under foreign minister Walter M. Gibson 
launched its ‘New Departure” policy of pan-Oceanianism, the situation in Samoa became once 
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more one of the top priorities.  As discussed in the previous chapter, in late 1886, Kalākaua 
launched a new and final attempt at State-building in Sāmoa, this time by direct Hawaiian 
intervention.  
That this Hawaiian initiative was not an ill-advised oddity as which it has often been 
dismissed by historians when mentioned at all (e.g.  Gilson 1970: 386), but something actually 
sought by at least certain people in Samoa itself is demonstrated in a confidential letter written to 
Gibson by Apia-based American businessman H.T. Moors in October of 1886, i.e. more than two 
months before the Hawaiian embassy to Samoa was commissioned. In the letter, Moors suggests 
that in the absence of a functioning Samoan government, Hawai‘i should annex Sāmoa. All the 
American and British settlers would accept this, and German interests could be bought out with a 
sum of £338,000.402 While this of course represents merely settler interests and ignores those of 
the Samoans, it is nonetheless quite significant as it implies a sympathetic attitude towards a 
Hawaiian intervention in Samoa by at least parts of the Western settler community in Apia, whose 
support or lack thereof could stabilise or destabilise Samoan governments, as the Steinberger 
affair had demonstrated.  
As mentioned chapter seven, John E. Bush, was sent as Hawaiian Envoy to Sāmoa, 
accompanied by Henry Poor, and a permanent Hawaiian Legation was opened in Apia in January 
of 1887 while, the Hawaiian navy ship HHMS Kaimiloa was dispatched to Sāmoa, the details of the 
mission having been extensively discussed and analysed by Horn (1951: 97-170) and Cook (2011: 
201-276) [Fig. 8.8]. Unlike urged by Moors, Hawaiian annexation of the archipelago was never on 
the legation’s agenda. Rather, their mission was to consolidate and strengthen the Samoan 
government under Malietoa Laupepa and establish a political confederation between that 
government and Hawai‘i, later to be joined by other Polynesian governments if possible. 
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Nonetheless, the terms of the Treaty of Political Confederation between Hawaiʻi and Sāmoa that 
Bush concluded with Malietoa Laupepa, and which was countersigned by Samoa’s Assistant 
Secretary of State William Coe and Secretary of the Interior Le Mamea as well as some of the 
Ta‘imua and Faipule403 were not equal and turned Sāmoa into a Hawaiian protectorate of sort.  
In the treaty, Malietoa 
Laupepa pledged that he would 
“matua fai atu i lenei faamaoni i 
mataupu uma ma to loto faatasi i 
ai, ma Lana Afioga a Kalakaua, ina 
ia faia ma faataunuuina lenei 
Feosiaiga Faale-Malo ma ia 
faatumauina,” [“conform to 
whatever measures may hereafter 
be adopted by His Majesty 
Kalakaua and be mutually agreed 
upon to promote and carry into 
effect this Political Confederation”]. Hence, Malietoa basically agreed to Hawaiian over-rule in 
Sāmoa.  
After concluding the treaty, Bush spend the following months to assist Malietoa, his cabinet 
and the Ta‘imua and Faipule in consolidating the Samoan government. Making use of the 
impression created by the presence of the Kaimiloa and the entertainment provided by its band, 
Bush and Poor travelled around the archipelago to hold formal meetings with various dignitaries, 
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Fig. 8.8: King Malietoa Laupepa in Hawaiian court uniform 
gifted by Kalākaua wearing what appears to be the insignia of 
the Grand Cross of the Royal Order of the Star of Oceania 
(third from left), meeting with Hawaiian envoy John E. Bush 
and Secretary of the Hawaiian Legation Henry Poor (fourth 
and fifth from left) aboard the HHMS Kaimiloa in 1887. 
Photograph taken by Joseph Strong. Copyright expired. 
Original in Hawai‘i State Archives. 
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and were especially eager to reach out to Malietoa’s two main contenders for the Kingship from 
the Tupua family, Tui Ātua Mata‘afa Iosefo and Tui Ā‘ana Tupua Tamasese Titimaea, attempting to 
convince them to join Malietoa’s government under Hawaiian protection (Gilson 1970: 386; Cook 
2011: 212-214; 224-231). The first was easier to approach, as he was a popular leader who 
generally had the welfare of the Samoan people in mind and was not easily manipulable by settler 
interests [see fig. 8.9].   
 
Tamasese, on the other hand, was more difficult to deal with. He had declared himself King 
and set up a rival government with the active support of German plantation interests and the 
Fig. 8.9: Formal meeting, following Samoan protocol, between high chief Mata‘afa Iosefo (centre, in 
white shirt) and officials of the Hawaiian legation and officers of the Kaimiloa including Envoy 
John E. Bush and Secretary Henry Poor (to the right of Mata‘afa). Note the Kaimiloa’s band in the 
background. The location is likely Lufilufi, the capital  village of Ātua district. Photo taken by 
Joseph Strong in 1887. Copyright expired. Original in Hawai‘i State Archives. 
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German consul, with a German plantation manager named Eugen Brandeis serving in 
‘Steinberger-esque’ fashion as Tamasese’s premier.  While Tamasese himself was eager to 
negotiate with the Hawaiian mission, and reportedly was ready to shut down his rebel 
government in exchange for a pension paid by the Hawaiian government, Brandeis and other 
Germans were constantly watching him and preventing a formal meeting with Bush and Poor 
from taking place [Fig. 8.10] (Horn 1951: 134-136; Cook 2011: 224-232).  
With the Tamasese issue yet unresolved but otherwise having achieved a great deal of 
consensus through careful negotiations with leading Samoan chiefs as well as European settlers, 
Fig. 8.10: High chief and rebel king Tupua Tamasese Titimaea with family members and 
supporters. Photographed by Joseph Strong in 1887, labeled in Henry Poor’s handwriting as 
“Tamasese and family, and his German allies.” The location is likely Leulumoega, the capital 
village of Ā‘ana district. Tamasese is the man wearing a garland sitting in front of the standing 
man. One of the two European men is Tamasese’s premier Eugen Brandeis, the other the German 
Vice-consul Sonnenschein. Copyright expired. Original in Hawai‘i State Archives. 
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Bush began to prepare the implementation of the terms of the confederation treaty and drafted a 
“Temporary Scheme of Government for Samoa” in June of 1887.404 This would indeed have 
established a Hawaiian protectorate over Sāmoa. Roughly based on the 1875 Samoan constitution, 
the Bush draft strengthened Malietoa’s position by reinforcing the monarchical character of the 
Samoan state, recommending that Malietoa should assume “supreme sovereignty over the group”. 
As a compromise with the settlers in Apia, the hitherto extraterritorial municipality was to be 
placed under the sovereignty of the Samoan government, but administered by “an elected board 
of resident foreign taxpayers”. Most importantly, however, the draft gave Kalakāua, not Malietoa, 
the power to appoint the Samoan Minister of Finance, Attorney General and Chief Justice, thus 
placing key positions in the Samoan government under direct Hawaiian control, which, in Bush’s 
words, was done at the request of the Samoan government leaders themselves who considered it 
“desirable until the government is well established.”405 
Since no unified and stable Samoan government had existed in the decade since 
Steinberger’s removal, the Hawaiian protectorate might indeed have been the only way to 
establish a functioning State in Sāmoa. And since the foreign oversight was done not by Western 
imperialists but by fellow Polynesians, it would probably have been more acceptable to the 
Samoans than a colonial protectorate or outright colonial rule by a Western power (Cook 2011: 
232).  
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the almost simultaneously occurring 
‘Bayonet’ coup in Honolulu and the German naval invasion of Samoa put a premature end to this 
most elaborate attempt of Samoan  state-building under Hawaiian protection.  Having previously 
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had a falling out with his secretary Poor and being removed by Gibson from his diplomatic 
position at Poor’s urging in June of 1887 shortly before the mission was recalled as a whole by the 
Missionary Party usurpers, Bush endeavoured to stay in Samoa, as he was personally trusted by 
Malietoa (Cook 2011: 215-217). In a move reminiscent of Steinberger before him, Bush shifted his 
allegiance from Hawai‘i to Samoa and became a personal advisor to Malietoa  while studying the 
Samoan language, but the German invasion and the kidnapping and deportation of Malietoa put an 
end to these ambitions. Under the protection of German guns, the Tamasese-Brandeis regime 
established itself as the new government of all Sāmoa, which left Bush no chance but to return 
home to Honolulu.406 
Nonetheless, the important Hawaiian influence – indirect in 1873-75 and direct in 1887 – 
left a legacy that influenced subsequent attempts at Samoan state-building. While the Tamasese-
Brandeis government obviously started as a puppet regime brought about by German gunboat 
diplomacy, its administrative efficiency that was noted by contemporary observers (Stevenson 
2009: 49 )407 could at least be partly traced to the partly Hawaiian-influenced constitutional 
foundations of 1873-1875 and the recent experience of Hawaiian-induced state building. The 
Tamasese regime went even further than Bush in asserting Samoan sovereignty over Apia when it 
boldly announced to dissolve the extraterritorial municipality put the town under Samoan 
government control,408 apparently with the aim of creating a fully sovereign and independent 
Samoan government under German protection. However, the latter move once more lead to 
hostile foreign reactions, this time from British and American settlers, while Tamasese’s claim to 
be not only constitutional King but also holder of all the paramount titles and therefore Tafa‘ifā 
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stirred up Samoan opposition to the regime, soon leading to new dissent and violent clashed and 
bringing back the status quo of the period prior to the Hawaiian and German interventions 
(Stevenson 2009: 53-56; Powles 1979: 96). 
As mentioned previously, the next outside attempt to create a sustainable Samoan state 
was the Berlin conference of the Western powers that led to the tripartite protectorate agreement 
of 1889. Likely during the negotiations leading to this agreement, British Governor of Fiji and 
Western Pacific High Commissioner John B. Thurston submitted a draft organic law to reform the 
Samoan constitutional system. Thurston suggested the refashioning  of the Ta‘imua as a “King’s 
Council,” including three foreign representatives to serve as a cabinet, viz. a Chief Secretary, 
Treasurer and Minister of  Lands and Works,  and of the Faipule as a “Legislative Council.”409 This 
might be dismissed as merely British colonial meddling if not for the fact that Thurston previously 
had served as Chief Secretary of the Fijian Kingdom under Cakobau, and terminology and offices 
from the Fijian constitutional system were included into the draft, testifying to the continuing 
interconnected dynamics of constitution-building in nineteenth-century Oceania, which ultimately 
originated in the Hawaiian Kingdom. 
More direct ramifications of the Hawaiian mission to Sāmoa continued throughout the 
following decade. In 1889, Hawaiian chargé d’affaires in London Abraham Hoffnung, a particularly 
loyal confidant of Kalākaua and Gibson, wrote two letters to Jonathan Austin, Gibson’s successor 
as Hawaiian minister of foreign affairs under the ‘Bayonet’ regime, in order to urge the Hawaiian 
government to resume its “useful and valuable efforts of the Hawaiian government in promoting 
the welfare of Samoa.”410 A few months later, Apia resident George Glendon requested the 
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Hawaiian ministry of foreign affairs to send copies of Gibson’s 1881 He mau Olelo Ao e Pili ana i ke 
Ola Kino/Sanitary Instructions for Hawaiians , preferably bilingually or in absence thereof the 
Hawaiian version, to Samoa.411  And in 1892, the Samoan government attempted to resume direct 
contact with the Hawaiian Kingdom, which it continued to see as a politics model, when Samoan 
secretary of state Thomas Maben requested Queen Lili‘uokalani’s government to send copies of 
the Hawaiian constitution and laws.412 
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Hawaiian influences on state formation processes in Kiribati and other parts of Eastern 
Micronesia 
While direct institutional transfer of the Hawaiian constitutional system took place to 
Tonga and Fiji, and the Samoan constitutional system imported important elements from the 
Hawaiian constitution as well, the influence of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a model for political 
modernisation and a partner for international alliances extended further across the Pacific to 
the eastern parts of Micronesia. As mentioned previously, this influence was mainly 
disseminated through Hawaiian missionaries affiliated with the ABCFM who were stationed on 
the Gilberts (Kiribati), the Marshalls, Kosrae and Pohnpei (Morris 1987) [see fig. 8.11].  
Fig. 8.11: 1886 map of the eastern half of Micronesia, prepared by the Hawaiian Calvinist 
mission and published on the back cover of Westmore 1886. Copyright expired. Modified by 
the author. The names of islands with Hawaiian missionary presence are underlined in red. 
Note that the late nineteenth-century spelling of several island names is significantly different 
from current spellings, e.g. Ponape [Pohnpei], Kusaie [Kosrae], Ruk [Chuuk] etc.  
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It was in Kiribati that this Hawaiian presence had the most explicit political 
consequences, as on some islands in the archipelago Hawaiian missionaries came to exert 
major political influence, while on others their presence influenced the local rulers to see the 
Hawaiian Kingdom as a potential ally and a model for themselves to follow. Between 1878 and 
1889 various Gilbertese rulers or community leaders wrote petitions to King Kalākaua in that 
sense. 
The first of these petitions came from 194 elders of the atoll of Tabiteuea, and was 
countersigned by Hawaiian missionaries H. B. Nalimu and W. B. Kapu. The petitioners asked 
the Hawaiian King for his approval “e hoohui aku i ko makou mukupuni malalo o kou malu, a 
nau e noonoo mai i ko makou pono. A e noho makou malalo o ka malu o ka hae o kou Aupuni, i 
lilo ai i Aupuni hookahi” [“to unite our island under your protection, and for you to consider 
our welfare. And we will live under the protection of the flag of your state, to become unified 
into one state,”] as well as to send a Hawaiian government official to administer the island.413 In 
his reply, Hawaiian Foreign Minister John Kapena expressed his government’s sympathy to the 
petitioner’s cause but declined annexing their island, arguing that this might draw the 
Hawaiian kingdom into an unwarranted conflict with third countries in case a dispute with 
nationals of such country would arise on the atoll.414  
In hindsight, this attitude of Kalākaua’s administration may be deeply regretted, 
because a Hawaiian government presence would most likely have prevented the atrocities that 
were to happen two years later on the atoll at the instigation of the very same Hawaiian 
missionaries who apparently were the driving force behind the 1878 petition. In 1880, the 
inhabitants of the northern section of Tabiteuea, converted to Calvinist Christianity by Nalimu 
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and Kapu, massacred several hundred of the inhabitants of the southern part of the atoll who 
were practicing a syncretism combining Christianity and classical Gilbertese religion, and were 
thus regarded as heretics by the Calvinists (Maude 1981b). Even though the Hawaiian church 
later reprimanded the two Hawaiian missionaries for their part in encouraging or at least not 
preventing the slaughter, Kealani Cook convincingly argues that the massacre was enabled by 
the basics of the Calvinist mission ideology with its inherent division of people into na‘auao 
[enlightened] and na‘aupō [benighted] (Cook 2015: 887, 906-908).  
While it is ironic that the two missionaries themselves supported, and possibly initiated 
the petition for Hawaiian annexation of the atoll, it would have brought a secular Hawaiian 
government presence that would have prevented such excesses of religious bigotry. The 
Tabiteuea episode thus became an awkward and discomforting issue for the Hawaiian 
government, and it is telling that no reference was made to the 1878 petition during the 1880s, 
when Hawaiian involvement in Kiribati was once more discussed within the framework of 
Gibson’s ‘New Departure’ policy. 
The renewed Hawaiian government interest in the Gilberts was started by a new 
petition sent to the King in 1882, this time from Uea [King] Teitei415 of Butaritari. Similarly to 
the elders of Tabiteuea four years earlier, the island ruler requested to be taken under the 
wings of the Hawaiian Kingdom. The difference was that unlike Tabiteua and the other 
southern islands, Butaritari and its satellite atoll of Makin formed a unified polity ruled by a 
native dynasty, in fact one of only two such islands under a relatively stable monarchical 
system in the nineteenth century [see map 8.12].  
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Unlike the Tabiteuea elders, Teitei did not use the term ho‘ohui [to unite/annex] but a 
different formula more akin to a protectorate, asking Kalākaua “[…] e hana i Kuikahi ma Waena 
o’u a me ou, O Ko’u Aupuni ma lalo, O Kou ma luna, a nau e kau kanawai maluna o ko’u mau 
makaainana […]” [“to make a Treaty between you and me, my kingdom to be below, yours to be 
above, and you will be the one making laws upon my subjects”].416 While not addressing the 
substance of the request, Gibson in his reply expressed Hawai‘i’s intention to establish close 
relations and sent gifts to Teitei (Horn 1951: 62).  
Teitei thanked for the consideration but reiterated his demand for Hawaiian 
intervention, now going even further towards outright Hawaiian annexation, requesting “[n]a 
ke Alii ka Moi o Ko Hawaii Paeaina, e noho hoomalu maluna o na aina o Makin a me Butaritari  
me ka mana piha, e like me ke aupuni o Hawaii” [“for His Majesty the King of the Hawaiian 
Islands to reign over the islands of Makin and Butaritari like the Hawaiian Kingdom”].417  
At the same time, High Chief Kaiea II of Abaiang, the centre of Hawaiian mission activity 
in the Gilberts, also wrote a letter, arguing that “aole i maluhia iki ka noho ana o ko makou lahui, 
aole hoi i pii ae ma ke ano, he lahui naauao, o keia au malamalama, ma ko makou wahi waa 
aupuni” [“Our people have not been living in peace, nor have they risen to the state of a civilised 
people of this age of enlightenment, in our canoe of state”]. And that therefore, Kalākaua was 
requested to “noho hoomalu maluna o ko makou mokupuni me ka mana piha, e like me ke 
Aupuni Hawaii” [“reign over our island with full powers, like the Hawaiian Kingdom”],418 words 
almost identical to those of Teitei’s second petition. It needs to be pointed out, however, that 
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 Nan Teitei to Kalākaua, Undated 1882. Gilbertese original with attached Hawaiian translation. FO&Ex, 
Miscellaneous Foreign 1882, Hawai‘i State Archives. 
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Abaiang was a less centralised polity than Butaritari, and Kaiea’s power, supported by the HMS 
mission, was less consolidated than that of Teitei (Morris 1987: 138). Interestingly, Hawaiian 
missionary George Leleo separately sent another letter to the Hawaiian King, underlining his full 
support for Hawaiian annexation of the island, but with a totally different agenda, namely to 
control and discipline the unruly and uncivilised Gilbertese, in a truly colonial sense,419 clearly 
reflecting and replicating the discourse of white Calvinist missionary towards Islanders in 
general  (Cook 2015). 
Kalākaua replied to the two petitions by sending official letters to Teitei and Kaiea, 
underlining his willingness to maintain close and friendly relations with them and inviting 
them to come to Honolulu and attend his upcoming coronation in February of 1883 in order to 
discuss their requests further. 420 He did not directly address the question of Hawaiian 
annexation.  
Very intriguing is the way Kalākaua identified himself in the letters and addressed the 
Gilbertese high chiefs. In the letterhead, Kalākaua presents himself as “Ma ka Lokomaikai o ke 
Akua o Ko Hawaii Pae Aina, a me kekahi mau Mokupuni ma na Ailana Polenisia, Moi.” [“By the 
Grace of God, of the Hawaiian Islands and of some Islands in the Isles of Polynesia, King”], and 
he addressed Teitei and Kaiea as “ko Makou Hoahanau a me Hoa Aloha maikai hoi” [‘Our cousin 
and Good Friend”], while expressing his “olioli e hoolauna pu mawaena o na Mokupuni a lahui 
like hoi o Polenisia” [“joy about the acquaintance between kindred Islands and people of 
Polynesia”]. The first indicates that even though he did not directly address the annexation 
requests, Kalākaua clearly envisioned himself ruling other Polynesian [i.e. Oceanian] islands 
beside Hawai‘i, likely counting the uninhabited atolls of Palmyra and Kalama – then the only 
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parts of the Kingdom not geographically part of the Hawaiian Islands – and possibly Sikaiana, 
over which the claim from the 1850s was never clearly renounced, as the “kekahi mau 
Mokupuni ma na Ailana Polenisia” already under his rule. That he addressed the Gilbertese 
rulers as his hoahānau [cousins] and identified Kiribati as mokupuni a me lāhui like [kindred 
islands and people] is equally significant, as it testifies to the special bond he felt with them as 
fellow Oceanians.  
Unfortunately, no Gilbertese delegation showed up for the coronation (Horn 1951: 63), 
most likely because the invitees lacked the resources to travel that far, and their hold to power 
was not stable enough to leave their island for prolonged periods. When later in 1883, as a 
follow-up Kalākaua commissioned Alfred Tripp as Special Commissioner and sent him to the 
islands, the latter carried letters not only to Teitei and Kaiea but also to Binoka, the King of 
Abemama.421  
Apparently, Kalākaua through his commissioner Tripp successfully convinced the 
Gilbertese rulers that Hawaiian annexation of their domains was out of the question, at least for 
the time being. In his reply letter, Kaiea, thanked the Hawaiian King and asked him for help, 
advice, council and guidance, but backed away from demanding annexation.422 Similarly, on a 
second visit to Kiribati in early 1884423 Tripp’s secretary F.L. Clarke received a letter from High 
                                                 
421
 Report by Special Commissioner Alfred Tripp, 17 June 1884, FO&Ex, Hawaiian Officials Abroad, Special 
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Report. Unfortunately, I was unable to view copies of these letters. Horn cites the letters (1951: 65) but provides no 
detailed description of where in the Hawaii State Archives they might be located, giving only the very vague 
“FO&Ex” (a category including thousands of folders in hundreds of boxes). I have found the letters neither in the 
Hawaiian Officials Abroad file on the 1883-84 Special Commission to Western and Central Polynesia, nor in the 
Miscellaneous Foreign file for 1883.  
422
 Te Kaiea to Kalākaua, 20 August 1883. Gilbertese Original with English translation attached. FO&Ex, Hawaiian 
Officials Abroad, Special Commission to Western and Central Polynesia 1883-1884, Hawai‘i State Archives. 
423
 Tripp’s mission had a complex itinerary, as he wore two different hats, being concurrently a labour recruiter for 
Hawaiian plantations and Special Commissioner for the Hawaiian government. Tripp first visited some of the 
Gilbert Islands, then departed for the New Hebrides in his capacity as a labour recruiter, to return to the Gilberts in 
his return to complete his diplomatic mission, but this was interrupted by the wrecking of his ship, leading to the 
splitting up of the diplomatic mission, with his secretary F.L. Clarke visiting some more Islands, while Tripp 
himself returned to Honolulu quicker. See 1884 Tripp Report. 
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Chief Toaulu and lower chief Teriaki of Abaiang’s southern neighbour atoll of Tarawa, to 
Kalākaua, which also emphasised friendship and did not mention Hawaiian suzerainty.424 
According to Tripp’s report, however, the leading chiefs of both Abaiang and Tarawa desired 
Hawaiian help in establishing functioning and stable governments on their islands.  
Teitei of Butaritari showed a similar reaction, but kept to stronger wording that more 
clearly implied a sort of Hawaiian protectorate or suzerainty, declaring his trust in Kalākaua 
and accepting “i kou noho ana ma ke ano he makua na’u a me ko’u lahui kanaka” [“your rule as 
a father for me and my people”] 425 On 13 February 1884, between the Tripp mission’s first and 
second visit, Uea Teitei passed away. The funeral of the late Gilbertese ruler was later 
extensively reported on in the Hawaiian press. 426 In late February, his successor Bakatokia 
authored another letter to Kalākaua, which he addressed as “ko makou hoahanau a makamaka 
maikai o na mokupuni Polynesia, Ka Moi Kalakaua, o ko Hawaii Paeaina a me na mokupuni o 
Polunesia” [“our cousin and good friend of the Polynesian islands, King Kalākaua of the 
Hawaiian Islands and the Isles of Polynesia”], picking up the language of the 1882 letter to 
Teitei.  The substance of Bakatokia’s letter is even more intriguing, as the Butaritari Uea, after 
informing Kalākaua of the passing of his predecessor and renewing the friendship between the 
two states, asked for his heir, Prince Tiata, a youth of fifteen years of age who co-signed the 
letter, to be educated in Honolulu, “e hoonaauaoia ma ka olelo haole a me ka olelo Hawaii a 
olelo eae, e like me ka hiki, a e aoia hoi ma ka oihana koa a me ka ike naauao eae.  and oihana 
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koa” [to be educated in the foreigners language (i.e. English), in the Hawaiian  language and in 
other languages when possible, and also to be taught military skills and other knowledge”] 427 
 
The fact that on the islands examined so far Hawaiian missionaries played an important 
role, often having become advisors to the Uea, might lead one to suspect that the latter were 
the driving force in the moves of the island rulers to seek closer relations with, advice from, or 
even annexation by, Hawai‘i. Similarly to the previous critical evaluations by Morris (1987), 
Kealani Cook argues that Hawaiian missionaries had often adopted the racist and imperialist 
mind set of their ABCFM teachers and in turn envisioned themselves as Hawaiian imperialists 
dominating the locals they considered one notch lower on the civilizational hierarchy than 
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themselves (Cook 2015). The 1882 letter by George Leleo to King Kalākaua certainly testifies of 
such an attitude. 
However, Hawaiian influence on state-building in Kiribati and moves to bring the two 
archipelagos closer together, both Hawaiian-initiated and Gilbertese-initiated, clearly extended 
beyond the circles of Calvinist Hawaiian missionaries and their particular ideology.  It is very 
significant in this context that King Kalākaua sought out Binoka of Abemama as the third 
Gilbertese ruler to have Tripp deliver a letter to, even though Binoka had not previously 
petitioned Kalākaua, and there were no Hawaiian missionaries, and no missionaries at all for 
that matter, on Abemama. 
Kalākaua’s reasons lie at hand if long-term political strategy is considered. Besides the 
kingdom of Butaritari, Binoka’s realm centred on Abemama and including the neighbour atolls 
of Kuria and Aranuka [see map 8.14] was the only consolidated monarchical state in the 
Gilberts. Earlier in the century, Binoka’s father Baiteke had conquered the two neighbouring 
atolls and established a stratified monarchical state based on a hybrid political model that 
selectively appropriated Western aspects of statecraft while at 
the same time strictly controlling interaction with Westerners 
who were not allowed to settle and could only trade through 
one port controlled by the monarch, reminiscent of the port of 
Nagasaki in Tokugawa Japan. This experiment of ‘controlled 
acculturation’ was quite unique in Oceanian state-building 
(Maude 1976) and proved successful, as Abemama remained a 
stable polity and society throughout the nineteenth century. 
While Binoka [fig. 8.13] inherited this state from his 
father, he had even greater ambitions and aimed at becoming 
Fig. 8.13: Tem Binoka (1844-
1891), King of Abemama (reg. 
1878-1891). Photo taken in 
1889 by Robert Louis 
Stevenson. Copyright expired. 
Reproduced in Morris 1987: 
183. 
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the ‘Gilbertese Kamehameha’ and subjugating the entire archipelago (Maude 1976: 219, 223). 
While there is no evidence that Kalākaua directly supported this endeavour, apparently the 
Hawaiian Government was interested in boosting Binoka’s ambitions, as according to Tripp’s 
report, in Kalākaua’s letter Binoka was identified as King not only of Abemama and its two 
satellite islands but also of Maiana and Nonouti, which Binoka during that time was attempting 
to conquer and subjugate,428 failing mainly because of British naval interference (Maude 1976: 
222). 
Binoka replied to Kalākaua’s letter quite enthusiastically, and in a very utilitarian 
manner used the opportunity to demand Hawaiian military support to subjugate Tarawa,429 
apparently the next island he had laid his eyes on (ibid. 220), somewhat reminiscent of Tapoa 
II’s letter to Kauikeaouli half a century earlier that I mentioned in chapter six. That Kalākaua 
initiated the relationship and that Binoka enthusiastically responded, shows that Hawaiian 
missionary agency was not a necessary condition for these types of exchanges. Interestingly, 
however, Binoka addressed Kalākaua as his “brother in Christ.” Binoka had a complex 
relationship with Christianity, not directly opposing it and being on good terms with ABCFM 
and HMS representatives on other islands, but at the same time not allowing missionaries to 
reside and work in his kingdom, except for one who had temporarily taught reading and 
writing to him (ibid: 312-213). It appears likely that he was misled by Hawaiian missionaries 
who portrayed their king as a pious Christian, despite the fact that Kalākaua did not care much 
about Christianity. Had the two visionary Oceanian monarchs ever met each other and 
understood how their views on Christianity were rather similar, they would probably have 
fraternized even more.  
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On the southern atolls of the archipelago, where there was for the most part no 
Hawaiian missionary presence, and where the traditional system did not include high chiefs 
but rather governance by councils of elders, a very different state-building project under 
Hawaiian influence was happening which has apparently been overlooked by previous 
historians. When the Hawaiian commission visited the atoll of Beru, the centre of the southern 
Gilberts, its representatives met with the Tyrolian trader Fraico [Franco?] Vallerio who had 
been appointed commercial agent of the Hawaiian government by the captain of a previously 
visiting Hawaiian ship. In this capacity, Vallerio had proposed a federation of the southern 
Gilbert Islands and created a flag for this burgeoning new state.430 
While the letters collected by Tripp and his detailed report were duly received and 
archived, it appears that there was no clear follow-up by the Hawaiian government. While the 
Gilbertese petitions were used as evidence of the interest of other island leaders in Hawaiian 
regional leadership, as for instance in Gibson’s letter to French commissioner Greer cited in the 
previous chapter, during the following years no further diplomatic efforts were undertaken on 
the ground to help with Gilbertese state-building under Hawaiian protection as requested. Only 
in late 1886 was the issue once more taken up, when Kiribati was included in John E. Bush’s 
area of archipelagos he was commissioned for. While detailed instructions were to be sent 
later, Gibson this time indeed contemplated annexing the Gilberts, and Bush was to appoint 
Hawaiian missionaries to serve as diplomatic agents of the Hawaiian government (Horn 1951: 
107). Despite the secular political orientation of Kalākaua and Gibson, they were thus 
apparently ready to follow the course suggested by HMS missionaries. As in the case Tonga, 
however, no action in regards to Kiribati could be initiated before the ‘Bayonet’ coup aborted 
Bush’s and Poor’s mission. 
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In 1889, Abaiang once more petitioned the Hawaiian government, this time apparently 
without input from Hawaiian missionaries, as the petition was only in Gilbertese, and 
addressed not to the Mō‘ī but to the president of the Hawaiian legislature.431 What Uea Kaiea 
and the council of Elders desired was for the Hawaiian legislature to intercede on their behalf 
with the British, American, German and French diplomatic missions in Honolulu to obtain from 
them a joint recognition of Abaiang’s independence, arguing that they had a functioning 
government and enacted a code of law, thus qualified as a ‘recognisable’ nation-state. But 
unless formal recognition was forthcoming, they feared suffering the same fate as neighbouring 
Tarawa, which had just been invaded and plundered by German naval forces at the initiative of 
a trader. Furthermore they asked the Hawaiian legislature to design a flag for Abaiang and have 
the island’s law code printed in Honolulu. With the Hawaiian legislature at the time hijacked by 
the Missionary Party and its pronounced opposition to pan-Oceanianism, it goes without saying 
that the petition remained unanswered. 
Frustrated with Hawaiian inaction, it appears Gilbertese leaders looked for alliances 
with those Western powers they considered the least evil, namely first the Americans, which 
Butaritari petitioned for a protectorate in 1892 (Morris 1987: 151-151), and eventually the 
British, who intervened with massive naval presence in 1892 and declared a protectorate over 
the entire group, which led to eight decades of British colonial rule (Ministry of Education, 
Training and Culture of Kiribati 1979: 64-66; Macdonald 2001: 75 ff).  
In the other Eastern Micronesian archipelagos, Hawaiian influence on governance and 
state-building was much less significant, even though it was not completely absent. In the 
Marshall Islands, especially their southwestern part, there was a strong Hawaiian missionary 
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presence between 1862 and 1883 (Morris 1987), centred on the island of Ebon. Coincidentally, 
Ebon was also the main seat and socio-economic centre of the most powerful Irooj [high chief 
or king] in the archipelago, whose sphere of influence covered the entire Ralik chain of atolls, 
i.e. the western half of the archipelago (Walsh 2003: 158). Within that realm was also the atoll 
of Jaluit, which had a better harbour than Ebon, and subsequently the German copra traders 
that had first established themselves in Ebon on a Hawaiian ship in 1859 (Hezel 1983: 210) 
moved from there to Jaluit in the 1870s, which soon became an important Pacific trading port 
and also the main residence of the Irooj (Hezel 1983: 215; Walsh 2003: 164). Under German 
commercial and naval influence, a proto-state of the Ralik group, with a German-recognised 
national flag and an unratified treaty with Germany, was established in 1878, (Hezel 1983: 
298-304), but it was clearly more German- than Hawaiian-influenced. In 1885 the archipelago 
as a whole was annexed by Germany.   
Nonetheless there was some apparent overlap between German trading interests and 
those of the Hawaiian Kingdom, as the latter maintained a commercial agency on Jaluit, which 
was mostly staffed by German traders.432 Strangely enough, however, there is no evidence that 
the 1883-1884 Tripp commission ever communicated with that Hawaiian government 
representative, nor that any contacts were established between the commission and the Irooj 
of Ralik or representatives of his government, even though Tripp mentions passing through 
Jaluit.433 While I have found no conclusive answer to this enigma, it appears that there was a 
greater rift between the chiefs, the traders and the Hawaiian mission in the Marshalls than in 
the Gilberts, and comparatively few modifications or hybridisations of the Marshallese chiefly 
system took place. Morris argues that Hawaiian missionaries influenced mainly the commoners 
but not the Irooj (1987: 137) and Walsh comes to a similar conclusion (2003: 163).  
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On Kosrae and Pohnpei, on the other hand, there was also a significant Hawaiian 
missionary presence, starting from 1852, but the staff were mainly ABCFM haole, whereas HMS 
‘ōiwi missionaries served only from 1852-57 on Kosrae and from 1852-59 on Pohnpei, and on 
both islands they were never in key positions within in the mission. Nonetheless, Hawaiian 
influences in the transformation of governance of the two islands were certainly present, as the 
haole missionaries, while disliking most Hawaiian monarchs and their policies, were not 
necessary antagonistic to the constitutional structure of the Hawaiian Kingdom as such, which, 
to the contrary, they often promoted as a possible model of modernisation, especially the 1840 
constitution with its theocratic provisions. Hawai‘i-born missionary Luther Gulick, for instance, 
frequently referred to the Hawaiian Islands as an inspiration to his own mission on Pohnpei 
(Hezel 1983: 145). Later, his ABCFM colleague Albert Sturges envisioned Pohnpeian to become 
the national language of all of Eastern Micronesia (ibid. 1983: 315), an idea that might have laid 
the groundwork for a politically unified state in the future, given the experience of other 
‘Andersonian’ national literary languages in Oceania described in chapter five.  
However, quite similarly to the situation on the Marshalls, Pohnpei’s classical political 
system, hierarchical yet decentralised into five separate chiefdoms, was not easily impressed 
with modernisation suggestions by the missionaries. An emissary from the Hawaiian Calvinist 
church visiting the island in 1886 expresses it poignantly, stating that “with five tribes and as 
many kings for 3,000 people there would naturally arise from such sources many antagonistic 
elements” (Wetmore 1886: 10). Later though, Henry Nahnpei, an ABCFM-educated Pohnpeian 
businessman of high chiefly rank, presided over a council of five pre-eminent native church 
leaders (Ehrlich 1978: 138-139), an embryonic structure that was envisioned as a first step 
towards the creation of a central modern government (Hanlon 1988b: 40). Nahnpei clearly saw 
the Hawaiian Islands as a source of modern knowledge for such a future state and thus sent his 
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son to be schooled in Honolulu.434 Subsequent Spanish [1886-1899], German [1899-1914] and 
Japanese [1914-1945] colonial rule prevented these ideas to come to fruition, and Nahnpei, 
being first and foremost a businessman, arranged himself with the colonial status quo and gave 
up his ambitions to be a national political leader. 
On Kosrae, on the other hand, the Hawai‘i-based ABCFM missionary presence worked to 
undermine the classically very strong native monarchy and hence prevented the formation of a 
modern monarchical state that might have compared to the Hawaiian or Tongan kingdoms. 
While under Lupalik I (reg. 1837-1854), also known as “King George,” the Tokosra [king] who 
ruled the island at the beginning of intense Western contact and during the establishment of 
the mission, was in some ways comparable to his contemporaries Kamehameha III or his 
namesake “George” Tupou I of Tonga, the tendency under subsequent reigns appears to have 
been the slow erasure of the classical Kosraean state, not its modernisation. Already during the 
selection of Lupalik’s successor in 1854, the missionaries attempted to interfere, (Hezel 1983: 
161), and they further worked in fomenting popular resentment against the dynasty – which 
refused conversion to Christianity – until in 1874, the ruling Tokosra was overthrown and 
replaced with a Christian cousin (Hezel 1983: 169), and the next king abolished sunak [the 
traditional protocol surrounding the office] in 1884 (Buck 2005: 165-166). Unlike in Hawai‘i 
and Tonga, no modern constitutional state supplanted the classical system, but rather it slowly 
morphed into a theocracy of the Calvinist church. While the Kosraean monarchy nominally 
survived most of the incoming colonial regimes [identical to those on Pohnpei named above], 
its eventual replacement with a church theocracy was epitomised by the fact that in 1947, 
under the post-War American colonial regime, the last King resigned to become a church 
minister and the office was abolished (Buck 2005: 365, 565). 
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 Nahnpei’s biographers disagree on what school his son attended, it was either Kamehameha Schools (Ehrlich 
1978: 137) or Punahou School (Hanlon 1988b: 42).  
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Still, in this deplorable process of Calvinist erasure of a once strong island monarchy 
descending from the only other ‘primary state’ society in Oceania besides Hawai‘i and Tonga 
(Cordy and Ueki 1983: 1), there was some Hawaiian influence onto the Kosraean Kingdom. The 
second to last Tokosra, Sa II (reg. 1890-1910) had lived in Honolulu from 1863 to 1890 before 
going back to Kosrae to assume kingship at the request of his people and with the support of 
the mission (Buck 2005: 565). Hence it can be assumed that some ideas he brought back from 
the Hawaiian Kingdom influenced his rule. However, if this was indeed so, it must not have 
much significant impact as there is no evidence that the ongoing erasure of the monarchy’s 
power was reversed during his reign.   
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have examined the processes of institutional transfer and political 
influence from the Hawaiian Kingdom to various other states and state formation projects in 
Oceania and beyond, and thus provided an analysis of how the Kingdom’s pan-Oceanian visions 
and intentions were actually implemented on the ground. In this context, I have provided 
detailed analyses of the political systems created in these transfer processes, in which the 
already hybrid Hawaiian constitutional system or elements thereof were further hybridised 
with existing concepts of governance in each archipelago.  
The conclusions of this analysis can be summarised as follows: First of all, it has 
confirmed the important distinction made by Kirch (2010) and Hommon (2013) about primary 
and secondary State formation. While the Hawaiian Kingdom was the modernised and 
hybridised embodiment of an endogenous development of statecraft that went back to 
illustrious Mō‘ī like Kalaunuiohua, Ma‘ilikūkahi and ‘Umi a Līloa many generations before 
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Kamehameha, one could argue that the late nineteenth-century kingdoms of Tonga, Sāmoa and 
Fiji were secondary states, taking their constitutional system as modern states either directly 
from Hawai‘i, or, in Sāmoa’s case, using Hawaiian institutions as important building blocks for a 
newly created political system.  
Tonga, of course had its own background of a classical primary state, and Sioasi Tupou’s 
Kingdom was to a significant degree built on these classical foundations. Hence, the modern 
Kingdom of Tonga can clearly be seen as a primary state of its own. Nonetheless, the fact is that 
its post-1875 political system was to a large degree transferred from Hawai‘i, hence it certainly 
has properties of a secondary state as well. Overall, however, the process of transferring the 
Hawaiian political system to Tonga and adapting it to Tongan specificities was a relatively 
smooth process, and the fact that the resulting hybrid constitutional Tongan state has survived 
with periodical amendments and modifications to this day testifies to the similarity of the 
underlying classical political systems and their comparatively easy adaptability to the modern 
nation-state model.  
A much more challenging enterprise was the transfer of the Hawaiian political system to 
Oceania’s archipelagos with non-state classical systems of governance, i.e. all others except 
Hawai‘i, Tonga and Kosrae. In the process of finding ways to create modern states for those 
societies, a need that became imperative once the globalised world-system reached these 
archipelagos, the limitation of the Hawaiian model became apparent. In Fiji, this was clearly 
shown by the various crises and overall dysfunctionality of Cakobau’s government, despite the 
best efforts made by the Fijian King and his loyal advisors like Thurston and St. Julian. In some 
sense, one might argue that instead of grafting the Hawaiian model of a centralised Kingdom 
onto the various vanua and matanitū [tribal chiefdoms and confederations thereof], the 
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bottom-up approach used by Ma‘afu to first stabilise singular matanitū and then federate them 
into the Tovata confederacy might have been a more efficient way of durable state-building.435 
In contrast, the partly-Hawaiian influenced constitutional system created in Sāmoa in 
1873 was a creative, well-thought out solution to the problem of creating a modern state on top 
of, and in parallel to, the complex classical system of Samoan governance. It appears that the 
system worked best until the idea of having a King on top of the complex state apparatus was 
pushed by certain interested parties, which led to jealousies between the contenting high title 
holders and in consequence a return of political instability that made the constitutional 
Samoan state largely dysfunctional for most of its formal existence. In this context it is regretful 
that instead of restoring the successful collective leadership by the Ta‘imua, the 1887 Hawaiian 
diplomatic mission under Bush renewed the push for a strengthened kingship largely based on 
the Hawaiian model. Both Fiji and Sāmoa are thus examples of how the Hawaiian political 
system failed to provide stable governance to a society lacking classical primary state 
structures, unless significant modifications and adaptations were done. 
This is not to say that this was not attempted to be done, and that the recipients of 
institutional transfer from Hawai‘i lacked agency in doing so, leading to the second point in my 
conclusion. None of the island nations discussed took over the Hawaiian constitution and legal 
system as an inflexible package, but each of them hybridized it in its turn. For example, none of 
those using the 1852 Hawaiian constitution as a model adopted the office of Kuhina nui as a co-
regent, which was clearly seen as a specifically Hawaiian institution that was not needed in any 
of the other archipelagos.  
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 It is interesting in this case that Ma‘afu himself, as a Tongan prince, also came from a primary state society and 
needed to adapt to the realities of tribal chiefly Fijian governance. While clearly aiming to ultimately transform Fiji 
into a Tongan-style kingdom with himself at its head, he perfectly mastered playing within the traditional chiefly 
system and undertaking these transformations very slowly by manipulating the various matanitū under his influence. 
On the other hand, Cakobau and the Westerners who promoted the Hawaiian model to him were apparently less able 
to understand these subtleties and manipulate them to their advantage. 
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Tonga originally refused to carbon-copy the Hawaiian constitution but used the 
Hawaiian ideas transmitted by St. Julian to modify a legal system based on the Tahitian model; 
this hybridisation created the 1862 Tongan code. Then in 1875 the Hawaiian constitution of 
1864 was almost completely copied. However, provisions on land tenure were attached, an 
area not touched upon by the Hawaiian constitution, and furthermore the reformed Tongan 
land tenure system was sui generis in the Pacific, and conceptually quite different from the land 
system then existing in the Hawaiian Kingdom.  
The Bauan Kingdom in Fiji in 1867 deleted the legislature from the Hawaiian 
constitution because it was not practical at the time, but two years later added it back in, and in 
1871 the Fijian Kingdom created distinct institutions and modifications in the constitution, 
such as the chief secretary and the privy council as upper house of the legislature, whereas two 
years later in 1873 the composition of the legislature was once more modified to respond to 
practical problems.  
Sāmoa clearly presents the most complex example of selective appropriation, as its 
1875 constitution included both Hawaiian and American elements, traceable almost to the 
point to Kalākaua and Steinberger, respectively, while the Samoan leaders also closely watched 
Tonga as a nearby existing politically stable native monarchy, despite the obvious concerns 
about Tongan political influence, given the historical experience of Tongan domination and 
Sāmoa’s successful liberation struggle against them in the past.  
The emerging polities in the Gilberts and other Micronesian islands never proceeded to 
the point of creating permanent constitutional systems, so they are hard to compare. 
Nonetheless, native agency and selective appropriation is very evident in the case of Tem 
Binoka, who took from Hawai‘i and its available representatives (missionaries and diplomats) 
only what he found useful, namely education for his family but not for his subjects, the political 
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model of Kamehameha’s archipelagic conquest, and the possibility to get military support to 
implement that model, but he rejected what he considered harmful, such as uncontrolled 
capitalism by Western traders and a resident Christian mission. 
Once more, this dispels common historiography. Historians  and other scholars of the 
Pacific during most of the twentieth century all the way to today seem to have been obsessed 
with tearing down nineteenth-century island transformations and achievements as either 
inconsequential, ridiculous aping, Western-dominated, or all of the three together (e.g. Watson 
1918: 74; Oliver 1961: 139; Thomas 2010: 243, 274).  But the complex networks of 
institutional transfer and influence throughout the Islands during the nineteenth century, 
initially centred on Tahiti, and later on Hawai‘i, provide clear evidence of islander agency and 
great achievements in political development.  
While I have already discussed in much detail how recent research has highlighted this 
agency and achievement in the Hawaiian Kingdom, it was clearly also the case for the other 
archipelagos, even if in some of them the degree of native power might have been less than in 
Hawai‘i. This point is particularly often made about the Fijian Kingdom, which of all the 
Hawaiian-derived constitutional systems had arguably the most government offices staffed by 
Europeans and was thus as recently as in 2015 labelled on an academic book as a “farcical 
planter oligarchy” (Spurway 2015, back cover). However, Routledge has strongly cautioned 
against such prejudice, making a strong argument against the impression that opposition by 
Europeans to Cakobau’s government was mainly a struggle between rival settler factions. 
Routledge states that “[t]he government’s preparedness to seek Fijian interests, even in 
opposition to European, was the real issue” (Routledge 1985a: 168), a statement that clearly 
contradicts the notion of Cakobau being a settler puppet. Routledge also holds the 1873 Fijian 
constitution in high regard, arguing that “[t]he provisions had about them much that compares 
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with the constitutions of ex-colonial nations that have emerged in the recent era of 
decolonization,”  and that as such “they were far in advance of their time” (1985a: 217), an 
evaluation also recently expressed by Indo-Fijian legal scholar Shaista Shameem who regards 
the 1871 and 1873 constitutions as foundational documents for the development of human 
rights in Fiji (Shameem 2007). 
Closely related to the issue of agency in the processes of institutional transfer and state-
building is that of language use, which is the third and last important point in my conclusion. As 
shown in the following table 8.14, there is a striking difference in the use of terminology for 
institutions and items of modern statecraft between the archipelagos discussed, with Hawaiian 
leading in the use of traditional terms [marked T in the table], closely followed by Samoan, 
whereas Tahiti and Tonga are leading in the use of Foreign borrowings [marked F].  
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Archipelago 
 
English term 
Hawai‘i Tahiti/ 
Leeward Is. 
Sāmoa Tonga Fiji 
Government/ 
State/ 
Kingdom 
Aupuni Hau/ Bāsīleia Mālō Pule‘anga Matanitū 
T T/F T T T 
King Mō‘ī Ari’i Tupu Kingi/Tu‘i Tui 
T T T F/T T 
Privy Council ‘Aha 
kūkākūkā 
malu 
n/a n/a Fakataha 
Tokoni 
Bose-ni-
Tui 
T   T T 
Premier/head 
executive 
official 
Kuhina Nui Fa’aterehau Ta‘imua sili Palemia Vunivola 
T T T F T 
cabinet 
minister/ 
executive 
official 
Kuhina Fa’aterehau Failautusi  Minisitā  Talatala-
ni-
Matanitū 
T T T F T 
Governor Kia‘āina Tāvana Ta‘ita‘itū  Kōvana Kōvana 
T F T F F 
Legislative 
body 
‘Aha ‘ōlelo ’Āpo’ora’a Ta‘imua/ 
Faipule 
Fale alea Bose-ni-
Matanitu 
Td T T/T T T 
Judiciary  Ho‘okolokolo Ha’avā Fa‘amasino Fakamau- 
‘anga  
Veilewai 
T T T T T 
Judge/ 
Magistrate 
Lunakānāwai Ha’avā Fa‘amasino Fakamau  Turaga-
ni-lewa 
T T T T T 
Constitution Kumu 
Kānāwai 
Ture Tusi fa‘avae Konisitūtone Yavu-ni-
lawa 
T F T F T/F 
Law Kānāwai Ture Tulāfono  Lao  Lao/Lawa 
 
T F T F F 
Treaty  Ku‘ikahi Parau  au/ 
Parau fa’aau 
Feagaiga  Talite  Tariti  
T T T F F 
Flag Hae Reva Fu‘a Fuka Kuila 
T T T T T 
 
 
The discrepancy between the frequent occurrence of loanwords for governmental 
terms in Tahitian and their near-absence in Hawaiian has already been discussed above. It has 
Table 8.14: Terms for institutions and items of modern statecraft in Pacific languages during the 
nineteenth century 
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primarily to do with the fact that classical Hawai‘i was a primary state society and had native 
terminology for many such institutions that classical Tahiti lacked, leading to the importation 
of countless foreign words into Tahitian. Secondly, after Christian teachings and models of 
governance were transmitted to Hawai‘i through the medium of the Tahitian language by Ellis, 
Tute, A‘una and others, Hawaiian Christianity, starting with the Bible translation, was 
constructed deliberately more based on classical language use than in the existing neo-Tahitian 
system (Arista 1998: 41-45). 
Unfortunately, institutional transfer of the Hawaiian political model to Western 
Polynesia in the later parts of the century was done through the medium of English, i.e. English-
language translation of Hawaiian constitutions were transferred – literally so, as paper copies 
in diplomatic correspondence –, these English texts then modified or hybridised to adapt them 
to local specificities, and then further translated into the national language of the archipelago in 
question. Hence, no direct communication from Hawaiian to those languages took place, and in 
consequence, much of the hybridity of the Hawaiian constitution was lost in the process. As a 
result, the outcomes were constitutions less hybrid in character than the Hawaiian model, 
which included much more English loanwords in the Fijian and especially the Tongan 
constitutions.  
It is significant that this is not the case in Samoan, which like Hawaiian contains no 
foreign loanword for any of the terms in the table;436 this reflects the complex, locally founded 
crafting process for the Samoan constitution that has been described above. When the 
Hawaiian diplomats arrived in 1887, they initially ignored these complexities and came with 
the assumption that Sāmoa must be like Hawai‘i and imagined the Samoan state-building 
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 Not having been able to access the Samoan originals of the 1873 and 1875 constitutions, I have gathered the 
terms given in the table from various archival writings and printed government documents in Samoan during the 
time the constitutions were used. 
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project as a “nascent” or “underdeveloped” version of the Hawaiian Kingdom, severely 
misunderstanding the differences in the two societies that had resulted from centuries of 
diverging socio-political development (Cook 2011: 241, 246, 257). Nonetheless, after several 
months of stay, acquiring skills in the Samoan language, and having multiple and repeated 
discussions with a wide range of Samoan leaders, John Bush, more than Henry Poor, slowly 
started understanding the particularities of the country. 
A significant step was done when Bush learned the Samoan language, as this established 
the potential for a direct communication from Hawaiian to Samoan. Had the Hawaiian envoy 
been able to stay longer, a true Hawaiian-Samoan synthesis of statecraft might have become 
possible. Even the otherwise more culturally arrogant Poor started moving into the direction 
when for instance, he labelled one of Joseph Strong’s photographs in an interesting mix of 
Samoan, Hawaiian and English as “A Talolo (Hookupu) to Tamasese”437 
A very similar potential was provided by the situation in Kiribati, where due to the 
Hawaiian missionary presence, a direct communication between Hawaiian and Gilbertese 
without English intermediary took place. The multiple translations of diplomatic 
correspondence from Gilbertese to Hawaiian thus clearly deserve to be studied in more detail 
by comparative Austronesian linguistics.438 In that sense it is extremely unfortunate that the 
Gilbertese nation-state formation process was only embryonic in form before the British 
colonisation of that archipelago and the American occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom took 
place. Had both continued unencumbered into the twentieth century, with Gilbertese chiefs 
                                                 
437
 Photographs, 1887 Samoan Embassy, Hawai‘i State Archives. 
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 Unfortunately, while I am well-versed in Hawaiian and other Eastern Polynesian languages and somewhat 
knowledgeable of Western Polynesian languages as well, I am not familiar at all with the I-Kiribati language. 
Hence, I could not use the Gilbertese originals of the letters but had to rely solely on their translations into Hawaiian 
by HMS missionaries.  
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studying the Hawaiian language in Honolulu as intended, a direct transfer and hybridisation of 
Hawaiian modernity to Kiribati without an English intermediary might have taken place. 
In the context of linguistic and cultural specificities it is also important not to adhere too 
strictly to Western categories in analysing the hybrid political systems discussed here, such as 
Montesquieu’s three powers system, or the abstract distinction of forms of government into 
monarchies and republics. The sui generis Samoan state (even today’s post-colonial one) hence 
includes elements of both a republic and a monarchy. Much more important than such abstract 
categories is the fact that both the nineteenth-century Hawaiian and Samoan constitutions 
were the basis of hybrid political systems of non-Western states, and that the former partially 
served as a model for the latter. 
What all the examined cases have shown is that the Hawaiian Kingdom was indeed, a 
“vessel of potential,” as Kamanamaikalani Beamer succinctly stated (2014: 16). Of all the great 
potential it contained, arguably the most far-reaching was the idea of pan-Oceanianism and the 
influence the Hawaiian state had as a model for modern governance in the region. 
Unfortunately, however, as I have already mentioned several times, this potential was 
prevented from coming to full fruition by the Missionary Party’s 1887 ‘bayonet’ coup, followed 
by the American invasion and occupation of the islands in 1893-1898. Nonetheless, the 
developments discussed in this chapter have wide ramifications throughout the region until 
today, and currently ongoing developments might hold chances for the nineteenth potential to 
be indeed brought into fruition in the future, which I will discuss in the final, concluding 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER 9 (Conclusion):  
“Running the Film of the Past through the Projector of Today onto the 
Screen of Tomorrow:” How Nineteenth-Century Hawaiian Policy Affects 
Twenty-First Century Oceania 
 
 
As I watched the Big Island of Hawai‘i expanding into and rising from the depths, I saw in it 
the future of Oceania, our sea of islands. The future lies in the hands of our own people, not 
those who would prescribe for us get us forever dependent and indebted, because they can 
see no way out. (Tongan anthropologist Epeli Hau‘ofa, 1993)439 
 
Rather than stages of development, there is a kind of rough constitutional symmetry between 
the fifty years before colonial rule (say, from 1840, the date of the first Hawaiian constitution) 
and the fifty years since (say, from 1962). Colonialism interrupted a process of transforming 
indigenous political systems that had begun in Hawai‘i and continues in Tonga. (Australian 
political scientist Peter Larmour, 2005)440 
 
[E]ven though we may be small island states, we are large ocean states, and with a great deal 
more relevance in international affairs than we realised. The Pacific Ocean under the 
jurisdiction of Pacific Island countries is a significant portion of the earth’s surface, and I 
believe it is important to keep reminding ourselves of this fact, especially in our foreign policy 
analysis. (President of Kiribati Anote Tong, 2012)441 
 
The practical value of history is that it is a film of the past, run through the projector of today 
onto the screen of tomorrow. The film always remains the same, but the projector gets 
updated. (Hawaiian political scientist and diplomat D. Keanu Sai, 2014)442 
 
 
Winding up the mo‘olelo 
 
In this dissertation, I have discussed the Hawaiian Kingdom’s role in shaping the politics 
of Oceania during the nineteenth century by serving as the model hybrid state that was 
emulated by other archipelagos, and by promoting a vision of regional unity that was first 
based on the archipelagos of Oceania but came to be envisioned for the entire Asia-Pacific 
region.  First situating nineteenth century Oceania within the global history of state formation 
and the development of international relations, I then examined the origins and the 
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 Hau‘ofa,“Our Sea of Islands,” in Hau‘ofa 2008: 38. 
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 Larmour 2005: 67. 
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 Keynote Address at a conference in Suva in 2012; reprinted in Fry and Tarte 2016: 23. 
442 Guest Lecture in LLEA 371, 3 April 2014. 
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development of the Hawaiian Kingdom and explored its hybrid qualities, both in its 
constitutional system and its political culture and its artefacts. In the last three chapters I 
provided a systematic analysis of the development of Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism and how 
Hawaiian influence affected state formation processes in other archipelagos.  
In order to wind up this mo‘olelo, I will now, in this concluding chapter, examine the 
implications of this nineteenth-century history for the political issues faced by Hawai‘i and the 
other the nations of Oceania in the present and thereby make the mo‘olelo relevant, especially 
in relation to re-emerging pan-Oceanian regionalist movements, and explore decolonial, 
deoccupational, and pan-Oceanian futures within this paradigm. The story of the dissertation 
thereby fulfils what Keanu Sai calls the practical value of history in the above quote.  
First, I will look into the subsequent history of the region during the past century, when 
all of Oceania fell under Western imperialist rule, and was metaphorically beheaded through 
the occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom by the United States and the usurpation of its 
leadership by the Missionary Party. This in turn led to a century of misinformation and 
confusion that necessitates multiple efforts to rectify, providing the rationale why this 
dissertation is written in the first place. Upon a closer look however, the Hawaiian Kingdom 
and its pro-active international policy continued after occupation and thus cast a long shadow 
into the twentieth century. 
 This sets the stage for the re-emergence of Hawaiian national consciousness that has 
been unfolding over the past few decades, so that the Islands are again claiming their rightful 
place in the centre of Oceania, while in parallel, among the southern islands once influenced by 
the Hawaiian Kingdom, a new and more assertive regionalism with global geopolitical impacts 
is emerging, making Oceania once more a “power in the world.”  This leads me to examine the 
foundational value of the nineteenth-century political developments on current political 
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systems and political cultures in the region, exploring the relevance of the hybrid state model 
and its promotion by the Hawaiian Kingdom for the Pacific region today. I will end this mo‘olelo 
with a reflection on the symbolic and metaphorical value of the Hawaiian navy ship Kaimiloa 
and provide some final thoughts on how the potential of the Hawaiian Kingdom’s policies can 
be fulfilled in the future for the benefit of the Hawaiian Islands, Oceania and the world beyond. 
 
Oceania beheaded, drawn, and quartered:  A long Imperial interlude 
 
As mentioned in chapter seven, the 1887 coup that brought the Missionary Party to 
power and forced the ‘Bayonet Constitution’ upon King Kalākaua “marked the beginning of a 
lengthy eclipse in Island internationalist activity,” (Hooper 1980: 65). The usurpers of 1887 not 
only closed down the Hawaiian Legation in Sāmoa but also many other diplomatic and consular 
posts abroad that connected to Kalākaua’s pan-Asia-Pacific project, for instance the Hawaiian 
consulates in Singapore and Bangkok that provided the liaison to the courts of Johor and 
Siam.443 Domestically, the ‘bayonet’ coup marked Hawai‘i’s fall into a decade of political 
instability and civilian unrest, with frequent changes in the composition of government and 
various attempted revolutionary acts taking place (Young 2006: 18). For a short while, 
Hawaiian resistance to the 1887 coup proved successful, the Honolulu Rifles were disbanded in 
1890 (Kuykendall 3: 465-66), and Kalākaua’s successor Queen Lili‘uokalani [reg. 1891-1917] 
was planning to replace the ‘Bayonet Constitution’ with one somewhat similar to that of 1864 
but more liberal. However, members of the Missionary Party, unwilling to hand back their 
usurped power to a pluralistic Hawaiian government, in January of 1893 conspired with the US 
diplomatic representative to initiate a US military invasion of the Kingdom, which, without a 
declaration of war, was in blatant violation of the then valid rules of international law 
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 See folders for Singapore and Bangkok, FO&Ex., Hawaiian Officials Abroad, Hawai‘i State Archives. 
456 
 
(Liliuokalani 1990: 229-42; Kuykendall 1967: 582-84). The details of what followed have been 
discussed in a plethora of sources and are beyond the scope of this dissertation, but the 
eventual result was that despite clearly expressed Hawaiian popular opposition, the United 
States began permanent occupation of the Islands in 1898, purportedly annexing them through 
a joint resolution of the US Congress, a procedure that both defied the US constitution and once 
more violated international law. Even though the illegality of both actions [1893 and 1898] was 
admitted by US government officials at the time, an admission reiterated in 1993, the United 
States government has yet to undo these actions and the Hawaiian Islands have been under 
prolonged US occupation ever since (Sai 2008b; 2011). 
The U.S. takeover of Hawai‘i virtually ‘beheaded’ Oceania, disabling its most developed 
nation-state, the only one enjoying full international recognition, and the only one with its own 
network of international diplomats, a fact which in turn facilitated the colonial takeover of the 
other archipelagos, i.e. figuratively the ‘dismemberment’444 and ‘disembowelling’ of Oceania. As 
French royalist writer Frédéric Amaretti put it, “Voici que quelques sucriers américains ont 
détruit l’œuvre du grand Kamehameha” [“This is how some American sugar planters have 
destroyed the work of the Great Kamehameha,”] whom he prized as “un véritable grand 
homme; il est le héros de la race canaque.” [“a true Grand Man; he is the hero of the Kanaka 
race”] (Amouretti 1897).  By the turn of the twentieth century, every single Pacific Island 
nation had in some way, directly or indirectly, become subject to Western imperial rule. This 
dividing up of Oceania into colonial territories interrupted the Pan-Oceanianism and regional 
integration that the Hawaiian Kingdom had started and set it back for about a century. In the 
words of David Armitage and Alison Bashford, the “actions [of the colonial powers] pushed 
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 In a similar manner, Jonathan Osorio refers to the 1887 Bayonet coup and its ramifications as a process of 
“Dismembering [the] Lāhui [Hawaiian body politic]” (Osorio 2002). 
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Pacific integration into reverse and disengaged it from broader currents of what would later be 
called ‘globalisation’” (Armitage and Bashford 2014: 17). 
  It is my hypothesis that the marked reluctance of Hawai‘i’s European treaty partners to 
help out the Kingdom against American aggression during the 1890s was most likely motivated 
by their considering Hawai‘i a nuisance to their own colonial policies in the Southern Pacific.  
Hence, they must have been relieved overall that American imperialism was taking that 
nuisance out of their way. 445 The absence of the Hawaiian legation in Apia removed one of the 
obstacles for German colonisation of the major part of Sāmoa, and similarly, Great Britain could 
colonise the atoll of Sikaiana in 1897 and attach it to the British Solomon Islands Protectorate 
(MacQuarrie 1952), an act that would most likely have been disputed by Hawai‘i based on its 
earlier claims dating back to St. Julian in the 1850s. Significantly, the one country which 
protested vigorously against the 1887 coup, the overthrow of the Queen’s government and 
American annexation was Japan (Watanabe 1944: 138ff; Horne 2007: 166ff), because at that 
time it shared Hawai‘i’s geopolitical interests and not those of the Western powers. 
Within Hawai‘i, the consequences of US imperialism were no less devastating. With the 
imprisonment of Queen Lili‘uokalani in her own place by the US-installed Missionary Party 
puppet regime headed by Sanford B. Dole in 1895, her subsequent exile to her private 
residence across the street and the early twentieth-century attempt to have her declared 
insane, the Mō‘ī was symbolically disempowered and humiliated with the intent to break the 
bond between her and her people. Hawaiian political scientist Sydney Iaukea compares this to 
common practices of colonial powers to exile and humiliate the monarchs of native states they 
had conquered in order to sever the spiritual and identitary connections with their subjects, 
such as the last King of Burma who had been exiled by the British to India in 1885 (Iaukea 
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2012: 113-114). Similarly, a law of the Missionary Party regime prior to the official annexation 
virtually banned the use of the Hawaiian Language in schools in 1896, which, together with 
later US government policies brought it to the brink of extinction by the mid-twentieth century, 
and in consequence, the last Hawaiian-language newspaper closed down in 1948 (Silva 2004a: 
144; Nogelmeier 2010: 11-16, 64). In addition, US rule resulted in uncontrolled mass migration 
from the United States, turning Hawaiian nationals into a minority in their own country (Sai 
2008b: 162-63). The local population was indoctrinated with US propaganda in schools, which 
included a twisted history and, disregarding all evidence to the contrary, claimed that 
Hawaiians actually desired US annexation, and that it was done legally through a treaty, even 
though no such document exists.446 Virtually all institutions, public and private, were purged of 
Hawaiian patriots and co-opted into becoming ‘American’ institutions, even institutions as 
symbolic of Hawaiian independence as the Anglican Church,447 in a process reminiscent of the 
Gleichschaltung in early Nazi Germany. 
That the Americanisation of the Hawaiian Islands specifically aimed at the destruction 
of bonds between Hawai‘i and the rest of Oceania was symbolically epitomised in a truly 
macabre spectacle when the HHMS Kaimiloa was publicly burned in Honolulu Harbour as part 
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of a Fourth of July celebration in 1912, enacted as the sinking of a hostile warship by America’s 
‘heroic’ navy.448 The former flagship of the Royal Hawaiian Navy was previously intended to be 
used for naval target practice.449  As an image of the Kaimiloa had a decade earlier been 
proudly featured on the title page of the Hawaiian Newspaper Ka Nupepa Kuokoa on Hawaiian 
Independence Day450 and was thus clearly not forgotten during the territorial period, the 1912 
burning was evidently not a coincidental move to dispose of an unknown wrecked old ship but 
an intentional symbolic act to posthumously humiliate the Hawaiian Kingdom and what it 
stood for. Newspaper commentators specifically mentioned that what was burned was “the 
only warship ever boasted by a Pacific Island kingdom,”451 and that “Royalty’s one-time pride 
but burned the brighter for being part of the celebration of a Republic’s birthday.”452 
 
Misrepresentations of the Hawaiian Kingdom as a prelude to US Empire 
 
American indoctrination of the people of Hawai‘i had profound negative consequences 
not only on Hawaiian culture and identity, but also on the islands’ historiography. As soon as 
the Missionary Party, or the “American Mafia” as loyalist newspaper editor Edmund Norrie 
called them,453 had taken over the reins of power, they came up with a master plan to 
systematically re-write the country’s history and obscure and discredit the achievements of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom. Samuel Mills Damon, son of ABCFM missionary Samuel C. Damon and one 
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of the leaders of the 1893 overthrow and the dictatorial regime that followed, stated very 
succinctly during one of the regime’s business meetings in 1895 that “[i]f we are ever to have 
peace and annexation the first thing to do is to obliterate the past” (quoted in Beamer 2014: 
197).  During the same time, Norrie warned that the Hawaiian Historical Society, founded in 
1892 by the very same leaders of the Missionary Party, was “falsifying history… to be palmed 
off on the unknowing as true history” (quoted in Mellen 1958: 327). 
For about a century, these efforts were highly successful. In her recent dissertation, 
Hawaiian scholar Tiffany Lani Ing Tsai has well documented that during King Kalākaua’s 
lifetime, contemporary sources throughout the world portrayed him for the most part as the 
cultured, intellectual and visionary statesman that he was. However,  due to the Missionary 
Party’s control of the dissemination of information in the early twentieth century, the small set 
of sources that painted Kalākaua negatively became the ‘canon’ of historical writing on him and 
has  subsequently informed countless historians (Ing Tsai 2015). This is particularly true about 
the King’s pan-Oceanianist policies, as I have discussed in detail in previous chapters. 
Furthermore, the above-mentioned language assimilation policies had the effect of 
essentially making the extensive Hawaiian-language archive largely inaccessible to the public. 
Worse, even specialised historians have written extensively on nineteenth-century Hawai‘i 
without bothering to learn the language most relevant sources are written in.454 If Hawaiian-
language sources are cited by them at all, it is another ‘canon’ consisting of the writings of four 
nineteenth-century Hawaiian historians that have been published in English translations, a 
“discourse of sufficiency” that obscures the other ninety-nine per cent of Hawaiian-language 
source material available (Nogelmeier 2010).   
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But the issue of source selection bias goes well beyond a simplistic language dichotomy. 
Even among sources in English, a selection has been made in favour of Missionary Party 
viewpoints. One example is King Kalākaua’s 1881 trip around the world, for which almost 
everyone has cited William Armstrong’s disloyal 1903 account, which was constantly being 
republished in the twentieth century (Armstrong 1977), whereas the contemporary English-
language booklet published by Gibson that portrays the king positively (Pacific Commercial 
Advertiser 1881) is being ignored, and the few surviving copies are collecting dust in the 
archives. Another instance is the 1893 overthrow and its aftermath, on which Missionary Party 
member William D. Alexander’s anti-Lili‘uokalani propaganda book (Alexander 1896) is 
constantly being cited, while an almost simultaneously published loyalist account in English 
(Makaainana Printing House 1897) has sunk into oblivion. The trend continues for mid-
twentieth century secondary sources, where the English-language accounts of Kathleen Mellen 
who was mandated by both the descendants of Gibson and of the Kalākaua dynasty to write 
Hawaiian history from their perspective (Mellen 1956; 1958) have remained quite obscure 
publications hard to access today, while Gavan Daws’ history book that for a large part 
replicates Missionary Party propaganda (Daws 1968) is constantly being reprinted. Needless to 
say, any sources highlighting the Kingdom’s pan-Oceanianist policies have been relegated to 
the category of non-publicised archival curiosities in this system of historiography, including 
published books in English such as St. Julian’s 1857 Report. 
With so many source materials ignored, it is not surprising that the prevalent 
historiography of Hawai‘i has tended to regard the Islands as an outpost of North America, 
visually situated on most US maps as an insert somewhere to the southwest of California or 
even in the Gulf of Mexico, blurring its true geography as an Oceanic archipelago at the centre 
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of the Northern Pacific. Imperial rule by the United States has thus been seen as the Islands’ 
natural destiny, which then renders the Hawaiian Kingdom as a mere prelude to US annexation.  
Today, the early twentieth-century writings under direct Missionary Party influence, 
which are straightforwardly racist against both Hawaiians and Asian immigrants and 
uninhibited in their display of US chauvinism, are no longer considered accurate, except by 
some extremist right-wing fringe groups. However, what replaced those writings at the end of 
the twentieth century in mainstream historiography was a ‘fatal-impact’ type of discourse, full 
of sympathy for the Hawaiian people, but still offering little acknowledgement of the 
nineteenth-century developments, denying native agency within them, and continuing to 
misinterpret them as preludes to US rule.455 American anthropologist Sally Merry, for instance, 
tends to lump together the diverse foreign influences on Hawai‘i during the nineteenth century 
as “American,” dismisses Ha‘alilio’s and Richards’ achievement of international recognition for 
the Kingdom in 1843 as a “temporary postponement of colonial annexation by the United 
States” (Merry 2000: 13), and names the US-born Richards as the active agent in the diplomatic 
mission while relegating Ha‘alilio, the delegation’s head, to a secondary status (ibid: 84-85). 
American Studies scholar Robert Stauffer, in his case study of land tenure in a land section on 
O‘ahu, goes even further in his dismissal, suggesting that the Hawaiian Kingdom was “little 
more than a de facto unincorporated territory of the United States,” since “[t]he kingdom’s 
government was often American-dominated if not American-run” (Stauffer 2003: 73). Stauffer 
seems to be oblivious to the constitutional role of the native Mō‘ī as head of state and chief 
executive. Secondly, he refuses to see naturalized foreigners in Hawaiian government service 
as people of complex identities, and to evaluate individually whether they served their 
monarchs loyally or not – both of which occurred, see for instance the contrasting tenures in 
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foreign affairs and education by loyalist W.M. Gibson and treasonous C.R. Bishop. Instead, 
Stauffer makes the generalizing assumption that if they were not of native ancestry, they must 
have been ‘foreigners’ – thereby disregarding their Hawaiian nationality –, and furthermore 
that they must have acted only in the interest of themselves, of other foreigners, or even of the 
government of their country of origin.  
However, the ethnocentrism and denial of multi-ethnic Hawaiian nationality implied in 
such statements, which Stauffer most likely picked up from a discourse prevalent in the late 
twentieth century in Hawai‘i456 should not be blamed on some kind of unreasonable Hawaiian 
‘racism’ as current Missionary Party descendants have been doing (Twigg-Smith 1998). 
Instead, Hawaiian ethnocentrism can ultimately be traced to the efforts of the Missionary Party 
itself, only that it was not their own discourse but one constructed as an overreaction in 
resistance to it. British Commissioner James Wodehouse – himself once in conspiracy with the 
Missionary Party in 1880 to force Kalākaua to get rid of Moreno – by the 1890s had come to 
understand the irreparable damage that was being done to the fragile multi-ethnic local 
community by the white supremacist agitation of Dole and his clique. Wodehouse warned of a 
generalised anti-foreigner attitude that might develop among ‘Ōiwi in reaction to the ongoing 
outrages being perpetrated against their country: 
The Hawaiians who have been so patiently waiting for more than a year for the “undoing 
of the wrong” and the Restoration of their Sovereign and of their cherished institutions 
are now beginning to feel dissatisfied and restless at this long delay and they will feel 
keenly their abandonment by the U.S. Their faith and trust in that country will be gone 
forever and will be succeeded by a hatred which may even extend to all foreign 
Nationalities.457 
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If one wants to see efforts to overcome such antagonism succeed and a true, deep 
culture of aloha prevail in the Hawaiian Islands again, it is thus imperative to first deconstruct 
and dispose of the Missionary Party’s vicious political and ideological project. I agree with Ing 
Tsai (2015: 4) that Mellen’s courageous but as yet largely unsuccessful mid-twentieth century 
efforts need to be continued today, for the very reason that Damon stated in 1895. It is our 
kuleana as twenty-first century scholars of Hawai‘i to resurrect the past Damon and his 
acolytes wanted to obliterate, so that the Missionary Party’s descendants – both actual and in 
spirit – shall never have their “peace and annexation.” 
 
The Hawaiian Kingdom’s long shadow into the twentieth century  
 
Part of these efforts to resurrect the history Damon wanted to obliterate and to clear the 
fog of a century of American propaganda is to realise that despite the largely successful 
Missionary Party policies, the agency of the Hawaiian Kingdom and its representatives 
continued deep into the time after the American occupation had taken place and hence cast a 
long shadow into the twentieth century, both domestically and internationally. And while this 
was largely obscured from mainstream views, it has never been fully obliterated. 
Since Lili‘uokalani only effectively ruled the country for the first two years of her long 
reign from 1891 to 1917,458 it remains a matter of speculation how Hawaiian foreign policy 
might have evolved under her once the pressing issue of the constitution would have been 
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resolved. It is not entirely clear whether the Queen had the same personal commitment to pan-
Asia-Pacific unity as her brother. Since she had only travelled to America and the United 
Kingdom but not to Asia and continental Europe, she might have been somewhat more 
confined within the Anglo-Saxon world than him. Nonetheless, during Queen Victoria’s Golden 
Jubilee in 1887, Lili‘uokalani felt strong bonds with the representatives of the other present 
non-Western representatives from Japan, Siam and Persia (Warinner 1975: 36), and most 
significantly, shortly before her overthrow she made the decisive move to conclude the 
negotiations initiated by her brother to end Hawaiian extraterritoriality in Japan, which was 
the initial step that lead to the full international recognition of Japan’s independence in 1894-
1899.459  
Certainly, Hawaiian government officials who had been at the forefront of Kalākaua’s 
Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism and pan-Asianism remained highly active politically during the 
Queen’s reign, including John E. Bush,460 Henry Poor461  and Curtis ‘Iaukea.462 Perhaps most 
significantly, the Queen’s last appointed kia‘āina of Hawai‘i Island, John Tamatoa Baker, who 
had posed as a model for the famous statue of Kamehameha commissioned under Kalākaua, 
undertook a long voyage through the Pacific and Asia in 1907, visiting Tahiti, the Cook Islands, 
Tonga, Sāmoa, Fiji, Aotearoa and Japan, where he reconnected with the native leaders of each 
archipelago and had deep intellectual exchanges with them, as Kealani Cook has  meticulously 
documented and analysed (Cook 2011: 335-395). Baker’s voyage was evidently much more 
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than a tourist venture. In many ways it was an act of quasi-diplomacy in the name of the then 
US-occupied Hawaiian Kingdom, possibly the substitute for the very diplomatic tour to the 
South Pacific Kalākaua was apparently planning in 1887 but could never carry out. 
Queen Lili‘uokalani herself did take interests in the Asia-Pacific region in the later years 
of her reign. In 1915, she involved herself in the newly formed Hawai‘i-based Pan-Pacific 
movement that was being spearheaded by American Journalist Alexander Hume Ford and most 
famously attended the club’s 1916 banquet in ‘Iolani Palace as the guest of honour (Hooper 
1980: 70; Iaukea 2012: front cover). While being a practicing Christian throughout her life, the 
Queen also supported the establishment of Japanese Buddhism in Hawai‘i and in 1901 
personally attended one of the first Buddhist celebrations held in the Islands (Karpiel 1996: 
189), thus fulfilling another project of her brother to bring other non-Christian religions to his 
country in order to diversify its cultural landscape. The main local support behind the 
establishment of Buddhism in Hawai‘i was Mary Foster, another prominent Hawaiian royalist 
figure (ibid.; Masters and Tsomo 2000). When the Queen passed away in 1917, In 
acknowledgement of her crucial support for the revision of unequal treaties and her support 
for the religious freedom of Japanese immigrants her funeral was attended by a high-profile 
Japanese diplomatic delegation (Askman 2015: 93). 
The Kingdom’s ‘long shadow’ also manifested itself in the continued articulation of 
Hawaiian national identity through publications in the early 20th century that subverted the 
Missionary Party’s master narrative of Americanisation, such as prominent Hawaiian scholar 
Emma Nakuina’s 1904 book on Hawaiian mythology,463 and other important works chronicling 
important personages and events of the Kingdom like J.G.M Sheldon’s 1908 biography of 
patriotic Hawaiian politician Joseph Nāwahī (Sheldon 1996) and various publications by 
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Joseph Mokuohai Poepoe and others in patriotic Kingdom-themed early twentieth-century 
newspapers such as the appropriately named Ka Na‘i Aupuni.464 Even Ka Nupepa Kuokoa, the 
newspaper that once had been a Hawaiian-language mouthpiece of the Missionary Party, 
increasingly developed a royalist nostalgia after the occupation, featuring for instance in 1902 
the above-mentioned mentioned title story honouring the Kaimiloa [fig. 9.1.] and starting, 
perhaps not coincidentally the very day after the Kaimiloa was burnt in 1912, to feature the 
Hawaiian Kingdom’s Coat of Arms – not the territorial seal – in its masthead.465  
  One of the latest highlights of this post-occupation Hawaiian intellectual culture was 
the publication in 1938 of James McGuire’s mo‘olelo vividly describing that climax of the 
Kingdom’s international visibility which was Queen Kapiolani’s and Princess Lili‘uokalani’s 
attendance at Queen Victoria’s Jubilee mentioned in the opening of this dissertation (McGuire 
1938).466 All of this parallels similar situations in newly colonised countries throughout the 
non-Western world, where the elite intellectual culture of the late pre-colonial period usually 
continued into the early colonial periods.467 Seen in this context, the burning of the Kaimiloa 
mentioned above provides clear evidence of the strong influence the Kingdom continued to 
exert, prompting the American occupiers to symbolically destroy its remaining artefacts in a 
public spectacle. 
 
                                                 
464
 The name of the newspaper is an epithet of Kamehameha the Great. For the articulation of Hawaiian nationalism 
within the imposed American political system, see also Silva 2004b and Williams 2015. 
465
 Ka Nupepa Kuokoa, 5 July 1912, p.1. The important number of public spaces featuring the Hawaiian Kingdom’s 
Coat of Arms instead of the territorial seal during the early territorial period, e.g. the World War I memorial arch in 
Waikīkī, the interior decoration of Hawai‘i Theatre, the entrance of the downtown Honolulu YMCA building (now 
the State Art Museum) and that of Honolulu’s City Hall, is quite fascinating in this sense and deserves to be 
researched in much more detail. 
466
 McGuire had been one of the attendants of the royal Hawaiian ladies during their voyage. 
467
 For instance, in 1928, when Johor had formally become reduced to a British protectorate, Maharajah  Abu Bakar 
of Johor’s chief advisor Mohammad Salleh bin Perang published an autobiography that featured the Sultan’s voyage 
to China and Japan in 1883 (Sweeney 1980), and Malagasy publications referring to Japan as a model for non-
Western modernization continued after the French colonization of Madagascar (Esoavelomandroso 1988). 
468 
 
 
In the wider international arena, the Hawaiian Kingdom’s long shadow was visible in 
multiple ways as well. Most likely based on the impression of the Hawaiian King’s visit in 1881, 
cordial encounters with other Hawaiian royalty and diplomats throughout the 1880s, and 
Hawai‘i’s crucial role in setting the precedent for treaty revision, Imperial Japan developed a 
particularly affinity towards Hawaiians, and Polynesians in general. This was shown for 
instance in the attitude to the Samoan anti-colonial insurgents, interned on Saipan in the 
Northern Marianas by the Germans, that were liberated by Japanese forces in World War I 
Fig. 9.1: Photo on the title page of Ka Nupepa Kuokoa, 28 November 1902, showing King Kalākaua 
inspecting the Kaimiloa prior to her departure for Sāmoa. The headline says “Remembrances of the 
Times Past.” Copyright expired. Retrieved from <www.nupepa.org> 
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(Charlot 1985: 59-60 n35) as well as by the cordial reception of Māori spiritual and political 
leader T.W. Ratana who visited Japan in 1924 and met the Taisho Emperor [Meiji’s son and 
successor, reg. 1912-1926] (Newman 2009: 100-103). 
As far as King Kalākaua’s 1881 pan-Asianist proposals to the Meiji Emperor were 
concerned, the King’s visionary ideas were indeed taken up in the mid-twentieth century, albeit 
in a way somewhat different from what the King intended. In his 1984 study on Japanese plans 
for Hawai‘i if they had conquered it from the Americans in the wake of the attack on Ke Awalau 
o Pu‘uloa [Pearl Harbour] in 1941, historian John Stephan cites Japanese policymakers of the 
1930s and 40s who were fully aware of Kalākaua’s 1881 Asia-Pacific confederation proposal 
and explicitly regarded it as a precedent for the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” that 
Japan was building in the territories it had conquered during World War II (Stephan 1984: 18, 
142). They furthermore intended to liberate Hawai‘i from American occupation and restore the 
Hawaiian Kingdom as a Japanese client state akin to Manchuria, intending to count on the 
existing “dissatisfaction with American rule among Hawaiian intellectuals” and to rely on 
Hawaiian political leaders with pre-US occupation connections to Japan such as Isaac Harbottle 
and James Haku‘ole that had been trained in Japan under Kalākaua’s study abroad program and 
were still alive in the 1940s (Stephan 1984: 157-158).468  
But Japan’s World War II empire was not the only example of a twentieth-century pan-
Asianist movement connecting with nineteenth-century Hawaiian policies. In the 1930s, young 
Filipino intellectual Wenceslao Vinzons created the pan-Malayan association Perhempoenan 
Orang Melayoe469 among students in Manila from various Austronesian-speaking countries, 
including Polynesians. Referencing both the ancient maritime empires of Srivijaya and 
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Majapahit in the Malay Archipelago and the Hawaiian pan-Oceanian project under King 
Kalākaua, Vinzons envisioned a “unified Malaysia extending from the northern extremity of the 
Malay Peninsula to the shores of the remotest islands of Polynesia” (Salazar 1998: 126-127).470  
While Vinzons’ pan-Austronesian political project competed and conflicted with the pan-Asian 
one of Imperial Japan, to the point where Vinzons was assassinated by the Japanese secret 
service in 1942, an awareness of nineteenth-century Hawaiian pan-Oceanianism as an 
important historical precedent was common to both.471 
It was on China, however, that perhaps the largest twentieth-century shadow of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom was cast.  Hawaiian ideas of hybrid modern governance were transferred 
there through the agency of Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the revolutionary leader, founding 
president of the Chinese Republic and leading pan-Asianist, who had spent his formative years 
and received his secondary education in the Hawaiian Islands between 1879 and 1883, i.e. 
during the very time King Kalākaua’s Hawaiian renaissance, ‘New Departure’ policy and Pan-
Oceanianism was reaching its climax. As quoted at the beginning of the previous chapter, Sun 
later specifically stated that he learned about the importance of modern governance in the 
Hawaiian Kingdom, an assertion reiterated in the Hawaiian-language press when an extensive 
obituary highlighted the importance of Hawai‘i for his political ideas, pointing out “ka naauao i 
loaa iaia ma Hawaii nei, ka ike ame ka hoomaopopo ana i ke kulana hookele aupuni maanei” 
[“the enlightenment he received here in Hawai‘i, the knowledge and the understanding of the 
quality of governance here”].472  Based on those quotes, it is evident that as a modernised, yet 
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not foreign-colonized non-Western state, the Hawaiian Kingdom became Sun’s first 
inspirational model for a reformed China.473  
 
Reclaiming Hawai‘i’s place in the centre of Oceania 
 
During the last six decades, the impacts of Western imperialism in the Pacific region 
have slowly been reversed. The Austronesian peoples of Southeast Asia were able to cast off 
the Dutch, American and British colonial yokes after World War II, and in the insular Pacific, 
decolonization started with the independence of Western Samoa in 1962, even though the 
Samoan archipelago remains incompletely decolonized, with its eastern islands still a US 
territory today. Tonga, under British protectorate since 1900, regained its independence and 
became a fully recognized independent state in 1970, continuing to operate under its 
Hawaiian-inspired constitution of 1875. Fiji gained its independence in 1970 as well, as did 
Kiribati in 1979, and many other Pacific archipelagos followed suit in the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s. Places like New Caledonia, Tahiti, and Rapa Nui, on the other hand, have so far remained 
colonial dependencies of France and Chile, but movements to free them from foreign imperial 
rule are on the rise there as well.474 
Unfortunately, the formerly leading nation of Oceania, the Hawaiian Kingdom, has 
remained under US occupation. Thus, even though parts of Oceania’s body have been 
reassembled, its head is still missing, at least politically speaking. Still under the spell of the 
Missionary Party’s master plan, most historians, even if they acknowledge the Hawaiian 
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Kingdom’s extraordinary qualities, have been treating the demise of its government in 1893 
and takeover by the United States in 1898 as a more or less typical colonial takeover. The fact 
that in the second half of the twentieth century the ‘colonisation’ process did not lead up to 
decolonisation but to the creation of an American  ‘State’ of Hawai‘i, i.e. a supposedly definitive 
integration of the islands into the ‘mother country’ would then make Hawai’i  a territory that 
has been removed not only from any prospect of regaining its independence but also from its 
attachment to the Pacific region, to be found in an alphabetical listing between Georgia and 
Idaho, but not in one between Fiji and Kiribati.  
In fact however, Hawaii’s situation is fundamentally different in international law from 
any of the Pacific Island territories that were colonised and have either been decolonised or are 
awaiting decolonisation today. Thanks to the pioneering work of Keanu Sai, it has been 
definitively established that what we are dealing in Hawai‘i’s case is one of the occupation of an 
independent state, which is presumed independent and has the right to restore its government, 
whereas a colony, or non-self-governing territory, is presumed to be under the sovereignty of 
their colonizer but has the right to achieve independence through a process of self-
determination (Sai 2011: 114-116). Of course, the political social, cultural and economic 
conditions of Hawai‘i under American occupation have to a large degree resembled those of a 
colony, which leads Beamer to speak of the current Hawaiian situation as “faux-colonial” 
(Beamer 2014: 196).  Given the irrefutable legal facts, however, Hawai‘i has never been a 
colony, and was never ‘decolonised through integration’ in 1959 but remains an independent 
state, albeit under prolonged occupation, with the closest parallels in history being the Italian 
occupation of Ethiopia from 1936 to 1941475 and the Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia and 
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Lithuania from 1940 to 1991 (Vogeler 2009). The last word on the Hawaiian Kingdom is far 
from being spoken. 
After a hundred years of successful propaganda, the fog is finally lifting, not only among 
historians and other academics but also among both international and local and political 
institutions. In 1999-2001, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, the oldest 
international court created in 1899, heard the case Larsen v. Hawaiian Kingdom, in which the 
Hawaiian Kingdom was accepted as a state party, providing evidence that the Hawaiian Islands 
is indeed still a sovereign state.476 Furthermore, archival research has provided evidence that 
in at least two cases, viz. Switzerland and Belgium, the treaties those countries had with the 
Hawaiian Kingdom were never considered cancelled and reprinted in those countries’ official 
law books as treaties in force far into the twentieth century.477 
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Locally, the Hawaiian Kingdom’s continued existence is being acknowledged by an 
increasing number of institutions and 
individuals of the so-called State of 
Hawai‘i. Former State governor John 
Waihe‘e [in office 1986-1994] for 
instance, in a public panel discussion 
admitted that he had “absolutely no 
doubt that Hawai‘i is in an illegal 
occupation” and that one had “to be 
illiterate not to get to that point.”478 In 
line with Waihe‘e, a year later, in mid-
2015, the state government under current governor David Ige implemented his predecessor 
Neil Abercrombie’s decision to have the dates on the foundation of the statue of Queen 
Lili‘uokalani in front of the State Capital building recast, so that it now reads “Queen of Hawaii 
1891-1917” [fig. 9.2], indicating that the 1893 overthrow did not end the Kingdom’s existence, 
which, by implication, concludes that the ‘State’ of Hawai‘i, as an indirect successor to the 
Missionary Party regime installed in 1893, is an illegitimate entity.  
How the process of ending the American occupation and restoring the Hawaiian 
Kingdom government will exactly play out, and how much time it will take are still open-ended 
questions. But there is no doubt that once these processes have been completed, Hawai‘i will 
fundamentally change, both domestically and internationally. Hawaiian anthropologist 
Kēhaunani Abad succinctly stated how instead of pursuing the fake “American dream,” what 
needs to be implemented is the “Hawaiian dream,” which she defines as follows: 
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 Waihe‘e at a panel discussion at the University of Hawaii’s William S. Richardson School of Law, 17 April 
2014. See online video recording of the panel at  <http://hawaiiankingdom.org/blog/?p=1504> 
Fig. 9.2: Base of the statue of Queen Lili‘uokalani between 
‘Iolani Palace and the State Capitol in Honolulu, featuring 
the altered dates of the Queen’s reign. Photo taken by the 
author in 2015. 
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[T]he American dream is not the Hawaiian dream. That difference is a fundamental problem 
we face as Hawaiians. [...] A Hawaiian dream – one shared by many in Hawai‘i of all races and 
creeds – would recognize our intrinsic connection to the natural world, honour our perpetual 
relationship to our kūpuna (ancestors) and mo‘opuna (descendants), seek collective success 
for ‘ohana and communities and consider long-term impacts of our actions for generations to 
come.479    
 
But the significance of the Hawaiian Kingdom government’s future restoration goes well 
beyond changing the way the islands, their society and resources are being managed. Given the 
central importance of Hawai‘i in Oceania, a de-occupied Hawai‘i will doubtlessly affect the 
entire region.  In many ways, Hawai‘i has already started taking a leading role in the 
restoration of Oceanian identity. For example, the modern revival of traditional Polynesian 
navigation began in Hawai‘i in the 1970s with the voyages of the double-hulled canoe Hōkūleʻa 
(Finney 2003). That Epeli Hau‘ofa had his epiphany that led to the visionary 1993 essay “Our 
Sea of Islands” in Hawai‘i of all places, and more specifically in some proximity to the heiau 
‘Āhua a ‘Umi [or Ahu a ‘Umi], i.e. the physical embodiment of the early Hawaiian state in its 
inception,480 is also of great significance and forecasts the important role the Hawaiian 
Kingdom is to play in Oceania’s near future. 
The renewed awareness of Hawai‘i’s place in the centre of the Pacific481 has been 
paralleled in the emergence of a new orientation of Hawaiian historiography, particularly since 
the turn of the twenty-first century, represented by such scholars as Sai and Beamer, and an 
increasing number of their  students and mentees. Unlike representatives of the earlier U.S. 
hegemonic and fatal-impact discourses, representatives of this new inclination do not look at 
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the Hawaiian Kingdom as a prelude to US imperialism, but rather focus on the dynamics of 
nineteenth-century Hawaiian politics within a global context, emphasizing the creative agency 
of Hawaiian leaders and their Western supporters in shaping and navigating those dynamics. 
This historiography is imbedded in a wider political movement to reshape present Hawaiian 
resistance to US rule into a state-centred Hawaiian Kingdom nationalism (Moore 2010: 215-19; 
Vogeler 2014), based on the legal argument that the Kingdom was never lawfully dissolved, 
leading to the conclusion by many Hawaiians, once multiple layers of propaganda are cast off, 
that “We Are Who We Were,” as Hawaiian anthropologist Lynette Cruz has entitled her 
dissertation (2003). As the late Hawaiian historian Kanalu Young, an early proponent of these 
ideas and mentor to many of the scholars mentioned here including myself, summarizes it, 
there is a need for the “development of a body of publishable research that gives life and 
structure to a Hawaiian national consciousness and connects thereby to the theory of State 
continuity” (Young 2006: 1). 
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Within this emerging Hawaiian national discourse of scholarship, the international 
dimension of the Kingdom’s policy and specifically its pan-Oceanianism is also slowly re-
emerging in academia. Beamer has highlighted it in his writings, Sai is currently doing it in his 
forthcoming book chapter “Hawaiian 
Neutrality” (Sai 2015) and other 
emerging Hawaiian academics such as 
Ing Tsai (2015) and Cook (2011a, 2011b) 
have emphasised the topic as well, as has 
Canadian literature scholar Carla 
Manfredi in her study of Robert Louis 
Stevenson’s connections to the Hawaiian 
embassy to Sāmoa (Manfredi 2015). 
Pride in the regional and global achievements of the Hawaiian Kingdom has also found its 
expression in recent artwork, such as Tamara Moan’s 2009 Royal Travels celebrating 
Kalākaua’s 1881 circumnavigation [fig. 9.3].482 Even more relevant to this dissertation, Woven 
History of a Notion by Maile Andrade, also made in 2009, represents the written 
correspondence by Foreign Minister Gibson to Minister-resident Carter on the notion on 
Oceanian unification during the mid-1880s, frequently citing St. Julian, embossed into an 
aluminium reel that is woven into a basket as it is traditionally made out of lau hala [pandanus 
leaves] all over Polynesia [fig. 9. 4]. With its use of 
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Fig. 9.3: Royal travels (2009) by Tamara Moan. Scan of 
copy in the author’s possession. 
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Fig. 9.4: Woven History of a Notion (2009) by Maile Andrade. Woven aluminum reel. Photo of artwork 
and artist’s statement by the author, taken in 2009. 
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modern technical materials in a traditional Polynesian form, carrying a message of Oceanian 
unity articulated by ethnic non-Polynesians in the service of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Woven 
History of a Notion represents perhaps the most appreciative and creative transposition of 
nineteenth-century hybridity by any recent Polynesian artist.483  
 From the precedents in the nineteenth century, we can gather that Hawai‘i’s destiny is 
to play once more a role of intermediator in the larger Asia-Pacific region, since it is both a 
Pacific Islands nation and a major non-Western nation on the global scale. No other country can 
make a similar claim to be primus inter pares of Polynesia and one of the major Asia-Pacific 
nations concurrently. The multiple Asian immigrant communities living in Hawai‘i make it 
especially important in that sense, an importance that already became evident towards the end 
of the nineteenth century, when the Chinese-language press in Honolulu reported on issues in 
other Polynesian archipelagos with no Chinese immigrants, something unlikely to have 
occurred elsewhere during the time.484 
Even under occupation, the Hawaiian Islands have never fully ceased to play that role of 
an Asia-Pacific hinge and hub, albeit it has mainly been within the limited US context. Examples 
include the above-mentioned Pan-Pacific Union under Alexander Hume Ford in the early 
twentieth century, and currently the East-West Centre with its academic focus on both Oceania 
and Asia, as well as the Pacific Forum Centre for Strategic and International Studies,485 and, on 
a more practical level, the recently created Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre.  
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Once more a “Power in the World:” Re-emerging Oceanian regionalism 
 
While Hawai‘i’s future as a restored Oceanian nation is being discussed, the wider 
region of Oceania is politically in motion too. After most of the islands nations in the Southern 
Pacific were decolonised in the 1970s and 1980s, towards the end of the twentieth century a 
neo-colonial regional order had emerged, in which the Anglo-Saxon settler states of Australia 
and New Zealand paternalistically assumed the role as the region’s leaders and came to 
dominate the regional political infrastructure, such as the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), 
effectively blocking any progressive initiatives to improve or change the status quo in the 
region (Fry 2015: 5-6). This neo-colonial relationship also somewhat resembles that of the 
unequal or concession-burdened treaty regime of the nineteenth century, since most Pacific 
Islands countries allow citizens of Western states, viz. those of Western Europe, North America, 
Australia and New Zealand, visa-free entry, while the latter do not reciprocate this curtesy to 
the island nations’ citizens who need to go through painstaking processes to obtain visas to 
enter Western states.486   
Presently, this neo-colonial regional order is being challenged in a move spearheaded 
especially by Fiji, but also other Oceanian states such as Vanuatu and Sāmoa.  Since the PIF 
appears firmly in the grips of Australia and New Zealand, the two competing most powerful 
national political leaders in the region, Fijian former military ruler and now elected Prime 
Minister Voreqe Bainimarama and Sāmoan Prime Minster Tuila‘epa Sailele Malielegaoi, have 
both come up with new regional international organisations in the early 2010s. Fiji 
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spearheaded the creation of what was first known as the annual ‘Engaging with the Pacific’ 
meetings and has since 2013 become the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), 
conceptualised as a dialogue forum that includes political leaders, businesses and civil society 
organisations (Tarte 2014: 320). Sāmoa, on the other hand, founded the Polynesian Leaders 
Group (PLG) and its subsidiary, the Polynesian Parliamentary Group (PPG), a sub-regional 
initiative that groups the political leaders of the archipelagos within the Polynesian triangle, 
including independent states such as Sāmoa and Tonga, semi-autonomous colonial territories 
such as French Polynesia and American Sāmoa, and, as observers, Polynesian indigenous 
groups within Western settler states such as the Māori of Aotearoa (Al Wardi 2015).  
Both organisations, besides the already existing Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) 
which has strengthened its coherence as a result of effective leadership by member states like 
Fiji (Mrgudovic 2015), have made stronger assertions of pan-Pacific identity and visions, 
including, unlike the PIF, assertions antagonistic to Western imperial interests such as openly 
supporting French Polynesia’s and Rapa Nui’s struggles for decolonisation (Maclellan 2016).  
In her 2014 essay on the changing regional order in Oceania, Fijian political scientist 
Sandra Tarte argues that “[...] much of the new regional dynamism is driven by the discontent 
of a growing number of island states with the established regional order and by a desire to 
assert greater control over their own futures.” (313) Hence, “[…]the PIDF was seen as ‘stepping 
outside the box’ and moving away from ‘business as usual’”(320) since the “PIDF has been 
portrayed as a more genuine Pacific regionalism to that of the PIF and its secretariat” (321), 
which had earlier been characterised as “patron-client regionalism” (Stewart Firth quoted in 
Tarte 2014: 314). 
Thinking in post-/neo-colonial boxes indeed seems to be a prevalent problem that is 
slowing down these initiatives, not only in ‘Missionary Party’ propaganda-infested Hawai‘i. An 
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editorial in Islands Business magazine, for instance, perfectly shows such ‘box-thinking’ bias, 
criticising that “[t]he Polynesian Leaders Group can either be a grouping of sovereign nations 
and territories on a political footing or a grouping of ethnically similar peoples on the basis of 
culture and heritage. It cannot be both.”487 One might wonder, why exactly the organisation 
cannot be both, especially as it has shown to work productively within the described 
ambiguities, for instance in providing the pro-independence leaders of Rapa Nui, currently not 
recognised as even a non-self-governing territory, a forum to articulate their political project in 
the international arena (Al Wardi 2015: 75,81). 
Like its nineteenth-century Hawaiian predecessor, the “New Pacific Diplomacy,” which 
is unfolding as I write this (Fry and Tarte 2016) extends beyond reformulating Oceanian 
regionalism and reaches out globally. Fiji, the new emerging regional power and in some sense 
a successor to Hawai‘i in this respect, is actively pursuing a pro-active multilateral diplomacy to 
enhance Fiji’s – and by extension the Pacific Islands region’s – global standing and make it less 
unilaterally dependent (Mataitonga 2013). This has been largely successful, as Fiji has since not 
only joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 2011, but also became the chair the Group of 
77, the NAM’s economic subsidiary at the United Nations, in 2013, “an unprecedented status 
for an island nation” (Maclellan 2015: 3).  
Greg Fry argues that what is being observed in the 2010s is in some sense a cyclical 
repetition of history, as the newly independent island nations of the 1970s already asserted 
themselves in a similar way in order to create the PIF in the first place (Fry 2015). While this is 
undoubtedly correct, what none of the recent authors on Pacific regionalism seem to realise is 
that late nineteenth century Hawaiian policy was the first such cycle of assertive Oceanian 
regionalism in the modern age. As mentioned above, some late twentieth and early twenty-first 
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century scholars have acknowledged the precedence set by nineteenth-century states in the 
region, and Hawaiian leadership among them, including Lātūkefu (1982) and Larmour (2005), 
but most treatises of Pacific regionalism start only in the post-colonial era and completely 
ignore the important developments in the nineteenth century, which colonialism and 
occupation have in fact merely interrupted for a century. 
 
Why hybridity matters: The foundational value of nineteenth-century political 
developments 
 
A deeper examination of contemporary Pacific Islands politics shows that the 
developments discussed in this dissertation are indeed of foundational value for the region, not 
only in setting a precedent for regional integration and diplomacy, but also for the political 
systems, national identities and political cultures of each of the archipelagos discussed. As a 
general paradigm, the notion of the hybrid state is clearly relevant not only for non-Western 
states that escaped Western colonialism, but also for post-colonial nation-building everywhere 
across the globe, where political leaders “have hybridised the local with the global, the 
indigenous with the Western” (Aldrich in Armitage and Bashford 2014: 322).  
More specifically, due to the developments in the nineteenth century that included both 
national literary language development and state-building, Tonga, Sāmoa, Fiji and other 
Polynesian countries have a heritage of pre-colonial nation-building, as opposed to purely post-
colonial states in western Melanesia that had no such national coherence prior to colonialism. 
This is strikingly similar to the crucial difference that can be observed between Madagascar 
with its pre-colonial national heritage as opposed to most states on the African continent that 
are purely post-colonial creations (Fournet-Guérin 2009). 
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The most remarkable example of a nineteenth-century hybrid state formed under 
Hawaiian influence is of course Tonga, where the Hawaiian-derived constitution is still in 
existence today. While there had been some political troubles in the 1990s and early 2000s 
when people asked for a democratisation of the political system, the recent constitutional 
amendment which changed the executive ministry from being appointed by the King at his 
pleasure to being responsible to a majority of the legislature, has essentially quieted these 
protests (Campbell 2011; Powles  2013). Interestingly, the composition of the Tongan 
legislature under the 2010 constitutional amendment is exactly as it was planned in Queen 
Lili‘uokalani’s constitutional draft of 1893, namely one third nobles and two thirds 
representatives. 
While in Fiji and Sāmoa, the Hawaiian-derived or Hawaiian-influenced political systems 
did not endure, their legacy is very important today as well. In Fiji, the British essentially side-
lined the pre-colonial project of Ma‘afu, Cakobau, John B. Thurston, Swanston and St. Julian to 
build a modern hybrid nation-state, and replaced it with the division of society into a colonial 
plantation system staffed with Indian contract labourers on one side, and an invented 
ethnocentric ‘neo-traditional’ system of chiefly rule over Fijian commoners on the other, 
demarcating iTaukei [native Fijian] identity and fossilising it as if the more dynamic urban and 
plantation sections of Fijian society did not exist, a step backwards from the integrative hybrid 
nation-state that was in the process of being formed immediately previous to British 
colonisation. The policy ultimately resulted in the divided society after independence that led 
to multiple coups d‘état and political unrest and has only begun to be reconciled under Voreqe 
Bainimarama’s current government.   
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The failure of the British-constructed political system in Fiji, and the new government’s 
policies to phase it out and replace it with a modern inclusive nation-state model488 has made 
the pre-colonial Fijian state, i.e. the Kingdom of the 1870s and its predecessors, increasingly 
relevant for modern Fiji. Indo-Fijian lawyer and human rights activist Shaista Shameem was 
one of the first to do so, pointing out the importance of the of Hawaiian-derived 1871 and 1873 
constitutions for the development of human rights in Fiji (Shameem 2007). A most important 
point to make is that the pre-colonial chiefly structures were much more flexible towards their 
hybridisation and adaptation of modernity than after they were fossilized by the British 
colonial system (France 1969). 
In Sāmoa, German and New Zealand colonial policies did not create a divided society 
like in Fiji and hence left less of a burdensome legacy. Sāmoa’s postcolonial constitution of 
1962, while drafted from scratch and not directly traceable to any nineteenth century 
precedent, does in fact resemble the 1875 constitution of Malietoa Laupepa and Steinberger, in 
that it creates a largely ceremonial head of state, to be either concurrently held by or 
alternating between the two supreme families,489 while actual executive power is exercised by 
a prime minister elected by a parliament representing matai from the various districts 
(Davidson 1967; So‘o 2008). 
In Kiribati, independence from Great Britain in 1979 at last realised the dreams of 
Binoka and Kalākaua of having a unified Gilbertese state. While the political structures of that 
state were essentially built by the British, Hawaiian influence did make a lasting contribution to 
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I-Kiribati national identity, since Hawaiian missionaries had an important part in creating the 
Gilbertese literary language. 
The foundational value of late nineteenth-century hybrid states has recently also gained 
recognition by the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), as in 
2013, the city of Levuka, the capital of the Fijian Kingdom, was declared a world heritage site. 
The monuments in the old capitals of the Tu‘i Tonga Empire on Tongatapu and the classical 
urban centres of Eastern Micronesia [Nan Madol on Pohnpei and Lelu on Kosrae] are on the list 
of nominations, and so is Marae Taputapuātea on Ra’iātea, the centre of the classical priesthood 
and aristocracy of central eastern Polynesia.490 This implies that the world community is 
beginning to acknowledge the importance of Oceanian polities and state building, both in the 
classical and pre-colonial modern periods.   
Since the Hawaiian Kingdom was the pivot of all of these developments, both in terms of 
classical development and in its model function for nineteenth-century hybridisation, it would 
appear only logical that a UNESCO World Heritage nomination for sites associated with the 
Hawaiian Kingdom be done. Such a nomination should first and foremost encompass ‘Iolani 
Palace, of course, but also the Kamehameha statue, Ali‘iōlani Hale, the royal mausoleum at 
Mauna ‘Ala, and various other historical buildings in Honolulu associated with the Kingdom. 
The World Heritage complex could also extend to other islands and include sites such as 
Moku‘ula and Lāhainaluna School on Maui, as well as sites associated with Kamehameha’s rise 
and the classical kingdom before him, such as Pu‘ukoholā and ‘Āhua a ‘Umi, on Hawai‘i Island. 
Similarly, the Kumulipo should be added to the UNESCO’s “Memory of the World 
Programme.”491 
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Ka ‘Ume Mageneti: Why the Kaimiloa both precedes and follows the Hōkūle‘a 
 
In concluding, I would like to return to the central symbolism of the Kaimiloa mentioned 
above. First of all, the name of the vessel is highly metaphorical. ‘Imi loa, “to seek widely,” is a 
central concept in classical Hawaiian epistemology. As scholar of Hawaiian religion John 
Charlot expresses it, “[a]ll learning and experience are part of the great search, ka ‘imi loa: 
probing backward in time to the origins, entering intensely into the current experience, and 
looking forward in time both to estimate the consequences of past and present and also to 
innovate and create” (Charlot 2005: xiii). 492 
When Kalākaua named his navy’s flagship, he was thus clearly thinking of much more 
than to have an embryonic navy to impress the Samoans and show Hawai‘i’s flag in the region. 
Sending out a diplomatic and naval delegation to the islands known as Kahiki in the classical 
Hawaiian cosmology was as much a search for Hawaiian origins in deep Oceanian history, as it 
was about securing Oceania’s continuous freedom and position it on the geopolitical map, to 
become, at last, “a Power in the world.” It is thus no wonder the ship and the project it stood for 
was well remembered in the early territorial years and the American occupiers and their 
Missionary Party acolytes were compelled to burn it as part of their campaign “to obliterate the 
past.” 
Within the context of a resurgence of pan-Oceanian cultural identity, the great seafaring 
traditions of Austronesian people have been repeatedly celebrated, which has led to a  
renaissance of traditional voyaging, using double-hulled or outrigger canoes and navigating in 
the manner of the ancestors without the use of modern instruments. This revival of traditional 
navigation began in Hawai‘i in the 1970s with the formation of the Polynesian Voyaging Society 
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and voyages of its flagship double-hulled canoe Hōkūleʻa, which has  in turn precipitated the 
formation of similar endeavours to revive or perpetuate classical voyaging traditions all across 
Austronesia (Finney 2003, Low 2013). As the embodiment of the oldest maritime civilisation in 
human history that dominated the world’s oceans for several millennia until a few centuries 
ago, the Hōkūle‘a and other rebuilt traditional voyaging canoes have become a central icon for 
the re-emerging pan-Oceanian visions of the present. Hōkūle‘a’s circumnavigation that is 
currently under way aims at rising global awareness of those visions. 493  
While there is no reason to dispute this importance of the Hōkūle‘a and what she stands 
for, the equally important symbolic value of the Kaimiloa should not be forgotten, lest we play 
in the hands of those who burned her in 1912. As an archetypical embodiment of Hawaiian – 
and by extension Oceanian – hybrid modernity, the Kaimiloa combines the classical Hawaiian 
search for knowledge contained in her name and the maritime orientation of Oceanian 
civilisation with selectively appropriated Western technology, since it is of course far more 
comfortable and safe to undertake diplomatic missions between the islands of Oceania on a 
steamship than it is on an Austronesian canoe.  
The selective appropriation of Western maritime technology by Pacific Islanders is a 
significantly under-rated topic in Pacific scholarship. But it is in fact very important, as it fills 
the supposed gap between the end of most of the classical voyaging spheres shown in fig. 8.1 
and their late twentieth-century revival with a continuity of native agency. One of the few case 
studies on hand by A. Degage (n.d.) highlights the importance of native-run western-style 
sailing ships for the economy, and indeed the very national identity, of the small island 
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kingdoms of Rurutu and Rimatara south of Tahiti in the nineteenth century. And a more 
general overview by British maritime historian Alastair Couper links both nineteenth-century 
Western-style sailing and island-owned twentieth-century commercial freight shipping 
industries to aboriginal Oceanian maritime traditions (Couper 2008). This also falls in line with 
the very Hau‘ofaesque statement by the Hōkūle‘a’s co-designer Ben Finney that current 
movements of Pacific Islanders should be understood within the migratory pattern of the 
“longue durée in Autronesian history” (Finney 1994: 295).  
As the logical outcome and epitome of hybridisation of Oceanian maritime culture 
through selective appropriation and as an iconic symbol of Oceanian unity, the Kaimiloa thus in 
a sense both follows and prefigures the Hōkūle‘a. Surely the Kaimiloa had its bad moments, 
such as an apparent lack of crew discipline on its maiden voyage, but so had the Hōkūle‘a 
(Finney 2003). The Hōkūle‘a subsequently had a chance to resolve these problems and has 
been sailing smoothly ever since, and surely the Kaimiloa would have figured out its issues as 
well, had she been given the time.  
Modern navigational technology was not merely selectively appropriated for practical 
purposes, but also for symbolic metaphors. In the first issue of the appropriately titled loyalist 
Hawaiian newspaper Ke Aloha Aina editor Joseph Nāwahī compared the sentiment of aloha 
‘āina [translatable as both “love for the land” and “patriotism”] to the ‘ume mageneti [magnetic 
field] of compass needles: 
 
O ke aloha Aina, oia ka Ume Mageneti iloko o ka puuwai o ka Lahui, e kaohi ana i ka noho 
Kuokoa Lanakila ana o kona one hanau ponoi. O ka Ume Mageneti, oia no ka ikaika nana i 
kaohi i ke kui mageneti o ka Panana, e hoopololei ana i kona kuhikuhi i ka weleleu Akau o ka 
Honua nei, a i ka hoku akau hoi. […] I na i hookokoke ia na kui hao Mageneti i kahi hookahi, 
alaila, he mea maopopo loa me ke kanalua ole o ka manao, ua ume like no lakou a pau loa 
kekahi i kekahi. Pela hoi na  lahui a me na kanaka a pau loa i noho pihaia e ka uhane aloha i 
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ka aina hanau. [...]No ka mea, ua nui aku ke aloha no ka aina hanau mamua o na mea e ae a 
pau loa.494 
 
That the compass needle was not a Western invention, but one that the West itself had 
centuries earlier selectively appropriated from the Chinese only adds to the multiple levels of 
kaona in Nāwahī’s statement, and makes it perfectly appropriate to describe the progression of 
Hawaiian and other archipelago-based national identities into pan-Oceanianism and pan-
Asianism through the processes of hybrid state-building that I have described and analysed.  
 
Final Thoughts: Hawai‘i in Oceania and the world as it was, is and can be495 
 
 Looking back at the themes discussed through the dissertation, and especially the 
conclusions and prospects of this last chapter, the core issues can be summarised as follows: In 
the second half of the nineteenth century, Hawai‘i, as the most advanced hybrid state in 
Oceania, stood at the centre of an emerging pan-Oceanianism, a development that was then 
interrupted, but not obliterated, by Western imperialism during most of the twentieth century. 
Today, a re-alignment of Pacific regionalism, with potential geopolitical ramifications, is taking 
place, while simultaneously Hawaiian political thought is in the process of liberating itself from 
a century of distorted history and an American dominance which is still powerful but turns out 
to stand on shaky legal foundations. The ultimate question is, how can these two strings of 
                                                 
494
 “Patriotism/Love for the Land is the Magnetic Field in the heart of the People/Nation, which is controlling the 
glorious independence of its own native soil. The Magnetic Field is the force that controls the magnetic needle of the 
compass that points to the north pole of this Earth, and to the northern star. […] If needles of magnetic steel are 
brought together at one place, then it is well understood, without any doubt of mind, they all pull each other in the 
same direction. Likewise all the nations and peoples are fully taken by the spirit of love for their native land. […] 
Because the love for their land of birth is far larger than anything else.” Article entitled  “Ke Aloha Aina, he aha 
ia?,” Ke Aloha Aina, 25 Mei 1895, p. 7. The article was brought to my attention in the 2014 Kamehameha Schools 
Song Contest pre-show documentary video “Kaapuni Honua/Global Travels,” 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zHwGulJxUGw> . 
495
 I give credit to New Zealand geographer Cosbie Walsh, who maintains a blog on Fijian politics titled Fiji: The 
Way It Was, Is and Can Be, < http://crosbiew.blogspot.com/> on which this subheading is based. 
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development be woven back together? In other words, how can the re-emerging Hawaiian 
nation-state reconnect with re-emerging assertive Pacific regionalism, and how can this re-
aligning Pacific regionalism reconnect to its original foundations in Hawai‘i?  
 While the dissertation cannot provide definitive answers to these questions, what it can 
do is to complement Kamanamaikalani Beamer’s famous statement, that the “Hawaiian 
Kingdom was a vessel of potential” (2014: 16) by attempting to explore some of that potential. 
By looking at how this potential would likely have developed in the twentieth century if the 
American occupation had not taken place, some ideas could be gathered for how that potential 
could be further developed after the Islands’ de-occupation. 
 The most far-reaching potential lies in the fact that Hawai‘i under Kalākaua was one of 
the pioneers of Pan-Asianism, articulating this ideology long before it was taken up by any of 
the Asian states. Already ahead of Asian nations in its geopolitical visions, as well as its 
international status, the Hawaiian Kingdom certainly would have used its potential in the early 
twentieth to catch up in the fields it lagged behind them, such as the higher education of a 
native elite, which could have taken over all relevant administrative positions as well as excel 
in the private sector,496 and might have changed its legal system to one based purely on the 
civil law tradition like Japan,497 and created an effective and loyal military force capable of 
                                                 
496
 Efforts in that direction already started with Kalākaua’s study abroad programme, but in the twentieth century 
they would certainly have been extended much further to have a native elite just as well-educated as the Missionary 
Party, but which unlike the latter would be loyal to the nation.  
497
 In his critical analysis of language policy of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Ruben Fernández Asensio (2010) argues 
that the adoption of a legal system predominantly based on English common law led to an over-reliance on 
foreigners as legal experts in the upper echelons of the judicial branch, from which aboriginals were virtually absent 
after the 1860s. While many of the earlier haole Supreme Court justices were arguably individuals of “complex 
personality” loyal to the Kingdom, the Supreme Court later fell in the hands of unscrupulous Missionary Party 
acolytes such as Albert F. Judd and Sanford B. Dole who later helped their friends and relatives overthrow the 
government in 1887 and 1893. Fernández Asensio contrasts this to non-Western nations adopting the civil law 
system like Japan, China and others, where a codified corpus of law could be easily translated into the local 
language, and the legal system then operated independently by local jurists, while Thailand as well as the formerly 
British colonised nations of Israel and Malaysia first adapted the English common law but then codified and 
translated it to create an independent legal system operated in the national language (18, 22). While the Hawaiian 
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crushing any domestic insurgency by the Misionary Party, as had repeatedly been urged by 
patriotic Hawaiian commenters such as W.L. Bishop (as cited in chapter 7) and Robert Hoapili 
Baker (n.d.). 
Having been a vessel of potential for both Pan-Asianism and pan-Oceanianism, the most 
important kuleana for Hawai‘i could be to combine the two in a way that would balance both 
regions and create a genuine Asia-Pacific bloc based on related notions of cultural identity and 
social harmony, but in which the Pacific Islands, with their more feeble population sizes and 
land surfaces maintain equal importance and  are not brushed aside by the sheer size of Asian 
nations’ land surface and populations. Introducing the above-quoted notion of Oceanian 
countries as “large ocean states” instead of “small island states” into the equation might be one 
way to accomplish this.  
Lastly, and equally importantly, one of the greatest potentials arising out of the 
Hawaiian Kingdom’s international policy is the potential to press for a further modification of 
the Westphalian nation-state system to make it more accommodating to indigenous peoples’ 
rights.  Just as in the nineteenth century the Hawaiian Kingdom was at the forefront of 
equalising relations between Western and non-Western states by revising unequal treaties, 
Hawaiian political scientist Noenoe Silva argues  that “Hawai‘i’s unique position as the first 
non-European member of the family of nations may allow it to regain its status as an 
independent state and, further, to join the movement to reform international law so that other 
indigenous peoples are treated fairly” (Silva 2004a: 201).  
In this context, it is remarkable how Kalākaua started to venture beyond typical 
Western-standard concepts of international relations, for instance when basing the Hawaiian 
sovereignty claim on uninhabited Midway Atoll not on a claim of discovery but on Hawaiian 
                                                                                                                                                             
Civil code of 1859 was a step into that direction, it was not consistently pursued and later Anglo-Saxon case law 
was explicitly made applicable as a source for Hawaiian jurisprudence (20). 
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oral traditions, and to refer not to states or nations but to “native communities” in the statutes 
of the Royal Order of the Star of Oceania. Bush was being commissioned not merely to the 
monarchs of Tonga and Sāmoa, semi-recognised states in the then existing international order, 
but also to “Sovereign Chiefs and Peoples of Polynesia.” But even before Kalākaua’s reign, 
already St. Julian carried the title of “His Hawaiian Majesty’s Commissioner, and Political and 
Commercial Agent, to the Independent States and Tribes of Polynesia,” and was thus likely the 
first diplomat in the history of the Westphalian system to be commissioned to entities other 
than states. That during the same time Kamehameha IV insisted on a self-determination vote 
for the people of Sikaiana is very telling in that sense as well.   
With all of this marvellous nineteenth-century precedence, nothing could be more 
desirable for the Hawaiian Kingdom under a restored future government than to once again 
assume a leading position in Oceania and be indeed “a power in the world.” 
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GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS 
 
ABCFM American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions 
 
‘afakasi (Samoan, from English half-caste) person of mixed Samoan and foreign 
ancestry 
 
‘āiga (Samoan) extended family 
 
aliʻi  (Hawaiian) chief, member of the nobility 
 
ari’i (Tahitian) chief, later king of an island or archipelago 
 
ariki (Cook Island Māori and Aotearoa Māori) high chief 
 
aupuni (Hawaiian) state or government 
 
bakufu (Japanese) military government through a dynasty of shoguns 
 
CMSNC  China Merchants Steam Navigation Company 
 
coup d’état (French) unlawful overthrow of a government and/or constitutional order 
 
daimyo (Japanese) feudal lord 
 
déjà vu (French) already seen [before] 
 
ex officio (Latin) by virtue of someone’s office 
 
faʻalupega (Samoan) ceremonial greeting enumerating the most important chiefly titles 
of a nu‘u or of a larger political unit 
 
fa’aterehau (Tahitian) government minister; prime minister in 19th century Leeward 
Islands kingdoms  
 
fono (Samoan) council of matai 
 
Gleichschaltung (German) forced co-optation or coordination of both public and private 
institutions to bring them in line with the official state ideology. 
 
haole (Hawaiian) foreigner, non-Polynesian person 
 
hapa (Hawaiian, from English half) person of mixed ancestry 
 
HMS Hawaiian Missionary Society 
 
kahuna (Hawaiian) priest 
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kai colo (Fijian) Less stratified clans inhabiting the interior of Viti Levu, lit. “people of 
the hills.” Cf. Tahitian noho vao. 
 
kaina (Hawaiian) younger sibling. Also spelled kaikaina. 
 
kanaka ʻōiwi (Hawaiian) aboriginal Hawaiian 
 
kānāwai  (Hawaiian) classically: chiefly or divine commandment, law or decree;  
modern: law 
 
kaona (Hawaiian) hidden or layered meaning of a statement, common in Hawaiian 
poetry and rhetoric 
 
kapu (Hawaiian) prohibition, with a strong spiritual connotation. 
 
kia ‘āina (Hawaiian) governor appointed by a Mō‘ī to administer an island in his or her 
name. 
 
kimono (Japanese) traditional dress 
 
kua‘ana (Hawaiian) older sibling. Also spelled kaikua‘ana 
 
kuleana (Hawaiian) responsibility, with a strong spiritual connotation 
 
longue durée (French) the long run; the big picture; a historical approach focusing on long-
term processes and structures instead of singular events 
 
LMS London Missionary Society 
 
matai (Samoan) titled head of an extended family 
 
matanitū (Fijian) complex chiefdom; confederation or tributary network of several 
vanua  
 
mana (all Polynesian languages) power, with a strong spiritual connotation 
 
mana‘o (Hawaiian, Tahitian) to think; thought, idea, opinion, discourse 
 
maka‘āinana (Hawaiian) person of non-chiefly rank; commoner 
 
mā’ohi (Tahitian) aboriginal Polynesian 
 
mata’eina’a (Tahitian) tribal chiefdom; district 
 
mōʻī (Hawaiian) king of an island, later of the Hawaiian archipelago 
 
mo‘olelo (Hawaiian) story; history. Also spelled mo‘o‘ōlelo. 
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MSG Melanesian Spearhead Group 
 
NAM Non-Aligned Movement 
 
noho vao (Tahitian) non-hierarchical clans originally inhabiting the interior of Tahiti 
island, lit. “inhabiting the woods.” Cf. Fijian Kai Colo. 
 
nu‘u (Samoan) “village,” i.e. autonomous polity consisting of several ʻāiga owning a 
piece of land usually wedge-shaped and stretching from the shore to the 
interior mountain ranges 
 
pae ‘āina (Hawaiian) archipelago, lit. cluster of lands 
 
pālangi (languages of Western Polynesia) foreigner, non-Polynesian person. Also 
spelled pālagi, or in partial reduplication papālagi/papālangi.  
 
palena (Hawaiian) boundary [of land units]. 
 
pākehā (Aotearoa Māori) foreigner, non-Polynesian person 
 
PIDF Pacific Islands Development Forum 
 
PIF Pacific Islands Forum 
 
PLG Polynesian Leaders Group 
 
PPG Polynesian Parliamentary Group 
 
pōpa‘ā (Tahitian and Rarotongan) foreigner, non-Polynesian person. Also spelled 
pāpa‘ā. 
 
primus inter  
pares (Latin) first among equals    
 
rangatiratanga  (Aotearoa Māori) independence, sovereignty, chieftainship 
 
rova (Malagasy) castle, fortified royal residence complex  
 
Schwellenland (German) a country in transition from an economic classification of 
“developing” to one of “developed”; literally “threshold country.” Often not 
quite accurately translated into English as “newly industrialised country.” 
 
sui generis (Latin) of its own kind [i.e. not comparable with anything else] 
 
tāvana (Tahitian, from English governor) district chief, subordinate to an ariʻi, later to 
the French colonial administration, today mayor of a municipality. 
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ture  (Tahitian and other Eastern Polynesian languages, from Hebrew תּ וֹרָה [torah]) 
law 
 
uea (Gilbertese) High chief [on the central and northern Islands]; supreme ruler 
or king [on Butraritari and Abemama] 
 
UH University of Hawaiʻi 
 
UK United Kingdom [of Great Britain and Ireland, later Northern Ireland] 
 
UN United Nations 
 
US[A] United States [of America] 
 
vanua  (Fijian) land; chiefdom 
 
whakaminenga (Aotearoa Māori) assembly, confederation 
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APPENDIX 1: Treaties and Acts of Recognition of Pacific and selected other 
Austronesian and Asian states, 1800-1900498 
 
Hawaiʻi: 
1826 Draft commercial agreement with the USA (not ratified) 
1836 Equal treaty with the UK 
1837 Equal treaty with France 
1839 Disadvantaging499 unequal treaty with France 
1843 Recognition by Anglo-Franco Proclamation 
1844 Recognition by USA 
1846 Disadvantaging concession-burdedned treaties with France and the UK 
1846 Equal treaty with Denmark 
1848 Equal treaty with Hamburg 
1850 Equal treaty with the USA 
1852 Equal treaty with the UK 
1852 Equal treaty with Sweden-Norway 
1854 Equal treaty with Bremen 
1858 Equal treaty with France 
1863 Equal treaty with Belgium 
1863 Equal treaty with Spain 
1864 Equal treaty with the Netherlands-Luxemburg 
1864 Equal treaty with Italy 
1864 Equal treaty with Switzerland 
1869 Equal treaty with Russia 
1871 Advantaging unequal treaty with Japan 
1875 Equal treaty with Austria-Hungary 
1879 Equal treaty with Germany 
1882 Equal treaty with Portugal 
1887 Advantaging unequal treaty with Sāmoa 
1893-4 agreement with Japan to end extraterritoriality 
 
Tahiti 
1826 Draft commercial agreement with the USA (not ratified) 
                                                 
498
 Treaties ceding a country’s sovereignty or formally establishing protectorates are not included. Also excluded are 
multilateral international treaties one of the mentioned states is a party to. Sources for treaties not individually cited 
in the dissertation are 1) The Consolidated Treaty Series, 1648-1919, Ed. Clive Perry, 231 vols. (Dobbs Ferry: 
Oceana Publications 1969-1981); 2) Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 
1776-1949. Compiled under the direction of Charles I. Bevans, LL.B., Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State. 
8 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Department of State and United States Printing Office, 1968-1974); 3) Perez 1999; 4) 
Kayaoğlu 2010. 
499
 “Disadvantaging” refers to being the disadvantaged party of an unequal treaty; “Advantaging” to being the 
advantaged party of an unequal treaty. 
III 
 
1838 Equal treaty with France 
1839 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with France 
Leeward Islands 
1826 Ra’iātea draft commercial agreement with the USA (not ratified) 
1847 Independence acknowledged by Anglo-Franco-Proclamation 
1868 Huahine convention with the “French protectorate government in Tahiti” 
1879 Huahine draft equal treaty with Germany (not ratified) 
Tonga 
1855 Convention with France (not filed as a treaty in France) 
1865 Equal treaty with Bua 
1865 Advantaging unequal treaty with Lakeba 
1876 Equal treaty with Germany 
1879 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1888 De facto disadvantaging unequal treaty with the USA 
1891 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK (amended from 1879 treaty) 
1900 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK (de facto protectorate) 
Sāmoa 
1839 Draft commercial agreement with the USA and Great Britain (not ratified) 
1878 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the USA 
1879 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Germany  
1879 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1887 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Hawaiʻi  
1889 Tripartite international agreement between USA, Great Britain and Germany (de facto 
tripartite protectorate) 
Fiji 
1840 Bau draft commercial agreement with the USA (not ratified) 
1855 Bau draft agreement with the USA (not ratified) 
1858 Bau convention with France (not filed as a treaty in France) 
1865 Bua equal treaty with Tonga 
1865 Lakeba Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Tonga 
Various small Pacific Islands 
1844 ‘Uvea disadvantaging unequal treaty with France (unratified until protectorate 
established in 1887) 
1878 Funafuti draft disadvantaging unequal treaty with Germany (not ratified) 
1878 Jaluit draft disadvantaging unequal treaty with Germany (not ratified) 
Madagascar 
1817 Equal treaty with the UK 
1820 Equal treaty with the UK 
1823 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1862 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with France 
1865 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1867 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the USA 
1868 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with France 
IV 
 
1881 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the USA 
1883 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1883 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Italy 
1883 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Germany 
Johor 
1818 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1819 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1824 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1885 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK (de facto protectorate) 
Siam 
1826 Equal treaty with the UK 
1833 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the USA 
1855 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1856 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with the UK, the USA and France 
1858 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Denmark 
1862 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the German Customs Union 
1867 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with France and the USA 
1868 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with the UK, Sweden-Norway, Belgium and Italy 
1869 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with the UK and Austria-Hungary 
1870 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with Spain and France 
1874 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1883 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with the UK, France, Sweden-Norway, Denmark and 
Belgium 
1884 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with Germany, the USA and Italy 
1885 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with the UK and Austria-Hungary 
1887 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1887 Equal treaty with Japan 
1896 Independence acknowledged by Franco-Anglo Proclamation 
1896 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with France 
1897 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1898 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Japan 
1899 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with Russia and the UK 
China 
1842 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1843 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1844 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with the USA and France 
1847 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Sweden-Norway 
1851 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Russia 
1858 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with Russia, France, the UK and the USA 
1860 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK, France and Russia 
1861 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Prussia and the German Confederation 
1862 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with France  
1863 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the Netherlands-Luxemburg and Denmark 
1865 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Belgium 
1866 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Italy 
V 
 
1871 Equal treaty with Japan (mutual extraterritoriality) 
1876 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1881 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Russia 
1884 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with France  
1885 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with France 
1887 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Portugal 
1895 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Japan 
1896 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Russia 
1898 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with the UK, Russia and Germany 
1899 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with France 
Japan 
1854 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the USA 
1854 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the UK 
1855 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Russia 
1856 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the Netherlands-Luxemburg 
1858 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with the USA, the Netherlands, Russia the UK and France 
1860 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Portugal (abrogated in 1892) 
1861 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Prussia 
1864 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Switzerland 
1866 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with Belgium and Italy 
1867 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Denmark 
1868 Disadvantaging unequal treaties with Sweden-Norway and Spain 
1869 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Austria-Hungary 
1871 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Hawaiʻi 
1871 Equal treaty with China 
1874 Disadvantaging unequal treaty with Peru 
1876 Advantaging unequal treaty with Korea 
1887 Equal treaty with Siam 
1888 Equal treaty with Mexico 
1893-4 agreement with Hawaii to end extraterritoriality 
1894 Equal treaty with the UK 
1894 Equal treaties with the USA and Italy 
1895 Equal treaty with Peru 
1895 Advantaging unequal treaty with China 
1895 Equal treaties with Russia and Denmark 
1896 Equal treaties with Germany, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria-
Hungary 
1897 Equal treaties with Spain and Portugal 
1898 Advantaging unequal treaty with Siam 
  
VI 
 
APPENDIX 2: Constitutions of non-Western States and Other Political Entities, 1827-
1932500 
 
Pacific Islands States 
1825 Kingdom of Tahiti 
1840 Hawaiian Kingdom 
1842 Kingdom of Tahiti (amended) 
1848 Kingdom of Tahiti (amended under French protectorate) 
1852 Hawaiian Kingdom (amended) 
1862 Kingdom of Tonga 
1864 Hawaiian Kingdom (amended) 
1867 Kingdom of Bau [Fiji] 
1869 Chiefdom of Lau and Tovata Confederacy [Fiji] 
1869 Kingdom of Mangareva (under ill-defined French protectorate) 
1871 Kingdom of Fiji 
1873 Kingdom of Fiji (amended) 
1873 Kingdom of Sāmoa 
1875 Kingdom of Sāmoa (amended) 
1875 Kingdom of Tonga 
1877 Kingdom of Ra’iātea 
1887 Hawaiian Kingdom (amended by insurgents) 
[1894 Kingdom of Aotearoa (in rebellion against British rule)] 
1914 Kingdom of Tonga (amended under British protectorate)  
 
 
Other Non-Western States and Political Entities 
1827 Cherokee Nation (under ill-defined degree of US overlordship) 
1876 Ottoman Empire (abrogated 1878) 
1889 Empire of Japan 
1895 Sultanate of Johor (under ill-defined degree of British overlordship) 
1899 Empire of Korea (in fact a written reiteration of absolute imperial authority) 
1906 Empire of Iran 
1908 Ottoman Empire  
1912 Republic of China (amended 1923, 1931) 
[1923 Kingdom of Afghanistan (after dissolution of ill-defined British protectorate)]  
1931 Empire of Ethiopia 
1932 Kingdom of Siam 
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 Data gathered from various sources cited in the dissertation. 
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APPENDIX 3: Newspapers in Oceania, 1834-1900501 
 
Hawai‘i 
Ka Lama Hawaii (1834; 1841) [ABCFM church] 
Ke Kumu Hawaii (1834-1839) [ABCFM church] 
Sandwich Island Gazette and Journal of Commerce (1836-1839) [private independent] 
Ke Kumu Kamalii (1837) [ABCFM church] 
The Hawaiian Spectator (1838-1839) [ABCFM-affiliated] 
Sandwich Island Mirror and Commercial Gazette (1839-1840) [private independent] 
The Polynesian (1840-1841; 1844-1864) [private independent, later Hawaiian Government] 
Ka Nonanona (1841-1845) [ABCFM church] 
The Friend (1843-) [ABCFM church] 
Monitor (1845) [ABCFM church] 
Ka Elele (1845-1855) [ABCFM church] 
Sandwich Island News (1846-1847) [private independent] 
Honolulu Times (1849) [private independent] 
He Mau Hana i Hanaia (1852) [Catholic church] 
Ka Nuhou  (1854) [pro-US annexation] 
Ka Misionari Hawaii (1856-1857) [AEH church] 
Ka Hae Hawaii (1856-1861) [Hawaiian Government] 
The Pacific Commercial Advertiser (1856-1921) [independent, then patriotic, then Missionary 
Party] 
Ka Hoku Loa o Hawaii (1856) [Hawaiian-language supplement of PCA] 
No Ta Hae Havaii (1858) [Catholic church] 
Haimanava (1858-1859) [Catholic church] 
Hooiliili Havaii (1858-1860) [Catholic church] 
He Mau Hana (1859) [Catholic church] 
Na Helu Kalavina (1859-1860) [Catholic church] 
Ka Hoku Loa (1859-1864) [ABCFM/AEH church] 
No Ta Hoku Loa Kalavina !!! (1859) [Catholic church] 
He Mau Manao (1859) [Catholic mission] 
Ka Hae Kiritiano (1860-1863) [Catholic church] 
Ka Hoku o ka Pakipika (1861-1863) [independent] 
Ka Nupepa Kuokoa (1861-1927) [independent, Missionary Party affiliated] 
Ka Aha Elele (1864) 
Hawaiian Gazette (1865-1918) [Hawaiian Government, then Missionary Party] 
Ke Au Okoa (1865-1873) 
Ke Alaula (1866-1873) 
Daily Legislative Bulletin – Ka Nupepa Kuokoa Puka La (1867-1867) 
O ka Hae Katolika (1868-1871) [Catholic church] 
Ka Manawa (1870) 
Ka Lau Oliva (1871-1874) [AEH church] 
Ko Hawaii Ponoi (1873-1874) 
Nuhou - The Hawaiian News (1873-1874) 
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 Data gathered from Mookini 1974, Chapin 2000, Maori Newspaper database <http://www.nzdl.org/cgi-
bin/library.cgi?gg=text&c=niupepa&a=d&cl=CL1> , O’Reilly and Reitman 1967, and various library holdings. 
VIII 
 
Ka Lahui Hawaii (1875-1877) [AEH church] 
Ko Hawaii Pae Aina (1878-1891) 
Hoiliili Havaii (1880) [Catholic church] 
Ka Elele Poakolu (1880-1881) 
Ko Haiku Ponoi (1881) [published in Haiku, Maui] 
Hoku Kakahiaka (1881) [published in Haiku, Maui] 
Ka Hoolaha Manaoio (1882-1928) [Catholic church] 
Ka Nupepa Elele Poakolu (1882-1885) 
Ka Hoku o ke Kai (1883-1884) [government affiliated literary magazine] 
Na Lima Hana (1883-1884) [AEH church] 
檀山新報 [T’an Shan Hsin Pao; i.e. Hawaiian Chinese News] (1883-1907) [private Chinese 
association, later close to Sun Yat-Sen] 
Ke Koo o Hawaii (1883) 
Ke Ola o Hawaii (1884) 
Ka Nupepa Puka La Ko Hawaii Pae Aina (1884-1885) 
Ka La o Hawaii (1884~1900) 
Ka Elele Poaono (1885) 
O Luso Hawaiiano (August 1885 to December 1890) 
Ka Nupepa Elele (1885-1892) [patriotic] 
Na Paahana Hawaii (1885) [Catholic church] 
Na Lani Ehiku (1886-1887) 
Ke Karistiano (1887) [AEH church] 
Hawaii Kukala Pili Aupuni – Hawaii Government Gazette (1887) [Hawaiian Government] 
Ke Alakai o Hawaii (1887-1888) 
Ka Makaainana (1887-1893; 1894-1902) [independent, patriotic] 
Ka Oiaio (1889-1896) [J. Bush] 
Aurora Hawaiiana (1889-1891) 
Ka Leo o ka Lahui (1889-1896) 
Ahailono a ka Lahui (1890) 
Ke Kiai o Ka Lahui (1890) 
Hawaii Holomua (1891-1895) 
A União Lusitana Hawaiiana (1892-1896) 
A Sentinella (1892-1896) 
Ka Lei Alii o Hawaii (1892) 
The Liberal – Ka Liberale (1892-1893) [mouthpiece of Liberal Party of R. Wilcox] 
Ka Malamalama (1892) 
Ka Nupepa Puka La Kuokoa me Ko Hawaii Pae Aina i Huiia (1893-1896) 
The Hawaiian Star (1893-1912) [pro-PG] 
Ka Lei Momi (1893; 1896) [independent, patriotic] 
Ka Nupepa Puka La Aloha Aina (1893-1894) [independent, patriotic] 
Ka Nupepa Aloha Aina (1894-1895) [independent, patriotic] 
Ka Hoahana (1895-1902) [AEH church] 
Ke Aloha Aina (1895-1920) [independent, patriotic] 
Hawaii Herald – Ka Elele Hawaii (1895-1905) [published in Hilo] 
Ka Elele Euanelio (1896-1899) [Reorganized Mormon church] 
O Luso (1896-1897) 
Ke Au Hou (1896-1896) 
IX 
 
Ke Aloha Aina Oiaio (1896-1897) 
Ka Ahailono o Hawaii (1897) 
Ka Loea Kalaiaina (1897-1900) 
Ka Lei Rose o Hawaii (1898) 
Ka Moi o ka Pakipika (1898) 
Ke Ola o ka Lahui (1899) 
Lahui Hawaii (1899-1905) 
 
Tahiti 
Te Faaite Tahiti (1836-1837) [LMS mission] 
Te Tiarama no te mau Fenua Tahiti (1844-1845) [LMS mission] 
L’Océanie Française (1844-1845) [ed. E.G. de la Coche] 
Te Fetia Aratai (1847-1848) [LMS mission] 
Bulletin Officiel des Etablissements Français de l’Océanie (1847-1902) [Protectorate, later 
Colonial Govt.] 
Te Vea no Tahiti (1850-1859) [Protectorate Govt.] 
Messager de Tahiti (1852-1883) [Protectorate, later Colonial Govt.] 
Le Petit Tahitien (1883) [ed. A.Goupil, A.Cohen] 
L’Océanie Française (1883-1887, 1899-1903) [ed. A. Goupil] 
Journal Officiel des Etablissements Français de l’Océanie (1884-1957) [Colonial Govt.] 
Messager de Tahiti / Te Vea no Tahiti. (1884-1887) [ed. V. Raoulx, P.G. Martiny, F. Cardella] 
L’Arc-en-ciel/Te Anuanua (1886-1887) [Protestant Mission, ed. Charles Viénot] 
Les Petites Affiches de Tahiti (1888) [ed. L.Brault] 
Tahiti News and General Advertiser (1891) [ed. L. Brault] 
Te Vea o te Hau no Tahiti (1891) [ed L. Brault] 
Le Tahitien (1894-1896) [ed. G. Coulon] 
Te Orometua (1894-18xx, 1909-195x) [Reorganised Mormon mission, ed T. Teriiinohorai, F.E. 
Butterworth, R.T. Farthing] 
Les Guêpes (1899-1902) [ed. C. Coulon, P. Gauguin, T. Taumihau]  
Le Sourire (1899-1900) [ed. P. Gauguin] 
 
Ra’iātea 
E Ramepa no te Aratia (1891) [LMS mission] 
Ramepa Api (1899-1912) [Protestant mission, ed. G. Brunel] 
 
Rarotonga 
Te Punavai Rarotonga (1843-1844) [LMS mission] 
Te Manu Rere (1870) 
Te Torea (1895-1899) [ed. H. Nicholas] 
Te Karere (1897-1910, 192x-1965) [LMS mission] 
Ioi Karanga (1898-1900) [ed. O. Owen] 
Cook Islands Gazette (1898-190x) [Protectorate, later Colonial Govt.] 
 
Sāmoa 
O Le Sulu Samoa (1839-1848, 1868-1869, 1896-1956) [LMS mission] 
X 
 
The Samoan Reporter (1845-1862/1870) [LMS mission, ed. J.B. Stair] 
The Samoa Times (1877-1879) [ed. W.E. Agar] 
Samoa Times and South Sea Gazette (1879-1881) [ed. W.E. Agar] 
Samoa Times and South Sea Advertiser (1888-1896) [ed. S.E. Cusack, R.T. Chatfield] 
Samoa Weekly Herald (1888-?, 1892-1900) [ed. J.R. Macfarlane] 
O Le Sulu Samoa (1890-194x) [Samoa Times printing office; unclear if same as above] 
Samoa Royal Gazette (1892-1899) [Samoan Govt.] 
O Le ʻAuʻauna (1900-1968) [Catholic mission] 
 
Tonga 
Koe Fetuu o Toga (1869) [Tongan Government] 
Koe Makasini ‘a Koliji (1874-1918) [Tupou College] 
Koe Boobooi (1874-1877, 1882?) [Tongan Govt., ed. S.W. Baker] 
Tonga Times (1876-?) [Tongan Govt., ed. Shirley Baker] 
Tonga Government Gazette (1876-198x) [Tongan Govt.] 
Niu Vakai (1881-188x) [independent, ed. Robert Hanslip] 
Koe Taimi O Tonga (1882-xxxx) 
Koe Jiaji Tauataina (1889-1896) [Free Church, ed. J.B. Watkin] 
Koe kasete : Koe tohi fanogonogo faka’buleaga (1897-190x) [Tongan Govt.] 
Koe Fafagu (1892-19xx) [Catholic mission] 
 
Fiji 
The Fijian Weekly News and Planters’ Journal (1868) [ed. T. Johnson] 
The Fiji Times (1869-1918) [ed. G.L. Griffiths, J.B. Hobson] 
Fiji Gazette and Central Polynesian (18xx-187x) [Fijian Govt.] 
The Fiji Gazette (1872-1874) [Fijian Govt., ed. W. Cook] 
Fiji Royal Gazette (1875-1987) [Colonial Govt.] 
Na Mata (1876, 1884-196x) [Colonial Govt.] 
Na Rarama (1890-1957) [Seventh Day Adventist mission, ed. C.H. Parker] 
A Talanoa ni Lotu kei nai tukutuku eso (1890-1940) [Catholic mission] 
Ai Tukutuku Vakalotu (1893-196x) [Methodist mission] 
Polynesian Gazette (1895-193x) [ed. W.A. King] 
 
Aotearoa (only items containing Māori language) 
Ko Te Karere O Nui Tireni (1842-1846) [British colonial government]  
Anglo Maori Warder (1848)  
The Maori Messenger – (Ko) te Karere Maori (1849-1854) [British colonial government] 
Te Waka o Te Iwi (1857)  
Te Karere o Poneke (1857-1858) 
Te Whetu O Te Tau (1858)  
Te Haeata (1859-1862) [Wesleyan church] 
Te Karere Maori (1861-1863) [British Colonial government] 
Te Manuhiri Tuarangi Maori Intelligencer (1861) 
Aotearoa - Maori Recorder (1861-1862) 
Te Hokioi o Niutireni e Rere atu na (1862-1863) [Maori King’s government] 
XI 
 
Te Pihoihoi Mokemoke (1863) 
Te Waka Maori o Ahuriri (1863-1871)  
Te Waka Maori o Niu Tirani (1871-1879) [British colonial government] 
Te Wananga (1874-1878) [private, independent] 
Matariki (1881) 
Te Korimako (1882-1888)  
Takitimu (1883)  
Te Waka Maori o Aotearoa (1884) 
Te Hoa Maori (1885-1895)  
Te Korimako Hou (1882-1890)  
Aotearoa (1892) 
Te Paki o Matariki (1892-1935) [Maori King’s government] 
Huia Tangata Kotahi (1893-1895) [Kotahitanga organization] 
Panui Whakawa Whenua Maori (1894-1896) 
Nga Hua Mohiotanga (1894-1896)  
Te Puke Ki Hikurangi (1897-1913) [Kotahitanga organization]  
The Jubilee – Te Tiupiri (1898-1900) [independent, local colonial govt.-affiliated] 
He Kupu Whakamarama (1898-1902) [Anglican church] 
Te Pipiwharauroa: He Kupu Whakamarama (1899-1913) [Anglican church]  
 
Norfolk Island 
The Norfolk Island Pioneer (1885-188x) [ed. Kingston Club] 
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APPENDIX 4: Hawaiian diplomatic and consular representatives in Oceania502 
Sydney, New South Wales503 
Thomas Winder Campbell, Consul-General, 1850-1855 
Charles St. Julian, Commissioner to the Independent States and Tribes of Polynesia, 1853-1872; 
acting Consul-General 1855-1860; Consul-General 1860-1872. 
Edward Wilbraham Bell, Chancellor of the Commission to the Independent States and Tribes of 
Polynesia, 1854 
Edward Reeve, Chancellor of the Commission to the Independent States and Tribes of 
Polynesia, 1855-1873; Consul-General 1872-1879 
 
Alexander Speed Webster, Consul ….1874…; Consul-General …1883… 
Apia, Sāmoa 
Virginius P. Chapin, Consular and Commercial Agent, 1853-1856 
John C. Williams, Consular and Commercial Agent, 1856-1859 
Henry De Boos, Consular and Commercial Agent, 1859- 
John E. Bush, Envoy Extraordinary, Minister Plenipotentiary and High Commissioner, 1886-
1887 
Henry Poor, Secretary of the Legation, 1886-1887 
Henry Poor, Envoy Extraordinary, Minister Plenipotentiary and High Commissioner, 1887 
Vava‘u, Tonga 
Alexander Blake, 1855- 
Levuka, Fiji 
Robert Sherson Swanston, Consul, 1857-1859 
D’Arcy Wentworth Lathrop Murray, Consul, 1871- 
Charles St. Julian, Special Commissioner, 1871 
Jaluit, Marshall Islands 
D. Hernsheim, Commercial Agent, -1881 
W. Robertson (acting), Commercial Agent, 1881 
Herrmann Grösser, Commercial Agent, 1881-1884 
Bruno Weimann (acting), Commercial Agent, 1884-1884  
John Naht, Commercial Agent, 1884- 
Central and Western Polynesia [in fact, Gilbert Islands] 
Alfred N. Tripp, Special Commissioner, 1883 
Beru, Southern Gilbert Islands 
Fraico Vallerio, Commercial Agent, 1883- 
  
                                                 
502
 Data gathered from diplomatic correspondence in FO & Ex., Hawai‘i State Archives. 
503
 Only positions with relevance to Oceania at-large are included. 
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